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Abstract 
This thesis examines the experience of Malawian soldiers serving in Britain's 
colonial army between 1891 and 1964. Until recently, the experience of East 
African colonial soldiers in particular has been largely overlooked, and African 
soldiers in general have been perceived either as collaborators in the machinery of 
colonial oppression or, conversely, as victims at the hands of the military 
authorities. However, little attempt has been made to unify these two views of 
military service. 
Using Malawi as a case study, this thesis investigates social relations within 
the colonial army and examines perceptions of their often-violent role within wider 
colonial society. Developing and expanding upon previous scholarship, this thesis 
provides the first sustained and unified study of the colonial army in Malawi. The 
project is based principally upon archival sources in Britain and Malawi, but also 
draws upon interviews with British and Malawian veterans. Chapter one provides 
an overview of the institutional history of the Malawian forces. Chapter two 
outlines the development of recruitment policy, with special reference to the 
concept of `martial races', and examines the motivations behind Malawian 
enlistment. Chapters three and four investigate the reactions of African soldiers to 
the formal military environment and to barrack life. Chapter five examines 
perceptions of soldiers' roles in warfare and internal security, and contrasts this with 
the place of soldiers in their own communities. 
The thesis highlights the extent to which Malawian soldiers were successfully 
co-opted by the military authorities, but also stresses the capacity of soldiers to 
iii 
influence the conditions under which they served. This, combined with the 
unusually long association which many Malawians had with the army, fed into a 
growing perception of the colonial army as a Malawian institution. 
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Note on Terminology 
Malawi experienced a number of name changes during the colonial period. 
The earliest official report termed the country `Nyassaland', ' but from 1893 the 
official name was changed to the `British Central Africa Protectorate'. In 1907, the 
name changed once again to the `Nyasaland Protectorate'. In this work, to avoid 
confusion, the name `Nyasaland' has been used throughout, except where reference 
is made to a specific body such as the British Central Africa administration. To 
minimize confusion, other territories are also referred to by their colonial names. 
The spellings of place names in Malawi have generally been normalised to the 
modem orthography, except where a completely new name has been adopted. 
The term `Malawian' has been preferred in reference to the inhabitants. Of 
the alternatives, `Nyasalander' was only rarely used to describe the Africans in 
Nyasaland, whilst Nyasa is problematic in having gained currency only in the latter 
part of the colonial period. The significance of the emergence of the term in the 
current study would be obscured if it were applied indiscriminately for the entire 
colonial period. Except in quotations, the names of ethnic groups have been 
modernised, so that Atonga becomes Tonga, Angoni becomes Ngoni, Achewa 
becomes Chewa, and Anguru becomes Nguru. Possible confusion arising from the 
recasting of the Nguru as Lomwe which took place in the 1940s is accounted for by 
referring to the Nguru before the 1940s and to the Nguru/Lomwe afterwards. 
1 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression of Slave-Raiding in 
Nyassaland, Africa No. 5,1892, C. 6699. 
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Introduction 
Background 
The role of state violence in the maintenance of the colonial project has been 
acknowledged in many studies of the colonial state. Even those studies which have 
stressed the importance of consent in the colonial state have pointed to the ability of 
the state to threaten force as a prime source of the `legitimacy' of colonial rule.! 
Given the acknowledged centrality of violence, it is surprising that coercive 
institutions such as the police force, and especially the army, are rarely mentioned in 
general studies of the colonial state in Africa. Berman's utilization of such concepts 
as `control', `crisis' and `domination', even in the title of his influential study of the 
structure of the colonial state in Kenya, clearly suggests the importance of coercion 
in his understanding of the operation of the colonial state, yet he barely mentions the 
police force, despite its being one of the largest departments represented in his own 
tables, whilst the armed forces do not even seem to be included within his definition 
of the state. 2 This also applies to the major study of Central Africa, where Phyllis 
Martin's chapter on `The violence of empire' does not make any reference to the 
coercive institutions. 3 
In `The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa', David 
Killingray has examined in detail the role played by African colonial armies and 
Partha Chatterjee, `Was there a hegemonic project of the colonial state', in Dagmar Engels and Shula 
Marks (eds. ), Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India (London., 1994), 
pp. 79-84. 
2 Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (London, 1990), 
pp. 73-127. 
Phyllis M. Martin, `The violence of empire', in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin (eds. ), 
/-Iistory of Central Africa, Volume Two (London, 1983), pp. 1-26. 
2 
police forces in sustaining the colonial state. 4 Killingray sees the maintenance of law 
and order as one of `two basic pillars', upon which effective colonial government 
rested, with state violence held in reserve as a constantly present but rarely used 
threat. 5 After a period of `conquest and "pacification"' before 1914, during which 
the army and police force were often interchangeable, Killingray sees the army 
principally fulfilling a role as reserve behind the colonial police for internal security, 
with only limited military functions of defending the frontier and providing 
assistance to neighbouring territories. 
Although Killingray characterises the long-term role of African colonial armies 
as essentially one of policing, he has also looked at the question of an `imperial' 
military role for African soldiers. 6 He sees British colonial African armies as having 
had no real imperial role before the First World War, contrasting this with the role 
played by the Indian army during the period, which had an important function not 
only in defence and internal security, but also as an `imperial military reserve'. 
7 By 
contrast, Africans, Killingray stresses, were `not to be used in "white men's wars"' 
as a principle of British policy. 8 Even after the First World War the Colonial Office 
continued to resist the use of African troops outside their own parts of Africa, and it 
was only the conditions of the Second World War which led to the acceptance of the 
use of African troops for imperial purposes. 9 
David Killingray, `The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa', African Affairs, 
85 (1986), 411-437. 
5 Ibid, p. 411. 
6 David Killingray, `The Idea of a British Imperial African Army', Journal of African History, 20,3 
(1979), 421-436. 
Keith Jeffery, "`An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas"? India in the Aftermath of the First World 
War', Modern Asian Studies, 15,3, (1981), 369-386(p. 372). 
8 Killingray, `The Idea of a British Imperial African Army', p. 422. 
9 Ibid., p. 428. 
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J. `Bayo Adekson and Anthony Kirk-Greene have both examined colonial 
attitudes to ethnicity and recruitment for the armed forces. 10 Kirk-Greene identifies 
the origins of recruitment policy in Africa in the `martial races' theory which 
increasingly dominated recruitment in the Indian Army from the mid-nineteenth 
century, and which ascribed warlike characteristics to particular ethnic groups. The 
origins of martial races theory have been regarded as arising from an essentially 
pragmatic decision to recruit from those groups of soldiers, including Sikhs, 
Gurkhas, and Punjabi Muslims, who had proven most reliable in the `mutiny' of 
1857. This developed into an elaborately codified system of recruitment which saw 
an increasingly limited number of groups or `classes' organised in class companies 
within regiments, which would prevent any single group from dominating, or 
increasingly in whole regiments of a single class. " Many of those groups favoured, 
such as Sikhs, certainly had a martial history, but recruitment policies were also 
characterised by a preference for groups who were remote from urban centres (and 
were therefore less well educated, less politically informed, and most likely to be 
ethnically `pure'), and by a bias against the darker-skinned peoples of Southern 
India. 12 
Kirk-Greene sees recruitment policy in Africa largely as a direct result of the 
direct introduction of the martial races concept by Indian Army officers seconded for 
101. `Bayo Adekson, `Ethnicity and army recruitment in colonial plural societies', Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 2,2 (1979), pp. 151-165; Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, "`Damnosa Hereditas": ethnic 
ranking and the martial races imperative in Africa', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 3,4 (1980), 392-414. 
For the Indian Army, see Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army Its 
Officers and Men (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), pp. 341-61; David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: 
The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1956), pp. 1-46; Lionel Caplan, Warrior 
Gentlemen: 'Gurkhas' in the Western Imagination (Oxford: Berghahn, 1995). 
12 Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 32-34. 
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African service, particularly those brought in by Frederick Lugard to staff the newly 
formed West African Frontier Force (WAFF) from around 1898. He finds evidence 
for the impact of these officers in a shifting emphasis in recruitment in West Africa 
after their arrival, with existing recruiting bases such as the Yoruba increasingly 
replaced by inland groups, particularly the Hausa. Recruiting policy in Africa 
mirrored that in India in its shift away from coastal groups who might be `corrupted' 
by proximity to urban centres, towards more remote rural groups, a shift which also 
implied a bias against Christians and in favour of Muslims and practitioners of 
traditional religions. As both Kirk-Greene and `Bayo Adekson demonstrate, the 
Indian Army's bias in favour of fair skinned northern Indians was also echoed in a 
general preference for northern `negroid' as opposed to `negro' groups, as 
exemplified by the early preferences for Hausas in West Africa and Sudanese in East 
Africa. At the same time, both writers also recognise that the identification of 
`martial races' or `warrior tribes' in Africa was not straightforward, since some of 
the most obviously martial groups, such as Maasai, were not recruited into colonial 
armies. 13 `Bayo Adekson stresses that this reflected the principle of `divide and 
rule', and that `you can afford to take care of the politically weak, provided you 
subdue the powerful'. 14 Essentially, only those groups which were `politically non- 
dominant' and were not themselves able to threaten the state were believed to be 
suitable to defend its interests. 
What is missing from these accounts of recruitment, and in particular the issue 
of why certain groups came to predominate, is the question of why Africans 
13 `Bayo Adekson, `Ethnicity and army recruitment', pp. 151-152; Kirk-Greene, "`Damnosa 
Hereditas" pp. 407-408. 
14 'Bayo Adekson, `Ethnicity and army recruitment', p. 153. 
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themselves were attracted to military service. In `The maintenance of law and 
order', Killingray characterises African recruits and their motivation, depicting early 
soldiers as 
hastily raised and poorly trained ... 
A uniform often provided a licence to loot; 
black mercenaries and policemen, especially those on active duty lived off the land 
and frequently exploited those whom they had been employed to protect. 15 
Killingray characterises early African soldiers and police as generally despised by 
other Africans, with African policemen in Southern Rhodesia referred to as "`white 
men's dog's [sic]"', 16 a feeling which he points out was partly a direct consequence 
of recruitment policies which meant that men in uniform were often outsiders. This 
view of early African soldiers as mercenaries carrying out an unpopular task in return 
for material gain has been echoed elsewhere. Myron Echenberg's study of the 
Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa notes that Africans were so reluctant to 
engage in military service, that from 1857 to the early 1880s the French authorities 
were unable to rely upon the attractions of enlistment bonuses and had openly to buy 
slaves to make up their recruitment needs. 17 Similarly, Ukpabi notes recruitment 
problems in the early WAFF, pointing out the numbers of recruits who deserted as 
soon as they had `earned enough money to pay a debt'. ' 8 
Omissi also emphasises the importance of pay as a motivating factor in Indian 
recruitment, emphasising the extent to which recruits were drawn from areas 
suffering from land scarcity, or from areas where the fertility of the land was poor. 
Illustrating this, he outlines the way in which recruitment tended to coincide with the 
's Killingray, `The Maintenance of Law and Order', p. 423. 
161bid. 
'7 Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857- 
1960 (London, 1991), pp. 10-11. 
18 Ukpabi, `Recruiting for the British Colonial Forces in West Africa', p. 92. 
6 
season of low agricultural activity, whilst conversely, recruitment tended to be 
curtailed during periods of prosperity. 19 As a result, Omissi sees economic factors as 
the major incentive in Indian enlistment. However, Omissi also emphasises the need 
for a broad conception of the material benefits of military service, including adequate 
food, healthcare, and clothing. 20 Such fringe benefits were also undoubtedly 
important in an African context, and in his study of African `collaborators' in 
Rhodesia, van Onselen outlines these graphically, adding to higher than average 
wages, the possibilities to loot, exact bribes, rob, or even `commandeer' women. 21 
Nevertheless, we should expect African soldiers' motivation to go beyond 
material gain alone; as Omissi notes, `It is rarely an act of rational self-interest to risk 
death in battle, and it would be a feeble army indeed whose soldiers were motivated 
by nothing more than cool calculations of profit and loss'. Omissi stresses of the 
roles in the Indian Army of the concepts of `honour' and `shame' embodied in the 
Indian concept of izzat as defining forces for the Indian soldier. Omissi sees a 
number of other elements in the development of identity within the Indian army, 
including the role of class composition of regiments in creating cohesion, and in 
particular the role played by the consequent connections to the wider communities 
from which recruits were drawn; the role of uniform, the connections which its visual 
language could express, and its significance for the pride of its wearer; the impact of 
the military on ethnic identity; the practice of indigenous religion by the troops; and 
19 Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 48-52. 
20 Ibid. pp. 61-63. 
21 Charles van Onselen, `The role of collaborators in the Rhodesian mining industry 1900-1935', 
African Affairs, 72,829 (1973), 401-18 (pp. 406-410). 
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the function of military isolation from the rest of society. u If we substitute the 
concept of `tribe' for those of `class' or `caste', the value of these ideas for the study 
of military identity in Africa is immediately obvious, and parallels can easily be 
drawn. However, very little attempt has been made to study African military 
identities in these terms. 
The approach applied in Benedict Anderson's influential study of nationalism, 
Imagined Communities, 23 can be useful in understanding the formulation of identity 
within military communities. Anderson looks at the question of how administrative 
organizations create meaning, and describes the emergence of a `consciousness of 
connectedness', based on the asking of the imaginary question, `why are we ... 
here 
... together'. 
4 Anderson also stresses the role of a shared administrative language in 
creating this consciousness, which also raises questions regarding the role of 
languages in the colonial armed forces. 
In `The Invention of Tradition', Ranger seems to suggest that the military 
environment was deliberately constructed to control the behaviour of African 
soldiers, referring to `the drill square as source and symbol of discipline and 
punctuality'. 25 This echoes Foucault's writing on discipline, 26 in which Omissi's 
`isolation' becomes the first stage in a conscious process whereby the authorities 
obtain power over the individuals under their control by separating them from the 
22 Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 84-103. 
23 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London Verso, 1991). 
24 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 56. 
23 Terence Ranger, `The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (eds. ), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 211-262, p228- 26 Michel Foucault(2nd edn. ), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan 
Sheridan (London 1979). 
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outside world, and partitioning them so that they can be `know[n] mastere[d] and 
use[d]'27. Foucault refers to the control of activity, such as the control of time by the 
use of timetables, and the control of individual movements, as in the instructions 
given in a drill manual. Foucault also describes a system whereby training is divided 
into a progressive series of segments, each followed by an examination, after which 
the individual moves on to a higher stage. Where Foucault's work makes explicit 
reference to the military sphere, he draws mainly on conscript armies, so it is 
unsurprising that he makes little of the idea of consent, but he nevertheless does 
provide a useful model of discipline which might be evaluated with reference to 
colonial armies. However, Berman emphasizes the severe limitations placed upon 
the collection of knowledge by colonial officials (due especially to problems of 
communication), which challenges the applicability of Foucault's totalising concept 
of discipline in a colonial setting. 28 
Works utilizing Gramsci's notion of hegemony have included the concept of 
consent in the relationship between military authority and military identities. Shula 
Marks and Dagmar Engels define hegemony as a process of making authority appear 
`natural and legitimate' rather than `alien and repressive' to those subject to it. 29 
Crucially, they see hegemony as requiring the `incorporation and transformation' of 
indigenous values, and again this echoes Omissi's account of identity in the Indian 
Army, particularly the active encouragement of indigenous religion by the military 
authorities. 
27 ]bid., p. 143. 
28 Berman, Control and Crisis, pp. 95-96. 
29 Dagmar Engels and Shula Marks, `Introduction: hegemony in a colonial context', in Dagmar 
Engels and Shula Marks(eds. ), Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State and Society in Africa and India 
(London., 1994), p. 3. 
9 
The exclusion of non-Europeans from commissioned rank is an obvious feature 
of colonial armies. 30 The idea of hegemony raises the question of how far this 
position of institutional subordination was accepted as legitimate by African soldiers, 
and of how the authorities might have promoted its acceptance. In this respect, 
Ranger emphasizes the role of European ideas of class in defining officers and men 
in the British army as leader and led, and sees this concept being applied to authority 
in colonial Africa. This raises the question of how far (if at all) such concepts were 
accepted by African soldiers. Omissi emphasizes Indian soldiers' indifference 
towards the position of their socially remote European officers. 31 Again, the nature 
of this relationship in an African context is worthy of further study. 
Malawian Soldiers in East and Central African History 
The major published source for the history of Malawian soldiers in the colonial 
forces remains Hubert Moyse Bartlett's The King's African Rifles, which examines 
the history of the colonial armed forces in Nyasaland, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, 
Somaliland and Zanzibar from the 1880s to 1945.32 Written by a former KAR 
officer, The King's African Rifles shares many of the features of the genre of the 
regimental history, concentration upon organisational structure and campaign 
histories, the latter in particular, as George Shepperson has observed, being `choked 
30 David Killingray, 'Race and rank in the British Army in the twentieth century', Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 10,3 (1987), pp. 276-290; `Bayo Adekson, `Ethnicity and army recruitment', pp. 155-157. 31 Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 105-106. 
32 Hubert Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and 
Central Africa, 1890-1945 (Aldershot, 1956). 
to 
with names, dates and places'. 33 However, in providing an overview of the service 
of the regiment in which most Malawian soldiers served, Moyse-Bartlett provides an 
excellent framework for any military history of East Africa. For the period before 
the amalgamation of the Nyasaland, Kenya and Uganda forces into the KAR in 1903, 
the work provides separate accounts of the three forces, including a thorough account 
of the early armed forces of Nyasaland. 34 However, for the period after 1903, whilst 
Moyse-Bartlett's description of organisational development continues to show the 
distinctive development of the Malawian battalions, in the description of military 
operations Malawians are increasingly difficult to locate as a discrete group. Moyse- 
Bartlett treats the ethnic categorisations applied to colonial soldiers as essentially 
unproblematic, and there is no real discussion of social relations within the armed 
forces. 
Malcolm Page, another ex-KAR officer, has continued the `regimental history' 
approach in KAR, which provides an overview of the period covered by Moyse- 
Bartlett, but takes the description of the regiment's history up to independence in the 
1960s. 5 This work shares many features with Moyse-Bartlett, being largely focused 
upon the experience of European members of the KAR, although it demonstrates a 
greater awareness of relations between European and African ranks. 36 Again, there 
is little recognition of a distinctive Malawian as opposed to a generalised East 
"George Shepperson, `The Military History of British Central Africa', The Rhodes-Livingstone 
Journal: Human Problems in British Central Africa, 26 (1959) p. 24. 
34 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Ries, pp. 12-48. 
35 Malcolm Page, KAR: A History of the King's African Rifles and East African Forces (Barnsley: Leo 
Cooper, 1998). 
36 Other regimental histories of the KAR include W. Lloyd-Jones, KA. R.: Being an Unofficial 
Account of the Origin and Activities of the King's African Rifles (London: Arrowsmith, 1926) and 
James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: Macdonald, I981), pp. 
205-243. 
African experience of military service. Regimental histories have also been 
produced for other units in which Malawians provided a significant recruiting base, 
notably Brelsford's The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Owen's The 
Rhodesian African Rifles. 37 Brelsford acknowledges the importance of Malawians in 
the establishment of the NRR, but makes little reference to the continuing service of 
Malawians in the unit into the post-war period, whilst Owen makes no overt 
acknowledgement of the role played by Malawians in the RAR, despite his reference 
to the ex-KAR Regimental Sergeant Major. 38 
The earliest academic study to pose detailed questions about Malawian military 
service was George Shepperson's article `The Military History of British Central 
Africa'. 39 Shepperson sought to overcome a number of inadequacies identified in 
Moyse-Bartlett's work. Shepperson emphasises the need to address the social', 
political, and economic backgrounds of the ethnic groups joining the armed forces, 
and also points to the fluidity of ethnic identity within the Malawi army, stressing the 
extent to which the recruiting biases of the colonial army could shape ethnic 
identities. 40 Shepperson also looks at the wider influence of the army and soldiers 
within Malawian society, paying particular attention to the development of military 
style dance societies (mbeni and malipenga), the impact of the military on Malawian 
37 W. V. Brelsford (ed. ), The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (Lusaka: Government Printer, 
1954; repr. Bromley: Galago Publishing, 1990); Christopher Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1970). 
38 Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles, p. 11. 
39 George Shepperson, `The Military History of British Central Africa', The Rhodes-Livingstone 
Journal: Human Problems in British Central Africa, 26 (1959), 23-33. 
"o Shepperson, `The Military History of British Central Africa', p. 25. 
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language, and the extent to which military service connected Malawi with the outside 
world. 1 
John McCracken has taken up a number of the issues raised by Shepperson in 
his 1992 study of the Malawian colonial police force, which includes the 
development of the armed forces up to the division of the military and police in the 
late 1890s. 42 As well as examining the early role of the army, McCracken looks at 
the composition of forces in some depth, noting the different strategies of recruitment 
and enlistment adopted in the 1890s (including the conscription of levies by local 
chiefs, the co-opting of small mercenary gangs, the commitment of labourers by their 
employers, and press ganging), and explaining the economic background to military 
recruitment. 3 In addition to the attraction of higher than average pay, McCracken 
highlights the declining economic potential of the areas from which most recruits 
were drawn, resulting from the collapse of long distance trade between Malawi and 
the east coast and the increasing demands of taxation. 44 
More recently, Melvin Page's The Chiwaya War has focused upon the 
experience of Malawians in the First World War. 45 Page examines the motivations 
behind African enlistment, looking not only at the role of financial inducements, but 
also at the genuine fears of many Malawians of invasion by the Germans, and even 
41 Shepperson, `The Military History of British Central Africa', pp. 27-29. 
42 John McCracken, `Authority and Legitimacy in Malawi: policing and politics in a colonial state', in 
David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds. ), Policing and Decolonization: Nationalism, politics 
and the police, 1917-65 (Manchester, 1992). 
43 Ibid. pp. 163-164. 
4' Ibid. pp. 164-165. 
45 Melvin E. Page, The Chiwaya War: Malawians and the First World War (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2000). See also Melvin E. Page, `The War of Thangata: Nyasaland and the East 
African Campaign, 1914-1918', Journal of African History, 29,1 (1978), 87-100. 
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the appeal of military imagery and images of masculinity. 46 Page also examines 
Malawian experience of military service and warfare, including material conditions 
and relations between African and European ranks. Importantly, this work also 
acknowledges the role of Malawians outside Nyasaland in the Northern Rhodesia 
Police, Rhodesian Native Regiment, and even in the German forces. 
Finally, Timothy Parsons's work on the KAR, The African Rank-and-File, has 
dealt with a number of key issues in relation to the colonial army in East Africa. 47 
Parsons work deals with the KAR as a whole, but focuses principally upon Kenya 
and Malawi, and has posed a number of important questions about military service in 
colonial East Africa. Parsons provides a thorough analysis of the changing nature of 
ethnic recruitment criteria, emphasising the grounding of those criteria in the 
willingness of particular groups of Africans to enlist. Parsons examines African 
soldiers' experience of military life, showing how military culture was conceived to 
promote the reliability of soldiers by providing privileges at the same time as 
alienating them from the remainder of colonial society, and - in an area that has 
largely been overlooked48 - the way in which the military authorities sought to 
maintain the stability of the army by providing access to women. However, he also 
emphasises the extent to which soldiers sought to shape the character of military 
service by negotiating for improvements in conditions, or through various forms of 
resistance to the military authorities. For Parsons, this conflict arose from tensions 
46 Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 28-37. 
47 Timothy H. Parsons, The African Rank-and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in 
the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Oxford: James Currey, 1999). 
18 See David Killingray, `Gender Issues and African Colonial Armies', in Guardians of Empire: The 
Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964, ed. by David Killingray and David Omissi 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 221-248, and Timothy Parsons, 'All Askaris 
are Family Men: Sex, Domesticity and Discipline in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964', in 
Guardians of Empire, pp. 157-178. 
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between the need for military officials to provide privileges, and the fears of civil 
officials that the creation of a privileged group would destabilise African society. 
Parsons's work has considerably expanded the study of colonial soldiers in 
East Africa, but does have drawbacks as an all encompassing social history of East 
African colonial soldiers. The work concentrates heavily upon the experience of 
African soldiers in the Second World War, although it could be argued that the 
soldiers recruited during the period were not typical of the broad pattern of 
recruitment. In terms of specifically Malawian experience, Parsons provides a strong 
account of the distinctive features of the economy of Malawian recruitment, but 
elsewhere, a distinctively Malawian voice is lost, providing comparative material for 
a fuller analysis of the Kenyan experience of the KAR. It is also notable that, with 
his focus upon the KAR, Parsons fails to deal with the regiment's direct antecedents, 
and therefore with the formative period in Malawian recruitment policy. This is 
particularly important in the Malawian context, where the creation of the KAR 
signified little more than a change in designation. 
The Malawian experience of colonial military service is worthy of special 
investigation for a number of reasons. As will be demonstrated in chapter one, 
Malawians played a unique role as a reserve within the KAR, with Malawians 
consistently serving outside the territory between 1899 and the end of the colonial 
period in 1964. Whilst, as Parsons observes, their heavy engagement in colonial 
military service means that Malawian soldiers provide an excellent paradigm of 
military service in colonial Africa, it also poses particular questions about the role 
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and experience of Malawian soldiers. Further, the close economic - and later 
political - integration of Nyasaland into Southern Africa, combined with the 
extensive involvement of Malawians in Rhodesian military units, leaves much scope 
for a discussion of Malawian experience beyond the confines of East African 
military organisation. This is underlined by the fact that for at least twenty years of 
the colonial army's existence, Malawian soldiers had little formal connection to the 
East African forces. This thesis is intended to examine the experience of Malawian 
soldiers throughout the colonial period, in the wider context of colonial society in 
Nyasaland. It aims to examine the development of ethnic recruiting doctrines from 
the 1890s, taking into account not only the impact of martial races theory but also the 
effects of local conditions, especially the willingness of Malawians to enlist the 
colonial army. It will seek to examine the reaction of Malawians to the disciplinary 
environment of the armed forces, and the extent to which Malawians sought or were 
able to indigenise the military environment. Finally, it aims to answer the question 
of how Malawians perceived their role as soldiers, and how the identity of the soldier 
was understood in colonial Nyasaland. 
Methodology 
This thesis is primarily based upon archival sources in the United Kingdom and 
Malawi. The sources available in Britain fall into two major categories: 
contemporary documents generated by the Colonial Office, War Office and Foreign 
Office, and the memoirs of former officers. Foreign Office and Colonial Office Files 
provide an excellent overview of the institutional development of the colonial army, 
and of the rules and regulations which governed soldiers' lives. In general, an 
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account of the experience of African soldiers is difficult to extract from these 
sources, but annual reports often include accounts of African soldiers' grievances, 
serious disciplinary incidents, and sometimes detailed breakdowns of statistical 
information such as criminal convictions. Such records give relatively little 
indication of the daily lives of African soldiers, but `war diaries' kept by military 
units during the World Wars can provide a useful day by day account of Malawian 
soldiers lives during specific periods. Officers' memoirs, whilst they can only 
provide a limited account of African soldiers' subjective experience, can provide a 
reliable account of the public life of the army, as well as specific issues such as 
relations between European and African ranks. The latter are supplemented by a 
small number of published memoirs. 
The archival sources available in Malawi include much material from lower 
level administrative sources which relates more directly to the daily routine of the 
army. Provincial and district files in particular show how soldiers related to wider 
colonial society, and the files contain large amounts of material generated by 
Malawian soldiers themselves. These are mainly letters requesting Government 
officials to deal with specific problems, but also contain a significant quantity of 
private correspondence intercepted by censors during the Second World War. A 
limited number of short autobiographies by former soldiers also appeared in 
publications such as the Nyasaland Journal, but it must be recognised that these are 
heavily mediated. 
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Reflecting a conscious effort to provide a balanced account of the army 
throughout the colonial period, it was never intended in this project to focus 
primarily upon oral testimony. Nevertheless, opportunities were taken to interview 
former soldiers whenever the possibility arose. English-speaking veterans were 
interviewed directly, whilst the majority of interviews were conducted by a 
Malawian Army officer. These interviews provided a valuable insight into the 
subjective experience and opinions of a limited number of soldiers, which raised a 
number of new issues. However, the informants contacted were largely veterans of 
the Second World War, and it should be noted that given the vast expansion of the 
recruiting base, and the changing conditions which took place during the War, it 
would be unwise to extrapolate from their experience to the pre-war peacetime army. 
Thus, efforts to analyse the experience of Malawian soldiers during the majority of 
the colonial period must rely upon official and other contemporary sources, however 
inadequate. 
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Chapter 1 
The Role of the Colonial Armed Forces in Nyasaland 
In seeking to investigate the nature of African military identities in colonial 
Nyasaland, it is clearly vital to establish the role played by the armed forces in the 
colonial state. The character of any institution is, by definition, bound to its 
functions, and soldiers' experience of, and reactions to, military service must relate at 
some level to the nature of that service and the functions which they are asked to 
perform. The aim of this chapter is not to discuss in detail the military history of 
either the East African colonial army in general, or Nyasaland's colonial forces in 
particular, since a number of works have dealt with this history in varying degrees of 
depth, and a detailed description is outside the scope of this work. ' Rather, this 
chapter seeks to place the role played by Nyasaland's colonial forces in a broader 
context by comparing the particular case of Nyasaland to more generalised, 
established models of the role of African colonial armies. At a more basic level, by 
exploring the changing role of the Nyasaland forces, this chapter also aims to provide 
a narrative framework which will act as a point of reference for the discussion of the 
African experience of the colonial army in the subsequent chapters. 
Background to the role of colonial armies. 
In `The Maintenance of Law and Order', David Killingray has provided a 
periodisation of the role of military and policing institutions in Africa, which 
1 See H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and 
Central Africa, 1890-1945 (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956); Malcolm Page, KAR: A History of the 
King's African Ries and East African Forces (London: Leo Cooper, 1998); James Lunt, Imperial 
Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: Macdonald, 1981), pp. 205-43. 
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identifies four broad phases. 2 Killingray sees the first phase, between the 1880s and 
1914, as comprising a period of conquest and the establishment of colonial control 
by paramilitary police and local armed forces, followed by the development of 
separate military and police forces. The second phase covers the period of the First 
World War, and is characterised by the withdrawal of military forces from law-and 
order to perform military duties, at the same time as an increase in military activities 
in those areas (including East Africa) where fighting was taking place. The third 
phase, from around 1920 to the end of the Second World War, is seen as one in 
which the role of colonial military forces in law and order was reduced in line with a 
transfer of responsibilities to Native Authorities, a trend which was continued with 
the withdrawal of forces for military service during the War. The final phase, from 
1945 to the end of the colonial period, is characterised as one in which, in the face of 
growing African Nationalism, both military and police forces were modernised and 
expanded, and the colonial army was increasingly dedicated to an active role in the 
maintenance of law and order. 
Examinations of the imperial military role of African colonial armies have 
been, to an extent, the inverse of the scheme relating to law and order. Killingray has 
again provided a periodisation of official attitudes towards the use of African troops 
for a `major imperial role', by which he essentially means service outside Africa. 3 In 
terms of their imperial function, Killingray sees British African colonial forces as 
entirely limited to local defence before 1916, which is contrasted with the overtly 
2 David Killingray, `The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa', African Affairs, 
85 (1986), 411-37. 
David Killingray, 'The Idea of a British Imperial African Army', Journal of African History, 20,3 
(1979), 421-36. 
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imperial role of the Indian Army in providing garrison troops in the far east and an 
imperial military reserve in general. From 1916, when Indian Army units serving 
against German forces in East Africa were replaced by African troops, Killingray 
outlines a change in official thinking, whereby the serious possibility of using 
African troops outside Africa was raised. Following this, it was agreed in 1918 to 
send African forces to Palestine to fight against the Turks, a plan which was not 
carried out due to the cessation of hostilities. However, Killingray also emphasises 
that in contrast to French policy, there was little support in the British government 
for the idea of sending African combat troops to the Western Front, both on the 
grounds of the unsuitability of the climate, and because of a political reluctance to 
utilise African troops against European forces. The early 1920s saw further interest 
in the idea of using African troops to garrison the Middle East, especially given the 
growing unwillingness of the Indian Government to allow their own forces to be 
used as an imperial reserve. 4 However, this plan was again abandoned, and the inter- 
war years are thus seen as a period in which African forces were largely withdrawn 
from an imperial or even a military role, as they were increasingly focused towards 
internal security duties. 
Killingray thus sees the African forces at the outbreak of the Second World 
War still as overwhelmingly local forces which was not intended for use outside 
Africa. Although British African troops served outside their own territories against 
Italians in Abyssinia from the Spring of 1941 to the end of the year, this attitude 
towards the use of African troops is seen as changing primarily as a result of the 
° See Keith Jeffery, `An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas'? India in the Aftermath of the First 
World War', Modern Asian Studies, 15,3 (1981), 369-86. 
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pressures placed upon manpower by the entry of Japan into the war in the same year, 
and especially by the fall of Singapore. Following this, from 1942, African soldiers 
from both East and West Africa served in Madagascar against Vichy French forces, 
and in Ceylon, India, and Burma against the Japanese. Finally, in the post-war 
period Killingray points to a discussion of using African forces on a large scale as an 
imperial reserve to replace the Indian Army lost in 1947, but he sees this as an idea 
abandoned by 1950, after which the African colonial forces reverted again to law and 
order duties, which they performed until the end of the colonial period. 
Parsons has generally seen the role of the King's African Rifles in terms which 
are reflective of Killingray's scheme outlined above. 5 Starting with the formal 
establishment of the KAR in 1902, out of the local forces of Nyasaland, Kenya and 
Uganda, Parsons sees a period of `pacification campaigns' in Kenya and Somaliland 
before 1914, during which time the colonial governments sought to cut back the 
KAR to the minimum numbers required for local needs. This was followed by a 
period of expansion during the First World War, which saw the KAR engaged 
against German forces in East Africa, initially in a defensive role, but from 1916 as 
an expanded and much more fully organised imperial force under War Office 
control. In the years between the First and Second World Wars, Parsons describes a 
further period of retrenchment, during which the KAR passed back to local control, 
was drastically reduced in size, and was mainly involved in the suppression of 
lawlessness in the northern frontier of Kenya and elsewhere, supporting the colonial 
state by providing a symbol of government strength. Towards the end of this period, 
5 Parsons, The African Rank-and File, pp. 13-52. 
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with the realisation of the growing threat of war against the Italians in East Africa, 
attempts were made to prepare the KAR for modem warfare. Thus, battalions were 
expanded and KAR reserves were prepared for expansion. The Second World War 
again saw the KAR assuming an imperial military role, placed under the control of 
the War Office and greatly enlarged, serving in Somaliland against Italian forces, in 
Madagascar against the Vichy French, as well as subsequently serving outside Africa 
in Ceylon and Burma from 1943. Finally, Parsons sees the post-war KAR once 
again reduced in size and - although assuming an imperial role in Malaya in the early 
1950s - mainly engaged in an internal security role in the face of growing African 
nationalism, particularly the Mau Mau in Kenya. 
In this chapter, it is intended to investigate how well the Nyasaland forces 
actually match both the general model of the role of colonial armies, and the general 
pattern of development in the KAR as a whole. This chapter is not intended to 
examine the changing function and structure of the East African forces as a whole, as 
this has been ably carried out by both Moyse-Bartlett and Parsons. Rather it seeks to 
place the Nyasaland forces within this wider context. More attention is paid to the 
question of what roles were actually being performed by the forces than to questions 
of colonial and imperial policy which have been dealt with elsewhere, since it is this 
former question which has most bearing on the central theme of the experience of 
colonial soldiers and the development of military identities. 
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The Nyasaland forces in the period of conquest and pacification, 1891-1914 
The first military force in Nyasaland was raised in 1891 for service under the 
control of the Foreign Office by Sir H. H. Johnston, the Commissioner and Consul- 
General of the new British Central Africa Protectorate. Despite its title of the 
`British Central Africa Police', the core of the force was composed of 71 soldiers 
from the Indian Army (including 40 Sikh infantrymen from Pioneer regiments and 
30 Muslim Cavalrymen from the Hyderabad Lancers, under an Indian Army officer), 
to whom were added 120 Africans recruited in Zanzibar. However, of this latter 
number only ten were initially employed in military duties, the remainder being used 
as labour for the construction of the infrastructure of the new Protectorate. 6 
It is clear that the new force was intended to perform the function of conquest 
and pacification as described by Killingray. Arriving in Nyasaland with Johnston in 
July 1891, the small army almost immediately launched into a series of expeditions 
of conquest against local chiefs. This was nominally aimed at the suppression of the 
slave trade, but whilst reports of the freeing of slaves were sent back to London, the 
main aim was clearly to subjugate all possible indigenous opposition to the new 
colonial government. 8 The numerous expeditions and engagements undertaken by 
the early armed forces have been well described elsewhere, and a detailed account of 
them is beyond the scope of this work, but the number of such expeditions was 
6 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression of Slave-Raiding in 
Nyassaland, Africa No. 5,1892, C. 6699, pp. 2-3. 
7 Blantyre Mission: Life and Work, July 1891. 
8 See A. J. Hanna, The Beginnings of Nyasaland and North Eastern Rhodesia 1859-95 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969) and Eric Stokes `Malawi Political Systems and the Introduction of 
Colonial Rule 1891-1896', in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown (eds. ), The Zambesian Past 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), pp. 352-75. 
24 
intense until 1897, and punitive expeditions in Nyasaland continued until 1900.9 
Besides their use in expeditions of conquest, it is notable that the armed forces were 
also employed from an early date to enforce African payment of taxes by burning the 
villages of defaulting chiefs. '° 
It seems likely that the cavalry component in particular were originally 
intended to compensate for the small size of the force by taking advantage of a high 
level of mobility, but in fact their horses soon died of tsetse fly or horse sickness. 
' 1 
As Johnston recorded in 1894, `Were it not for this, we could keep the whole Shire 
province under control by a small troop of fifty mounted police'. 
12 This was clearly 
a crucial element in the subsequent development of the Nyasaland forces as an 
infantry regiment, and the small number of men quickly proved inadequate to the 
task of imposing the Government's will upon the population. The Indian contingent 
was increased, Makua men from Mozambique were added to the force, and local 
Malawians were frequently employed as auxiliaries or `irregulars', so that by 1895 
the size of the force had reached 200 Sikhs, 100 Makua Regulars, and 200 local 
Irregulars, under nine European officers. 13 
9 Five major expeditions were carried out in the first six months alone. 
See Sir Harry H. Johnston, British Central Africa: an attempt to give some account of the territories 
under British influence north of the Zambezi (London: Methuen, 1898), pp. 80-151; Lieutenant- 
Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and 
Central Africa, 1890-1945 (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956), pp. 12-48. 
'° Life and Work: Blantyre Mission Supplement, December 1891, p. 3; Life and Work in British 
Central Africa, June 1892; Malawi National Archives (MNA) 13/WPO/1/l, f. 136, Wordsworth Poole 
to his mother, Zomba, 16 April 1896. 
" Johnston, British Central Africa, p. 98n. 
'Z Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, Africa No. 6,1894, C. 7504, p. 19. 
13 Public Records Office (hereafter PRO), FO 2/88, f. 291, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul- 
General to the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8 May 1895. 
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Although almost continuously engaged in military expeditions, the armed 
forces at this time had an ambiguous role reflective of the lack of a division between 
the army and the police which is identified by Killingray. As British control 
extended out from the Shire Highlands in the south of the country, increasing 
numbers of men were required for garrison duties in numerous newly-established 
forts and Posts. 14 Moreover, the distinction between military and civil policing 
duties was bluffed, as local Civil Police tended to comprise a mixture of Regular 
Sikhs and Makua (who remained members of the armed forces) and local Malawians 
directly recruited by magistrates. " This situation was formally changed in 1896, 
when the force was reorganised along the lines of a regular infantry regiment of six 
companies of 126 local Africans, each commanded by a British officer, as well as the 
Indian Contingent of 185 men. The latter also supplied the three senior officers for 
the armed forces. Two further companies were detached to become a separate Civil 
Police. 16 In line with the new fully military organisation, the African portion was 
granted the title `British Central Africa Rifles', the force as a whole being called the 
`Armed Forces'. ' 7 
14 James Njoloma identified 55 separate forts, military camps and fortified government posts which 
had been manned by the Nyasaland forces before the First World War, not including posts in North- 
Eastern Rhodesia. James Njoloma, `A Listing of the British Colonial Forts, Military Encampments 
and Fortified Bomas of Malawi', Society of Malawi Journal, 51,2 (1998). 
15 PRO, FO 2/55, f. 354, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul-General to the Earl of Roseberry, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8 May 1895; PRO, FO 2/67, `Estimates for the Year's 
Expenditure in British Central Africa Protectorate: April 1,1894, to March 31,1895', 29 August 
1894; PRO, FO 2/67, ff. 343-36 I, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul-General to the Earl of 
Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 22 October 1894. 
16 PRO, FO 2/106, ff. 246-248, `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa proposed by 
Major C. A. Edwards', April 1896; National Army Museum (hereafter NAM), 6706-64-66, Force 
Order 7 `Civil Police not furnished from A. F. ', 20 December 1896; NAM 6706-64-66, Force Order 9 
`Reduction of establishment' [n. d. ]. 
'7 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 84, `Designation B. C. A. Rifles' [July 1897? 1. In fact the title 
British Central Africa Rifles was in regular use from 1896. 
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As operations to assert government control in Nyasaland reached a conclusion 
in the late 1890s, the responsibilities of the BCA Rifles shifted beyond the borders of 
the Protectorate. Since their establishment in 1891, the Nyasaland forces had had a 
nominal responsibility for the defence of the British South Africa Company's 
(BSAC) territory in North-Eastern Rhodesia, and in September 1898 a further three 
companies, amounting to 350 Malawian men, were raised specifically for service in 
the BSAC sphere. 18 Three months later, this trend towards a role outside Nyasaland 
saw realisation on a fuller scale as a Second Battalion of BCA Rifles19 was raised 
under the separate command of the War Office, with the First Battalion remaining 
under the control of the Foreign Office. The new battalion was intended to fulfil the 
specific role of providing a garrison for the Royal Navy's coaling station in 
Mauritius, and as such was to be an official component of the British Army. This 
purpose in itself was not unique in Africa, since the West African Regiment was 
raised in Sierra Leone as part of the British Army in 1898, principally to defeat 
rebels in the Hut Tax War, but also to replace the West India Regiment in the 
landward defence of the port of Freetown. 20 However, the idea of raising such a unit 
for service so far from the territory where it originated, indeed beyond the African 
mainland, was quite new, and was significantly different from the experience of 
African colonial forces elsewhere at this date. This is especially true of the rest of 
East Africa, where the Uganda Rifles and East African Rifles were still engaged in 
1e NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 190, `Augmentation of Forces', 5 September 1898; NAM, 6706- 
64-66, Force Order 192, `Strength of new force', 5 September 1898. 
'' The two battalions were subsequently renamed the `Central African Regiment' (CAR). 
20 David Killingray, `The Mutiny of the West African Regiment in the Gold Coast, 1901', 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 16,3 (1983), 441-54 (p. 444); James Lunt, 
Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: Macdonald, 1981), pp. 201-204. 
Outside Africa, the British Army included several `local' forces such as the West India Regiment, 
Hong Kong Regiment, Ist Chinese Regiment, and a number of units of the Royal Artillery and Royal 
Engineers. These were distinct from the Colonial defence forces, and were intended for the defence of 
particular places of strategic importance. 
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the conquest of their own territories. Although the nature of the duties undertaken by 
Nyasaland troops does little to alter the general impression that African troops 
continued to be used only for local functions, it set a very significant precedent for 
the subsequent role of the Nyasaland forces. 
In fact the new battalion's posting in Mauritius was short-lived, as it was 
removed after an incident in December 1899 in which Malawian soldiers attacked 
local Mauritian villagers, who had reacted violently against being garrisoned by 
African troops. 21 Nevertheless, the battalion was retained for service outside 
Nyasaland, subsequently being sent to garrison Somaliland, from where in 1900 half 
of the Battalion were despatched to fight in the Ashanti campaign in West Africa. 22 
This unique employment of an East African force for active service in West Africa 
represented an additional development of the special role of the Nyasaland forces, 
one which was carried further in the same year when half of the Ist Battalion (still 
under Foreign Office control) joined the 2nd Battalion in Ashanti. 
In 1902 the Nyasaland forces were joined to the East African Rifles (of Kenya) 
and the Uganda Rifles, to form the five battalion strong King's African Rifles 
(KAR). Thus, the Ist Battalion CAR and the Indian contingent became the Ist 
(Central African) Battalion KAR (1 KAR), and the 2nd Battalion CAR became the 
2nd (Central African) Battalion KAR (2 KAR). 23 The special function of the 2nd 
21 `The African Regiment in Mauritius: Grave Misconduct', Central African Times, 7 April 1900, p. 3; 
`The BCA Rifles in Mauritius', Central African Times, 14 April 1900, p. 7; `The BCA Rifles in 
Mauritius', Central African Times, 19 May 1900, p. 8. 
22 `The 2nd Battalion Central Africa Regiment', The Times, 18 October 1900, p. 4. 
23 The territories to which each battalion of the KAR belonged at this time were as follows: 1st 
Battalion Nyasaland, 2nd Battalion Nyasaland, 3rd Battalion Kenya, 4th Battalion Uganda, 5th 
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Battalion was enshrined in the new organisation as it was designated the `Reserve' 
Battalion of the KAR, to be posted outside its territory of origin, unlike the Kenya 
and Uganda Battalions. Accordingly, 2 KAR was stationed in Somaliland, where it 
took part in operations against the so-called `Mad Mullah' (Mohammed Abdille 
Hassan) until early 1904, although it was joined for most of this period by portions of 
1 KAR, 3 KAR and 5 KAR. 24 Following the return of 2 KAR from Somaliland, the 
position of Nyasaland as a supplier of reserve military force to the rest of East Africa 
was further formalised as I KAR and 2 KAR were placed on the same footing for 
foreign service. The two battalions would take turns as the `Foreign Service 
Battalion' serving in Kenya and the `Home Service Battalion' (always including the 
Indian contingent) serving in Nyasaland, exchanging stations at the end of three 
years. 25 This position was maintained until the First World War, although a series of 
economically inspired reductions in the size of the KAR led to the disbandment of 2 
KAR in 1911, and of the Indian contingent in 1912. Following this, however, the 
same system of Home and Foreign service was carried out within 1 KAR, with two 
of its four companies serving in Nyasaland and two in East Africa. 
26 From this time 
until the end of the colonial period, in peacetime, a portion of the Nyasaland forces 
always continued to be stationed outside Nyasaland. 
Throughout the 1890s, the Nyasaland forces matched the recognised pattern of 
conquest and pacification, enforcing the will of the colonial government and acting 
Battalion Uganda Indian Contingent. A 6th Battalion was subsequently raised from the local forces in 
Somaliland. 
24 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Ries, pp. 161-190. 
ss NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order. 775, `Re-organization of Ist and 2nd K. A. R. ', 17 December 1904; 
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Colonial Reports - Annual. No. 472. British Central Africa 
Protectorate. Report for 1904-5, Cd. 2684-18. 
26 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 152-159. 
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both as army and police force. However, in some respects the early forces in 
Nyasaland were distinctive. They were organised as a battalion along formal 
military lines earlier than other East African forces, and in the period before the First 
World War they were unique in being given a genuinely imperial role outside the 
African mainland. Further, by the outbreak of the war, the responsibility of 
Nyasaland troops in supplying reserve manpower to the remainder of East Africa 
was so well established that it continued even after the reduction to a single battalion. 
The Nyasaland Forces in the First World War 
The First World War clearly had a dramatic effect upon the KAR as a whole. 
By the beginning of the conflict the regiment had been reduced to three Battalions, I 
KAR recruited in Nyasaland, 3 KAR from Kenya, and 4 KAR from Uganda, 
numbering around 2,300 men in all. 27 However, despite the commencement of 
hostilities in German East Africa, the KAR was maintained at this low establishment, 
and the onus of offensive military operations fell upon an Expeditionary Force from 
the Indian Army. 28 At the outbreak of war, four companies of I KAR were stationed 
in Kenya, and another four in Nyasaland. 29 These two portions of 1 KAR initially 
took part in defensive operations in their respective areas, and the KAR as a whole 
stayed under the control of the colonial governments. Indeed, conditions remained 
unchanged to the extent that two companies of I KAR had to be returned from East 
Africa to Nyasaland in July 1915 because they had exceeded their period of `Foreign 
Service'. During this time, the only real attempt to expand the KAR was focused 
27 Parsons, Tire African Rank-and File, p. 18. 
28 Timothy H. Parsons, `East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army, 1902-1964' (unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1996), pp. 32-33. 
29 Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hordern, Military Operations East Africa: Volume / August 1914- 
September 1916 (London: HMSO, 1941; repr. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1990), pp. 15-16,167-69. 
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upon Nyasaland, when 2 KAR was re-raised from elements of 1 KAR serving in 
Kenya, again reflecting the special pre-war role of Nyasaland as a reserve for the 
remainder of the force. 30 
A full-scale expansion of the KAR was not carried out until 1916, when a 
decision was made to transfer the burden of fighting to African troops, especially 
since European and Indian soldiers were suffering from very high rates of disease. 31 
Importantly, the various battalions, previously under the command of the respective 
colonial governments in whose territories they had been stationed before the war, 
were now placed under the unified command of the East African Force, under the 
control of the War Office. 32 The existing battalions of the KAR were converted into 
`regiments', each consisting of two battalions (so that, for example, 1 KAR became 
1/1 KAR and 2/1 KAR), and a new 5 KAR was raised for service in Northern Kenya. 
Further expansions followed so that by the end of the war, each of the two Nyasaland 
Regiments consisted of four battalions, whilst Kenya accounted for five battalions, 
Uganda for six, German East Africa for two, and Zanzibar for one. 33 By the time 
that these expansions were completed, the KAR numbered nearly 31,000 men, of 
whom around 10,000 were serving with Nyasaland units, clearly suggesting the 
extent to which Malawians continued to play a disproportionately large role in terms 
'o Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 561-62. 
31 Parsons, `East African Soldiers', p. 34; Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 210-11,564. 
32 Brigadier-General C. P. Fendall, The East African Force 1915-1919 (London: Witherby, 1921; repr. 
Nashville: The Battery Press, 1992), pp. 36-39,54. 
33 Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 563-68. The actual territorial origins of the battalions 
were more complex than this suggests; for example the two German East Africa battalions were raised 
partly from surrendered Africans from the German forces, and partly from Kenyan recruits. 
3, 
of military recruitment. 34 Government figures estimated that in total 14,920 
Nyasaland men served in the field in the KAR in the First World War, whilst another 
3100 did not reach their units in time to see action. Of this number, 1741 died as the 
result of action or disease. 35 It should be noted that Malawians also served outside 
the official Nyasaland battalions of the KAR, including up to 1,000 Nyasaland labour 
migrants who served in the Rhodesia Native Regiment (RNR) from 1916.36 
Nyasaland did not just supply a disproportionate number of recruits to the KAR 
during the First World War, Malawian units also seem to have played a 
disproportionate role in action. Excepting their 4th Battalions, which were training 
rather than organised combat units, all the Nyasaland battalions served in the field in 
the offensive campaign against German forces after 1916. By contrast, two Kenyan, 
one Ugandan, both German East African battalions and the Zanzibar battalion were 
serving as garrison troops in November 1918, so that although they accounted for 
less than one third of the men under arms in the KAR, half of the battalions actually 
in the field were Nyasaland units. 37 
The Inter-War Period 
Although they supplied a large proportion of the combat manpower, there was 
little else distinctive about the role of Malawian troops in the First World War when 
compared to the remainder of the KAR. The war had drawn the different 
'° Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 18; PRO, CO 534/25, f. 105, `King's African Rifles: Table 
Showing Distribution, Effectives and Non-Effectives, Trained Men and Recruits, Native Combatant 
Ranks Only, on 19th December 1917'. 
's PRO CO 534/49, f. 421, `War Effort: Numerical Records of Nyasaland's Efforts in the War Against 
Germany', [n. d. ]. 
36 Jonathan Newell, "`I wore sergeant's stripes because I wanted to be one": protest, punishment and 
the assertion of rights in the Rhodesian Native Regiment' (unpublished paper, 1997), p. 1. 
37 Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 575-76. 
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components of the KAR closer together, not least physically by providing, in the 
form of the newly occupied German East Africa, a land connection between all the 
territories in which the KAR was raised. Nevertheless, the special role which had 
been undertaken by the Nyasaland units before the war was soon reassumed. Within 
a short time following the end of the war the KAR was returned from War Office to 
Colonial Office control, and around early 1919, the KAR as a whole was reduced to 
a scale not substantially greater than its pre-war peacetime establishment, consisting 
of 1 KAR and 2 KAR from Nyasaland, 3 KAR and 5 KAR from Kenya, 4 KAR from 
Uganda, and 6 KAR from the newly acquired German East Africa (Tanganyika 
Territory) 38 However, the Nyasaland units, unlike those of other territories, were 
again posted outside their own area, with half of 1 KAR (renamed 1/1 KAR) 
stationed in Nyasaland, and the other half of I KAR (2/1 KAR) as well as the whole 
of 2 KAR stationed in Tanganyika (alongside the locally raised 6 KAR). The 
external role of the Nyasaland forces was further expanded in 1922 when a decision 
was made to permanently attach a contingent of Nyasaland soldiers to the 
Somaliland Camel Corps (SCC), where they were to replace a company of Indian 
Army soldiers which had previously served alongside the two Somali companies. 9 
The Nyasaland company, each contingent serving for three years, continued to be 
attached to the SCC throughout the inter-war period. 
Despite the experience of the First World War, the inter-war period saw the 
idea of the KAR as a modem fighting force largely abandoned, following an early 
'a PRO, CO 534/34, ff. 76.81, Commandant's Representative, KAR Nyasaland to Acting Chief 
Secretary Nyasaland, Zomba, 3 May 1919. 
39 MNA, S 2/32/22/14, Winston Churchill to Sir George Smith, Governor of Nyasaland, 17 August 
1922. 
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consideration of using East African forces to garrison the Middle East. 0 As in the 
years preceding the First World War, financial constraints meant that colonial 
governments were anxious to cut back the size of the local forces. Consequently, the 
KAR was reduced to an internal security role, which in Nyasaland itself translated 
into little more than a routine of patrols, often incorporating displays of machine-gun 
fire, which were clearly designed to demonstrate to the African population the 
continuing power of the colonial state. On occasion, such patrols were used as a 
direct threat against non-taxpayers. 41 
In 1929 the whole KAR was reorganised along what appeared on paper to be 
sound military lines. Replacing the system of individual territories controlling units, 
the KAR was divided into two brigades, the Northern Brigade comprising Brigade 
Headquarters, 3 KAR, 4 KAR, 5 KAR, a Brigade Signal Section, and a Transport 
Company from the Supply and Transport Corps, King's African Rifles (KAR S&T); 
and the Southern Brigade, comprising 1 KAR, 2 KAR, and 6 KAR, as well as 
Headquarters, Signals and KAR S&T. 42 In fact this new organisation seems mainly 
to have been intended to permit the reduction of the force by enabling the swift 
movement of reinforcements between neighbouring territories. As a result, the 
battalions were reduced to a level of only two companies and a machine gun platoon 
40 Parsons, 'East African Soldiers', pp. 38-39. 
41 MNA, S 2/8/20/1, C. G. Phillips, OC I KAR Nyasaland Detachment to Mangoche Detachment 1 
KAR, Zomba 5 February 1920; MNA, S 2/8/20/4, OC Troops Nyasaland to Acting Chief Secretary 
Nyasaland, Zomba 1 December 1923; MNA, S 2/8/20/8A, `Report on Demonstration Patrol from 
Zomba to Ntondwe, Mlanje, Cholo, Mikalongwe, Limbe, & Chiradzulu', by Lieutenant C. J. Keegan, 
I KAR, Zomba, 27 December 1923; MNA, S 2/8/20/8C, `Report on Demonstration Patrol from 
Zomba to Mpimbi, Ncheu, M'neno, Chikwawa & Blantyre', by Lieutenant W. J. Skinner, I KAR, 
Zomba, 27 December 1923; PRO, CO 534/56, f 193-201, '1 st. Battalion, The King's African Rifles: 
Diary of the Battalion March, 1924' [n. d. ]; Sir Francis De Guingand, African Assignment (London: 
Hodder and Stroughton, 1953), pp. 60-62. 
42 MNA, KAR 5/1/3, `Report on the Re-organization of the King's African Rifles', 1929, p. 1. 
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each, or 13 Europeans and 321 Africans. As the Inspector-General of the KAR noted 
in 1937, this left the KAR units as `battalions only in name', and crucially unable to 
carry out modern military training due to the fact that `all our infantry tactics are 
based on battalions of 4 companies'. 43 Moreover, in the Southern Brigade the key 
feature of the new scheme, the new Supply and Transport Corps, was not enacted. 
Instead, in Nyasaland six old civil vehicles were simply painted up in KAR colours 
and their drivers put into uniform as the `Civil Wing KAR' under civil government 
control. This emphasises that however important Nyasaland troops were in colonial 
military thinking, the local government was not willing to subsidise them any more 
than was absolutely necessary for their own purposes. 
44 Clearly the KAR battalions 
were no longer organised as an effective military force. 
Despite growing fears of war from 1935, following the Italian conquest of 
Abyssinia, this organisation of the KAR continued to obtain. In 1937, however, 
steps were taken to expand the Regiment in preparation for modern warfare. The 
KAR as a whole, along with the Northern Rhodesia Regiment (NRR), were finally 
placed under a unified command structure, and the Inspector-General recommended 
that one battalion in each Brigade should be expanded to a full four-company 
battalion, whilst the other two battalions were maintained as cadre battalions of two 
companies ready for expansion in case of war. Unsurprisingly, in the Southern 
43 MNA, KAR 5/111, `The re-organization of the forces in our East African Colonies', memorandum 
by the Inspector-General, Royal West African Frontier Force and King's African Rifles, p. 8; Parsons, 
`East African Soldiers', p. 43. 
44 MNA, S 1/11(2)29/4, Chief Transport Officer, Nyasaland to Chief Secretary, Nyasaland, I1 
November 1930; MNA, S 1/11(2)129/4a, Officer Commanding Southern Brigade KAR to Chief 
Transport Officer, Nyasaland, 29 October 1930; MNA, S 1/11(2)/29/7, Chief Transport Officer, 
Nyasaland to Chief Secretary, Nyasaland, 17 December 1930. 
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Brigade it was one of the two Nyasaland battalions which was expanded, again 
confirming their special role 45 
The Second World War 
Unlike the situation in the First World War, on the outbreak of war in 1939, the 
KAR quickly passed from Colonial Office to War Office control under the Middle 
East Command. As in the First World War, the KAR as a whole was increased 
significantly, from seven battalions to a total of 43, including 12 raised in 
Nyasaland. 46 From 1939, Malawian soldiers were also recruited into sub-units of a 
growing number of regionally based support units, such as the East African Artillery, 
Engineers, Army Service Corps, and Army Medical Corps and Army Education 
Corps. 7 Although the Nyasaland contingent of the SCC was used as the basis of 
some of the new KAR infantry battalions, the special role of Malawian troops in 
Somaliland was continued in 1941 when 500 Malawians were sent to form the 
Somaliland Gendarmerie. As Parsons has noted, the use of Swahili as the official 
language in most East African units meant that Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanganyikan 
soldiers were increasingly posted to units without reference to their official territorial 
designations, whilst many support units were inter-territorial. By contrast, the 
continued use of a Chinyanja as the official language in the Nyasaland forces meant 
that Malawian units remained largely homogenous. However, it is should be noted 
that numbers of Malawian labour migrants did serve in the Northern Rhodesia 
45 MNA, KAR 5/111, `The re-organization of the forces in our East African Colonies', memorandum 
by the Inspector-General, Royal West African Frontier Force and King's African Rifles, p. 36; 
Parsons, `East African Soldiers', p. 48-49. 
46 Parsons, `East African Soldiers', pp. 50,437; Page, KAR, pp. 60-62. The Nyasaland battalions were 
l KAR, 2 KAR, 21 KAR, 22 KAR, 13 KAR, 14 KAR, 18 KAR, 27 KAR, 29 KAR, 30 KAR, 31 
KAR, and 62 KAR. 
47 Parsons, `East African Soldiers', p. 51; Page, KAR, p. 63. 
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Regiment (NRR), in which Chinyanja was also spoken, and, echoing the situation in 
the RNR in the First World War, numbers of Malawians resident in Southern 
Rhodesia joined the newly raised Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), 49 the Rhodesian 
Air Askari Corps and the Southern Rhodesian Internment Camp Corps. Malawians 
continued to serve in Rhodesian regiments in significant numbers after the war. 49 
The first duty undertaken by Nyasaland troops was to support the police in the 
internment of German citizens in East Africa. 50 However, at the entry of Italy into 
the war in 1940, Nyasaland forces from I KAR were posted in Kenya's Northern 
Frontier District and were the only KAR battalion present when the Italians invaded 
in July, successfully defending the border fortress of Moyale. Similarly, the other 
Nyasaland battalion, 2 KAR, was the only KAR battalion in British Somaliland at the 
time of the Italian invasion, alongside the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, two Indian 
battalions and a British battalion, a force which was compelled to evacuate due to the 
numerical superiority of the Italian forces. 51 However, this was the last point during 
the war when Nyasaland forces coul1 be said to have played a distinctive role. In the 
subsequent operations, which saw the Italians expelled from Ethiopia and Somaliland 
48 Malawians serving in the Rhodesian African Rifles included the Regimental Sergeant Major, 
Lechanda or Lichanda, who had served as a boy bugler in the Somaliland Campaigns, and reached the 
rank of Company Sergeant Major in the KAR during the First World War. Christopher Owen, The 
Rhodesian African Rifles, (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), p. 11; PRO, CO 534/34, `Nominal Roll of 
Askari Entitled for 1914-15 Star', Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Zomba, 1 December 1919. 
49 Parsons, `East African Soldiers', p. 50; W. V Brelsford (ed. ), The Story of the Northern Rhodesia 
Regiment (Bromley: Galago, 1990); Owen, The Rhodesian African Rifles; MNA, LB 8/7/I, Labour 
Office, Military, Southern Rhodesia Native Regiments, 1942-1946; MNA, 1/DCKU/1/8/1/7, Adjutant 
I KAR to DC Kasungu, 13 October 1953. 
5" Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM), 3864/03, transcript of interview with Major P. Q. Logan 
(I 1 September 1979), pp. 26-27. 
51 Page, KAR, pp. 68-74. 
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during 1941, the two East African brigades (21 (EA) Brigade and 22 (EA) Brigade) 
contained battalions from all the East African territories. 52 
With the defeat of the Italians in East Africa complete, East African forces 
were freed for service elsewhere. The War Office transferred command from the 
Middle East Command to a new East African Command (EAC), with responsibility 
not only for the East African coast but also for British colonial territories in the west 
of the Indian Ocean. In June 1942,22 (EA) Brigade, including one Nyasaland, one 
Kenya and one Tanganyika battalion, was sent to take over Diego Suarez in southern 
Madagascar from a British brigade, and was subsequently responsible for completing 
the successful defeat of the Vichy French forces of the island. 53 
Also in 1942, in direct response to a call for East African troops from the 
Indian command, the War Office signalled its willingness to use African forces 
outside the African continent by sending KAR battalions to garrison Ceylon, in the 
first instance to replace Indian troops in order to free them for service against the 
Japanese in Burma. 54 However, with the worsening situation in Burma, a decision 
was taken to send a whole East African Division to the front there, along with two 
independent brigades, under the South East Asia Command. As in earlier formations 
in the war, units from the various East African territories were well distributed 
throughout the formation, and the total of 17 battalions included four from 
52 Page, KAR, pp. 81-82. 53 The brigade consisted of 1/1 KAR, 5 KAR, and 1/6 KAR. 
Page, KAR, pp. 115-132; Parsons, `East African Soldiers', pp. 59-60; Kenneth Gandar Dower, The 
King's African Ries in Madagascar (Nairobi, East Africa Command [n. d. ]). 
54 Parsons, 'East African Soldiers', p. 59. 
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Nyasaland. 55 The military history of the East African forces in Burma has been 
described in detail elsewhere, but it is worth noting that, probably as a result of the 
military authorities' belief that African soldiers were natural jungle fighters, the 
KAR played a prominent role in the gruelling campaign in Burma from 1944.56 
As in the First World War, the Second World War had signalled a dramatic 
change in the state of the KAR as a whole, from a local force which had been 
reduced to a level at which it was not fit to fight in modern warfare, to a large 
effective force under the unified control of the War Office, which was clearly 
fulfilling an imperial function well beyond the borders of Africa. However, from the 
perspective of Nyasaland, it is clear that, whilst fully included in the actions of East 
African forces, Nyasaland troops did not have a distinctive or outstanding role such 
as they had previously performed both in peace and war. Whereas it had accounted 
for over 30 percent of recruits in the First World War, less than 10 percent of soldiers 
raised in East Africa in the Second World War were drawn from Nyasaland. 57 
The Nyasaland Forces in the Post War Period 
The end of the war again saw a reduction in the establishment of the KAR, and 
the Nyasaland contribution was once more reduced to 1 KAR and 2 KAR. However, 
contrary to the situation at the end of the First World War, in 1945 the unified East 
Africa Command remained in place under War Office control. The KAR as a whole 
returned to its primary pre-war role of supporting the civil authorities in East Africa, 
55 Parsons, 'East African Soldiers', pp. 61-62; Page, KAR, pp. 133. 56 Parsons, 'East African Soldiers', pp. 62-72; Page, KAR, pp. 137-175; Gerald Hanley, Monsoon 
Victory (London: Collins, 1946). 
S' Parsons, `East African Soldiers', p. 72. 
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particularly in recognition of growing political aspirations and activities of Africans 
in Kenya. However, as Parsons has described, a permanent imperial role was also 
adopted, as up to 1949 the East Africa Command was returned to the control of the 
Middle East Land Forces, with the intention that the KAR should provide a reserve 
force for the defence of the Middle East against a possible Soviet threat. 58 This area 
had been seen as the responsibility of the Indian Army after the First World War, and 
it was no doubt in response to the loss of this vast reserve as a result of Indian 
Independence that the KAR found itself fulfilling this new task. 59 
Again reflecting the strain placed upon colonial military commitments by the 
loss of the Indian Army, in 1952 it was decided to send two KAR battalions to 
Malaya to combat communist terrorists. Accordingly, 1 KAR from Nyasaland and 3 
KAR from Kenya were both sent there early in the same year. 60 Service in Malaya 
on this basis was to have become a regular duty for KAR battalions during the 
Malayan emergency, but the outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya made it 
impossible to release battalions from the other East African territories, so 
responsibility for providing troops to Malaya was reserved to the Nyasaland 
battalions along with the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and the Rhodesian African 
Rifles. 2 KAR accordingly took over from I KAR from 1953 to 1954 61 
58 Parsons, `East African Soldiers', pp. 75-78. 
59 Keith Jeffrey, "`An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas"? India in the Aftermath of the First World 
War', Modern Asian Studies, 15,3 (1981), 369-86; David Killingray, The Idea of a British Imperial 
African Army'. Journal of African History, 20,3 (1979), 421-36 (pp. 434-35). 
60 Parsons, 'East African Soldiers', p. 80; Page, KAR, pp. 191-92. 
61 Parsons, 'East African Soldiers', p. 81; Page, KAR, p. 196. 
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The Central African Federation and Independence 
The separation of functions between the Rhodesian regiments and the KAR in 
Nyasaland on one hand and the rest of the KAR on the other was prophetic, as 
independent political events in central Africa formalised the process. The advent of 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in January 1954, which placed Nyasaland, 
Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia under one Government in Salisbury, saw 
a dramatic change in the relationship of the Nyasaland battalions to the rest of the 
KAR. I KAR and 2 KAR were transferred from the East Africa Command to the 
Federation's Central Africa Command, becoming in the process, as a contributor to 
the KAR Journal observed, `completely divorced from the British Army'. 62 Whilst 
remaining a part of the KAR in name, the Nyasaland battalions now found 
themselves far more closely aligned in organisation and function to the other two 
African-manned regular infantry units in the Federation Army, the NRR and RAR, 
with whom they continued to rotate service in Malaya. 63 The separation of the 
Nyasaland units from the rest of the KAR was emphasised by the fact that the 
peacetime policy of drawing European officers from the British Army, which had 
been a feature of the Nyasaland forces from the 1890s, ceased, and in common with 
other Federation units, officers were obtained locally from the predominantly white 
Rhodesian-manned Rhodesia and Nyasaland Staff Corps. This process - referred to 
bitterly by the commanding officer of 2 KAR as being `Federalised'64 - was 
62 `Battalion Notes', The Journal of the King's African Rifles, 1,2 (1957), p. 9. 63 See Brelsford, The Story of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment and Owen, The Rhodesian African 
Rifles. 
64 IWM, 83/21/1/177, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Dauncey, OC I KAR, Zomba, to Brigadier T. H. 
Birkbeck, HQ 70 (EA) Infantry Brigade, Nyeri, Kenya, 3 September 1956; IWM, 83/21/1/175, 
Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Conroy, OC 2 KAR, Llewellyn Barracks, Southern Rhodesia, to Brigadier 
T. H. Birkbeck, HQ 70 (EA) Infantry Brigade, Nyeri, Kenya, 3 August 1956. 
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completed by 1959.65 To emphasise the new allegiance, the two battalions' sub-titles 
of `(Nyasaland)' were replaced by `(Central African Rifles)', a resurrection of an 
earlier title which conveniently fitted new requirements. 66 
Whilst the Federal Government continued to send African battalions to 
Malaya, following the return of 2 KAR from there in early 1955, this duty was 
undertaken first by the NRR and then by the RAR. As a consequence, while 1 KAR 
remained in Zomba, 2 KAR took over first from the NRR in Lusaka, then from the 
RAR in Bulawayo, before moving back to Lusaka on their return. Thus the 
Nyasaland battalions found themselves fulfilling a function which was reminiscent of 
their pre-war role as a reserve - this time within the Federation - with one battalion 
always serving outside the territory. I KAR and 2 KAR exchanged stations in 1958, 
and once again for the last time in September 1961. As a consequence, I KAR was 
stationed in Zomba and 2 KAR in Lusaka at independence in 1964.67 
Once they returned to Africa, the role of the African battalions in the Federal 
Army was mainly one of internal security. In the face of growing African 
nationalism, and especially strong antipathy towards the white Rhodesian dominated 
Federation on the part of Africans in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this 
role increasingly became a reality for the battalions. 1 KAR was subsequently 
deployed in aid of the civil power in the disturbances of September 1953 in the 
Southern Province of Nyasaland. In 1959 widespread protests against the Federation 
by Nyasaland Africans, which culminated in the declaration of a state of emergency, 
65 `Newsletters', Journal of the King's African Rifles, 1,6 (1959), p. 3 66 Journal of the King's African Ries, 1,4 (1958), p. 8 
67 J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 40. 
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saw the involvement of both 1 and 2 KAR in riot control duties, along with white 
Rhodesian units, as well as in the arrest of Congress Party leaders in `Operation 
Sunrise'. " Following this, in 1961 1 KAR was deployed against African nationalists 
in Northern Rhodesia, while in 1962,2 KAR served in Southern Rhodesia during the 
banning of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). 
69 
However, Rhodesian efforts to maintain the Central African Federation in the 
face of African opposition in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were ultimately 
unsuccessful, and the Federation was dissolved at the end of 1963, with both 
territories reverting to the direct control of the Colonial Office. The dissolution of 
the Federation inevitably meant the end of the Central Africa Command. However, 
the KAR battalions from Nyasaland and the NRR could not revert to the East Africa 
Command, since the achievement of independence by Tanganyika, Uganda, and 
Kenya between 1961 and 1963 meant that the remainder of the KAR had already 
transformed into the armies of the newly independent states, and was no longer an 
integrated force. Instead, reflecting the reality that the new Malawi could `barely 
afford one' battalion, 2 KAR remained stationed in Northern Rhodesia, the officer 
commanding 1 KAR noting in his expectation that it would `probably return [to 
Nyasaland] for amalgamation. or disbanding towards the end of this year 
70 
However, in fact when the two territories became independent in 1964, the 
Nyasaland battalion passed into the army of independent Zambia along with the 
66 'Battalion Notes', Journal of the King's African Rifles, 1,1 (1956), p. 7; Journal of the King's 
African Ries, 1,6 (1958), pp. 3-5; Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky's 4000 Days (London: Collins, 
1964), pp. 115-32. 
69 `News Letters', Journal of the King's African Rifles, (December 1961), p. 12: `News Letters', 
Askari Journal (July 1963), p. 14. 
70 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/l/NY/5/6, Lieutenant Colonel T. P. J. Lewis, OC Nyasaland, to Brigadier R. 
R. J. Putterill, Chief of Staff, Army HQ Salisbury, Zomba, 27 May 1963. 
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NRR, a bizarre final reflection of the army's role beyond the borders of Nyasaland. 71 
1 KAR passed into independent Malawi's army as the Malawi Rifles, but like the 
Federation before it, the new regime chose a significant sub-title for the regiment, 
adding `(K. A. R. )'. 72 
In general, it is clear that the armed forces of Nyasaland fit into the picture 
drawn of African colonial armies. However, within that pattern it is equally clear 
that their role was often distinctive when compared to other East African forces, and 
indeed to Britain's colonial armies in other parts of Africa. A Nyasaland unit was 
deliberately raised for deployment outside their own territory as early as 1899, and a 
role outside Nyasaland, both in peace and war, was consistently undertaken by 
Nyasaland forces for the remainder of the colonial period. This was in clear contrast 
to the function of other forces in the region, which although they often served outside 
their territories in times of emergency and warfare, had no corresponding formal 
responsibility beyond their borders. Thus, although the general pattern described by 
Killingray and Parsons of African forces being largely consigned to local African 
duties up to the Second World War is quite valid in its own terms, the meaning of 
this with regard to Nyasaland's army was of a significantly different order to that in 
relation to other forces. 
71 Tim Wright, The History of the Northern Rhodesia Police (Bristol: British Empire & 
Commonwealth Museum Press, 2001), pp. 342-43. 
The official line was that Banda had not wished to `deprive Zambians of that very important part of 
their army' `Third Battalion to be Recruited as Soon as College Progresses', This is Malawi, 6,1 
(1976), p. 15. 
n Anon., `Farewell to Commander of the Malawi Army, Colonel D. E. Thornton, C. B. E., E. R. D. ', 
This is Malawi, 3,9 (1967), 12-13 (p. 13); Anon, `The Malawi Rifles', Vision of Malawi, March 1970, 
pp. I 1-1S (p. 15), Society of Malawi Library, Military Album No. 2, `Ist Battalion the Malawi Rifles 
(K. A. R. ) Officers Mess Rules' [n. d., 1966? ]. 
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John McCracken has ascribed the prominence of Malawian soldiers during this 
period to their relative cheapness. 73 This is a compelling argument; as noted in the 
following chapter, low wages in Nyasaland meant soldiers' pay was high enough to 
remain competitive within the territory, but could be kept at a significantly lower 
level than the pay scales pertaining in the other battalions of the KAR. Thus, on the 
eve of the First World War, a Malawian private received 10 shillings a month in 
comparison to the equivalent of about 22 shillings received by a Kenyan. 
74 
Similarly, in the late 1920s a Malawian private received 20 shillings whilst a Kenyan 
received 28.75 However, it is important to recognise that even in the period before 
the First World War, Malawian soldiers received a fifty percent increase in pay when 
serving abroad, and when 2 KAR was re-formed in 1915 soldiers received similar 
rates of pay to their Kenyan counterparts. In the inter-war period, Malawian soldiers 
serving outside Nyasaland continued to receive the same wage as other KAR 
soldiers. This is especially significant because individual territories paid for the 
battalions stationed within their borders, so that after the First World War, the 
Tanganyikan Administration gave the same pay to its Malawian soldiers as to 
Tanganyikans, thus receiving little direct benefit from the low rates which 
Malawians received from their own administration. During the Second World War, 
Nyasaland pay came into line with the remainder of the KAR. Similarly, after 1953 
73 John McCracken, `Authority and Legitimacy in Malawi: Policing and Politics in a Colonial State', 
in Policing and Decolonization: Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-65, ed. by David M. 
Anderson and David Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 158-86 (p. 
165). 
74 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 541, `Rates of Pay Ist and 2nd K. A. R. ', 17 April 1902; PRO, CO 
534/20, f. 105, Colonel E. H. Llewellyn, Commandant KAR, to Chief Secretary East African 
Protectorate, 6 September 1916. Parsons (The African Rank-and-File, p. 62) gives the Kenyan figure 
as 38 shillings. 
75 MNA, KAR 5/1/3, 'Report on the Re-organization of the King's African Rifles', 1929. 
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the Federal authorities unified conditions of service in the four African Battalions, so 
cheap labour does not explain the predominance of Malawians in the Federal Army. 
Undoubtedly, the low cost of Malawian troops was also an important factor in 
the decision to send 2 CAR to Mauritius in 1899, since the Malawians were 
considerably cheaper than either the Indian or British soldiers who had been used to 
garrison the island to that point. However, Nyasaland was also in a much better 
position than other East African territories to supply imperial troops. The East 
African Rifles in Kenya were still engaged in the process of conquest, whilst the men 
of the Uganda Rifles had recently mutinied. Moreover, both forces were still largely 
made up of Sudanese soldiers, so that neither territory was established as a major 
recruiting base. In Nyasaland, by contrast, the process of conquest was largely 
complete, and the BCA Rifles were already established as an organised regiment. 
Thus, whilst the decision to send an African regiment to Mauritius was probably 
motivated by cost, the choice of Malawians in particular owed as much to the 
military situation in Nyasaland as to economic conditions. Before the Second World 
War, the cheapness of Malawian soldiers sustained them in their position as the 
premium suppliers of military labour in East Africa, but this prominence increasingly 
became self-sustaining as the authorities regarded it as an established fact of KAR 
organisation. Thus, by the time that the Nyasaland Battalions joined the Central 
African Command in the 1950s, the Federal authorities simply accepted the 
Malawians' special function. As a consequence, the Rhodesians made a considerable 
investment in modernisation of what became the Malawi Army in 1964. 
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Chapter 2 
Recruitment and Enlistment 
Recruitment imperatives and ethnicity 
Historians of Britain's colonial armed forces in Africa have been unanimous in 
drawing attention to the ethnic basis of military recruitment. ' This is seen as 
ultimately derived from the influence of Indian army theories of `martial races' 
which emphasised the recruitment of racially `pure' (and therefore necessarily rural) 
soldiers from particular, politically reliable groups which were identified as 
`warlike'. Martial races theory also sought to ensure the security of the state by 
fostering difference, either between soldiers drawn from diverse ethnic groups, or 
between `martial' soldiers and `non-martial' civilians. 2 In the context of Africa, the 
concept of martial races is seen as having been translated into a search for groups 
who had proven their `warlike' characteristics during the period of conquest, but 
were not so politically powerful or numerous as to pose a threat to the state. To the 
colonial authorities, suitable groups would ideally be rural and geographically 
I See J. Bayo Adekson, `Ethnicity and Army Recruitment in Colonial Plural Societies', Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 2,2 (1979), 149-65; Douglas H. Johnson, `The Fighting Nuer: Primary Sources and 
the Origins of a Stereotype', Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 51,1 (1981), 508- 
27; David Killingray, `Race and Rank in the British Army in the Twentieth Century', Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 10,3 (1987), 276-90; Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, "`Damnosa Hereditas": Ethnic 
Ranking and the Martial Races Imperative in Africa', Ethnic and Racial Studies, 3,4 (1980), 393-414. 
For the East Africa and Nyasaland in particular, see: Timothy H. Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: 
Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Oxford: 
James Currey, 1999), chapter 3 'Recruiting and the Doctrine of "Martial Race"'; Anthony Clayton and 
David Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1989), pp. 220-26; Jennifer Ann Warner, `Recruitment and Service in the King's 
African Rifles in the Second World War (M. Litt. Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1985); 2 See David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London: Macmillan Press, 
1994), pp. 1-46; John McCracken, `Authority and Legitimacy in Malawi: Policing and Politics in a 
Colonial State', in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds. ), Policing and Decolonization: 
Nationalism, politics and the police, 1917-65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 
161-66. 
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remote, so that they were less likely to have lost their warlike character through the 
degenerative `detribalising' effects of contact with the colonial economy and 
intermarriage with other groups. It is also generally argued that colonial recruitment 
policy was biased in favour of Muslim, or at least non-Christian groups, on the basis 
that those with a missionary education were more likely to be politically aware and 
less likely to be amenable to military discipline. 
In his study of East African soldiers, Parsons has suggested that recruitment 
patterns in Nyasaland differed from the general model outlined above, insofar as they 
were much more clearly dictated by patterns of labour migration. He argues that 
northern Malawians, with better access to missionary education, were able to secure 
access to better paid work in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, largely leaving 
military service to southerners for whom employment opportunities were more 
limited. At the same time, Parsons says very little about the early development of 
recruitment in Nyasaland before 1914, although this period saw the establishment of 
the pattern which was to have a lasting impact to the end of the colonial period. 3 In 
this chapter, it is intended first to examine the changing nature of official recruitment 
policy, with particular emphasis on the influence of `martial races' theory. Secondly, 
the chapter will examine the motivation behind African enlistment, looking at the 
methods of recruitment employed, African soldiers reactions to these, and the 
influence of the wider economic environment. 
Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, pp. 60-61. 
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`Tribes' in colonial Nyasaland 
Much of this chapter is concerned with the concept of `tribe', and it is therefore 
useful to provide a brief survey of the ethnographic situation in colonial Nyasaland 
as it was understood by the authorities. Early administrators viewed Nyasaland 
tribes as essentially discrete entities, although they recognised linguistic affinities 
between the groups. The Mang'anja in the south, the Nyanja around the south of 
Lake Malawi, and the Chewa in the centre of the country were identified as closely 
related groups which were regarded as `the real indigenous inhabitants of Southern 
Nyasaland'. 4 To the north lay the Tumbuka and the Lakeside Tonga, and in the far 
north the Ngonde. To these had been added a number of important immigrant 
groups. The Ngoni, a group ultimately of Zulu origin, had conquered and 
incorporated parts of northern and central Malawi in the mid-nineteenth century, 
although it was recognised that many of those who identified themselves as Ngoni 
were, in reality, descendants of the indigenous population. 5 In the south, Yao people 
from Mozambique had established dominance over the Mang'anja groups around the 
south of the lake and in the Shire Highlands in the 1860s, whilst in the far south, the 
Makololo porters who had accompanied Livingstone in the 1860s had established 
control over the Shire Valley. Finally, from the mid-1890s immigrants from 
Mozambique settled in the Shire Highlands on European plantations and under Yao 
and Mang'anja chiefs. 6 Reflecting the indigenous population's terminology, they 
4 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, 1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 22. s Leroy Vail and Landeg White, `Tribalism in the Political History of Malawi', in Leroy Vail (ed. ), 
The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London: James Currey, 1989), pp. 151-92 (pp. 152-53); 
Bridglal Pachai, `Ngoni politics and diplomacy in Malawi: 1848-1904', in Bridglal Pachai (ed. ), The 
Early History ofMaJawi (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 179-214, (pp. 179-80). 6 Vail and White, `Tribalism', pp. 166-67; Thomas Galligan, `The Nguru Penetration into Nyasaland, 
1892-1914', in Roderick J. Macdonald (ed. ), From Nyasaland to Malawi: Studies in Colonial History 
(Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1975), pp. 108-23 (pp. 109-11). 
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were universally identified as `Nguru'7 but included members of a number of groups 
such as the Lomwe and Mpotola. 
This picture of the population of colonial Nyasaland was simplistic in a number 
of ways. The levels of organisation of these groups varied considerably, and few 
could be regarded as well-defined political entities. The pre-eminence of the Ngoni 
in the centre of the country meant that many people who would be defined as 
Tumbuka, Tonga, or Chewa, were living under an Ngoni political system at the 
beginning of the colonial period. Similarly, in the South many Mang'anja (and later 
Nguru) lived under the control of Yao or Makololo chiefs. 8 Such conditions made 
tribal identity ambiguous, especially given the possibilities of inter-tribal marriages. 
Moreover, these ambiguities were intensified as a direct result of the policies and 
outlook of the colonial state. 
The creation of ethnic stereotypes, which has been identified as such an 
important feature of colonial armies, was mirrored in the attitudes of the civil 
authorities, forming a crucial element of the colonial state's economy of knowledge 
and power, as described by Said. As Ranger has suggested, the attribution of 
particular characteristics to ethnic groups permitted the division of the African 
population into specialised categories reflecting their function in the colonial state. 
To Ranger, such categorisation served a crucial role in the maintenance of colonial 
government through an implied system of divide-and-rule, so that categories such as 
7 Following a successful campaign by the Alomwe Tribal Representative Association in the 1940's, 
the Nguru were officially renamed `Lomwe'. To avoid confusion, they will be referred to as `Nguru' 
for the period up to the 1940s, and thereafter as `Nguru/Lomwe'. 
8 Vail and White, `Tribalism', pp. 152-53,166,173. 
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soldiers and bureaucrats received considerable prestige whilst industrial and 
agricultural labourers were marginalised. 9 
In Nyasaland, such stereotypes were not static, but changed considerably over 
time, as ethnic identities were not only described by, but also interacted with, 
colonial structures. In the early 1890s, the Tonga were regarded as the main 
indigenous allies of the colonial state, and through association with the Livingstonia 
Mission retained an identification with education, and hence also with `intelligence'. 
By contrast, the Yao had initially been regarded as cowardly slave-raiders, but this 
radically changed as soon as the Yao began to co-operate with the Administration 
from the mid-1890s. As Vail and White have shown, the new view of the Yao as 
loyal and trustworthy servants of the Government was dramatically strengthened by 
the events of the Chilembwe Rising of 1915, in which the predominantly Muslim 
Yao were contrasted with the Christian followers of Chilembwe. The Rising also 
had a marked affect upon the Nguru, who had been welcomed as providing urgently 
needed labour in the 1890s. As Chilembwe's followers were largely composed of 
Nguru, they were labelled as disloyal, and subsequently their position under Yao 
chiefs was used to portray them as degenerate and inherently inferior. As Mitchell 
noted in the late 1940s, this process had an effect upon both Nguru and Yao identity, 
as many Nguru who had lived in Yao areas for some time tended to identify 
themselves as Yao for the purposes of prestige. 1° Ultimately, this led to a successful 
attempt to recast the `Nguru' as `Lomwe', both dissociating the tribe from its 
9 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1985); Terence 
Ranger, `The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger 
(eds. ), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 211-62. 
'° J. Clyde Mitchell, The Yao Village: A Study in the Social Structure of a Nyasaland Tribe 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), p. 16. 
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negative image, and enhancing its sense of group identity. As will be shown, such 
changes had a profound impact upon the nature of military recruitment in 
Nyasaland. 11 
The establishment of an ethnic recruitment policy in Nyasaland, 1891-1914 
As McCracken has noted, the influence of the Indian Army upon recruitment in 
Nyasaland was more than conceptual. 12 As outlined in the preceding chapter, the 
core of the armed force which accompanied the new colonial administration in 1891 
was composed of volunteers under a European officer all loaned from the Indian 
Army. Until the late 1890s, the colonial army in Nyasaland was almost wholly 
officered by European officers from the Indian Army, and these men undoubtedly 
brought the assumptions of martial races theory with them. This was clearly 
demonstrated by the decision in 1893, at the suggestion of the Indian Army 
commandant of the armed forces, to replace the Indian Contingent's low caste 
Mazhabi Sikhs with higher caste Jat Sikhs. 13 In fact, however, the initial selection of 
African personnel for the colonial army, which was carried out in Zanzibar in 1891, 
was essentially pragmatic in character, and reflected the personal prejudices of 
Commissioner Johnston, rather than those of his Indian Army commandant. The 
majority of the 130 men were Zanzibaris or `Swahilis' 
4 selected on the basis of 
having accompanied Johnston as retainers on his earlier expeditions in East Africa. 
These were joined by two Goan cooks, two `Arab' clerks, 10 Somalis, 21 `ex-Sidi 
" Vail and White, `Tribalism'. 
12 McCracken, `Authority and Legitimacy', p. 165. 
13 Sir Harry. H. Johnston, British Central Africa: An attempt to Give Some Account of a Portion of the 
Territories Under British Influence North of the Zambesi (London: Methuen, 1897), p. 118; 
McCracken, `Authority and Legitimacy', p. 161. 
1° The term 'Zanzibaris' was used by the administration interchangeably with the term 'Swahilis', and 
as such could denote people from the coastal region of the African mainland opposite Zanzibar, as 
well as from the Island itself. 
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boys' from the Royal Navy, and 13 soldiers seconded from the Zanzibari Army. '5 
This process probably differed little from Johnston's recruitment of porters for his 
earlier expeditions in East Africa, and as such there is little indication that the choice 
of Zanzibaris reflected any kind of expectations of fighting prowess, so much as 
being established practice for obtaining armed retainers in the area. This pragmatism 
also seems to have been reflected in the subsequent decision to recruit `a few' Makua 
from Mozambique, as they were already established as suppliers of labour in 
Portuguese East Africa, 16 and Johnston had successfully used Makua men from 
Portuguese territory during his earlier expedition to Nyasaland in 1889. A number of 
Makua police were also inherited by the Nyasaland administration from an earlier 
expedition undertaken by the British South Africa Company. '7 
Johnston seems to have hoped that the Zanzibari `police force', being cheaper 
to maintain than Sikhs, would quickly be able to become the sole military force in 
Nyasaland. 18 In fact, the authorities rapidly decided that the Zanzibari contingent as a 
whole were of little use as soldiers, and only ten out of the 120 recruited were 
actually employed as police, the remainder being used for road building. 19 This 
probably reflected the fact that unlike the Sikhs, only a small number of the 
15 PRO, FO 94/2114, f. 236, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Zomba, 24 November 
1891. 
16 Thomas Galligan, `The Nguru Penetration into Nyasaland, 1892-1914', in Roderick J. Macdonald 
(ed. ), From Nyasaland to Malawi: Studies in Colonial History (Nairobi: East African Publishing 
House, 1975), pp. 108-23 (p. 111). 
17 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression ofSlave-Raiding in 
Nyassaland, 1892, Cmd. 6699, p. 5; Sir Harry. H. Johnston, British Central Africa: An attempt to 
Give Some Account of a Portion of the Territories Under British Influence North of the Zambesi 
(London: Methuen, 1897), pp. 82-83,90,118. 
18 PRO, FO 2/66, f. 287, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mozambique, 26 April 1894. 
19 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression ofSlave-Raiding in 
Nyassaland, 1892, Cmd. 6699, pp. 2-3. 
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Zanzibaris were trained soldiers, and at first there was little suggestion that they were 
lacking martial qualities as a whole. Whilst they were described as lacking `the 
discipline and military skill of the sepoys', they were also characterised as `willing, 
obedient, and able to stand up to much fatigue'. 20 
It was unsurprising that little emphasis was placed upon the fighting qualities 
of the Zanzibaris, as they were also perceived as fulfilling a useful political role in 
the conquest of Nyasaland. Johnston noted that 
The Zanzibaris are also useful (having been recruited by the direct permission of His 
Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar) in showing to the Mahommedan Chiefs of 
Nyassaland how completely at one with us the Sultan is in his desire to suppress the 
Slave Trade. ' 
However, by late 1893, the Zanzibari soldiers were coming to be regarded as 
generically unsuitable for military service. Johnston later observed, `they were not 
all of them very brave or reliable in warfare'. 
22 This change of opinion seems to 
have reflected a decline in the Zanzibaris' political value to Johnston, who now 
claimed that they were `of little use as fighting men, especially when directed against 
the Arabs and the Yaos, who were practically the brothers of the Zanzibaris on the 
fathers' or mothers' side'. 23 Finally, it was probably expedient that the Zanzibari 
contingent should be projected as poor soldiers, as restrictions placed upon 
20 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression of Slave-Raiding in 
Nyassaland, 1892, Cmd. 6699, p. 14. 
21 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression ofSlave-Raiding in 
Nyassaland, 1892, Cmd. 6699, p. 14. 
u PRO, FO 2/54, f. 71, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
Sir Percy Anderson, Foreign Office, [n. d., 1893]; PRO, FO 2/66, f. 287, H. H. Johnston, 
Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Mozambique, 26 April 1894; Sir Harry. H. Johnston, British Central 
Africa: An attempt to Give Some Account of a Portion of the Territories Under British Influence North 
othe Zambesi (London: Methuen, 1897), p. 118. 
PRO, FO 2/66, f. 287, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mozambique, 26 April 1894. 
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recruitment from Zanzibar meant that sufficient numbers of men could not be 
raised. 24 
By contrast, the Makua soldiers, as the remaining African component of the 
armed forces, were now lauded at the expense of the Zanzibaris. Johnston 
characterised the Makua as `thoroughly brave' but not behaving `too arrogantly or 
harshly towards the friendly natives'. 25 At the same time, however, it was clear that 
there was a willingness to experiment with different sources for soldiers, particularly 
since the Portuguese authorities also restricted the number of Makua who could be 
recruited in Mozambique to around 100. Indeed, by 1894 there were indications of 
broad reservations regarding the whole principle of employing African troops, 
Johnston writing that `In future I am going to spend more money on Sikhs than on a 
black police'. 26 It was probably in reaction to this that, despite the restrictions placed 
upon recruitment from Zanzibar, a body of about 40 `Zanzibar Arabs' were also 
raised for the local forces during 1893. The identity of these men is unclear, since 
the terms `Zanzibari', `Arab' and `Swahili' were often used interchangeably. 
However, they were clearly a distinct group from the earlier Zanzibari contingent, 
and since the majority of the men were former soldiers of the Sultan of Zanzibar's 
bodyguard, it is possible that the men were actually of Baluchi origin. This 
24 PRO, FO 2/66, f. 287, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mozambique, 26 April 1894; Sir Harry. 
H. Johnston, British Central Africa: An attempt to Give Some Account of a Portion of the Territories 
Under British Influence North of the Zambesi (London: Methuen, 1897), p. 118. 
2 PRO, FO 2/66, f. 287, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mozambique, 26 April 1894. 
26 PRO, FO 2/54, if. 271-77, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to Sir Percy Anderson, Foreign Office, [n. d., 1893]. 
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experiment also failed, as the men were considered to be `of poor physique', and 
were mostly discharged after a year. 27 
Thus, by late 1894 the African portion of the armed forces was essentially a 
Makua force, officially consisting of 69 Makua regular soldiers under a single 
Zanzibari Sergeant Major. 28 Emphasising the importance of the Makua element, a 
decision was taken in October to raise the force to the full 100 men permitted by the 
Portuguese authorities. 29 However, reflecting the increasing responsibilities placed 
on the administration by the increasing size of the area under direct British control, a 
decision was also taken to formally include 150 local Africans in the armed forces 
for the first time, although they were termed `irregulars' in contrast to the `regular' 
Makua. 30 The group chosen to provide these men were the Lakeside Tonga from the 
north west coast of Lake Nyasa. 31 This Tonga contingent was raised to 200 in 1895, 
and the situation was formalised later in the year when a decision was taken to train 
the men as regular soldiers, initially for a trial period of one year. 32 
27 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, 1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 41; Sir Harry. H. 
Johnston, British Central Africa: An attempt to Give Some Account of a Portion of the Territories 
Under British Influence North of the Zambesi (London: Methuen, 1897), p. 118. 
28 PRO, FO 2/67, f. 186, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 29 August 1894. 
29 PRO, FO 2/67, ff. 343-61, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 22 October 1894. 
30 PRO, FO 2/67, if. 343-61, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 22 October 1894. 
" The standard colonial terminology was `Atonga'. 
32 PRO, FO 2/88, f. 291, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8 May 1895; PRO, FO 2/89, f. 250, H. 
H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to the Marquis of Salisbury, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2 October 1895; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report 
by Consul and Acting Commissioner Sharpe on the Trade and General Condition of the British 
Central Africa Protectorate from April 1,1896, to March 31,1897,1897, Cmd. 8438, p. 11. 
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The choice of the Tonga appeared to be another essentially pragmatic decision, 
as they were already established as the main providers of civilian labour in 
Nyasaland, with large numbers travelling to work in the south of the country by the 
mid-1890s. This was mainly as a result of the presence of the United Free Church of 
Scotland's Livingstonia Mission, which had drawn the Tonga into the new colonial 
economy faster than other indigenous groups. 33 Their association with Livingstonia, 
and by extension with European interests, was also perceived by many Tonga as a 
sources of strength during a period when they faced a very real threat from their 
Ngoni neighbours. By 1894 Johnston described them as `a race of singular 
usefulness to the European settlers' who had `peculiarly identified themselves with 
the white men's interests'. 34 Moreover, Tonga men had already served as soldiers 
for Europeans in Nyasaland. The forces used in the African Lakes Company's wars 
against `slavers' at the north of Lake Nyasa in the late 1880s were largely composed 
of Tongas, whilst the colonial administration had already used numbers of Tongas as 
soldiers on an informal basis, referring to them either as `irregulars' or `armed 
Atonga labourers'. 35 Despite early harsh appraisals of their fighting capabilities (in 
1892 Johnston complained that some Tonga soldiers `threw down their guns and ran 
away' on hearing firing), the Tonga were confirmed in their position as suppliers of 
33 John McCracken, Politics and Christianity in Malawi 1875-1940: The Impact of the Livingstonia 
Mission in the Northern Province (Blantyre: Christian Literature Association in Malawi, 2000); J. van 
Velsen, The Politics of Kinship: A Study in Social Manipulation Among the Lakeside Tonga of 
Malawi (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 18-19. 
34 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, 1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 24. 
35 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression of Slave-Raiding in British 
Central Africa, 1893, Cmd. 7031, pp. 2,5; PRO, FO 2/54, ff. 100-03, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner 
and Consul General, British Central Africa, to the Earl of Roseberry, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 29 May 1893. 
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military labour. 36 Indeed, Johnston commenting on the 150 men recruited in 1894 
wrote that `These men have already for some time past been used by us [... ] under the 
head of porterage as they very often act as armed porters for the transport of 
ammunition and camp equipage on campaigns'. 37 
If the choice of the Tonga as the source of the first indigenous African recruits 
was in some senses a confirmation of existing civilian and military practice, it seems 
nevertheless that the choice was underlain by a set of assumptions which largely 
excluded other groups from consideration. As medical officer Dr Wordsworth Poole 
observed, 
There are certain recognised ideas about the different races wh. [sic] are repeated 
by everyone. They are passed on from one White man to another originating I 
fancy from the commissioner. For instance, the Yao is the essence of cowardice 
and laziness & never will be any good. The Atonga are the faithful servants of the 
White man or azungu as they call us, plucky and reliable. The Manganja timid and 
fearful. The Angoni Zulu raiders. Whether all this is gospel I don't know. 8 
Such prejudices, which resembled a crude form of `martial races' theory, were 
clearly held at the highest levels, as demonstrated by Johnston's own appraisal of the 
qualities of the various indigenous tribes. 39 Significantly, however, against the 
general assumptions of martial races theory, it was their association with Christianity 
which had brought the Tonga into such close alliance with the Administration, and 
many Tonga recruits were professed Christians 40 
36 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression of Slave-Raiding in British 
Central Africa, 1893, Cmd. 7031, p. 4. 
37 PRO, FO 2/67, if. 343-61, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 22 October 1894. 
36 MNA, 13/WPO/l/1, f. 48, Wordsworth Poole to his mother, Zomba, 21 August 1895. 
39 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, 1894, Cmd. 7504, pp. 22-25. 
40 See McCracken, Politics and Christianity. Sergeant Major Bandawe, the senior indigenous soldier 
during most of the 1890s, was educated at the Livingstonia Mission, and was noted for taking part in 
religious services at the end of military campaigns. Sir Harry H. Johnston, The Story of My Life 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1923), p. 305. 
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Despite the existence of stereotypes about Malawian tribes, the administration 
appears to have remained pragmatic in its willingness to experiment with different 
sources of recruits. Around the same time that 200 Tonga were enlisted as regular 
soldiers, an experiment was also made in the recruitment of 25 `Marimba' (Chewa) 
men from Nkhotakota. 41 on the west coast of Lake Nyasa, and of 50 `friendly' Yaos 
from the Shire Highlands and the southern end of Lake Nyasa. 42 Although it was not 
explicitly stated, this probably reflected the desire not to rely on one ethnic group, 
which was a central feature of recruitment policy in India following the Indian 
Mutiny. The choice of Yaos in particular was surprising. In 1894, Johnston had 
written that 
The Yao is not a brave enemy. He is a wily, skulking robber. You fight with him 
at a great disadvantage in his own country, where there is plenty of cover; in the 
open plains, he is too cowardly to come up within range of your guns. 43 
However, against official expectations, the experiment of using Yao soldiers proved 
to be a success. Johnston reported of the earliest expedition in which the men were 
involved that 
Perhaps the most surprising feature [... ] was the behaviour of the Yao Regulars 
who [... ] were repeatedly praised [... ] for their steadiness, discipline and bravery. 
These men came mostly from the Upper Shire, and were themselves fighting 
against us two years ago. 44 
" In the terminology of the period, `Kota Kota'. 
42 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Consul and Acting Commissioner Sharpe on the 
Trade and Genera! Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate from April 1,1896, to March 
31,1897,1897, Cmd. 8438, p. 12; Clyde Mitchell, The Yao Village, pp. 24-25. 
43 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, 1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 24. 
" PRO, FO 2/89, f. 250, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Zomba, October 1895. 
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By the end of the year, Edwards, the commanding officer of the armed forces, was 
reporting that the Yao soldiers were `steadier than the Atonga and Makua', 45 and by 
early 1896 a decision had been taken to replace the Makua contingent with Yaos, as 
`it seemed foolish to keep on the highly paid Makua when we could get much better 
and braver negro soldiers, locally recruited, who would serve for less than half the 
Makua pay'. 46 From this point, the Yao were swiftly established as the premium 
source of indigenous recruits. Using a language clearly reminiscent of the discourse 
of martial races, Edwards described them as `the most warlike of the tribes in British 
Central Africa', noting that 
The Yaos are undoubtedly our best soldiers, as they have more self reliance and 
character than the Atonga, and are more obedient than the Marimba and Atonga, 
and would be steadier in a critical situation. they are also better shots. " 
Also in line with martial races theory, unlike the Tonga, many Yaos were Muslims, 
although little emphasis was placed upon this point by the military authorities. 
Nevertheless, the Tonga continued to supply the bulk of manpower to the 
army, forming three companies compared to two Yao and one mixed Tonga and 
Chewa company. 48 In fact, Yaos do not appear at first to have shown any great 
45 PRO, FO 2/106, if. 43-57, Major C. A. Edwards, OC Armed Forces, BCA, to H. H. Johnston, 
Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, 27 December 1895. 
46 PRO, FO 2/106, if. 229-39, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to the Treasury, 1 April 1896; PRO, FO 2/107, if. 30-3 1, H. H. Johnston, Commissioner and 
Consul General, British Central Africa, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 11 July 1896; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Consul and Acting 
Commissioner Sharpe on the Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate 
from April 1,1896, to March 31,1897,1897, Cmd. 8438, p. 12; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 24, 
`Composition of Companies - Tribes to be enlisted', ca. 1896; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 50, 
`Composition of D&F Companies', ca. 1896. 
47Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Consul and Acting Commissioner Sharpe on the 
Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate from April 1,1896, to March 
31,1897,1897, Cmd. 8438, p. 12. 
4e Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Consul and Acting Commissioner Sharpe on the 
Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate from April 1,1896, to March 
31,1897,1897, Cmd. 8438, p. 12. 
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inclination to join the army, as it was reported that it was `difficult to obtain 
sufficient' recruits at Zomba, whilst Tongas were easily obtained at Bandawe, and so 
many Chewa recruits were available at Kota Kota that it was decided to set up a new 
recruiting post there. 49 The armed forces continued to show a willingness to 
experiment with different sources of soldiers, and when the new 2nd Battalion was 
raised in 1898, three out of six companies were to include `Aasguru' (Nguru) men. 
Despite the apparent diversity of recruitment, military service was increasingly 
identified with the Yao, to the extent that the 2nd Battalion was referred to in official 
correspondence as the `Yao battalion'. 50 This was partly a reflection of the growing 
difficulty of obtaining Tonga, as they were became more drawn into the colonial 
economy and particularly into labour migration to the mines in Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa. One officer, writing in 1905, still regarded the Tonga as `born 
fighters', compared to the `peaceable' and `easy going' Yao, but complained that `As 
the country settled down and prospered, wages advanced all round, and it became 
difficult to obtain recruits, especially Atongas', and that `recruiting for the [South 
African] mines [... ] seriously interfered with the supply of Atonga recruits'. 
51 The 
failure to attract Tongas seems to have inspired a search for alternative sources to 
balance the Yao companies, and an experiment was made in recruiting from the 
°9 PRO, FO 2/107, f. 288, Alfred Sharpe, Acting Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 9 September 1896; PRO, 
FO 2/108, f. 288, Alfred Sharpe, Acting Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Sir Clement Hill, Foreign Office, 1 December 1896. 
When the BCA Rifles expanded in late 1898, the proportion of Yaos increased, as they provided two 
out of three new companies. NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 192, `Strength of new force', 5 
September 1898; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 343, `Strength new coys. ', 21 December 1899. 
50 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Relating to the Ashanti War 1900, Cmd. 501, 
39. 
C. Percival, `Five Years in British Central Africa', in The Rifle Brigade Chronicle for 1905 
(London: John Bale and Sons, 1906), pp. 47-73 (pp. 48-49,68,71). 
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Ngoni, who it was noted showed `great promise'. 52 Johnston had referred to the 
Ngoni as early as 1894 as `warlike [... ] altogether a splendid people, and may be 
regarded as the backbone of British Central Africa', but in the 1890s they were still 
regarded as a potential source of internal opposition to the colonial Government, and 
were probably only considered as a source of recruits after Northern Ngoniland had 
been brought under formal administrative control in 1904.53 One of the Tonga 
companies in 2 KAR was also replaced by Bemba men from North-Eastern 
Rhodesia. 54 
The increasing reliance upon the Yao in the face of falling Tonga recruitment 
was accompanied by growing signs of concern with ethnic purity, and implied 
knowledge of tribal characteristics of the kind which informed the more developed 
martial races theory in India. The authorities had been happy to mix Yao soldiers 
with their Nguru neighbours in 1898, but by 1906 the Inspector-General of the KAR, 
finding that half of the Yao contingent of 2 KAR was actually made up of other 
southern tribes such as the Mang'anja, Nguru and Chewa, complained that `The Yao 
element in the battalion is considerably less than it should be [... ] there are 149 pure 
Yaos whereas the establishment should be 3 Yao Companies of 100 men'. He 
further explicitly stated that he was `not in favour of Manganja or Wa-Nyasa or other 
52 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, British Central Africa. Report on the Trade and General 
Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate for 1903-4,1904, Cmd. 2242. 
53 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, 1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 24; Great 
Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Sir Harry Johnston, K. C. B. on the Trade and 
General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate April 1,1895, to March 31,1896,1896, 
Cmd. 8254, p. 4; Bridglal Pachai, `Ngoni politics and diplomacy in Malawi, 1848-1904', in Bridglal 
Pachai (ed. ), The Early History of Malawi (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 179-214 (pp. 202-06). 
5e Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Colonial Reports - Annual. No. 472. British Central Africa 
Protectorate. Report for 1904-5, Cmd. 2684-18; Moyse Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 137. 
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such tribes to replace Yaos'. 55 Rather than eliminating non-Yao tribes from 
enlistment, the effect of this new emphasis was probably, as Shepperson has 
suggested, simply to encourage potential recruits to claim to be Yaos, a procedure 
which must have been relatively easy for those Mang'anja and Nguru recruits who 
lived under Yao Chiefs. 56 This seems to have been recognised by the authorities, 
since by 1908, whilst Mang'anja, Nguru and Chewa soldiers were no longer listed on 
the strength of the battalions, the term Yao had been replaced by `Yao and 
Kindred'. 57 In any case, if men were claiming to be Yaos in order to join the KAR, 
this can only have increased the level of association between the Yao and military 
service in the eyes of the authorities. 
The ascendancy of the Yao reached its apex in the reductions of 1911, when a 
decision was taken to reduce 1 KAR, already only four companies strong, to two 
companies. The Tonga and Ngoni companies were selected for reduction on the 
basis that the men, recruited in Northern Nyasaland, could not easily be transferred 
into companies made up of Yaos. With the disbandment of 2 KAR and the Indian 
contingent, this meant that the forces in Nyasaland were composed entirely of Yaos 
and Mang'anja (now regarded as their `kindred tribe'). 58 This situation was quite 
55 My italics. PRO, CO 534/3, f. 119, Inspection Report 2 KAR, Brigadier-General W. H. Manning, 
Inspector-General KAR, Zomba, 20 April 1906; PRO, CO 534/3, f. 128, `Notes for the Officer 
Commanding, 2nd Bn, The King's African Rifles', by Brigadier-General W. H. Manning, Inspector- 
General KAR, Zomba, 19 April 1906. 
56 Clyde Mitchell, The Yao Village, p. 16; George Shepperson, `The Military History of British 
Central Africa', The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal: Human Problems in British Central Africa, 26 
(1959), 23-33 (pp. 25-26); Violet Lucy Jhala, `The Yao in the Shire Highlands, 1861-1915: Political 
Dominance and Reaction to Colonialism', Journal of Social Science, University of Malawi, 9 (1982), 
1-21 (p. 14). 
s' Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Colonial Reports - Annual. No. 574. Nyasaland 
Protectorate. Report for 1907-8,1908, Cmd. 3729-38. 
51 The two Yao companies were subsequently increased to four in May 1911. 
Moyse Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 151-52; PRO, CO 534/15, f. 46, Inspection Report on 
the Ist Battalion KAR, 1912-1913, by Colonel G. Thesiger, Inspector General KAR, 12 November 
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contrary to the generally recognised aims of the doctrine of martial races, which 
insisted that different ethnic groups within the army should balance each other. Up 
to this point, the issue of ethnic balance had not arisen in Nyasaland, since the Indian 
contingent had provided the necessary reliable group in case of a rising by the 
indigenous population. However, the new situation brought the questions of ethnic 
balance and the reliability of the African soldiery into sharp focus for the first time. 
The Inspector-General questioned the new organisation as early as 1912, expressing 
concern that 
[I]n the event of any disturbance amongst the Yaos who include the larger 
proportion of the population of the country, we should have to deal with it by 
troops drawn from the same tribes and similar religious sympathies. This has 
hitherto been considered unsound [... ] in our own empire [... ] I would very much 
prefer to see a company available which was composed of men drawn from other 
tribes such as the Atonga or Angoni"59 
The fact that the majority of Yao soldiers identified themselves as Muslims increased 
official fears regarding the ethnic composition of the army, since it was felt that the 
main internal threat in Nyasaland was the danger of an Islamically inspired rebellion. 
The Intelligence Officer feared that the Yao soldiers `could hardly be expected to 
remain loyal to the British flag' in the event of a `religious war', and also called for 
the forces to be composed of more than one tribe. 60 In response, I KAR was again 
expanded, with two new Tonga and two Ngoni companies being raised by April 
1914, with the specific aim of maintaining `tribal balance'. 61 In line with this, 
contingency plans for a `native rising' now explicitly drew attention to the usefulness 
of tribal differences, stating that soldiers of `tribes other than those showing 
1912; PRO, CO 534/15, f. 60, Return showing Racial and Class Composition of the Ist Battalion 
KAR, November 1912. 
59 PRO, CO 534/15, f. 46, Inspection Report on the 1st Battalion KAR, 1912-1913, by Colonel G. 
Thesiger, Inspector General KAR, 12 November 1912. 
60 MNA, KAR I/l/I, Intelligence Officer I KAR, to Adjutant 1 KAR, 2 December 1912. 
6' Moyse Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 157,159; CO 534/18, f. 163, Governor of Nyasaland 
to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Zomba, 7 February 1914. 
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discontent' should be used, and suggesting that `differences of religion, prestige and 
character' which were felt to exist between tribes `might be worked upon' in an 
emergency. 62 
By 1914, therefore, a system was established which was in some respects 
typical of colonial recruitment policy in Africa. The Yao from Southern Nyasaland, 
on the one hand, were balanced by the Tonga and Ngoni from the north and west on 
the other, and all three groups were now identified as `fighting' or `warrior' tribes. 
Equally, the enlistment of educated Africans had been avoided in Nyasaland as in 
other territories, except in specific roles, such as interpreters. 63 At the same time, 
however, in the Tonga the army had unusually favoured a group which was 
perceived as being associated with missionary education. Equally, the emphasis 
which was placed upon the Yao as the premier martial group seemed to owe as much 
to the increasing unwillingness of the Tonga to enlist, in the face of more lucrative 
employment alternatives in the mines, as it did to any perceived inherent qualities of 
the Yao. This point was emphasised by the fluid nature of the term Yao; despite the 
increasing recourse to the language of martial races, rather than excluding non-Yaos, 
the authorities ultimately knowingly responded to shortages of Yao recruits by 
defining other groups, such as the Nguru, Mang'anja, and Nyanja, as `kindred tribes' 
to the Yao. Moreover, the Yao's Islam, which has been seen as a typical feature of 
martial races in Africa, was in fact viewed as their most worrying feature. 
62 MNA, KAR I/l/l, Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin, Officer Commanding Troops Nyasaland, to Chief 
Secretary Nyasaland, Dedza, 22 May 1914; MNA, KAR 1/2/1, Nyasaland Defence Scheme 1913. 
63 For example, in a list of occupations of 314 men baptised by the Blantyre Mission, 4 were shown to 
be `Sergeant-Interpreters' in the army, but only one was an ordinary soldier. `Analysis of 
Occupations followed by the Male Baptised Adults of Blantyre and Domasi, as at December 31st 
1899', Life and Work in British Central Africa, 154 (January-March 1901), p. 13. 
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Nevertheless, regardless of how far it reflected reality, the pattern which emerged, of 
Yaos predominating, balanced by Tonga and Ngoni as the premier sources of 
recruits, was to remain influential at least up to the Second World War. 
Recruitment policy in the First World War 
Prior to the expansion of the KAR from 1916, the impact of the First World 
War upon recruitment patterns was relatively limited. The initial requirements for 
expansion were met from former soldiers and reservists, who were formed into three 
`Reserve' companies to reinforce the companies of I KAR which were serving in 
Nyasaland, an arrangement which obviously reproduced earlier ethnic biases. 6' As 
Parsons has shown, in common with other elements of the KAR, recruitment 
requirements following the initial small scale expansion were limited to the 
replacement of casualties. However, in Nyasaland these efforts were so successful 
that in late 1915 a call for 500 recruits for the detachment of I KAR serving in 
Kenya provided over 1,000 men, permitting the re-raising of 2 KAR. 65" This 
recruitment continued to concentrate upon established recruiting areas. 66 
Pre-war biases in favour of the Yao, Tonga and Ngoni were also largely 
maintained during the expansion of I and 2 KAR after 1916. Indeed, in the new 2 
KAR these patterns seem to have been intensified, as whole battalions were 
established on a tribal basis, with 1/2 KAR predominantly Yao, whilst all Tonga and 
64 Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hordern, Military Operations East Africa: Volume 1 August 1914- 
September 1916 (London: HMSO, 1941; repr. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1990), pp. 561,565-66. 65 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 64; Hordern, Military Operations, p. 562. 66 Melvin E. Page, The Chiwaya War: Malawian and the First World War (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 2000), p. 35. 
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Ngoni soldiers were sent to 2/2 KAR. 67 However, at the same time as maintaining 
existing sources of recruits within Nyasaland, a general difficulty in obtaining 
enough men was reflected in a decision to expand recruiting for 1 and 2 KAR into 
Northern Rhodesia and Mozambique. However, even here established patterns were 
reproduced, with concentration in Northern Rhodesia upon the Bemba (who had 
already provided manpower for the KAR in 1905), whilst in Mozambique efforts 
were focussed upon the Yao. 68 In a more direct break with pre-war practice, the third 
battalions of 1 and 2 KAR were to be recruited from captured German territory and 
from surrendered German soldiers. 69 
By the end of the war, the tribal composition of the Nyasaland battalions was 
broader than it had been in 1914, but the numbers of Yao, Ngoni, and Tonga 
remained disproportionately high. From a total of 9,819 soldiers, 35 per cent were 
Yao, 17 per cent were Nyanja, 22 per cent were Ngoni and Chipeta, and six per cent 
were Tonga, whilst the remaining 20 per cent were made up of other tribes. In 
comparison to the numbers who had served as carriers, officially estimated at over 
125,000, the number of men serving in the army was trivial. Nevertheless, in the 
case of a small group such as the Tonga, such figures could be much more 
significant, as men serving in the KAR accounted for over 10 per cent of the able- 
bodied male population. It is interesting to note that with the exception of the Tonga, 
unlike the situation in Kenya, groups such as the Yao and Ngoni who were identified 
67 Hordern, Military Operations, p. 566. 
68 PRO, CO 534/20, if. 325-26, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor of Nyasaland, 13 
October 1916; PRO, CO 534/21, f. 353, `Scheme for Reorganization of the King's African Rifles', C- 
in-C East Africa Force to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Nairobi, 25 June 1916; PRO, CO 
534/20, f. 312, Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 August 1916; Page, 
The Chiwaya War, p. 32; Hordern, Military Operations, p. 562-63. 
69 PRO, CO 534/20, f 325-26, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor of Nyasaland, 13 
October 1916. 
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as martial were not avoided for service as carriers. Indeed, whilst the proportion of 
Yao carriers, at 20 per cent, was considerably lower than in the army, the number of 
Ngoni and Chipeta was much higher at 42 per cent of the total. 70 
Inter-war recruitment policy 
The period after the First World War saw a wholesale return to pre-war 
emphases in recruitment policy. Although the Chilembwe Rising of 1915 had been 
clearly identified with Christianity, the Nyasaland Defence Scheme of 1925 
continued to repeat the assertion that the major internal threat to stability in 
Nyasaland came from the possibility of an Islamic rising involving the Yao. It was 
again stressed that `the YAO soldiers amongst the local troops would feel impelled 
on religious grounds to join such a rising though perfectly loyal to the British 
Government under ordinary circumstances'. " This possibility therefore continued to 
inform recruitment policy, and particularly the notion of ethnic balance in the army. 
The renewed imperative to balance the Yao element in the Nyasaland 
battalions was evident early after the end of the war. When I KAR was reorganised 
in 1919, many of the Tanganyikan soldiers from the German Schutztruppen who had 
been co-opted by the British during the war were retained, allowing the three `Yao 
and Kindred' companies to be matched by one Tonga, one Ngoni, and one `Ex 
German' company. Emphasising its `balancing' function, the ex-German company 
70 PRO, CO 525/82, f. 64, Hector Duff, Acting Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, January 1919; Geoffrey Hodges, The Carrier Corps: Military Labor in the East African 
Campaign, 1914-1918 (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 100-02; Parsons, The African Rank- 
and-File, pp. 63,65. 
71 MNA, KAR 1/2/2, f. 17, `General Defence Scheme for the Protectorate of Nyasaland 1925'. 
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was to be used to garrison Nyasaland, along with one of the Yao companies. 72 In I 
KAR, even this innovation was abandoned as a decision was taken to disband all but 
one platoon of the Tanganyikan company and replace them with Tonga and Ngoni 
recruits from Nyasaland. 73 This effectively left 1 KAR in the state which had been 
perceived as ideal in the pre-war period, being composed of one half Yao and the 
other half Tonga and Ngoni, a situation regarded as `satisfactory from a political 
point of view'. 74 
In spite of the continued reference to the possibility of unrest amongst the Yao, 
2 KAR found it increasingly difficult to maintain the desired tribal balance in the 
face of falling Tonga and Ngoni enlistment. By 1921-22, about two-thirds of 2 KAR 
was made up of Yao and kindred tribes, a category which now seems to have 
included not only Yao, Nyanja and Nguru, but also Makokola, Mpotola, Mang'anja 
and possibly Chewa soldiers. 75 More significantly, whilst the majority of Tonga men 
were confined to one company, the remainder of the tribes were distributed evenly 
throughout the battalion, signifying a break from the established pattern of division 
72 PRO, CO 534/34, f. 76, Commandant's Representative, KAR Nyasaland, to Acting Chief Secretary 
Nyassaland, Zomba, 3 May 1919; PRO, CO 534/40, f. 65, Return showing Racial and Class 
Composition of the Ist Battalion KAR, Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Griffiths, OC 1 KAR, Masoko, 
May 1920. 
73 PRO, CO 534/41, f. 149, `Inspection Report 1919-1920,1st Battalion King's African Rifles and 
Combined Depot 1st and 2nd KAR Zomba', Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, 8 
May 1920. 
74 PRO, CO 534/49, f. 487, `Inspection Report 1921-1922,1st Battalion The King's African Rifles', 
Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, Zomba, 10 June 1922; PRO, CO 534/46, f. 338, 
`Class Composition No. 3. Depot Company 1/Ist K. A. R. ', Captain Henry Green, Zomba, 11 
December 1920; PRO, CO 534/47, f. 26, `Inspection Report 1920-1921,211 st Battalion The King's 
African Rifles', Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, Kilossa, 31 January 1921; PRO, 
CO 534/49, f. 623, `Inspection Report 1921-1922,2/1st Battalion The King's African Rifles', Colonel 
G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, [n. d. ]. 
"Although the Chewa were clearly linguistically related to the Mang'anja/Nyanja, the colonial 
authorities tended to associate them with the Ngoni on the basis of geographical proximity. 
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into tribal companies. 76 However, this practical reaction to changing recruitment 
patterns did not necessarily represent the abandonment of the imperatives which had 
informed tribal recruitment in Nyasaland, and in 1927 the Inspector-General 
complained that 
I was not only surprised, but concerned, to find that the old tribal organization had 
been broken up. I consider the tribal spirit should be maintained; it makes for 
rivalry and efficiency. It is also a factor of safety in case of unrest in Nyasaland. 
He added that `The sister Battalion (The 1st) still maintains the tribal system [... ] 
with the happiest results', and instructions that `the traditional tribal organization' 
should be restored. 77 
In fact, the difficulty of maintaining tribal balance could not be so easily 
overcome. Even in I KAR, which was still maintaining tribal companies in the early 
1930s, it was noted that there was `an increasing difficulty in obtaining Atonga and 
Angoni recruits', whilst in contrast `Yaos' presented themselves at the Zomba depot 
in such numbers that it was found unnecessary to send out recruiting parties. 
Nevertheless, the Inspector-General still insisted that `it would be most unwise to 
allow an undue preponderance of trained men in any one tribe'. 78 Nevertheless, by 
1933, both battalions comprised around two thirds soldiers from tribes formerly 
considered as `kindred' to the Yao, and in 1 KAR, Tonga soldiers comprised just 5.5 
76 PRO, CO 534/47, f. 45, `Inspection Report 1920-1921,2nd Battalion The King's African Rifles', 
Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, Tabora, 7 February 1921; PRO, CO 534/49, f. 
667, 'Inspection Report 1921-1922,2nd Battalion The King's African Rifles', Colonel G. M. P. 
Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, Tabora, 18 April 1922; PRO, CO 534/49, f. 673, `Numbers by 
Tribe', by Major L. G. Murray, OC 2/KAR, Tabora, 18 April 1922; PRO, CO 534/51, f. 378, 
'2nd Battalion The King's African Rifles. Numbers by Tribes', Lieutenant-Colonel L. G. Murray, OC 
2/KAR, Tabora, 1 April 1923; PRO, CO 534/54, f. 390, `2nd Battalion The King's African Rifles. 
Numbers by Tribes', Lieutenant-Colonel L. G. Murray, OC 2/KAR, Tabora, I November 1923. 
77 PRO, CO 820/3/11, `Inspection Report 2nd Battalion The King's African Rifles' , Colonel Walker, Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, Dar-es-Salaam, 4 December 1927. 
78 PRO, CO 820/6/1, 'Inspection Report, First Battalion The King's African Rifles, ' Colonel Walker, 
Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, Dar-es-Salaam, 1927. 
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per cent of the strength. 79 By this time, southern tribes were so prevalent that the 
concept of `kindred' tribes to the Yao seems to have outlived its usefulness and 
disappeared from official documents. 
By 1935, the authorities were forced to legitimise the abandonment of tribal 
balance by emphasising the importance of martial characteristics in isolation. It was 
claimed that Tonga and Ngoni recruits `appear[ed] to be declining in physique', as 
many were `discarded as suffering from bilharzia, hookworm, and V. D. ' Therefore, 
it could now be argued that the preponderance of Yaos and Nguru was unproblematic 
because, in contrast to the `degenerate' northern tribes, they were `famous for their 
fighting characteristics and deterioration in reliability and courage need not be 
anticipated. 80 However, as the decline in recruitment from northern Nyasaland 
continued a more realistic approach was adopted, again associating recruitment 
difficulties with `[t]he attractions of pay and standard of living of the South African 
labour market', but by this time the situation was regarded as so serious that 
consideration was given to engaging men from Northern Rhodesia to replace 
northern Malawians. 81 By the eve of the war, all signs of tribal balance had 
disappeared, with 58 per cent of soldiers identified as Yaos, and most of the 
79 PRO, CO 820/17/6, `Southern Brigade, King's African Rifles: Racial distribution of African 
combatant ranks on 30th September 1933', Major P. R. Mundy, Acting OC Southern Brigade KAR, 
Dar-es-Salaam, 30 October 1933. 
to PRO, CO 820/21/13, `Southern Brigade, King's African Rifles: Racial distribution of African 
combatant ranks on 31st December, 1935'; PRO, CO 820/25/9, `Southern Brigade, King's African 
Rifles: Racial distribution of African combatant ranks on 31st/12/1936', by Colonel C. C. Fowkes, 
OC Southern Brigade KAR, Dar-es-Salaam, 20 February 1937. 
81 PRO, CO 820/30/4, `Southern Brigade, King's African Rifles: Racial distribution of African 
combatant ranks on 30th November 1937', by Colonel C. C. Fowkes, OC Southern Brigade KAR, 
Dar-es-Salaam, 31 December 1937; PRO, CO 820/34/12, 'Southern Brigade, King's African Rifles: 
Racial distribution of African combatant ranks on 31st Oct. 1938, by Colonel C. C. Fowkes, OC 
Southern Brigade KAR, 7 December 1938. 
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remainder made up of Nyanja and Nguru, whilst Tonga and Ngoni soldiers together 
provided only five per cent of the manpower. 82 
The Second World War 
The outbreak of the war provoked renewed concern with tribal recruitment 
patterns, as the increased demand for manpower to fill places in newly raised units 
meant that the failure of the Tonga to enlist was again seen as an important obstacle 
to Nyasaland's recruitment capacity. In the face of a request to raise two new 
battalions in July 1940, the Governor complained that the Tonga were `not repeat not 
playing at present', and again identified labour migration from the north as the root 
cause. The Governor implored the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to limit 
labour recruitment to those men who were unfit for military service, and recruitment 
for South Africa by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) was 
banned until 1941.83 
Interest in tribal recruitment was increased by the agency of military officers 
serving with Nyasaland troops who, imbued with the concepts of warrior tribes, 
sought to ensure that they were provided with what they perceived as the best 
material. In line with this thinking, failings by particular groups of soldiers were 
immediately ascribed to particular tribal characteristics. One senior officer 
complained that 
82 MNA, KAR 3/3/2, `Half Yearly Additions and Amendments to the Nyasaland Intelligence Report. 
June, 1939. ' 
81 MNA, S 41/1/8/1, f. 4, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, to Major General D. P. Dickinson, 
10 July 1940; MNA, S 41/1/8/I, ff. 22-23, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir Herbert 
Stanley, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, 16 July 1940; David Killingray, `Labour Mobilisation 
in British Colonial Africa for the War Effort, 1939-46', in David Killingray and Richard Rathbone 
(eds. ), Africa and the Second World War (London: Macmillan Press, 1986), pp. 68-96 (pp. 79-80). 
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the only tribe that has shown any sign of being gun shy has been the Nguru, and 
commanders hope you will not enlist more of them than you must. I think you will 
agree that [... ] it is a pity to include members of a tribe that are not up to the fine 
fighting quality of the rest. '" 
Others noted that the Tonga were `disappointing', and in an even more explicit echo 
of earlier martial races discourse, a company commander was reported as saying that 
`his Atongas had run away' during fighting in northern Kenya, arguing that this was 
`because they were Christians'. 85 The senior officer who reported this conversation, 
and who had commanded Tonga soldiers during the First World War, rejected this 
explanation, but still clearly expressed a belief in martial characteristics, insisting 
that it was `just possible that the wrong sort of people had been recruited and called 
Atongas'. 86 As late as August 1940, the military authorities were still calling for a 
narrow recruiting base of 50 per cent Yaos, 30 per cent Ngoni, 15 per cent Tonga and 
only five per cent from other groups. 81 
In fact, as early as March 1940, even the Yao were no longer the dominant 
element in the armed forces, providing only 30 per cent of recruits compared to 43 
per cent Nguru, 20 per cent Nyanja, five per cent Ngoni and only two per cent others 
including the Tonga. Faced with the practical responsibility for raising recruits, the 
civil authorities argued that recruitment had to be broadened, as the tribes favoured 
by military commanders simply were not presenting themselves for enlistment. 
Indeed, the Governor cast doubts upon the whole idea of tribal characteristics, 
84 S 41/1/8/1, f. 38, Major General D. P. Dickinson, Advanced Force HQ, to D. M. Kennedy, 
Governor of Nyasaland, 12 July 1940. 
eS RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (7), f. 37, Colonel Desmond John Bannister, 1936-41; MNA, S 41/1/8/1, f. 
63, Mitchell, CSEAG, to D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, 20 July 1940. 
86 MNA, S 4I/1/8/l, f. 63, Mitchell, CSEAG, to D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, 20 July 
1940. 
87 MNA, S 41/1/8/1, f. 104, Chief Secretary to the East African Governors Conference to Chief 
Secretary Nyasaland, 3 August 1940. 
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suggesting that criticisms of the Nguru were the result of `an anti Anguru complex' 
in I KAR. 88 Following this, in August 1940 the bar on the enlistment of non-martial 
tribes was lifted at the discretion of the Governor, whilst the Chief Secretary made a 
further attack on tribal recruitment by pointing out that soldiers of `the despised 
N'guru' had recently received two medals for gallantry. 89 
Nevertheless, although it had now been conceded that `no potentially good 
soldier shall be rejected by reason of his tribe', the government still permitted an 
official `preference' for Yao, Ngoni and Tonga recruits. 90 Moreover, in terms of the 
total number of recruits required, the failure of the Tonga to enlist was still regarded 
as a major difficulty, and when in 1941 the officer responsible for recruitment among 
the Tonga reported that `the young men refused even to attend village meetings', 
were `frightened of aeroplanes and bombs', and were `determin[ed] to have nothing 
to do with the war', the Acting Governor resorted to the idea of tribal degeneration, 
blaming `[a]n individualistic outlook and the fleshpots of Johannesburg'. 91 In line 
with this, recruitment of Malawians for civilian work outside the Protectorate was 
again banned in November 1942.92 
88 MNA, S 41/1/8/1, f. 41, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland to Major General D. P. Dickinson, 
24 July 1940. 
89 MNA, S 41/1/8/1 f. 102, `Record of a meeting held in the Council Chamber, Zomba, at 2.30pm on 
Tuesday 6th August, 1940'; MNA, S 33/2/1/1, if. 76-77, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland to 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 October 1940. 
90 MNA, S 33/2/1/1, if. 76-77, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 26 October 1940. 
91 MNA, S 33/2/1/1, f 98-99, K. L. Hall, Acting Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 4 February 1941. 
92 MNA, S 332/2/l/l, E. C. Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir Oliver Stanley, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 27 January 1943, p. 12. 
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Despite the official abandonment of tribal recruitment by the Government of 
Nyasaland, the military authorities maintained an interest in the idea of distinctive 
tribal qualities. In late 1941 the East African Command decided to conduct a 
`Survey of Soldierly Qualities of African Troops', which asked European officers 
serving with African units to rate each tribe either `good', `fair' or `bad', according 
to 25 categories ranging from `Adaptability', `Reaction to Discipline' and `Fighting 
qualities', to `Cleanliness and Turnout' and 'Thrift'. 3 Surprisingly, some officers 
now felt that the Nguru were better soldiers than the Yao, but officers generally 
appeared to be abandoning the idea of martial races altogether. However, this did 
not necessarily reflect a complete rejection of the idea of tribal characteristics, but 
rather a feeling that `owing to the congestion of the population and the migratory 
habits of the male population it is not possible to differentiate between tribes'. 4 
Underlining this, the results of the survey suggested serious inconsistencies in 
attitudes towards tribal qualities. As a Nyasaland official pointed out, 
I think the most that one could say is that the `Anguru' would probably come out at 
the top of an order of merit and the `Ampatola' at the bottom. This I think clearly 
illustrates how useless is the analysis for the Ampatola are Anguru. `Anguru' is a 
term covering people who live in, or have migrated recently from, a certain area in 
Portuguese East Africa; the term `Anguru' covers several tribes, one of which is 
the Mpatola 95 
The shift away from martial races concepts may also have been encouraged by the 
arrival in the East African forces of new officers from the British army who, arriving 
in the KAR outside the context of colonial Nyasaland, could see little reason to seek 
inter-tribal distinctions. However, even an officer recruited from Nyasaland's 
93 MNA, S 41/1/20/5/1, Assistant Adjutant General, HQ East Africa Command, to HQ Central Area, 
12 November 1941; S 41/1/20/4/1, `Survey of Soldierly Qualities of African Troops', HQ East Africa 
Command, March 1943. 
94 S 41/1/20/4/1, `Survey of Soldierly Qualities of African Troops', HQ East Africa Command, March 
1943. 
's MNA, S 41/1/20/4, Minute to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 8 April 1943; Parsons, The African Rank- 
and-File, p. 91. 
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European population noted that `the opinion of the regular, pre-war K. A. R. officers 
about the fighting quality of the different Nyasaland tribes was based more on 
Mythology than fact. '96 By the end of the war, there is some suggestion that the 
military authorities were positively encouraging officers to think of all their soldiers 
as `Nyasas', and wartime officers certainly seem to have been happier to ascribe 
characteristics to Malawians as a whole, rather than to individual tribes. 7 
By 1943, following the official abandonment of tribal preferences in recruiting, 
the Nguru/Lomwe, Yao, and Nyanja nevertheless remained over-represented, 
accounting for around 65 per cent of the 30,000 soldiers from Nyasaland, with most 
of the remainder divided between the Chewa and Ngoni, Tonga soldiers still 
providing only two per cent 9 Despite the continuing under-representation of the 
Tonga, the ban on labour migration was lifted in August 1943, both in response to 
protests from the Governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and in 
reaction to fears that the large numbers of Malawians in military and civil 
employment was having a deleterious effect upon the social structure of Nyasaland. 
To facilitate this, military requirements for recruits from Nyasaland for the second 
% RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) 11, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's African 
Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947, By Donald Ferguson Tait 
Bowie', 1981; Interview with Professor George Shepperson, 30 March 2000. 
97 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (8), f. 18, Patrick William George Barnes, 1942-45; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 
(36), f. 65, Major G. N. Burden, 1940-42; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 24, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Harold Patrick Lepel Glass (1937-53); RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (154), if. 15,18, `Memorandum from R. 
W. Kettlewell concerning the role of British forces in Africa', 20 July 1979; Warner, `Recruitment 
and Service in the King's African Rifles', p. 60. 
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half of 1943 were reduced from 14,000 to 2,625.99 Thereafter, the numbers of men 
recruited in Nyasaland fell sharply, from 9,117 in 1943 to 978 in 1945.10° 
The war not only changed the tribal composition of Nyasaland's armed forces, 
it also affected the types of recruits sought by the authorities. Educated Africans had 
been sought only for a limited number of positions before the war, such as 
interpreters, and increasingly during the 1930s as musicians and signallers. 101 
However, as has been shown elsewhere, the modernisation and expansion of the East 
African forces during the Second World War created a large-scale requirement for 
educated Africans to fill clerical and technical positions such as clerks, teachers, 
medical staff, artillerymen, engineers and drivers. 102 As Parsons has noted, this 
meant that the colonial army in East Africa was for the first time competing with 
civilian employers for skilled African labour. This problem was particularly acute in 
the case of Nyasaland, where the army had to compete with the attraction of the 
labour markets of the Rhodesias and South Africa. Indeed, even before the war, in 
Nyasaland it had proven difficult to find enough educated recruits to fill posts in the 
thirty-three man Southern Brigade Signal Section. 103 Labour migration thus affected 
9' MNA, S 41/2/2/1/3, E. C. Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir Oliver Stanley, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 17 January 1944, pp. 3-4,6-7. 
100 MNA, S 41/2/2/1/3, E. C. Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir Oliver Stanley, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 17 January 1944, p. 8; MNA, S 41/2/2/1/3, E. C. Richards, Governor of 
Nyasaland, to G. H. Hall, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 March 1946, p. 7. 
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es-Salaam, 16 January 1932; PRO, CO 820/34/12, `Enlistments, re-engagements, discharges, 
desertions etc. for year from 1/12/37 to 31/10/38', by Colonel C. C. Fowkes, OC Southern Brigade 
KAR, 7 December 1938; IWM Sound Archive, 3960/05 Colonel R. E. S. Yeldham CBE (3 November 
1978), p. 13. 
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Africa to Under Secretary of State, War Office, Nairobi, 10 December 1939. 
103 PRO, CO 820/34/12, 'Southern Brigade, King's African Rifles: Enlistments, re-engagements, 
discharges, desertions etc. for year from 1/12/37 to 31/10/38', Colonel C. C. Fowkes, OC Southern 
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not only the ability to sustain the ethnic composition of the armed forces, but also 
meant that, as the Governor noted in 1943, `[v]ery few educated Africans [were] 
willing to enlist' as `Army rates of pay compare[d] unfavourably with the wages so 
easily obtained in the mines'. To remedy this, Malawians who failed to reach the 
required standards of education were sent to the Jeanes Training Centre in Kenya to 
be educated by the army. 104 By 1945 the army had established a long term 
requirement for educated recruits. 
Post-war recruitment policy 
Although the Nyasaland battalions were returned to their pre-war establishment 
of two battalions after the conflict, there was no official return to tribal recruitment 
biases. Post-war recruitment drives referred to provinces and districts rather than to 
tribes, and District Commissioners sending in individual recruits often made no 
reference to their tribal origin. 105 Enlistment in the army continued to be popular 
amongst Malawians throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and in early 1949, the Northern 
and Central Provinces which had proven such difficult recruiting ground in the inter- 
war period supplied 418 out of a total of 563 recruits. 
106 However, a concern 
regarding the general shortfall of enlistment from northern Nyasaland was still 
evident in a decision taken in 1952 to keep recruiting in the Northern and Central 
Racial distribution of African combatant ranks on 31st Oct. 1938', Colonel C. C. Fowkes, OC 
Southern Brigade KAR, 7 December 1938. 
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78 
Provinces open all year round. 107 The army also maintained the requirement for 
considerable numbers of educated recruits. A 1955 recruitment drive called for `45 
intelligent men' for enlistment into the KAR Nyasaland Band, insisting that 
`Applicants must have passed Standard V in any recognised school', `whilst a similar 
drive in 1956 called for signallers who `must be in possession of Standard VI 
Certificate of Education. "08 Later, in 1960 the Federal authorities introduced pay 
increases with the specific aim to `make service in the Army more attractive to the 
better-educated African'. 109 
However, there were still strong indications that old martial races concepts 
continued to be transferred from officer to officer. One officer who served with 2 
KAR for less than two years in the mid 1950s still recalled that 
Some tribes were better than others and also, although I am a practising Christian, I 
was of the opinion that the heathen and non-Christian Africans were the most 
trustworthy [... ] All our Askari were Nyasers [sic] of varying tribes but we found 
that the greatest number came from the Ndebele tribe. [... ] The Ndebele in our 
opinion made the best soldier. They were not particularly intelligent but accepted 
discipline far more easily than the other tribes and in fact liked being soldiers! 
Such an account suggests some confusion, since the Ndebele were in fact a group 
associated with Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the continuing currency of martial 
races even in an unofficial form cannot have failed to continue to inform recruitment 
when military officers were directly involved in the process. 
As in the war, the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
107 Major M. Wilkinson, 2 KAR, to DC Kasungu, 16 May 1952. 
10' 1 DCKU 1/8/1/66, OC Depot (Nyasaland) KAR to DC Kasungu, 16 September 1955; MNA, 1 
DCKU 1/8/1/81, OC I KAR to DC Kasungu, 16 August 1956. 
109 `Increases for Askari', Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Newsletter, 16 September 1960, p. 
7. 
110 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, pp. 2-3. 
79 
in 1954 probably encouraged the idea of Malawian soldiers simply as `Nyasas', as 
they were absorbed into a larger framework which invited comparison with Southern 
and Northern Rhodesian soldiers. Within the Federation, Malawians seem to have 
become identified particularly with service in the infantry, by the early 1960s 
providing not only over 97 per cent of the manpower in 1 and 2 KAR, but also nearly 
20 per cent of the Northern Rhodesia Regiment, as well as a small number serving in 
the Rhodesian African Rifles. By contrast, in 1962 Malawians represented only 30 
per cent of the Medical Corps and Army Service Corps, and just nine per cent of the 
Engineers, and seven per cent of the Signals. 
' 11 
Despite an extensive improvement in pay and conditions under the 
Federation, 112 by the early 1960s there were signs that African opposition to the 
Federal Government was having a negative impact upon recruitment from 
Nyasaland. The Tonga had boycotted military `Flag Marches' as early as 1953, and 
Parsons notes that by 1961 recruitment had become impossible in the Northern 
Province as the population there identified the KAR as part of the Federal structure 
rather than an indigenous military force. 
113 Finally, faced with the prospect of 
Nyasaland's secession from the Federation, the Federal authorities themselves came 
to doubt the wisdom of recruitment from Nyasaland, particularly in those units which 
were based outside Nyasaland. In 1962 it was noted that 
"' MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `Draft Memorandum on `The "Transfer" of One, or Both 
KAR Battalions to the Nyasaland Government', ca. May 1963; MNA F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), 
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June, 1962', 19 June 1962. 
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The Northern Rhodesia Regiment, Rhodesian African Rifles, and other Corps of 
the Army have serving in them some 300 Nyasaland Africans. [In the case of 
Nyasaland's secession] it is considered that it is expecting too much of human 
nature to demand loyalty from them and they [... ] should be released from the 
armed force 
As `a completely unacceptable security risk', 1 and 2 KAR were to be transferred 
from the Federal Army to the independent Nyasaland, whilst in general it was felt 
that `The 2500 trained Askari released from the Army will be an immediate gain for 
the armed forces of Pan-Africanism. ' 114 In these circumstances it was unsurprising 
that the recruitment of Malawians was no longer a priority for the Federal Army. 
Although a coherent theory of Nyasaland's martial races had been established 
by 1914, over time, recruitment policy in Nyasaland was characterised by vacillation. 
The Nguru were first identified as a source of recruits in 1898, were then denigrated 
as an inferior group to the Yao, but as Nguru men continued to join the army, they 
were subsequently subsumed within Yao identity as a `kindred tribe'. As the idea of 
kindred tribe lost its usefulness in the years before the Second World War, the Nguru 
were again maligned, but ultimately as they came to be the dominant group within 
the army, the authorities had little choice but to re-identify them as Nyasaland's best 
soldiers. Similarly the Yao were only identified as a martial group after Yaos had 
demonstrated their willingness to enlist in the army, and following this their position 
in the army seems to have been strengthened by non-Yaos simply calling themselves 
Yaos in order to enlist. The military authorities appear to have actively 
accommodated this pattern by identifying virtually all the groups in southern 
Nyasaland as `kindred to the Yao'. This strongly suggests the extent to which 
11° MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), Paper on the implications of the secession of Nyasaland, 
Federal Ministry of Defence, 21 June 1962. 
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recruitment policy was made in reaction to the readiness of particular groups of 
Malawians to join the Army. The importance of the willingness of Africans to enlist 
is even more clearly demonstrated in the failure of the military authorities' efforts to 
arrest the decline in Tonga and Ngoni recruitment, despite the recognition of the 
problem from the early 1900s. The remainder of the chapter will therefore seek to 
identify the motivation behind African enlistment. 
Methods of recruitment 
African motivation to enlist in the army was reflected in the changing 
recruitment methods adopted by the military authorities. The most active method 
adopted was the recruiting `ulendo', essentially a Chinyanja equivalent of the 
KiSwahili safari, which was used in various forms throughout most of the colonial 
period. In the 1890s, ulendos usually reflected a requirement for large numbers of 
recruits, such as when new companies or battalions were formed, or when large 
numbers of men had reached the end of their periods of service. t 15 The use of 
ulendos was limited at this time due to the relatively large number of military posts 
in the Protectorate, which allowed the authorities to recruit soldiers on a local basis 
throughout the country. Such recruitment could be very localised, and one officer 
raising a new company in 1896 obtained his first recruit simply by asking a man he 
met in a local store `whether he would like to be a soldier'. 116 To facilitate this 
process, a dedicated recruitment centre was established at Nkhotakota in the same 
year, and all six companies of the newly organised BCAR were allocated specific 
"S NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Orders 190-197, 'Augmentation of Forces', 5 September 1898; Moyse 
Bartlett, The King's African Ries, p. 125. 
116 MNA, I3/WPO/l/1, if. 189-90, Wordsworth Poole to his Aunt Mary, Zomba, 21 December 1896. 
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districts from which they were expected to raise their manpower. 
117 By the turn of 
the century, localised recruitment comprised an established process in which the 
commanding officer of a station simply notified local village headmen of his 
requirements for men, who were then sent to enlist individually. Indeed, the 
authorities were so reliant upon this approach that the use of large scale recruiting 
tours by the newly-raised 2 CAR caused considerable resentment among the officers 
of 1 CAR, who felt that this disrupted their own enlistments by causing fears of 
forced conscription. 118 
Early recruiting ulendos usually seem to have been carried out by an individual 
officer, sometimes accompanied by a small party of soldiers. The form of these first 
recruiting tours is unclear, but officials probably emphasised the material benefits of 
service, which were regarded as a vital component of the recruiting process. 
' 19 With 
the reduction of the number of military posts in the 1900s, local recruitment could no 
longer be relied upon. Accordingly, district officials were co-opted to assist, and 
recruiting ulendos took on a more elaborate form. 
120 In 1906, the Inspector-General 
argued that 
if an unknown Military Officer goes by himself to endeavour to obtain recruits he 
will get none. Application should be made [... ] for assistance from Civil Officers 
in certain districts and a party of picked N. C. Os and men with a few drummers and 
buglers under a picked Officer should accompany the Civil Officer to likely 
1" PRO, FO 2/107, f. 288, Alfred Sharpe, Acting Commissioner and Consul General, British Central 
Africa, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 9 September 1896; PRO, 
FO 2/108, f. 288, Alfred Sharpe, Acting Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa, to 
the Sir Clement Hill, Foreign Office, I December 1896; PRO, FO 2/106, f. 248, 'Reorganization of 
armed Forces in British Central Africa proposed by Major C. A. Edwards', April 1896. 
11g Moyse Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 125-26. 
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recruiting grounds. Everything should be done to make the service appear as 
attractive as possible. '2' 
From this point, military music became an established feature of recruiting tours in 
Nyasaland, and when a decision was taken to disband the KAR Band in 1911, the 
Governor forcefully argued against the action on the basis of the band's usefulness in 
attracting volunteers. 122 Despite the disbandment of the brass band, the Nyasaland 
battalions continued to maintain fife and drum bands as well as bugles, and these 
remained an integral part of recruitment ulendos in Nyasaland. 123 Indeed, Page has 
persuasively argued that the widespread use of bands during the First World War was 
largely responsible for the high levels of enlistment in the Protectorate. 124 
Reflecting the decline in recruitment from northern Nyasaland, ulendos 
accompanied by the band continued to be used in the 1920s and `30s in an attempt to 
obtain large numbers of Tonga and Ngoni recruits. 125 The concept of the ulendo was 
reinforced in the late 1930s by the prospect of war, and officials even suggested that 
the image of the ulendo itself could be a greater inducement to recruitment than the 
material rewards of military service: 
During the last War numbers of natives were recruited in Nyasaland by special 
recruiting parties, patrols of the King's African Rifles complete with band and flag- 
flying and commanded by specially selected officers. Repetition of these methods 
by their glamorous appeal to native imagination and love of display appear to me to 
offer greater promise of success. [... ] A bonus [of 20 shillings] might be an 
121 PRO, CO 534/3, f. 128, `Notes for the Officer Commanding, 2nd Bn, The King's African Rifles', 
by Brigadier-General W. H. Manning, Inspector-General KAR, Zomba, 19 April 1906. 
122 PRO, CO 534/13, f. 63, W. H. Manning, Governor of Nyasaland, to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Zomba, 28 October 1911. For the idea of military spectacle as `theatre', and 
especially the use of this in recruitment, see Scott Hughes Myerly, British Military Spectacle: From 
the Napoleonic Wars Through the Crimea (London: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
123 MNA, S 1/966/20/4, OC I KAR to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 28 April 1926. 
124 Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 33-35. 
125 MNA, NN 1/18/1, f. 2, Major Commanding 2 KAR, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 15 April 1935; 
MNA, NN 1/18/1, f. 5, OC 2 KAR to PC Northern Province, 11 February 1936; MNA, NN 1/18/1, f. 
22, PC Northern Province to Captain MacC. Wilkins, 2KAR, 18 June 1937; MNA, NN 1/18/1, 
Captain MacC. Wilkins, 2 KAR, to PC Northern Province, 2 July 1937. 
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additional inducement, but it should come from the military recruiting patrol on the 
spot, and not as propaganda undertaken by District Commissioners. '2 
In line with this thinking, with the onset of the war the new recruiting structure 
which was established was designed to replicate the most useful elements of the 
earlier ulendos, consisting of four `mobile recruiting units' which each included 
buglers and soldiers in uniform, despite the fact that the organisation was under the 
control of a civilian Director of Recruitment. 127 The explicit aim of such methods 
was `to go in for every kind of theatricality', and to add to the impressive nature of 
the `show', the Tanganyikan KAR Band was brought in to tour Nyasaland. This was 
regarded as successful enough that in the absence of a military band the Nyasaland 
Police Band was used in recruiting for the remainder of the war, and was 
subsequently supplemented by a mobile cinema showing film of the war. 
128 
The late 1940s saw a renewed interest in the use of ulendos, as 1 KAR, posted 
in Northern Rhodesia and lacking a depot in Nyasaland, was compelled to send back 
recruiting parties as the only means of obtaining the large numbers of recruits which 
they required. 129 These tours were carried out on a considerable scale; one 
undertaken in early 1949 consisted of a three week tour of the headquarters of 
important Native Authorities (NAs) in the Southern Province, and involved a total of 
126 MNA, S 1/240/34, f. 65, Johnie Abraham, Senior PC, Blantyre, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 31 
March 1937. 
127 MNA, S 41/1/8/1, f. 50, Captain G. N. Burden to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 30 July 1940. 
'28MNA, S 41/1/8/1, ff. 165-66, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, 5 August 1940; MNA, S 
41/1/8/1, f. 182, Lieutenant Colonel N. R. G. Tucker, OC Depot Battalion KAR Zomba, to Chief 
Secretary Nyasaland, 7 September 1940; MNA, S 33! 2/1/1, f. 76, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of 
Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 October 1940; MNA, S 332/1/1, f. 104, K. L. 
Hall, Acting Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 February 1941; MNA, S 
33/2/2/I/I, E. C. Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 27 January 1943, pp. 11-12; MNA, S 34/1/4/1/12, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 2 of 
1943,10 February 1943. 
129 IWM Sound Archive, 6185/03, Colonel H. P. Williams OBE (15 October 1979), p. 16. 
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47 military personnel equipped with eight vehicles. The band remained a prominent 
element in recruitment, with the entire procedure being described as follows: 
(a) Recruiting party arrives at time arranged by the D. C. with the N. A. concerned. 
(b) Corps of Drums plays programme for approximately 20 minutes. 
(c) Recruiting Officer addresses gathering explaining conditions of service in 
KAR. 
(d) Corps of Drums play further programme of approximately 15 minutes. 
(e) Recruits coming forward are selected. 
(f) Recruiting Party leaves, taking with them all recruits selected, and returns to the 
Advanced Recruiting Centre (normally D. Cs Boma). 130 
These methods of recruitment continued to be used in major recruiting campaigns at 
least until the mid-1950s, when the Corps of Drums were still included as a central 
feature of the recruiting process, considered `a great "draw"' which `assist[ed] 
considerably in recruiting. ' 131 
Native Authorities remained an important element in recruitment, serving as 
hosts to visiting ulendvs, and apparently sometimes still actively selecting men to 
present themselves to visiting recruiting parties. 132 Equally, it had always been felt 
that recruitment should appear to have the blessing of NAs, so that in 1940 it was 
argued that when possible parties `should include relations of chiefs or important 
headmen in the principal areas of recruitment'. 133 However, with the large scale 
manpower requirements of the Second World War, and particularly the failure of 
ulendos to attract Tonga and Ngoni recruits, the authorities increasingly looked to 
NAs as an alternative means of recruiting soldiers in their own right. In 1940, the 
Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province went to extreme lengths to 
1311 MNA, I DCMJ I/10/1/5, OC I KAR to DC Mlanje, January 1949. 
131 MNA, F 248/2077, CAC/1012/2/A(1)/78, Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Jackson, OC I KAR, to HQ 
Central Africa Command, 15 February 1955; MNA, F 248/2077, CAC/1012/2/A(1)/37, Lieutenant 
Colonel F. H. Hyde, OC I KAR, to HQ Central Africa Command, Zomba, 14 December 1955. 
132 IWM Sound Archive, 3864/03, Major P. Q. Logan (I I September 1979), p. 9. 
133 MNA, S 41/1/8/I, f. 52, Captain G. N. Burden to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 30 July 1940. 
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embarrass a group of Ngoni NAs into actively encouraging recruitment, using a 
mixture threats, and crude references to inter-tribal rivalries and concepts of 
masculinity: 
The Chiefs had said that, if the war came to Africa, their people would join the 
army M'mbelwa was asked for men two months ago. He had only sent 12 fit men. 
Would his grand-father call that an army, even when fighting the Chewa? [... ] 
In the Inkosi's grand-father's time no young man could marry unless he had been a 
soldier and no woman would sleep with a man who was afraid to fight. Why did 
not the women do something about it? He could understand Hitler calling them 
apes. They certainly did not seem to be men. [... ] 
Provincial Commissioner said that M'mbelwa had sent his own brother. The 
Makosana and Malumuzana should do the same immediately and every Village 
Headman should follow. What were the spirits of their ancestors thinking about 
them? 
(During this harangue, tribal photographs of the 2nd King's African Rifles were 
held up showing large numbers of Yao, Nyanja and Nguru and a very small group 
of Ngoni). The Chiefs and old men appeared to be genuinely ashamed, but alleged 
that they had no control over the young men. They were told that was their fault. 
["] 
The Chiefs said they [... ] would continue to try. Provincial Commissioner said 
they must get down to it at once. If they did not do something, he would have to 
consider whether they should continue to draw their pay and whether they were fit 
to be Chiefs. 134 
However, in general the administration tried to co-opt rather than threaten NAs5 
attempting to `latter' them by providing stocks of uniforms for issue to potential 
soldiers, and overall it was emphasised that they were making ' an important 
contribution to the recruitment process. '35 
Like NAs, district officials had always been involved in recruitment, providing 
logistical assistance to military recruiting parties, but from the Second World War, 
they too became more directly involved as recruiters in their own right. Lacking the 
facilities to create the military `theatre' of the ulendo, in the 1930s the military 
authorities had tended to turn to civil officials when seeking mission educated 
134 MNA, S 41/1/8/1, if. 71-72, `Notes of a Meeting with N. A. M'Mbelwa and Other Chiefs at 
Mzimba on the 19th July', [n. d., 1940]. 
"s MNA, S 33/2/1/1, f. 73, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 26 October 1940. 
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recruits for posts such as signallers and interpreters, who were felt to be more 
susceptible to the hard facts of the financial benefits of military service than to 
displays of military imagery. 136 During the Second World War, with recruitment 
under civil control, the role of District Commissioners (DCs) in this area was 
enhanced alongside other methods. By 1944, when the numbers of recruits required 
had been considerably reduced, and large scale civil recruitment structures had 
consequently outlived their usefulness, recruitment was placed entirely in the hands 
of DCs. 137 
Despite the continued use of ulendos, the role of DCs and NAs in recruitment 
expanded after the war, and by the mid-1950s DCs were regarded as the standard 
medium for recruitment. 138 In 1952, a major campaign was carried out through DCs, 
who were to appeal for new soldiers using a combination of posters and the 
notification of requirements to NAs. In contrast to the spectacle which was still 
employed in ulendos, poster campaigns emphasised rates of pay and allowances, as 
well as the useful skills which might be learned in the army. DCs were furnished 
with a fifteen-page pamphlet to allow them to provide detailed information on the 
food, clothing, and facilities which the KAR provided, as well as tables of pay rates 
and gratuities. Notably, these campaigns made little reference to military life, again 
136 MNA, S 2/16/32, f. 1, OC Southern Brigade KAR to K. L. Hall, Chief Secretary Nyasaland, Dar- 
es-Salaam, 16 January 1932; MNA, S 2/16/32, f. 2, Director of Education to K. L. Hall, Chief 
Secretary Nyasaland, Dar-es-Salaam, 16 January 1932; MNA, S 2/16/32, f. 13, K. L. Hall, Chief 
Secretary Nyasaland, to OC Southern Brigade KAR, 22 July 1932; MNA, NN 1/18/1, OC 2 KAR to 
PC Northern Province, 24 September 1938. 
137 MNA, S 33/2/2/1/5, E. C. Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir Oliver Stanley, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 31 January 1945, p. S. 
138 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 3. 
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reflecting a perception that educated Africans were less likely to find the army 
appealing. 139 
The military authorities also made conscious use of less official recruitment 
methods. At the turn of the century, one officer noted that during periods when 
active recruitment was not being carried out, `recruits [... ] were generally brought 
down by men returning from leave'. '40 The army continued to recognise the 
potential of experienced African soldiers as recruiters, and in 1935 as part of the 
effort to attract Tongas, Tonga soldiers were instructed `to inform their friends that 
recruiting is opening and ask those desirous of joining to present themselves to the 
District Commissioner'. 14 ' As in the British army, the authorities also made use of 
old soldiers as recruiting sergeants, such as ex-Company Sergeant Major Neza who 
was employed in 1938 to engage `as many men as possible' in Chinteche, receiving 
one shilling for each recruit he provided. 142 Similarly, in 1940, in the absence of a 
local recruiting organisation, it was suggested that `an old sergeant' should be sent 
from Nyasaland t' the Southern Rhodesian mines to recruit Malawians for the 
KAR. 143 By the end of the war, such systems were formalised as older serving non- 
commissioned officers and warrant officers were seconded to DCs to help 
recruitment. 144 However, whilst established old soldiers were seen as a useful 
139 MNA, 1 DCMJ 1/10/1/16, Recruiting Poster, ca. 1952; MNA I DCKU 1/8/1, OC 2 KAR to DC 
Kasungu, 16 May 1952; MNA, I DCKU 1/8/1, `Notes on the King's African Rifles', May 1952. 
140 Percival, `Five Years in British Central Africa', p. 70. 
1' MNA, NN 1/18/1, f. 2, Major Commanding 2 KAR, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, IS April 1935. 
142 MNA, NN 1/18/1, f. 33, Captain Collen, Adjutant 2KAR, to DC Chinteche, 3 October 1938. 
"' MNA, S 41/1/8/1, f. 43, Nyasaland Labour Officer Salisbury to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 24 
July 1940. 
144 MNA, LB 8/2/1/88, Memorandum to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 24 October 1944. 
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recruiting tool, it was also recognised that serving soldiers' complaints about military 
life might have an adverse effect upon recruitment. 145 
An extension to the idea of recruitment through individual soldiers was the 
acknowledgement that soldiers' families offered a potential source of manpower. An 
officer who served in the late 1920s noted that enlistment often `went through from 
the father to the son and then on to the family', and recalled the enthusiasm of 
soldiers' sons for military drill. 146 A desire to foster an interest in military life 
among soldiers' sons may have inspired the authorities' decision to support the 
formation of a KAR Scout Troop in 1951, for which 2 KAR not only supplied 
uniforms, but also appointed an African sergeant to act as Scoutmaster. 147 The aim 
of drawing soldiers' sons into the army was made clear in the unofficial, and un- 
uniformed, `Boys Platoon' which was established in 2 KAR by early 1961, providing 
military training in subjects such as close-order drill, map-reading and physical 
training. 148 In June 1962, the provision of education to soldiers' children was being 
linked with a new `scheme for the training of African boys as junior leaders with a 
view to suitable candidates being sent to Sandhurst for officer training'. 149 By the 
end of the same month, the aim of using the boys' platoon to feed soldiers' sons into 
the army was made quite explicit: 
145 MNA, S 34/1/4/1/12, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 2 of 1943,10 February 1943. 
146 IWM Sound Archive, 3960/05 Colonel R. E. S. Yeldham CBE (3 November 1978), pp. 9-10. 
147 MNA, 17/BSA/l/42, Captain M. E. W. Morton, 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion KAR, Zomba, to 
Richard C. Belcher, Organising Commissioner, Boy Scouts of Nyasaland, 6 September 1951; MNA, 
17/BSA/l/42, Organising Commissioner, Boy Scouts of Nyasaland, to Major Moss, KAR Zomba, 29 
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148 MNA, F 249/1131, G/ARC/A, Annex `J' to Agenda for 3rd GOC's Conference, 'Nyasaland Area 
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Boys' platoons have been formed within the African Battalions to enable the sons 
of serving soldiers to be given basic military training in the hope that this will 
encourage an interest in an army career. A Junior Leader Unit is now in the 
process of being formed to groom the sons of Askari or ex-Askari to fill non- 
commissioned officer posts and also to prepare the more promising entrants for 
eventual consideration for admission to Sandhurst. It is hoped that the Boys' 
Platoon will serve as a source of candidates for the Junior Leader Unit. 
'so 
In the face of Malawians' opposition to the Federation, and the consequent Federal 
fears regarding `Pan-Africanism', soldiers' families, already absorbed into military 
life, probably seemed a uniquely promising source of recruits in the 1960s. 
Finally, it is important to recognise that despite the array of active recruiting 
methods available to the army, in fact, the authorities were often able to take a 
passive attitude to recruitment throughout the colonial period. One officer writing of 
the late 1890s recalled that, in contrast to the general use of recruiting parties, `in 
Zomba the Yaos used to offer themselves for enlistment' without active 
encouragement, and Page has noted that large numbers of men simply presented 
themselves for service at the outbreak of the First World War, consequently being 
termed `Waself'. 15' Another officer serving in the mid-1920s noted that generally 
there had been no need for ulendos as `People used to come in [to Zomba] and ask to 
join'. 152 Inter-war reports consistently compared the difficulties of recruitment in the 
north to the ease with which local recruits were obtained at Zomba. Indeed, in 1927 
voluntary enlistment by local men at the Zomba depot was so common that concerns 
were even raised that it was having a detrimental effect upon the quality of KAR 
personnel, by discouraging efforts to recruit a `better type of Yao from the more 
150 F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `Improvements in African conditions of service since Federation. ' 
25 June 1962. 
151 Percival, `Five Years in British Central Africa', p. 70; Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 27-28. 
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distant parts of the Protectorate'. 153 Similarly, DCs' records show that as late as the 
1950s, numbers of men continued to present themselves for military service, and 
sometimes had to turned away due to the lack of vacancies. '54 
The motivation to enlist 
Official recruitment methods were obviously designed to appeal to potential 
recruits. As such, changing recruitment methods, which sought to react to shifts in 
the motivations behind African enlistment, offer some guide to the nature of that 
motivation. However, it must be recognised that some recruits did not in any sense 
choose to join the army. Unlike Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, which all 
introduced forms of conscription during the Second World War, compulsory military 
service was never officially adopted in Nyasaland. '55 Nevertheless, it is certain that 
numbers of Malawians who found themselves in the colonial army did not do so 
through their own choice. In the early 1890s, hundreds of Tonga labourers in 
European employment were simply loaned to the administration by their employers 
to act as soldiers, although there is no suggestion that these men became officially 
recognised members of the army. 156 There is also tantalising evidence for 
straightforward press-ganging in the early days of the colonial army. In an account 
of the Ashanti campaign of 1900, Naso, `a native of the West Shire District', recalls 
being `caught, and put on a boat' by soldiers and taken to West Africa where he took 
'S' I WM Sound Archive, 3864/03, Major P. Q. Logan (11 September 1979), pp. 9-10; PRO, CO 
820/6/1, `Inspection Report, First Battalion The King's African Rifles', Colonel Walker, Inspector- 
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part in fighting against the Asante. 157 Naso's account is reminiscent of the military's 
conscription of civilian porters at the turn of the century, but these porters did not 
usually accompany the regiment on overseas campaigns, so it is certainly possible 
that Naso was press-ganged into the army. 158 
The use of NAs in recruitment provides much more compelling evidence for an 
element of compulsion in enlistment. The early practice, outlined above, of military 
officers notifying village headmen of recruitment requirements implies that headmen 
were able to guarantee a supply of men, and this is suggestive of some element of 
compulsion being used by them. Page notes that NAs made concerted efforts to 
encourage men to join the army during the First World War, but there is little 
suggestion that this extended to a form of active conscription. 159 However, there is 
much stronger evidence for unofficial conscription on the part of NAs during the 
Second World War. Unsurprisingly, given the way in which chiefs were threatened 
at the beginning of the war, some took active steps to provide recruits, with Tonga 
chiefs calling for the power to conscript. 16() Hypocritically, the Governor criticised 
northern NAs for `[t]he use of over-zealous methods', but he also noted approvingly 
that `certain Native Authorities in the Northern Province have given their sons and 
nephews as soldiers in order to show the way to their people', so these men at least 
probably had little choice in their enlistment. 161 Such compulsion became even more 
overt in 1942, when village headmen in Nyasaland were unofficially allocated a 
. S' MNA, KAR 2/1/4, `History of the Ashanti campaign by a native of the West Shire District', 1900. 
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160 MNA, S 41/1/8/1, f. 73, `Meeting with Native Authorities at Chinteche on the 22nd of July', [n. d., 
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quota of about three recruits each, and as Parsons notes, even a recruiting official 
came to the conclusion that `It would be unfair [... ] to allow the East Africa 
Command to believe that all our 1942 recruits are true volunteers'. 162 
Nevertheless, as the authorities' consistently elaborate efforts to attract recruits 
attest, conscription was never perceived as either a viable or a desirable alternative to 
voluntary enlistment. Whilst the authorities emphasised the role of military spectacle 
in enlistment for most of the colonial period, there can be little doubt that financial 
inducements were always a major factor in Malawians' motivation to join the 
colonial army. The importance of pay is most clearly demonstrated in the persistent 
recruitment problem in northern Nyasaland, where the higher pay offered by the 
mines successfully competed with military pay levels. In this respect, enlistment into 
the army can be seen as analogous to other forms of wage labour. Supporting the 
idea of military service as essentially interchangeable with labour migration, van 
Velsen notes that the Tonga used the same term, `kujoin' to refer to enlistment in the 
army or the police as to contract labour in the mines. 
163 As Parsons emphasises, this 
suggests that the predominance of recruits from southern Malawi was a reflection of 
the lack of alternative options, due to the combination of more limited access to 
education, and the absence of direct labour recruitment for the mines. 164 
Pay policy throughout the colonial period certainly suggests the extent to 
which Malawian willingness to enlist was dependent upon the inducement of pay. In 
1894, irregular soldiers from Nyasaland were all paid about five to six shillings per 
162 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 83. 
163 Van Velsen, The Politics of Kinship, p. 19n. 
164 Parsons, The African Rank-and-file, pp. 60-61. 
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month, regardless of rank. 165 However, by 1896, following the formal organisation 
of the forces, a progressive pay scale had been introduced under which recruits 
would receive 2 shillings per month, rising after training to either four shillings if 
they enlisted for under a year (subsequently 3 years) or 5 shillings if they enlisted for 
a longer period. Men could expect to receive seven shillings on promotion to 
corporal, 10 if they were promoted to sergeant, and 15 if they reached the rank of 
colour-sergeant. 166 These levels seem to have compared favourably to a local 
average wage for unskilled labour (including military porters) of three shillings per 
month, but in 1897, the authorities were forced to raise recruits' pay from two to five 
shillings per month, as `it was found that no natives would enlist at the lower rate'. 167 
When the 2nd Battalion was raised for overseas service it was also felt necessary as 
an extra inducement to increase pay by 50 per cent for men serving outside 
Nyasaland. 168 Nevertheless, even this inducement proved insufficient, and from 
January 1902, pay rates were doubled, so that a private in Nyasaland would now 
receive 10 shillings per month or 15 shillings if he was serving outside the 
Protectorate. 169 In 1904, it was noted that `[t]he attraction of higher pay has brought 
many recruits to the colours'. 170 However, at the same time, rates of pay in the mines 
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of Rhodesia and South Africa had already reached a level of at least 30 shillings per 
month, and remained consistently higher than military wages in Nyasaland. '7' 
This new scale remained in force at the beginning of the First World War, but 
the importance of pay was again brought into focus by the differential rates received 
in the companies serving in Nyasaland and East Africa. In 1915 it was suggested 
that since all the companies were on active service, neither serving soldiers nor 
potential recruits would understand why they were paid on a lower scale. In 
consequence it was proposed that the pay of the Nyasaland companies should be 
increased by 50 per cent to the foreign service level as an aid to recruitment, but in 
fact the rate was only increased by 25 per cent. 172 The re-raising of 2 KAR in 1916 
compounded the difficulty, as it was formed under East African regulations, and in 
1917 the pay of all the KAR battalions outside Nyasaland was standardised so that a 
private in 2 KAR would receive 15 or 16 Rupees (about 21 shillings and four pence) 
per month by comparison to 15 shillings in 1 KAR. 173 Unsurprisingly, recruits seem 
to have been so reluctant to enlist at the lower rate that, if pay levels could not be 
standardised, it was suggested that 2 KAR recruiting should be stopped to enable 1 
KAR to obtain recruits. 174 
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Despite the evident reluctance of recruits to enlist for lower pay, rates were 
actually reduced in 1920 on the basis that they were `unnecessarily high, in normal 
times, to attract recruits for local service'. Privates would now receive 15 shillings 
instead of 18 shillings and eight pence, whilst a Regimental Sergeant Major was 
reduced from 80 to 100 shillings to 60 to 80 shillings per month. 175 However, the 
reduction did not seem to have an adverse effect upon recruitment as a whole, and 
similar rates remained in force through the 1920s. 176 By 1929, a private's pay had 
reached 20 shillings per month, but outside Nyasaland this rose to 28 shillings, a 
level which remained in force on the outbreak of the Second World War. At the 
same time, mechanisation forced the army to compete with civilian employers for 
educated Africans to fill specialised posts, and this showed the importance of pay as 
an inducement much more starkly, as a driver in the newly established Supply and 
Transport Section could expect to earn between 30 and 110 shillings per month, the 
same rate as that received by a Regimental Sergeant Major in the KAR in 
Nyasaland. 177 
The differences in pay between soldiers in the KAR and in the support services 
were less marked than this during the war, but were still significant. A private in the 
East African Army Service Corps (EAASC) earned 60 shillings a month in 
173 PRO, CO 534/41, if. 155-57, `Inspection Report 1919-1920.1st King's African Rifles and 
Combined Depot ist & 2nd K. A. R. Zomba', Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General King's 
African Rifles, Zomba, 8 May 1920. 
176 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles, (Zomba: 
Government Printer, Nyasaland, 1927), p. 48. 
"' MNA, KAR 5/1/3, `Report on the Re-organization of the King's African Rifles', 1929; MNA, 
KAR 5/111, 'The re-organisation of the forces in our East African Colonies', Inspector-General, 
RWAFF and KAR, August 1937. 
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comparison to 28 in the KAR. '78 As in the First World War, this caused problems in 
recruitment, as men who were aware of the differences declined to enlist at the lower 
rate, and in consequence recruitment to the EAASC was deliberately carried out in 
different locations from tat for the KAR. 179 Soldiers were keenly aware of such 
differences, as one EAASC sergeant recalled: 
I was getting five pounds a month, when a sergeant in the KAR was three pounds 
fifty, and a company sergeant major was four pounds ten, and RSM, you know, six 
pounds, but me, I was at five pounds a month, and I had a lot of privileges. 180 
Nevertheless, reflecting the different recruitment aims which lay behind these 
differential rates, soldiers' pay did not increase significantly during the war, and by 
the late 1940s, basic pay for a private had only risen to the equivalent of 33 shillings 
per month. '81 This was still higher than wages available for manual labour in 
Nyasaland, but was well behind the lowest wages available for skilled workers, or 
labour migrants in South Africa. 182 Even the commanding officer of 1 KAR was 
struck by the `terrible poverty' of the soldiers, noting that `pay had not gone ahead 
with times at all'. 183 This low pay was mitigated by the possibility of extra pay for 
active service in Malaya which rose to 115 shillings and six pence per month. 
194 
Finally, the absorption of the Nyasaland battalions into the Central Africa Command 
in 1954 led to a significant improvement, as new pay rates for African soldiers were 
178 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 89. 
19 MNA S 33/2/2/1, f. 147, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, to Lord Moyne, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies [n. d., c. late 1941 ]. 
180 Interview with Wilfred Chipanda, 19 February 1999. 
181 Rates were usually given by day in the post-war period, but here they have been calculated on the 
basis of a thirty day month for ease of comparison. 
182 In late 1945, an agricultural labourer in Nyasaland was estimated to earn 12 to 25 shillings per 
month; a hospital assistant could earn up to 330 shillings. A migrant mineworker in South Africa 
could expect a minimum of 70 to 100 shillings a month. 
LB 8/2/1/171, Labour Commissioner Nyasaland, to Directorate of Education and Welfare, Nairobi, I 
December 1945; John McCracken, `The Age of Development' (unpublished chapter, 2002), p. 28. 
183 IWM Sound Archive, 6185/03, Colonel H. P. Williams OBE (15 October 1979), pp. 3,17. 
194 PRO, CO 537/4651/1, H. A. Bennet, War Office, to P. H. Pavey, Admiralty. 29 December 1948; 
MNA I DCKU 1/8/1, `Notes on the King's African Rifles', May 1952, part 6. 
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standardised between the three territories. Following this, a private's basic pay 
reached 87 shillings and six pence per month, whilst a Regimental Sergeant Major's 
pay rose from 167 shillings and six pence to 675 shillings. 185 
It is also important to recognise that the potential financial rewards of military 
service went beyond the basic pay received by the soldier. In the 1890s, soldiers 
could expect to receive, according to their rank, a portion of the profits from the sale 
of any loot obtained during military campaigns, as well as being able to freely loot 
chickens and foodstuffs from captured villages. 186 In addition to such occasional 
benefits, soldiers were subject to various allowances and increments over time. 
Good conduct pay of one shilling per month was introduced in 1899, and by 1927 
proficiency pay of between five and 12 shillings per month was available to soldiers 
on the basis of efficiency. ' 97 Moreover, by the early 1950s, a marriage allowance 
had also been introduced which could provide up to 26 shillings per month for a man 
with two children, and by 1962 this had reached standard rate of 60 shillings. '88 
The financial rewards of military service were not limited to the period of 
active service. From 1911, after nine-years' service soldiers from Nyasaland were 
18S MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `The Nyasaland Battalions - Changes since Federation', 
Lieutenant Colonel K. R. Coster, AQMG, June 1962; MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), 
`Improvements in African conditions of service since Federation', Army Headquarters, Salisbury, 25 
June 1962. 
1B6 MNA, 13/WPO/5/1, Orders by Major C. A. Edwards Commanding the Armed Forces in the British 
Central Africa Protectorate, 1895. 
'$' NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 259, `Regulations on Re-engagement and Good Conduct Pay', 27 
March 1899; Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Rifles, 
(Nairobi: Uganda Railway Press, ca. 1908), p. 44; PRO, CO 534/41, f. 156, `Inspection Report 1919- 
1920. Ist King's African Rifles and Combined Depot 1st & 2nd K. A. R. Zomba', Colonel G. M. P. 
Hawthorn, Inspector-General King's African Rifles, Zomba, 8 May 1920. 
1Rg MNA, I DCKU 1/8/1, `Notes on the King's African Rifles', May 1952, part 6; MNA, F 248/2073, 
CAC/158/9/c(ops), `Improvements in African conditions of service since Federation', Army 
Headquarters, Salisbury, 25 June 1962. 
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eligible for life exemption from hut tax on one hut, as well as receiving a half 
remission on hut tax for the duration of their service. 189 Hut tax exemptions were 
regarded by the authorities as `one of the chief inducements to the best type of native 
to enlist', and were considered to be `highly prized by the natives'. 19° Indeed, the 
prospect of exemption from hut tax may even have acted as an inducement before 
1911, as many soldiers appear to have erroneously believed that they would be 
exempt or would be able to avoid the tax by virtue of their position, and in 1900 
several confused soldiers complained that their huts had been burned down because 
of non-payment. 19' From 1933, hut tax exemption was replaced by a system of 
gratuities, under which a soldier received a lump sum of 150 shillings after nine 
years' service or of 200 shillings after twelve years. After twelve years this was 
supplemented by a gratuity of between 180 to 600 shillings, which increased 
annually to a ceiling of between 270 to 900 shillings by eighteen years service. 192 
However, serving soldiers now received a full exemption from hut tax in lieu of the 
previous half remission, and ex-soldiers could extend their exemption by enlisting in 
the reserve. 193 Soldiers who served during the Second World War were also eligible 
for Overseas Service Benefit of one day's pay for each month outside East Africa, 
'89 The King's African Rifles Ordnance, Section 27 (8-9); Nyasaland Government Gazette, 268,31 
October 1911, p. 254; MNA, S 1/170923/2, OC 1/1st KAR to Acting Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 
[n. d., 1923]; MNA, S 1/879/21, Walter Long, Downing Street, to Officer Administering the 
Government of the East Africa Protectorate, 14 February 1918. 
190 MNA, S 1/1709/23/11, Bowring, Governor of Nyasaland, to Amery, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 21 March 1928; MNA, S 1/1709/23/4, Acting Governor of Nyasaland to the Duke of 
Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, [n. d., 1923). 
"1 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 360, `Hut taxes by Askari', 15 March 1900; NAM, 6706-64-66, 
Force Order 570, `Askari Hut-tax', 16 August 1902. 
'92 MNA, S 1/1709/23/64a, King's African Rifles (Amendment) Ordinance, 1932; MNA, LB 
8/2/1/144, `Long Service Gratuities', [n. d., 1945]. 
193 MNA, S 1/240/34, f. 11, Captain Slayter, OC 2 KAR, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 27 October 
1934, MNA, S 1/240/34, f. 41, `The Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance', Acting Chief Secretary 
Nyasaland, Zomba, 29 January 1937. 
100 
and a War Gratuity of up to six shillings for each month of war service. 194 Following 
Federation, a gratuity based on one month's pay for each year of service became 
payable after ten years, and this was also supplemented by a pension for those 
serving over 20 years or reaching 50 years of age, which averaged £40 per year (66 
shillings per month). 195 
The material rewards of military service were not only financial. The army 
also offered the prospect of free food, accommodation, and clothing for most of the 
colonial period. As will be discussed in the following chapters, such prospects could 
be illusory, as rations, accommodation and uniforms were often inadequate (in the 
years before the First World War men had to build their own huts, and in the 1890s 
soldiers even had to buy materials make their own fatigue uniforms). " 
Nevertheless, all three provisions generally improved over time, and by the early 
1960s, the total value of pay, rations, clothing, quarters, and allowances together was 
estimated to increase the total benefits received by a private from his basic pay of 87 
shillings and six pence to 302 shillings and three pence a month. '97 
Evidence for the importance of material incentives is not simply circumstantial. 
Page notes that some First World War soldiers were quite clear about their financial 
14 MNA, LB 8/2/1/111, 'East Africa Command Release Instruction No. 16. Instructions for the 
Release of Africans', 12 June 1945, p. 17. 
195 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/ 15 8/9/G(ops), `Pensions Authorised between December 1959-January 
1962', Army Headquarters, Salisbury, 25 June 1962; MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), 
'Improvements in African conditions of service since Federation', Army Headquarters, Salisbury, 25 
June 1962. 
'96 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 13, `Clothing', [n. d., 1897]. 
197 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `Improvements in African conditions of service since 
Federation', Army Headquarters, Salisbury, 25 June 1962. 
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motivation to enlist, and one drew a direct parallel with labour migration. 198 Soldiers 
who served in the Second World War described their motivation in similar terms. 
One soldier recalled joining because he wanted to `try shoes and socks', as well as 
the attraction of high wages at a time when he was living on two shillings and six 
pence for a whole month. '99 Others simply stated that they were `poor and [... ] 
wanted to get some money'. 200 More explicitly, it seems that many recruits in the 
1950s enlisted for very short-term material gain, as one officer noted that `recruits 
were liable to wait till they were issued with kit, sell it and disappear to their 
villages'. 201 Earlier, some may even have joined to obtain uniforms specifically so 
that they could abuse their authority to extort goods or money from civilians. 202 
However, claims to have joined the army for material gain were by no means 
universal. Some soldiers cited long-standing ambitions to enlist, and many make 
little reference to pay as their primary motivation for joining. 203 A purely economic 
explanation of enlistment cannot adequately account for the enduring success of 
military spectacle in attracting recruits. On a simple level, military service offered 
prestige in the eyes of the colonial authorities, and the army seems to have played 
upon this idea from the earliest days. When Yao soldiers were first enlisted in the 
mid-1890s, they wore a special uniform including a red turban, and it seems unlikely 
that this was adopted in ignorance of the significance of scarlet headbands as a 
"s Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 30. 
199 Interview with James Chigawa, 6 July 2000. 
200 Interview with Jauma Matola, October 2000; Interview with Alfred Mmambo, October 2000 
20 James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: Macdonald, 1981), 
234; IWM Sound Archive, 6185/03, Colonel H. P. Williams OBE (15 October 1979), p. 17. 2 Lewis Mataka Bandawe, Memoirs of a Malawian, ed. by B. Pachai (Blantyre: Christian Literature 
Association in Malawi, 1969), pp. 63-64. See chapter five. 
203 Interview with Henderson Simuja, October 2000. 
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symbol of senior chiefly authority amongst the Yao. 204 Thus military service at this 
stage offered direct access to an important symbol of authority which would 
otherwise be denied. This overt appropriation of an indigenous form was short lived, 
but the prestige promised by such symbols certainly continued to be realised in many 
cases. As will be shown in chapter five, ex-soldiers were often preferred for 
administrative authority. Indeed, when a new administrative structure was being 
established on the Magomero Estate around the turn of the century, military service 
became a prerequisite for appointment as a chief. 205 The practice adopted in the late 
1890s of appointing chiefs' relatives as non-commissioned officers in the army 
doubtless strengthened the implied connection between military service and status in 
wider society. 206 In line with these associations, Page found that some men joined in 
the army in the direct hope of becoming chiefs. 207 
Even if such high expectations were rarely fulfilled, other posts were also more 
likely to be open to those with military service. As will be shown in chapter five, the 
police force drew the majority of its recruits from ex-soldiers before the Second 
World War, and this association was renewed in the 1950s when the paramilitary 
Police Mobile Force established a new requirement for men with military experience. 
Former soldiers were often preferred for other uniformed jobs such as government 
messengers, and following the Second World War, the government actively 
204 MNA, 13/WPO/l/l, f. 87, Wordsworth Poole to his mother. Zomba, 22 October 1895; Clyde 
Mitchell, The Yao Village, pp. 78,91-95. 
205 Landeg White, Magomero: Portrait of an African Village (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), p. 90. 
206 `The British Central Africa Protectorate', The Times, 15 August 1899, p. 13. 
207 Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 30. 
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encouraged employers to give preference to ex-soldiers. 208 As the technical 
requirements of the army increased, many ex-soldiers entered civilian life as trained 
artisans, medical staff, clerks, signallers, and drivers, skills which were attractive to 
employers. 209 In the immediate postwar period, vacancies for skilled posts in 
Government service were offered to ex-soldiers in preference to those without 
military experience, which can only have increased the impression that military 
service would ensure access to prestigious employment opportunities. By 1952, the 
authorities clearly believed that this was a powerful incentive to enlistment, as a 
recruiting poster opened with a list of skills which military service could provide: 
1. Learn to shoot 
2. Learn how to drive a lorry 
3. Learn how to operate telephones and wireless sets21° 
Finally, some of the financial benefits of military service outlined above, and hut tax 
remissions in particular, were probably valued as much for the prestige which they 
conferred as for their financial value. 211 
The status associated with military service, however, seems to have extended 
beyond the simple prospect of privileged access to administrative authority or 
employment. Military spectacle, and the use of the band in particular, does seem to 
have acted as a powerful incentive to enlistment. Page notes that men enlisted during 
the First World War recalled the draw of the smart uniforms of the band, and in 
particular the appeal of the military musicians to women. Some men cited the 
208 MNA, LB 8/2/1/4, DC Dowa/Kasungu to PC Northern Province, Lilongwe, 31 October 1942; 
MNA, LB 8/2/1/64, Secretary, Native Tobacco Board, Limbe, to Labour Commissioner, Zomba, 1 
July 1944. 
209 MNA, LB 8/2/4/92, `Post-War Training and Employment for African Ex-servicemen in 
N asaland' [n. d., c. 1945]. 
21Z MNA, I DCMJ 1/10/1/16, Recruiting Poster, ca. 1952. 
211 MNA, S 1/1709/23/11, Bowring, Governor of Nyasaland, to Amery, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 21 March 1928. 
104 
general attraction of military drill and uniforms, whilst others joined the army in the 
erroneous belief that they would become bandsmen; as a consequence some 
regarding the use of the band in recruitment as a misleading trick. 212 As late as the 
1950s, potential recruits often expressed a preference for service in the band. 13 
Part of the reason for the appeal of the military spectacle probably lies in its 
role in wider society. Military style parades were not only used in military 
recruitment, but as Ranger has described, such ceremonies played an important 
symbolic role in the state's attempts to legitimise colonial authority, through recourse 
to rituals of loyalty to the crown. 214 Nyasaland was no exception in this respect. 
Parades were carried out at all levels of the administration on significant dates, such 
as the King's Birthday, Coronations, and Jubilees, and might include not only 
soldiers, but also policemen or even school children, so that the experience of 
parades was spread more widely than the concentration of military power in the 
south would suggest. 215 
As McCracken has noted, although it is doubtful whether most Malawians 
responded to the symbolism of parades in the manner intended by the authorities, 
some certainly recognised the functions of such symbolism. In any case, there is 
little doubt that such public rituals often attracted large numbers of civilian 
212 Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 33-35; Melvin E. Page, `Malawians and the Great War: Oral History 
in Reconstructing Africa's Recent Past', Oral History Review, 8 (1980), 49-61 (pp. 54-55). 
213 NINA, I DCKU 1/8/1, Weluzani, Mungwe Village, NA Mwase, Kasungu, to OC 2 KAR, 3 January 
1953; MNA, 1 DCKU 1/8/1/6, DC Kasungu to OC 1 KAR, 6 October 1953; MNA, I DCMJ 1/10/1/1, 
DC Mlanje to OC 2 KAR, 3 February 1953. 
214 Ranger, `The Invention of Tradition', pp. 229-36. 
215 McCracken, `Authority and Legitimacy', pp. 170-71. 
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spectators. 216 The KAR band in particular offered a genuinely colourful spectacle, 
dressed by the early 1900s in a garish uniform of black fezzes, gold-embroidered 
black jackets, white shirts, red sash and yellow shorts, which led them to be 
nicknamed the `Canary Birds'. 217 In 1911, the Governor argued that the KAR band 
was `exceedingly popular with the natives and has created an impression among 
them which tends to be of great assistance in such matters as military recruiting'. 
218 
Thus the success of military spectacle in recruitment may be seen not only as a result 
of the immediate display offered by the recruiting party, but also of the more general 
appeal of public rituals which represented authority (and therefore prestige) within 
the colonial state, at the same time as providing an aesthetically pleasing display. 
The development in Nyasaland of a number of dances based upon the form of 
military drill is indicative of the importance which was placed upon military 
spectacle. These dances (Beni, which was associated with the Yao, Malipenga, 
which developed in the Northern Province, and Mganda, a variation associated with 
the Chewa) probably all developed from the Beni dance, which had emerged on the 
coast of British and German East Africa after the 1890s. Beni seems to have been 
brought to Nyasaland after 1914 by soldiers returning from East Africa, and German 
askari prisoners-of-war. 219 However, many practitioners of Malipenga and Mganda 
believed that the strongly military character of the dances arose independently, from 
the direct observation of soldiers at drill during the war, and this belief in itself 
216 PRO, CO 534/13, if. 70-71, `The European Community of Zomba' to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Zomba, [n. d., 1911]. 
217 Photograph provided by Dr. John McCracken; Percival, `Five Years in British Central Africa', p. 
47. 
218 PRO, CO 534/13, f. 63, W. H. Manning, Governor of Nyasaland, to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Zomba, 28 October 1911. 
219 T. O. Ranger, Dance and Society in Eastern Africa 1890-1970: The Beni Ngoma (London: 
Heineman, 1975). 
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provides a strong indication of the appeal of military spectacle. 220 There are 
certainly suggestions that Malawians may have equated military drill with dance; one 
Malawian working for the UMCA mission at Lungwena in 1916 referred to a 
military parade as `dancing with drums and trumpets'. 221 Equally, the influence of 
direct observation of drill is also indicated by the use of British military commands 
which were unlikely to have been copied from German soldiers. 222 
The internalisation of military forms in this way, which resulted in 
considerable expense being incurred on smart military-style clothing and musical 
instruments, may have acted to provided a context in which the military rituals of 
recruiting efforts were understood. Indeed, it is even possible that once Beni, 
Malipenga and Mganda were established, just as men took part in labour migration 
to enable them to buy equipment for dances, some recruits may have joined the KAR 
to gain knowledge and experience of military uniforms and drill which would 
enhance their prestige within dance societies. 223 Ex-soldiers sometimes took a 
prominent role in early Beni societies. providing access to their knowledge of 
authentic military music and drill movements. 224 Unusually, whilst Beni was 
mistrusted as a parody of the colonial state in many territories, the authorities in 
220 James Njoloma, The Malawi Army: A Hundred Years Today, (Blantyre, Blantyre Printing and 
Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 16-18; W. P. Koma-Koma, M, ganda Kapena Malipenga (Limbe: 
1965), quoted in Ranger, Dance and Society, p. 117. 
221 Eustace Malisawa, Lungwena Station Notes, Nyasaland Diocesan Chronicle, 53 (October 1916), 
quoted in Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 33. 
2 Koma-Koma, M'ganda, quoted in Ranger, Dance and Society, p. 120. 
223 Koma-Koma, M'ganda, quoted in Ranger, Dance and Society, p. 118. 
224 Van Onselen, Chibaro, p. 200. 
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Nyasaland tolerated and even encouraged these dance forms as a possible aid to 
recruitment. 5 
It is clear that the army offered recruits the prospect of prestige as well as 
economic benefits, but it is equally possible that some Malawians joined the army 
with a genuine sense of enthusiasm for military service. In 1905, when I KAR were 
leaving Nyasaland for East Africa, the Central African Times noted that 
The native soldiers are all very keen to get away, and their enthusiasm 
communicated itself to other natives on the route to Blantyre, as the officers had 
many applications for enlistment from natives who have been fired with a desire to 
go abroad. 226 
However, the military authorities were also concerned that the prospect of overseas 
service might actually be detrimental to recruitment in some cases. When 2 KAR 
returned to Nyasaland from Somaliland in 1905 they were disembarked in Kenya on 
the basis that 
lt was considered that, if their only experience of foreign service was in 
Somaliland, the soldiers would give a very bad account of that experience on their 
return to B. C. A., and that it would, in consequence, be most difficult ever to recruit 
any Battn. again for service outside B. C. Africa. On the other hand, if they had 
experience, even for a short time, of a country somewhat like their own, it was 
thought probable that they would induce others to enlist 227 
Clearly, the army recognised the disparity between recruits' expectations and the 
reality of army life. Nevertheless, as George Shepperson has claimed, evidence such 
as the adoption of `Sitima' ('Steamer') as a forename in Nyasaland is suggestive of 
'25 Keith Coutanche, `The Beni Dance', Central Africa, 644, August 1936, pp. 157-59, quoted in 
Ranger, Dance and Society, p. 117; MNA, NCF 1/7/1 /I b, `Notes on the Beni Dance', Major F. 
Stephens, Chief Commissioner of Police, Zomba, 17 February 1921. 
226 `King's African Rifles for British East Africa - Departure for Blantyre', Central African Times, 24 
June 1905, p. 9. 
227 PRO, CO 534/2, f. 419, minute to the Secratary of the Treasury, 27 December 1905. 
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the real attraction to some recruits of the opportunities for travel offered by military 
service. 229 
Evidence of such prospects could be impressive. Twenty Malawian soldiers 
visited Britain to attend the Coronation of Edward VII in 1902, and ex-Sergeant 
Major Makwale of Zomba was still known for his part in this as late as the 1940s. 
29 
Soldiers from Nyasaland also attended subsequent coronations, while 35 Malawians 
visited London for the Victory Celebrations in 1946.230 The Second World War in 
particular, when many soldiers served outside Africa, probably increased the 
perception of some potential recruits that military service would provide 
opportunities to broaden their experience of the world. Some Malawians served in 
Palestine as part of the East African Army Service Corps, and others had contact 
with Biblical lands during campaigns in Somaliland and Abyssinia. Soldiers serving 
in Palestine may have taken part in the tours of Biblical sites organised by East 
African chaplains . 
23 1 Reports of such experiences probably appealed to Christian 
recruits, and as McCracken has shown, they rnuld also prove politically valuable. 
2 
Soldiers who had served outside the country also returned with fashionable skills, 
228 Shepperson, `The Military History of British Central Africa', p. 29, PRO, CO 534/34, if. 447-92, 
'Nominal Roll of Askari entitled for 1913-1915 Star', Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for 
Colonies, 1 December 1919; PRO, CO 534/34, if. 545-601, 'Roll of men of the 2nd Regiment King's 
African Rifles entitled to "1914-1915 Star" serving in the Ist KAR BEA', OC Depot 1st and 2nd 
KAR, [n. d., 1919]. 
229 `The Week', Central African Times, 1I May 1901, p. 3; IWM, 83/21/1, 'A History of the KAR: 
Lecture delivered by Major T. H. Birkbeck at the Goan Institute on Thursday, 18 Nov. 43'. 
230 IWM, 83/21/1, Major-General T. H. Birkbeck, `KAR Christmas Cards, Programmes, Orders of 
Service etc. '; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) III, 'Account of 22nd Bn. King's African Rifles 
(Nyasaland) in Action Burma (Khabaw Valley) 1944 by David Bowie (Intelligence Officer)', 1945- 
46. 
231 D. H. Barber, Africans in Khaki (London: Headly Brothers, 1948), pp. 96-100; `Maneno', Rhino 
Link: Newsletter of the King's African Rifles and East African Forces Officers' Dinner Club, 8 
(1996), p. 22. 
222 John McCracken, 'Conservation and Resistance in Colonial Malawi: the "Dead North" Revisited', 
(unpublished paper presented at a conference on African Environments Past and Present, St. Antony's 
College, Oxford, July 1999), p. 16. 
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such as the ability to play the guitar, and in 1943 N. A. Kyungu claimed that the very 
presence of a gramophone at a display by the Mobile Propaganda Unit `made some 
young men to join the army'. 233 
Of course, service outside Nyasaland not only implied the appeal of travel and 
unusual experiences, but might also entail first hand experience of combat. In the 
inter-war years, Malawians joining the colonial army could reasonably expect to see 
little military action, but at other times there was a strong likelihood of active 
service. Whilst it is hard to see this as a particularly appealing aspect of service, the 
military authorities certainly hoped that it might be made so. As noted above, during 
the Second World War recruiters berating chiefs for low rates of enlistment overtly 
tried to draw parallels between military service and an idea of `manliness' associated 
with pre-colonial warrior status. Similarly, as Parsons has noted, post-war recruiters 
entreated Malawians to `Join the KAR and Lead a Man's Life'. 4 
It is questionable whether many Malawians who joined the KAR did so on the 
basis of a direct analogy between the idea of military service and pre-colonial warrior 
status. However, there is evidence for an association between military service and 
masculinity. Some ex-soldiers from the First World War made claims such as `We 
joined the war because we were men', or `I was ready to die [... ] I wanted to test my 
23; MNA, NNK 1/10/1, f. 11, North Nyasa District Newsletter to troops, July 1943; MNA, NNK 
1/10/1, f. 19, North Nyasa District Newsletter to troops, August 1943; NNK 1/10/1, f. 180, `December 
1944: North Nyasa District: News for the Troops'; Interview with Black Paseli by Mitch Strumpf, 
Zomba, November 1989; Ranger, Dance and Society, p. 142. 
2-14 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 149; MNA, I DCMJ 1/10/1/16, Recruiting Poster, ca. 
1952. 
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manhood'. 235 The idea that soldiering was an appropriate occupation for a man was 
probably strengthened during wartime, as many First World War recruits genuinely 
wished to prevent the possibility of defeat by the Germans. 236 Such anti-German 
sentiment could certainly have an effect which was conducive to enlistment, and in 
1918 a missionary noted school children singing repeatedly `We can go and fight the 
Germans, Let us go! Let us go! '237 
Although the Second World War posed less of an immediate threat to 
Malawians, similar sentiments seem to have been held by some recruits, and a 
number insisted that they had joined the army `to protect [their] country'. 238 
However, as in the First World War, there were also indications that some men 
joined simply because of an attraction to the idea of war. G. N. Burden, the officer in 
charge of recruitment in Nyasaland, paraphrased a `rousing speech' made in 1940 by 
an NA who was a First World War veteran, describing his experiences in the army in 
graphic terms: "`when you come to battle, how exciting it is -I know; I worked a 
machine-gun in the last war and men fell in swathes before the spray of bullets"'. 
Burden noted that `Everybody was clapping and every attention was given to this 
speech', and claimed that about 50 men enlisted as a direct result 239 Reflecting the 
assumptions behind this, Wilfred Chipanda (a clerk in the EAASC) was keen to 
emphasise his desire to serve in a combat role: `I was very inquisitive for going [to] 
war. They said "no, no, no, no, there is no need, we cannot fight war without people 
235 Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 29. 
236 Ibid. 
237 `Mr. Baird's Report', Life and Work in Nyasaland, 1918,1 (January-March 1918), p. 11. 23g Interview with Joseph Kalilombe, October 2000; Interview with Seckson Philip Nkhoswe, October 
2000; Interview with Ordnance Zulani, October 2000. 
239 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1454, G. N. Burden, pp. 11-12.1 am grateful to Andrew Fairweather-Tall for this 
reference. 
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in the rear" [... ] Now then, I listened to that attentively'. 240 Other Malawians serving 
in Kenya in 1940 made exaggerated claims of their achievements in their letters 
home, such as "`I am in England fighting the Germans who are being greatly 
harassed by the British Empire"', or "`We have captured the King of the Germans"', 
again suggesting that part of their motivation in enlisting had been to `prove' 
themselves. 241 
It is harder to say whether many peacetime recruits were motivated by a desire 
to prove their masculinity (as opposed to a desire for adventure as suggested above). 
However, it seems probable that those recruits who were already well-acquainted 
with military life, and especially the sons of serving or ex-soldiers, did regard 
soldiering as an appropriate male occupation. As noted above, the army became 
increasingly dependent upon soldiers' sons as a source of manpower towards the end 
of the colonial period, and some families certainly had long standing associations 
with military service. 242 The seriousness of some recruits' attachment to the idea of 
soldiering is also suggested by the adoption of militarily themed names such as 
`Lipenga' ('Bugle'), `Captain', `Kannon', or `March'; one officer even recalled a 
recruit who wished to be named after a complete drill command. 243 Whilst such 
choices could be seen simply as a means of enhancing a recruit's appeal to the 
240 Interview with Wilfred Chipanda, 19 February 1999. 
241 S 33/2/1/1, f. 29, K. L. Hall, Acting Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
30 March 1940. 
242 James Chigawa's grandson is the fifth generation of his family to serve in the Nyasaland/Malawi 
armed forces. Interview with James Chigawa, 6 July 2000. 
243 PRO, CO 534/34, if. 447-92, `Nominal Roll of Askari entitled for 1913-1915 Star', Governor of 
Nyasaland to Secretary of State for Colonies, 1 December 1919; PRO, CO 534/34, ff. 545-601, `Roll 
of men of the 2nd Regiment King's African Rifles entitled to "1914-1915 Star" serving in the 1st 
KAR BEA', OC Depot 1st and 2nd KAR [n. d., 1919]; NAM, 6505-16/1, 'Nominal Roll and Diary of 
No. 9 Platoon, No. 3 Coy. 2/2nd. K. A. R. ' [n. d., 1916? ]; IWM Sound Archive, 3960/05 Colonel R. E. S. 
Yeldham CBE (3 November 1978), p. 9. 
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authorities, it seems unlikely that anyone would choose to be known by such a name 
for eighteen years or more unless he had some genuine attraction to the idea of being 
a soldier. It was probably precisely because soldiers' sons joined the army for 
reasons which went beyond simple economics that they remained a dependable 
source of recruits when other sources became less reliable. 
To outline the range of motivations behind African enlistment is not to deny 
the enduring importance of the economic impulse. The consistent failure of the 
authorities to persuade northerners in general, and Tongas in particular, to enlist is 
best explained by the attraction of the superior wages available to those who were 
willing and able to take part in labour migration to the South. However, to explain 
recruitment patterns throughout Nyasaland by the availability of labour migration in 
the North and the absence of that option in Southern Nyasaland is a simplification 
which reiterates the enduring colonial emphasis on northern recruitment. Because 
the military authorities were eager to obtain Tonga and Ngoni recruits, in an effort to 
ensure ethnic `balance', they sought to explain why men from these groups would 
not enlist. At the same time, the ready availability of recruits in the South meant that 
there was little need for the authorities to explain why southerners did enlist. 
On one level, the army's emphasis on Tonga enlistment is misleading. The 
1945 census classified less than 2.5 per cent of the population as Tongas, whilst the 
various southern groups which had become acceptable recruits by the eve of the 
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Second World War accounted for almost 50 per cent. 244 Thus the army's pre-war 
ideal that one quarter of the army should be comprised of Tongas would have 
entailed the Tonga being vastly over-represented. Even during the First World War, 
over a decade after competition from the mines for Tonga recruits had first been 
identified as a problem, statistics showed that there were far more Tongas in uniform 
per head of population than any other group. 245 In these circumstances it is hardly 
surprising that Tongas' privileged access to labour migration should have had a 
dramatic impact upon enlistment. Equally, whilst official recognition of the complex 
ethnography of southern Nyasaland meant that Nyanja speakers in the south could 
enlist as Yaos or `Yao and Kindred', it is possible that non-Tongas in the north were 
unable to pass themselves off as Tongas in a similar way. 
Finally, it is important to note the qualitative difference between military 
service and labour migration. Whilst the latter necessarily entailed periods away 
from home, for southern Malawians, service in the KAR in peacetime meant that 
they could expect to spend half of their service in Zomba. Therefore, whilst they 
received lower pay than labour migrants, they did so on terms which were less 
socially disruptive. By contrast, with the withdrawal of military posts in the North 
before the First World War, northerners who joined the army would be unlikely to be 
stationed near to their homes, making military service much more analogous to 
labour migration. Similarly, as military service was increasingly established the 
south, the extra financial benefits of military service, and the prestige accorded to 
those in uniform would have been much more readily recognised by southern 
244 Hailey, Native Administration, p. 24. 
245 PRO, CO 525/82, f. 64, Hector Duff, Acting Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, January 1919 
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Malawians than by those in the North, whose only contact with the army was usually 
in the form of flag marches or recruitment ulendos. 
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Chapter 3 
Military Structure and Routine in Colonial Nyasaland 
Most Western military institutions share common structural features, such as a 
rigid hierarchy and organisation in which each member's function is identified, a 
uniform symbolising both the subtleties of the hierarchy and the greater military 
identity, and are run according to tightly regulated timetables. As Foucault has 
demonstrated, military bodies have much in common with other western institutions, 
such as the school, the factory, and the prison. As such, few recruits to the British 
army since the nineteenth century would have recognised none of the methodologies 
employed upon them. However, the effect of entry into such a `total institution' 
upon a rural Malawian at the turn of the century can only be imagined. This chapter 
seeks to examine the impact of daily military life upon Malawian soldiers, and the 
implications of this for their attitudes towards military identity. 
The Military Hierarchy 
The hierarchies of colonial armies like the KAR were distinct from those of the 
metropolitan army in one obvious respect. Whilst officers and other ranks in the 
British army were generally distinguished by class, the structures of colonial armies 
were overtly based on ethnicity. This observation is not new, of course, but, save for 
a recognition of the `Africanisation' of officers towards the end of the colonial 
period, few studies have acknowledged the more subtle changes in the structure of 
the hierarchy in colonial armies throughout this period. This section aims to examine 
the changes in the nature of the military hierarchy in the colonial army in Nyasaland, 
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and to examine the way in which the changing structure of the hierarchy affected the 
experience of the Malawians who became soldiers. 
European Ranks 
The proportion of European officers was low in the early 1890s. Initially, the 
armed forces had only one officer, an Indian Army Captain, who had accompanied 
the first Indian contingent as its commander. He was officially supplemented by a 
`Commandant of Constabulary', who was a Captain seconded from the Royal 
Engineers, but in practice this officer's role was mainly confined to engineering 
tasks. ' Reflecting the central role of the Indian contingent, subsequent officers were 
also drawn from India, and by 1894 the force had three officers; a Major and Captain 
from the Indian Army, and a Lieutenant obtained locally from the Bechuanaland 
Border Police. 2 It was only with the reorganisation of the Nyasaland forces as a 
battalion in 1896 that the number of officers was significantly expanded to include a 
British Army officer in command of each of the six new African companies. 
However, Indian Army officers remained in control, as the three officers of the 
Indian contingent were to act as Commandant, Staff Officer, and Quartermaster of 
the reorganised force. 4 Indian army officers gradually passed control to British 
officers, as a British Army officer was appointed to the command of the new 2nd 
' Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Papers Relative to the Suppression ofSlave-Raiding in 
Nyassaland, Africa No. 5,1892, Cmd. 6699, pp. 2-3; PRO, FO 84/2114, if. 19-20, H. H. Johnston, 
Commissioner and Consul General, to the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 10 March 1891. 
2 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, Africa No. 6,1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 42. 
3 PRO FO 2/106, f. 248, `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed by 
Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 April 1896; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 3, `Arrival of Officers', 
November 1896; NAM 6706-64-66, Force Order 4, `Appointments to Command of Companies', 
November 1896. 
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Annual Report on the British Central Africa Protectorate for 
the Year 1897-98, Africa No. 9,1898, Cmd. 9048, p. 16. 
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Battalion in 1899, and in 1902 the commander of the Indian contingent officially 
became subordinate to the Commandant of 1 KARS With this exception, however, 
this structure largely remained in place until the First World War. 
Before 1914, the British and Indian armies were mainly officered by the sons 
of the aristocracy and gentry, military families, the clergy and the professions. As a 
consequence, such men naturally supplied the majority of officers serving in 
Nyasaland. 6 African colonial forces were seen by some as a repository for 
`regimental rejects',? a situation which Parsons stresses was reproduced throughout 
the history of the KAR. However, there is little to suggest that this was generally the 
case amongst the officers of the early forces in Nyasaland. Early officers included 
H. Coape Smith, a former Aide de Camp to the Viceroy of India; Guy de Herries 
Smith, a nephew of Lord Wolseley; Edward Alston, a godson of Queen Victoria; and 
Baron Louis von Guttenburg, an Austrian aristocrat. Several officers were also 
drawn from prestigious regiments such as the Grenadier and Coldstream Guards, the 
Royal Marine Light Infantry, the Rifle Brigade, and the Sikh Regiments of the Indian 
Army. 8 It is important to note, however, that as George Shepperson has pointed out, 
in the early 1890s the armed forces `included any [European] person who carried and 
s Hubert Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and 
Central Africa, 1890-1945 (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956), p. 27; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force 
Order 542, `Command Troops', 17 April 1902. 
6 Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992), pp. 90-100. 
Richard Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary 1902-1906 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), pp. 8-10. 
MNA, Wordsworth Poole to Francis Poole, Zomba, 8 January 1896; MNA, Note in Catalogue of 
Alston Papers, made available by Dr. K. J. McCracken; MNA AL I/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston 2 
August 1895; British Central Africa Gazette, 2,7,1 June 1895 ; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 3, 
`Arrival of Officers' [October? 1896]. For the reputation of Sikh Regiments of the Indian Army, see 
David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1994). 
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was prepared to use a gun' .9 
Formally appointed officers were often supplemented 
by `Volunteer Officers', who were usually former soldiers resident in the 
Protectorate or civilian Administrators, but might be drawn from any interested 
members of the European community. 10 In addition, European Naval personnel 
from Lake Nyasa often served as artillery officers in operations on land. This meant 
that in 1893, when the armed forces had an official establishment of only three 
officers, a military expedition could actually include nine European officers as well 
as thirty-two other Europeans. l t Therefore, at least until the structure of the army 
was formalised in 1896, the body of Europeans acting as officers was relatively 
heterogeneous. 
Officers' motivation in applying for service with the Nyasaland forces is 
clearly an important factor in understanding their relations to each other and to their 
African subordinates. As with African soldiers, there were strong financial 
motivations for service in Nyasaland. In the late 1890s, a subaltern in a British 
regiment, whose pay started at £100 per annum, could expect to receive between 
£300 and £600 as a company commander in the BCA Rifles. 12 At the same time, the 
cost of living was low, and as a result, early officers included both a notorious 
debtor, and an `ex-ranker', Captain Elwell, who could not afford to live in his 
George Shepperson, `The Military History of British Central Africa', The Rhodes-Livingstone 
Journal. Human Problems in British Central Africa, 26 (1959), 23-33 (p. 26). 
10 PRO, FO 2/106, f. It, Major Edwards to Commissioner Johnston, Zomba Camp, I January 1896. 
1 PRO, FO 2/54, f. 102, Commissioner Johnston to the Earl of Roseberry, 29 May 1893. 
12 Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992), p. 105; PRO, FO 2/106, f. 246, H. H. Johnston, `Revised Estimate for Expenditure on Armed 
Forces in British Central Africa Protectorate, 1896-97', April 3 1896. 
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prestigious and costly regiment. 13 As late as 1937, a subaltern could expect to 
double his salary by serving in Nyasaland, and this remained an important 
incentive. 14 Service in Nyasaland also offered advantages to an officer's military 
career. In the 1890s, there was a strong likelihood of seeing active service and 
qualifying for the rare Central African medal, a great inducement to officers whose 
regiments were stationed in Britain and who wished to prove themselves. 15 Officers 
were also routinely given higher `local' ranks and greater responsibilities than they 
would have had in their British regiments, an advantage which was clearly advertised 
by men such as C. A. Edwards, who arrived in Nyasaland as a Lieutenant in 1895, 
and died two years later as the youngest Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army. 16 The 
attraction of increased responsibilities was still an important incentive in the 1930s)7 
Finally, given the importance which was placed upon field sports in the social and 
professional ethos of the British Army, it is important to note that the opportunities 
for big game hunting also acted as a powerful draw for many. Indeed, an officer 
such as C. H. Stigand might spend the majority of his Nyasaland service engaged in 
13 MNA, 13/WPO/l/l, f. 106, Wordsworth Poole to Francis Garden Poole, Zomba, 8 January 1896; 
Note in Catalogue of Alston Papers, MNA, made available by Dr. K. J. McCracken; PRO, CO 534/5, 
f. 11, Captain P. Elwell, 2 KAR, to Adjutant, 2 KAR, Zomba, 16 February 1907. 
14 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 3, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]; RHL, 
MSS Afr. s. 1715 (59), f. 6, `The Role of British Forces in Africa: Serving Officer: Major F. G. 
Crozier' [1980? ]. 
15 MNA, 13/WPO/1/I, f. 81, Wordsworth Poole to his mother, Zomba, 15 October 1895; Ian F. W. 
Beckett, Johnnie Gough, Y. C.: A Biography of Sir John Edmund Gough, V. C., K. C. B., C. M. G. 
(London: Tom Donovan, 1989), pp. 14-31. 
16 MNA, 13/WPO/1/1, f. 106, Wordsworth Poole to Francis Garden Poole, Zomba, 8 January 1896; 
MNA, 13/WPO/1/l, f. 25, Wordsworth Poole to his mother, Zomba, 14 June 1895; NAM, 6706-64- 
66, Force Order 1, `Appointment' [February 1895]; PRO, FO 2167, f. 62, Commissioner H. H. 
Johnston to the Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 July 1894; MNA, 
13/WPO/1/l, if. 222-23, Wordsworth Poole to his Aunt Mary, Zomba, 20 May 1897. 
17 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 3, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
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sports. 18 Game shooting continued to play an important role in military life in 
Nyasaland throughout the colonial period. '9 
Whilst military officers were a relatively well-defined group from the mid- 
1890s, a more ambiguous category of European soldier was gradually introduced 
into the armed forces. Three British non-commissioned officers (BNCOs)20 from the 
Royal Engineers had been present in Nyasaland from 1891, but their official roles 
were limited to engineering, and any military functions were essentially performed as 
`volunteer officers'. From 1896, the armed forces included a European `Sergeant 
Major of Artillery and Transport Officer', who was responsible for the artillerymen 
and porters, but it was soon felt that these duties could be dealt with by the existing 
European officers, and the new Sergeant-Major was transferred from the armed 
forces in January 1897.21 However, the establishment of the new 2nd Battalion in 
1898 included a British Sergeant-Major, whose responsibilities for the administration 
and training of the African Ranks were much more clearly defined and differentiated 
'a Captain C. H. Stigand, Hunting the Elephant in Africa and Other Recollections of Thirteen Years' 
Wanderings (New York: Macmillan, 1913: repr. Bulawayo: Books of Zimbabwe, 1989); `The Week', 
Central African Times, I February 1902, p. 3; MNA, 13/WPO/l/l, f. 106, Wordsworth Poole to 
Francis Garden Poole, Zomba, 8 January 1896. 
19 Francis De Guingand, African Assignment (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1953), pp. 42-49,79; 
RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (105), f. 12, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass; `Battalion 
Notes', Journal of the King's African Ries, 1,1 (1956), p. 9. 
20 The term `British' was used to identify European NCOs, and did not necessarily indicate that they 
were seconded from the British Army. The term `non-commissioned officer' strictly refers to ranks 
from Lance-Corporal to Staff Sergeant, with the higher non-commissioned ranks falling into the 
category of `Warrant Officer'. However, the term 'NCO' may be taken to refer to both categories in 
this work, unless otherwise stated. 
21 PRO, FO 2/106, f. 246, `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed by 
Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 April 1896; PRO, FO 2/89, f. 250, Commissioner Johnston to Lord 
Salisbury, Zomba, 2 October 1895; PRO, FO 2/106, f. 11, Major C. A. Edwards to Commissioner 
Johnston, Zomba Camp, 1 January 1896; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 34, `Sergi. Major P. Devoy 
appt. to Civil Dept. ', January 1897. 
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from the duties of the European officers. 22 The status of the Sergeant-Major was 
ambiguous, as he was to be saluted by the African ranks, a privilege reserved to 
commissioned officers in the British Army. 23 But whilst the requirements of 
European prestige meant that African ranks were encouraged to regard the Sergeant- 
Major as akin to an officer, he was nevertheless excluded from the social life of the 
Officers' Mess, thus making his position unusually isolated. The Sergeant-Major, 
seconded from the British Army for a tour of two years, remained the only BNCO in 
the Nyasaland battalions before the First World War. 24 
The expansion of the KAR during the First World War, and especially after 
1916, naturally involved an increase in the number of European officers and NCOs 
serving with Nyasaland's forces. During the course of the war, the number of 
officers per company was increased from one in 1914 to six per double company by 
the end of 1916.25 As a result, whilst ten officers were serving with I KAR in 1914, 
a total of 273 had served with the regiment by the end of the war. Significantly, 
whilst the majority of these officers were still drawn from the British Army, 20 were 
obtained from the Rhodesian forces, 23 from the South African Defence Force, and 
34 were recruited locally from Europeans resident in Nyasaland, including members 
of the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve. The situation in 2 KAR was similar, although 
being stationed in East Africa locally obtained officers were drawn from the 
22 `The BCA Rifles in Mauritius', Central African Times, (Reproduced from The Times), 14 April 
1900, p. 7. 
23 Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Ries, (Nairobi: 
Uganda Railway Press, [1908(? ))), p. 6. 
24 Great Britain, Regulations for the King's African Ries, (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1908), p. 43; 
PRO, CO 534/18, f. 174, `Nyasaland Intelligence report No. 29. Quarter ending March 31st 1914'. 
25 PRO, CO 53421, f. 52, General Smuts to War Office, 14 March 1916. 
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European residents of Kenya, especially those serving in the East Africa Mounted 
Rifles. 26 
The proportion of BNCOs did not increase significantly during the first years 
of the war, although a Quartermaster Sergeant and Orderly Room Sergeant had been 
added to each battalion by 191627 However, from 1917 this position changed 
dramatically, as a BNCO was allocated to each company and platoon, and to each 
machine gun. 28 Thus, by the end of the war, one battalion alone had seven British 
Sergeants, 27 Platoon Sergeants, two Company Sergeant-Majors, and two Company 
Quartermaster Sergeants, in addition to the three battalion BNCOs. 29 Like earlier 
BNCOs, these men were partly intended to relieve officers of onerous administrative 
and training duties, for which it was felt African NCOs (ANCOs) lacked the required 
standard of education. However, as the authorities had acknowledged, it was 
inevitable that such large numbers of BNCOs would appear to displace existing 
ANCOs, and indeed, they were clearly intended to do so. The authorities' insistence 
that it was `essential [... ] to have a European in charge of each [machine] gun' openly 
suggested a lack of confidence in the reliability of African soldiers. 30 
26 PRO, CO 525/82, f. 63, `Ist King's African Rifles: European Contribution', Hector Duff, Acting 
Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the Colonies; CO 534/20, f. 316, Governor of 
Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 September 1916. 
27 January 1919; Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hordern, Military Operations East Africa: Voume I 
August 1914-September 1916 (London: HMSO, 1941; repr. Nashville: The Battery Press, 1990), p. 
565. - 
27 PRO, CO 534/20, if. 174-181, King's African Rifles Estimates 1916-1917. 
22 PRO, CO 534/25, f. 39, 'King's African Rifles: Condotions of Service for British Warrant and Non- 
Commissioned Officers', August 1917. 
29 PRO, CO 534/28, f. 6, Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 May 1918. 
10 PRO, CO 534/21, f. 374, Appendix G, C-in-C East Africa Force to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 25 June 1916. 
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Unlike the broad range of sources from which officers were obtained during 
the war, BNCOs continued to be drawn almost exclusively from the British Amy. 31 
However, whilst the military authorities in East Africa wanted their BNCOs to be 
taken from the elite of the infantry, the Brigade of Guards, in practice the majority of 
new BNCOs brought in from 1917 were from the pre-war part-time units of the 
Territorial Force. 32 More significantly, Europeans ranking as low as Private were 
seconded to the KAR, automatically being promoted to Sergeant, and receiving all 
the privileges of that rank in the KAR, including the right to be saluted by African 
ranks. Although the proportion of junior BNCOs serving as Sergeants in the KAR 
was low, the subordination of the most senior ANCO to a British Private clearly 
suggested the extent to which ANCOs had been superseded by Europeans during the 
war. 
33 
The reduced post-war KAR initially maintained a higher proportion of officers 
than it had in 1914, with four to each company in addition to the regimental staff. 
Whilst platoon BNCOs were discontinued, five BNCOs were maintained on the 
regimental staff, as well as a Sergeant-Major for each company. 34 However, the 
Administrator of Tanganyika (garrisoned by Nyasaland forces) argued that BNCOs 
were `unnecessary, and in many respects undesirable', as they damaged `the 
evolution of the capable native Non-Commissioned Officer with a sense of 
31 PRO, CO 525/82, f. 63, `1st King's African Rifles: European Contribution', Hector Duff, Acting 
Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 January 1919. 
32 PRO, CO 534/21, f. 353, C-in-C East Africa Force to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 June 
1916; PRO, CO 534/28, f. 6, Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 May 
1918. 
33 PRO, CO 534/22, f. 327, Acting Governor, East Africa Protectorate, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 22 December 1917; PRO, CO 534/25, f. 6, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Officer 
Administering the Government of the East Africa Protectorate, 8 January 1918; PRO, CO 534/28, f. 6, 
Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 May 1918. 
34 PRO, CO 534/31, f. 193, Commandant, KAR, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 May 1919. 
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responsibility'. 35 In line with this, by 1923, BNCOs had been limited once more to 
three positions on the regimental staff, although, perhaps to compensate, the number 
of officers had officially increased to six per company. 36 European officers and 
BNCOs were again obtained exclusively from the regular British Army, socially 
unchanged from the pre-war period. With the exception of the reductions in the 
strengths of I and 2 KAR, this situation prevailed for the remainder of the inter-war 
period, so that in 1937 both battalions had an establishment of 12 officers and just 
one or two BNCOs. 37 
Probably reflecting the use of `colonial' officers in the KAR during the First 
World War, by the mid-1930s, the European-manned Kenya Territorial Regiment 
was `primarily organised for the production of officers and non-commissioned 
officers' who could be used for the expansion of the KAR in the event of war. 
38 The 
relatively small European population made such an arrangement impracticable in 
Nyasaland, but a Reserve of Officers was established to train local Europeans for 
possible service with the KAR. 39 This arrangement was placed on a more formal 
footing in 1939, when an Officer Training Unit was set up in Zomba to select 
's PRO, CO 534/40, f. 35, Administrator of Tanganyika to Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Dar-es-Salaam, 24 April 1920. 
36 In 1923, these were Regimental Sergeant-Major, Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant, and Orderly 
Room Sergeant. PRO CO 534/54, ff. 389,392, `Inspection Report 1923-24,2nd Battalion King's 
African Rifles'. 
37 PRO, CO 820/25/9, `Annual Report on the 1st Battalion, The King's African Rifles covering the 
period from 31st December, 1935 to 31st December, 1936', by Colonel C. C. Fowkes, OC Southern 
Brigade KAR, 29 January 1937; PRO, CO 820/25/9, `Annual Report on the 2nd Battalion, The King's 
African Rifles covering the period from Ist January 1936 to 31st August, 1936', by Colonel C. C. 
Fowkes, OC Southern Brigade KAR, 6 October 1936. 
39 MNA, KAR 5/111, `Memorandum by the Inspector-General, Royal West African Frontier Force and 
King's African Rifles. The re-organisation of the forces in our East African Colonies', August 1937, 
7. F4 
MNA, S 2/6/35, f. 1, OC Southern Brigade KAR to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 13 June 1935. 
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European Officers and BNCOs from a field of 35 applicants. 40 The Officer Training 
Unit was suspended following the outbreak of war, but six men who had taken the 
course were granted commissions in the KAR, and a further nine were enlisted as 
BNCOs. 41 Nyasaland Europeans were subsequently sent to the Kenya Regiment for 
training, and by the end of 1942,219 had joined, most serving with Nyasaland 
troops. 42 Further officers for the Nyasaland battalions were again supplied from the 
larger European populations of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Kenya. 43 
As in the First World War, the proportion of BNCOs in KAR battalions was 
radically increased with appointment of European Platoon Sergeants, Company 
Sergeant-Majors and Quartermaster Sergeants, as well as Mortar Sergeants and other 
specialists (although by 1944 Platoon Sergeants had been discontinued). 44 In a 
striking change from previous policy, BNCOs were initially obtained - like the new - 
officers from East African 'colonials'. 45 Regular KAR officers in Nyasaland feared 
that men selected to become BNCOs rather than officers would resent `finding 
oneself of a lower social grade in the military to one's equal in private life'. 46 In fact, 
whilst the formal distinction between officers and BNCOs remained intact, the 
40 MNA, KAR 5/1/2, Officer Training Unit Camp Report, 1939. 
41 MNA, S 33/2/1/1, f. 26, Acting Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 30 
March 1940. 
42 MNA, S 33/2/2/1/1, E. C. Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir Oliver Stanley, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 27 January 1943, p. 20. 
43 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24 A), f. 95, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's 
African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald Ferguson 
Tait Bowie, 1981; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (8), f. 9, Patrick William George Barnes [1980? ]; James 
Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: Macdonald, 1981), p. 232. 
44 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (154), ff. 16-17, `Memorandum from R. W. Kettlewell concerning the role 
of British forces in Africa', 20 July 1979; PRO, WO 169/2994, `Field Return British O. R. s and 
African and Asian O. R. s', 24 May 1941; PRO, WO 172/6529, `1st (NY) Bn KAR Movement Order 
No. S' [November 1944]; PRO, WO 172/9477, 'Field Return - Other Ranks' March 1945. 45 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24 A), f. 95, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's 
African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald Ferguson 
Tait Bowie, 1981. 
46 MNA, KAR 5/1/2, Officer Training Unit Camp Report, 1939. 
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established social differentiation between the two groups was blurred, as their shared 
origins meant that some felt that there were `no social barriers between the different 
European ranks'. As a result, combined officers' and BNCOs' messes were created, 
in which forenames were used by all ranks. 7 This situation had an effect on the 
formal military hierarchy, as many colonial BNCOs quickly `thought of themselves 
as sub-officers and not as other ranks', an idea which was reinforced by access to 
officers' perquisites such as `Personal Servants', who were paid and uniformed 
privately by BNCOs before 1945.48 This situation was disrupted with the arrival of 
increasing numbers of British (or Imperial') BNCOs as the war progressed. Officers' 
and BNCOs' messes were again separated, and tensions developed as some colonials 
felt that Imperial BNCOs were unable to adapt to their `quasi officer' status. 49 
Similarly, although the KAR had been overwhelmingly officered from the British 
Army before the war, some colonial officers felt disdain for the Imperial officers' 
lack of knowledge and understanding of African soldiers. 50 
The post-war KAR again returned to a policy of obtaining officers and BNCOs 
from the British Army. However, whilst pre-war officers had all been drawn from 
the regular army, around a third of post war needs were met from National Service 
47 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24 A) 11, f. 95, 'A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's 
African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald Ferguson 
Tait Bowie, 1981. 
48 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24 A) 11, f. 95, 'A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's 
African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald Ferguson 
Tait Bowie, 1981; PRO, WO 169/758, `Battalion Orders by Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. Dillon, 
Commanding Ist Battalion, King's African Rifles', Isiolo, 14 November 1939; PRO, WO 172/9477 
'Field Return - Other Ranks', March 1945. 49 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24 A) 11, ff. 55,95, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The 
King's African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald 
Ferguson Tait Bowie, 1981. 
5o RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (154), f. 13, 'Memorandum from R. W. Kettlewell concerning the role of 
British forces in Africa', 20 July 1979. 
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officers who served with the KAR for shorter periods. 51 Probably reflecting the 
increasingly technical nature of the KAR, the proportion of BNCOs also remained 
higher than before the war, with sixteen per battalion in the early 1950s, in addition 
to five or six attached personnel from the East African Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineers and Signals. 52 
Federation with the Rhodesias brought a major change in the source from 
which officers and BNCOs were obtained. With the creation of the new Central 
Africa Command, all new officers and BNCOs in the Federal Army were to be 
supplied locally from the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Staff Corps (RNSC), which was 
largely composed of Europeans from Southern Rhodesia. 
53 In addition, those 
BNCOs attached to the Nyasaland battalions from East African support units were to 
be replaced by Federal personnel `as soon as possible'. 
54 Possibly reflecting the 
fears of the British Army officers of the KAR, who felt that the RNSC was `very 
much in its infancy' with officers who were still `learning their job', 
55 Rhodesian 
officials recommended that `the first federal officers posted to those forces should 
not hold higher rank than that of subaltern'. 56 Nevertheless, the existing officers of 1 
and 2 KAR resented the change. By 1956, the commanding officer of 1 KAR 
lamented, `I cannot help feeling both this Battalion and 2 KAR are getting more and 
51 'I KAR Newsletter No. 4 from Malaya. Aug/Sep 1952', 'Lipenga': Journal of the ! st (Nyasaland) 
Battalion The King's African Rifles, 1,3 (1953), p. 9. 
52 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/253/l/SEC/G(int), 'Details of East African Troops stationed in Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland and of commitment in Malaya 1953' [n. d. ]. 
53 IWM, 83/21/1/143, Lieutenant Colonel G. Dauncey, OC 1 KAR, Zomba, to Brigadier T. H. 
Birkbeck, 8 February 1956. 
54 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/253/l/SEC/G(int), 'Details of East African Troops stationed in Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland and of commitment in Malaya 1953' [n. d. ]. 
ss IWM, 83/21/1/143, Lieutenant Colonel G. Dauncey, OC I KAR, Zomba, to Brigadier T. H. 
Birkbeck, 8 February 1956. 
56 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/253/l/SEC/G(int), `Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Report by a 
Conference held at Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia in August, 1953' [n. d. ]. 
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more divorced from the KENYA Battalions', 57 whilst the commander of 2 KAR 
more explicitly complained, `we are rapidly being Federalised, and I doubt if I shall 
see any more British ranks come here from UK'. 58 British commanding officers 
made deliberate efforts to persuade existing BNCOs from the British Army to extend 
their KAR service, but by 1957 officers and BNCOs of all ranks were being obtained 
from the Federation. By 1958 no British Army personnel remained, although some 
59 existing officers and BNCOs transferred to the RNSC in order to stay in the KAR. 
The impetus to keep the Nyasaland battalions under the control of Federal 
officers was probably sustained from the early 1960s by Federal anxieties that a 
declaration of independence by the Federation might lead to military intervention by 
Britain. In this situation, it was feared that ex-British Army personnel would have 
divided loyalties, and would therefore `have to be relieved of their posts beforehand 
on some pretext or other'. 60 However, once it was clear that the Federation was 
going to break up, the authorities assumed that Federal personnel `who see a future in 
Southern Rhodesia' would no longer be willing to serve in the KAR, in contrast to 
ex-British army personnel who were `willing serve with whoever is prepared to pay 
the best price until such time as their services are dispensed with,. 61 In consequence, 
few new European officers were appointed. 
57 IWM, 83121/1/177, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Dauncey, OC I KAR, Zomba, to Brigadier T. H. 
Birkbeck, HQ 70 (EA) Infantry Brigade, Nyeri, Kenya, 3 September 1956. 
58 IWM, 83/21/1/175, Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Conroy, OC 2 KAR, Llewellyn Barracks, Southern 
Rhodesia, to"Brigadier T. H. Birkbeck, HQ 70 (EA) Infantry Brigade, Nyeri, Kenya, 3 August 1956. 
59 `Battalion Notes', Journal of the King's African Ries, 1,2 (1957), pp. 4,7,8; `Battalion Notes', 
Journal of the King's African Rifles, 1,3 (1957), pp. 7,8; `Battalion Notes', Journal of the King's 
African Rifles, 1,5 (1958), pp. 4,7-8. 
60 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/C/G(ops)/5, Brigadier C. M. Grigg, OC Northern Rhodesia District, to 
Chief of Staff, Army of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Lusaka, 29 September 1961. 
61 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/l/NR/5, `Intelligence Summary, Northern Rhodesia', Captain N. R. Taylor, 
Military Intelligence Officer, Northern Rhodesia Area, to Director of Military Intelligence, HQ CAC, 
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African Ranks 
In the early 1890s, African soldiers were generally restricted to the lowest 
ranks, and in 1894, Johnston noted that even the Swahili and Makua regulars who 
had been specially enlisted were `seldom of higher rank than that of corporal'. 62 
Instead, early non-commissioned officers were drawn almost exclusively from the 
Sikh soldiers of the Indian contingent. This partly reflected Johnston's wider 
ambition that Indian `traders and agriculturalists' would perform a crucial economic 
role in Nyasaland by occupying `a middle place [... ] between the two extremes' of 
black and white'. 63 In line with this concept, the experienced Sikh soldiers were 
regarded as providing `a nucleus without which it would be very difficult to train and 
discipline a useful native force'. However, the use of Sikh NCOs equally reflected 
the key question of the reliability of African soldiers. Johnston felt that whilst 
`Indian troops [... ] are to all intents and purposes as good as English soldiers [... ] 
Even the best of negroes as soldiers are unreliable'. 5 Similarly, Commissioner 
Sharpe argued that `it is somewhat dangerous to rely entirely on a local force [... ] 
drawn from among those tribes whom we have quite recently subdued'. 66 
21 May 1963. See MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), Draft Memorandum on `The "Transfer" of 
One, or Both KAR Battalions to the Nyasaland Government' [May? 1963]; MNA, F 248/2073, 
CAC/l58/9/G(ops), `The Secession of Nyasaland and the possible defence implications on that 
country that would flow therefrom', Federal Ministry of Defence, 6 July 1962. 
62 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, Africa No. 6,1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 42. 63 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, Africa No. 6,1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 30. 
64 PRO FO 2/106, f. 296, Acting Commissioner Sharpe to Lord Salisbury, Zomba, 16 June 1896. 
65 PRO FO 2/55, f. 354, Commissioner Johnston to the Earl of Roseberry, Zomba, 16 December 1893. 
66 PRO FO 2/106, f. 296, Acting Commissioner Sharpe to Lord Salisbury, Zomba, 16 June 1896. 
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When the Nyasaland forces were reorganised in 1896, the position of Africans 
within the military hierarchy was theoretically improved, with African soldiers filling 
all NCO positions up to the rank of Sergeant. 67 However, the senior NCO in each 
company, the Colour-Sergeant, remained a Sikh, and each company also received 
three Sikh `Drill Instructors', whose official function was `the training of recruits', 
but who were used in practice as NCOs. 68 This arrangement was also applied when 
the new 2nd Battalion was raised in 1898.69 The continued reliance upon Sikh 
soldiers in key positions no longer seemed to reflect a mistrust of the fidelity of 
African soldiers, so much as a genuinely held belief that African soldiers lacked the 
experience or even the capabilities to perform the functions of NCOs. In 1897, the 
commanding officer asserted that 
It is difficult at first to get [the African soldiers] to realize real discipline. By this I 
mean they cannot understand the chain of responsibility, and do not realize that an 
order given by any non-commissioned officer must be obeyed; in fact they at first 
dislike obeying any orders but those given them direct by their British officers. 
The non-commissioned officers do not as yet understand or realize the 
responsibilities of their positions, and so cannot command their men as they 
should. This will take some time to teach, but when taught the native soldiers 
should be a most reliable and efficient force [... ]70 
Similarly, in 1898 it was argued that `The native non-commissioned officer has not 
yet sufficient authority over his men to be able to take independent charge of a 
section'. 71 In line with this thinking, as late as 1899 an order was issued that 
67 PRO FO 2/106, f. 246, `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed by 
Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 April 1896. 
68 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 12, `Strength and composition of a company' [n. d., 1896] ; NAM, 
6706-64-66, Force Order 16, `Staff pay and composition of Staff" [n. d., 1896]; PRO FO 2/106, f. 246, 
`Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed by Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 
April 1896. 
69 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 237, `Companies to be raised stations and tribes to be recruited 
from', 23 December 1898. 
70 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Consul and Acting Commissioner Sharpe on the 
Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate from April 1,1896, to March 
31,1897, Cmd. 8438, p. 12. 
71 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Annual Report on the British Central Africa Protectorate for 
the Year 1897-98, Africa No. 9,1898, Cmd. 9048, p. 15. 
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whenever soldiers were sent out without a European officer, a Sikh `must always be 
placed in command'. 72 
In fact, there were notable exceptions to the policy of limiting senior NCOs' 
positions to Sikh soldiers. The most prominent of these was probably Ali Kiongwe, 
a `Swahili' originating from the coast opposite Zanzibar, who served as Sergeant- 
Major from 1891 to 1896. His position was unusual in that he was not promoted 
from within the forces, but was simply appointed as Sergeant of the Zanzibari section 
of the police on the basis of previous service as Johnston's head porter (or Capitao) 
between 1884 and 1891.73 As such, Ali Kiongwe's appointment was probably based 
upon his usefulness as an organiser of manpower and intermediary between the 
Administration and the Zanzibari and Makua soldiers, as much as upon any 
specifically military capabilities. In support of this, Johnston still referred to him as 
his `headman' as late as 1894.74 Nevertheless, he was regularly given real military 
responsibilities, and often operated far from the supervision of his European 
superiors. 
The removal of most `Zanzibari' or Swahili soldiers from the armed forces by 
1894 left All Kiongwe essentially an alien to the African troops under his command, 
a separation in status emphasised by a salary which had reached £85 a year by 1896, 
72 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 280,13 May 1899. 
73 Johnston, The Story of My Life, p. 302n ; PRO FO 2/67, ff. 339-40, Commissioner Johnston to the 
Earl of Kimberley, 18 October 1894. 
74 Commissioner Johnston to the Earl of Roseberry, 4 February 1894, PRO FO 2/66, f. 70. 
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compared to £6 received by an indigenous Sergeant. 75 However, the impact of the 
slave trade in Nyasaland meant that coastal Islamic culture, symbolised by figures 
such as Mlozi, was closely identified with indigenous power structures. Ali 
Kiongwe thus may have derived much of his personal authority from this association, 
and he certainly emphasised his Zanzibari identity, wearing the elaborate dress of a 
wealthy Omani Arab over his uniform. 76 This probably also applied to Hajji Askar, 
described as a 'Persian 77 interpreter on board HMS Pioneer on Lake Nyasa in the 
early 1890s, but who had become a Private in the armed forces by 1896, and retired 
as Sergeant-Major in 1899.78 
The kind of status achieved by Ali Kiongwe was not limited to Africans from 
outside Nyasaland. The indigenous Tonga `Irregulars' who were attached to the 
armed forces before 1895 operated under the personal command of their own 
`Sergeant-Major', Bandawe, who was allowed considerable independence of 
action. 79 As such, McCracken has described Bandawe as the `brutal commander' of 
men `no more disciplined or less ruthless than the fearsome bands of ruga ruga 
75 `Revized Estimate for Expenditure on Armed Forces in B. C. A. Protectorate, 1896-7', April 1896, 
PRO FO 2/106, f. 222 ; Force Order 12, `Strength and composition of a company', ca. December 
1896, Records of the King's African Rifles, NAM 6706-64-66 
76 Johnston 
, 
British Central Africa, pp. 83,127; C. Marlow, A History of the Malawi Police Force 
(Zomba: Government Printer, 1971), p. 1. See Laura Fair, `Dressing Up: Clothing, Class and Gender 
in Post-Abolition Zanzibar', Journal of African History, 39 (1989), pp. 63-94. 
" Possibly a Baluchi member of the `Zanzibari Arabs' enlisted in 1894. 
711 Johnston , British 
Central Africa, p. 125; Sir Harry H. Johnston, The Story of My Life (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1923), p. 305; PRO, WO 100/76, f. 159, `Native Contingent Armed 
Forces in BCA: List of Officers and Men Entitled to the Medal for operations in Eastern and Central 
Africa under Army Order 66 of 1895', Major C. A. Edwards, 5 January 1896; NAM 6706-64-66, 
Force Order 274, `Discharge S. M. Hadji Askar', 15 April 1899. 
79 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Johnston of the First Three Years' 
Administration of the Eastern Portion of British Central Africa, Africa No. 6,1894, Cmd. 7504, p. 42; 
`Chikala Expedition', Life and Work in British Central Africa, 85, March 1895, p. 4. 
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utilised by Johnston's Swahili opponents'. 80 There is certainly evidence to suggest 
that Bandawe's style of leadership owed more to traditional forms than to modem 
military structures, one officer noting before an operation that `before they started 
they shouted their war cry in a band together, and [Bandawe] danced a war dance in 
front of them'. 81 However, Bandawe was also an ex-'mission boy', who had served 
as an interpreter prior to joining the Armed Forces, and was able to read and write. 82 
Thus, when his Irregulars were integrated into the regular forces, he became 
Sergeant-Major and Interpreter to the Officer Commanding the Armed Forces. 83 
Bandawe's position was therefore derived not only from his ability to command his 
Tonga followers, but also from his capacity to act as an intermediary between 
European officers and African other ranks, in a role which could not be filled by an 
Indian NCO. 
Despite the continued dependence upon Sikhs as NCOs, the growing number 
of European officers increased the requirement for intermediaries between African 
and European ranks. In the 1890s, officers seem to have received no formal training 
in Chinyanja, the lingua franca of the Nyasaland forces. Some officers made 
successful attempts to learn the language, but others were unwilling or unable. 84 
Lieutenant Alston observed of a fellow officer in the mid-1890s, `He doesn't 
understand a word of the language and if a poor wretched native comes up to him 
80 John McCracken, `Authority and Legitimacy in Malawi: Policing and Politics in a Colonial State', 
in Policing and Decolonization: Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-65, ed. by David M. 
Anderson and David Killingray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 158-86 (p. 
162). 
81 MNA, AL 1/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston, 25 March 1895. 
82 Johnston, British Central Africa, p. 419 ; Johnston, The Story of My Life, p. 302n. 93 `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed by Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 
April 1896, PRO FO 2/106, f. 224. 
84 MNA, AL 1/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston, 5 March 1895. 
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and asks him a reasonable question, he clouts the poor man across the head'. 85 In 
line with this, from 1896 each European Company Commander was provided with an 
interpreter. 86 Interpreters were usually found from mission-educated Africans, and 
often received swift promotion to Interpreter Sergeant, as which they could expect to 
receive three times the pay of an ordinary Sergeant. 87 Thus, even whilst few 
Africans had executive authority, some educated Malawians were able to attain 
important positions of influence in the military hierarchy. 
By 1900, the authorities had begun to question their earlier assumption that 
Nyasaland soldiers must be placed under the command of Sikhs. Despite the 
continuing assertion that `The natives become attached to their [Sikh] instructors and 
follow them readily', 88 the military authorities had expressed reservations about 
relations between the Sikhs and their African subordinates as early as 1896, when 
officers were instructed to `check any tendencies of Sikh Non-commissioned 
Officers to strike or kick recruits under their instruction'. 
89 This order had to be 
reiterated with the threat of court martial the following year. 
9° More generally, in 
1897 it was argued that the `Sikh Drill Instructors [... ] cannot make themselves 
" MNA, AL 1/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston, 16 July 1895. 
86 `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed by Major C. A. Edwards', 3 
April 1896, PRO FO 2/106, f. 247. 
87 `Analysis of Occupations followed by the Male Baptised Adults of Blantyre and Domasi, as at 
December 31st 1899', Life and Work in British Central Africa, No. 154. Jany-March 1901, p. 13; 
NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 254, `Pay Interpreter', March 1899; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 
323, `Interpreters', 31 October 1899; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 359, `Interpreters', 15 March 
1900; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 378, `Promotion Interpreter Uledi', 1 June 1900; NAM, 6706- 
64-66, Force Order 379, `Promotion Interpreter Salimu James & Bell', 18 June 1900. 
88 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Annual Report on the British Central Africa Protectorate for 
the Year 1897-98, Africa No. 9,1898, Cmd. 9048, p. 15. 
89 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 31, 'N. C. Os. striking natives' [December 1896? 1. 
90 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 65, `Sikhs not to strike natives' [March 1897? 1. 
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clearly understood'. 91 These problems may have reflected the relative inexperience 
of some Sikh instructors, many of whom were junior NCOs or Sepoys in their own 
regiments. 92 However, some Sikhs were also said to have abused their authority by 
lending money to African soldiers, whilst others subverted the military hierarchy by 
wearing rank badges to which they were not entitled, or even by attacking their 
superiors. 93 
Subsequently, from the late 1890s, more serious attempts were made to 
encourage ANCOs to develop real authority. In 1897, the only formal requirement 
for eligibility for promotion to Corporal or Sergeant was that men should have 
`enlisted or extended their service up to 3 years'. However, in 1898, officers were 
instructed that `in future no soldiers should be recommended for promotion to Lance 
Corporal until they are thoroughly competent in instructing a squad in manual and 
firing exercises and in commanding a guard by day and night', signifying a shift 
towards a genuine professional requirement. 95 Also in 1898-99, possibly reflecting 
the success of Bandawe's `traditional' style of leadership, the authorities attempted 
to assimilate indigenous African social systems by `appointing the sons of chiefs and 
91 Parliamentary Papers, Report by Consul and Acting Commissioner Sharpe on the Trade and 
General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate from April 1,1896, to March 31,1897, 
Africa No. 5,1897 IC. 8438], p. 12. 
92 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 118, 'Drill Instructor F Coy', 15 November 1897; NAM, 6706-64- 
66, Force Order 175, 'Staff', August 1898; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 18I, 'Appointments', 8 
August 1898; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 354, 'Appointment', 5 February 1900. 
93 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 123, 'Extract Summary Court Martial', 9 December 1897; NAM, 
6706-64-66, Force Order 739, 'District Court Martial', 15 June 1905; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 
104, 'Punishment', 7 October 1897; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 118, 'Drill Instructor F Coy', 25 
November 1897; 'H. M. Consular Court Zomba', Central African Times, 7 September 1901, p. 3; 
NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 123, 'Extract Summary Court Martial', 9 December 1897; NAM, 
6706-64-66, Force Order 91, 'List of duly appointed Lance-Naicks' [September 1897? ]. 
94 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 53, 'Qualifications for promotion', [January 1897? ]. 
93 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 177, 'Drill Instruction', 9 August 1898. 
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headmen to be non-commissioned officers'. 96 Evidently, the authorities still assumed 
that Africans were unable to fully understand the military hierarchy, and that soldiers 
would more readily obey the `natural' authority of `traditional' leaders. 
The role of ANCOs was finally transformed around the turn of the century, 
following a series of key events. In December 1899, after sustained racial abuse at 
the hands of the local population, the Malawians of 2 BCA Rifles, stationed in 
Mauritius, rioted, injuring a number of the local population in the villages of La 
Caverne and Vacoas. Following the attack, attention was drawn to the inadequacy of 
the Sikh NCOs as intermediaries between the European and African ranks. It was 
claimed that to avoid losing caste, the battalion's Sikh drill instructors deliberately 
lived more than 50 yards from the African soldiers, and that on the day of the attack, 
they had avoided any contact with them as they had just been provided with an issue 
of beef 97 The senior officer in Mauritius even suggested that the Sikhs had known 
about the attack and had simply failed to inform their officers, perhaps out of 
resentment against `a tendency, on the part of some of the officers, to ignore [... ) the 
Sikhs', with the aim `to train and accustom the African N. C. O. 's to independence, 
and a sense of their responsibilities in view of the time when the Sikh N. C. O. 's 
would be entirely withdrawn'. 98 More generally, it was claimed again that `only one 
[Sikh] in each company was able to make himself understood'. 9 
96 `The British Central Africa Protectorate', The Times, 15 August 1899, p. 13. 
97 PRO, CO 167/728, Evidence of Major H. E. J. Brake, OC 2 BCA Rifles, Court of Enquiry, Garrison 
Orders, Head Quarters, Phoenix Camp, 13 December 1899. 
" PRO, CO 167/728, Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Jessep, OC Troops Mauritius, to Under Secretary 
of State for War, 6 January 1900. 
99`The B. C. A. Rifles in Mauritius', Central African Times, 14 April 1900, p. 7. 
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For the military authorities it was expedient to place some blame on the Sikhs. 
Exaggerated claims in the press that several people had been killed in a series of 
sexually motivated `acts of savagery', 100 by soldiers `not able to stand the strain of 
foreign residence in a civilised country', 1°' called the very existence of the battalion 
into question. 102 The military authorities therefore sought to mitigate the Africans' 
actions as much as possible. In fact, the ANCOs had not emerged from the incident 
in a favourable light, as many had taken part in the raid, and most seemed to have 
deliberately removed their badges of rank, although it is not clear whether this was 
intended to signify the abrogation of their responsibilities, or simply to avoid 
identification. ANCOs even seemed to have controlled the raid with military 
precision by the use of whistle blasts, but this at least demonstrated the fallacy of the 
idea that ANCOs did not command the respect of their subordinates. 103 
Following the Mauritius incident, 2 BCA Rifles was despatched to Somaliland, 
and elements of both the 1 st and 2nd Battalions were subsequently despatched to 
serve in the Ashanti War. 104 In Asante, the Nyasaland soldiers created a good 
impression with the military commanders. The Commandant of the Ashanti Field 
Force referred to 2 CAR as `one of the best corps in the Field Force -a reputation it 
10° `The African Regiment in Mauritius: Grave Misconduct', Central African Times, 7 April 1900, p. 3 
101 Life and Work in British Central Africa, 147 & 148, June-July 1900, p. 4. 
102 PRO, CO 167/724, Sir Charles Bruce, Governor of Mauritius to Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 14 December 1899; `Colonial', 'The Mauritius Outbreak', The Times, 21 
march 1900, p. 14. 
103 PRO, CO 167/728, Court of Enquiry, Garrison Orders, Head Quarters, Phoenix Camp, 13 
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138 
has right well maintained', 105 and formally thanked the battalion for `for their gallant 
conduct at the action of Ojesu on August 31'. 106 For their service in Asante, a 
number of Nyasaland soldiers and ANCOs were rewarded for gallantry, with two 
`specially recommended' for promotion or distinction to the Foreign Secretary, 15 
receiving financial rewards, and a further 38 being promoted. 107 Service in West 
Africa had been put forward as `giving officers and men alike the chance of wiping 
off, in active service, the stigma which they feel attaches to them', 
1° and certainly 
does seem to have eliminated many of the official doubts regarding Nyasaland 
soldiers' capabilities. 109 
By 1904, the use of Sikh NCOs and instructors had entirely ceased. 
" 
Contrary to their earlier assertions, the authorities argued that ANCOs had in fact 
been held back by the presence of Sikh NCOs: 
The withdrawal of the majority of the Sikh drill instructors is not felt as much as 
was expected, and the native non-commissioned officers show and take more 
interest in their work since they have ceased to be the cyphers they usually were 
behind their companies. They are learning their responsibilities as non- 
commissioned officers, though slowly. "' 
In any case, with the withdrawal of the Sikhs, the authorities were forced to treat the 
role of ANCOs more seriously, and from 1905 standards for promotion were 
established for all ranks throughout the KAR. A Lance-Corporal was expected to be 
105 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Relating to the Ashanti War 1900, Cmd. 
501, p. 103. 
106 `The 2nd Battalion Central Africa Regiment', The Times, 18 October 1900, p. 4. 
107 NAM, 6706-64-66,428, 'Ashanti expedition: Awards and promotions', 25 January 1901. 
1° 'The British Central Africa Rifles', The Times, 12 June 1900, p. 14. 
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Central Africa Protectorate for the Year 1902-1903, by Major F. B. Pearce, Acting Commissioner, 
Africa No. 13,1903, Cmd. 1772. 
139 
`Capable of imparting instruction in squad drill and of commanding a section on 
parade and on the field under all circumstances', a Corporal was also required to 
have `a general knowledge of company drill and [to be] capable of commanding a 
half-company on parade and in the field', while a Sergeant was to be `Capable of 
imparting instruction in squad and company drill and of commanding a company 
under all circumstances both on parade and in the field'. All African NCOs were 
also required to have a knowledge of discipline, duties in barracks and in the field, 
musketry, and outpost duty, and frequent classes were supposed to be held for the 
instruction of NCOs in all these areas. ' 12 The range of ANCOs' responsibilities also 
increased, as specialist appointments developed, such as Provost Sergeant, Signal 
Sergeant, or Sergeant Drummer. 113 However, the authorities clearly still had doubts 
about the capabilities of ANCOs, as the Standing Orders of 2 KAR cautioned that 
It is very necessary that all Non-Commissioned Officers should realize that they 
are in a responsible position and that in the absence of an Officer their Orders must 
be obeyed in the same manner as if the Officer was present. Unless a Non- 
Commissioned Officer can recognize his position he is not dependable and is 
consequently useless and as soon as this fact is discovered he should be reduced. ' 14 
By this time, the post of African Sergeant Major had also taken on an 
established form, distinct from the essentially personal roles fulfilled by All Kiongwe 
or Bandawe. Whilst the African Sergeant Major officially `assisted' the British 
1 12 PRO CO 534/2, f. 288, `Standard of Promotion of native N. C. Os', Staff Officer KAR, Zomba, I 
April 1905; Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Rifles, 
(Nairobi: Uganda Railway Press, [1908(? )]), p. 22. 
113 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, British Central Africa. Report on the Trade and General 
Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate for 1903-4,1904, Cmd. 2242; Commandant 
KAR, to Chief Secretary East African Protectorate, Nairobi, 6 September 1916, PRO CO 534/20, f. 
104. 
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140 
Sergeant Major, 115 in practice he was clearly regarded as a vital link between 
European and African ranks. By the 1920s, this role was more clearly laid out, as the 
African Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) was given special responsibility as an 
advisor `for all matters affecting native ranks', and as such was expected `to know 
the personal history of every N. C. O. and man in the battalion', `to encourage and 
foster espirit-de-corps', `to eliminate any inter-tribal or religious friction', and to take 
responsibility for soldiers' religious and domestic facilities. At the same time, 
however, the African RSM was also expected to act as the soldiers' representative, 
reporting any grievances to the military authorities. 116 
Whilst an African Sergeant was theoretically supposed to be able to command 
a company, under normal circumstances, there was little likelihood that he would be 
asked to do so. However, despite the increased proportion of European ranks, the 
First World War provided an opportunity for many Nyasaland ANCOs to 
demonstrate their initiative, as European officers were frequent casualties. Colour 
Sergeant Sumani was awarded the KAR Distinguished Conduct Medal for `leading 
his Company in a charge, after all his Officers had been shot down, and driving off 
the Germans' in early 1914.1 17 Sergeant Malemu was similarly awarded when, in late 
1917, 
The 3 British Officers [in his column] all became casualties. This N. C. O. at once 
took charge, got his men into suitable formation and replied to the enemy's fire [... ] 
115 Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd )Vyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Rifles, (Nairobi: 
Uganda Railway Press, [1908(? )]), p. 6. 
11 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles, (Zomba: 
Government Printer, Nyasaland, 1927), p. 20. 
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the surprise of the enemy's ambush was quickly counter-acted and the enemy driven 
off. ua 
On another occasion, 33 soldiers under the command of a Nyasaland Sergeant and 
Lance-Corporal successfully drove off a whole German Field Company including 
two machine guns. 19 Nyasaland companies were even sent into action under 
ANCOs alone. 120 Whilst these cases were always the result of emergencies, the 
authorities were happy to use such incidents as the basis for promoting African 
soldiers. 
Although many wartime promotions were based upon gallantry and initiative in 
combat, in peacetime, much emphasis was placed upon long and loyal service, 
especially amongst senior ranks. RSM Juma had served in the KAR for over thirty 
years when he retired at the end of the First World War. ' 2' RSM Magomero of I 
KAR, who joined the CAR in about 1899 and retired in 1921, was even allowed to 
re-enlist as RSM in 1939, and served until the end of the war, when he was probably 
at least 65 years old. 122 Similarly, RSM Aibu Chikwenga joined the KAR in 1916, 
was discharged in 1929, rejoined in 1940, and was finally promoted to RSM in 1942, 
remaining in this post until 1952.123 This emphasis on longevity was partially a 
reflection of the unusually high rate of long service amongst Nyasaland soldiers, who 
18 C-in-C East African Force, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, General Headquarters, East 
African Force, 16 March 1918, PRO CO 534/27, f. 258. 
119 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 168,170-71. 
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often enlisted for 21 years or more. ' 24 In the early 1930s, the officer commanding 
the Southern Brigade noted the contrast with other KAR battalions: 
The situation regarding the Ist and 2nd Battalions is entirely different, the Nyasa 
Native joins the King's African Rifles and, if he is allowed to do so, will remain a 
soldier for 18 years [... ] The average service of Soldiers of these two Battalions is 
approximately ten years and it is of interest to note that, in the Ist Battalion, there 
are some 50 Soldiers who either now or in the next few months, are eligible for the 
grant of the long service and good Conduct Medal 125 
This problem was still retarding rates of promotion for Nyasaland NCOs as late as 
the mid-1950s. 126 However, it also seems to have reflected the disdain of many 
European officers for educated or `intelligent' Africans, which meant that even by 
the late 1920s an officer could note that `most of our senior N. C. Os. were almost 
illiterate'. 127 
The authorities also emphasised the idea of `character' rather than strictly 
technical aptitude as a criteria for promotion, so that it was a matter of pride rather 
than concern that Corporal Chitenga, DCM, 129 `could tell who relieved not a few 
tengatenga [porters] of their loads in the days when robberies were frequent on the 
Blantyre-Matopo road'. 129 Similarly, De Guingand delighted in recording Sergeant 
Magombo's alleged cannibalism: 
When discussing food he would brazenly proclaim that a good joint of human flesh 
beat anything that was then available [... ] The old Sergeant was prepared however, 
124 PRO CO 534/40, f. 16,16,2 KAR Length of Service Return, Lieutenant Colonel W. I. Gunn, OC 2 
KAR, 4 March 1920; PRO CO 534/40, f. 66, I KAR, Tanganyika Territory, Length of Service Return, 
Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Griffiths, OC I KAR, I May 1920; PRO CO 534/54, f. 1651 KAR Length of 
Service Return, Adjutant, 1 KAR, November 1923; PRO CO 534/54, f. 391,2 KAR Length of Service 
Return, Lieutenant Colonel Murray, OC, 2 KAR, 1 November 1923; PRO CO 534/56, f. 189, No. 3 
Depot Company Length of Service Return, OC Depot I and 2 KAR, 4 March 1925. 
125 MNA, S 1/240/34, if. 2-3, OC Southern Brigade KAR to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 3 April 1932. 
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M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 6. 
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to eat most things, and it was well known amongst the recruits that a choice rat or 
mouse was a most acceptable gift for the old Ngoni. 130 
Finally, reflecting the KAR's wider recruitment policy, there are also suggestions 
that the authorities showed a bias towards promoting members of `martial' tribes. In 
1925,22 percent of Privates stationed in Nyasaland were identified as Yaos, yet 37 
percent of NCOs were Yao; conversely, 25 percent of Privates were Nyanja or 
Nguru, but only 11 percent of NCOs came from these groups. 131 It is unlikely that 
this reflected changing patterns of recruitment, since these groups had been enlisted 
into the same companies since at least 1907. 
Whilst there is no reason to doubt the competence of most ANCOs, the 
emphasis placed upon length of service and character meant that in practice some 
ANCOs failed to reflect the authorities' own aspirations as outlined in the 1905 
criteria for promotion. As late as the mid-1930s, the officer commanding I KAR's 
Machine Gun Platoon was able to write of his Platoon Sergeant, who had been 
promoted due to his seniority, that he had `v[ery] little knowledge of M. G. tactics 
[... ] & although he tries hard he is still v[ery] backward & slow to learn'. The 
majority of other ANCOs in the Platoon were seen as promising, but an `old soldier' 
who had been promoted to Lance-Corporal was felt to be `unintelligent, but tries 
hard & is a good instructor if told & shown exactly what to do [... ] Owing to his lack 
of intelligence will never make a good M. G. N. C. O. '. 132 
130 De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 30. 
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African soldiers' responses to the military hierarchy 
Prior to the Second World War, Nyasaland soldiers seem to have found little 
reason to question the place of Europeans at the top of the military hierarchy. The 
army was, after all, an institution set up to serve the interests of the European- 
dominated colonial state. Anthony Clayton has noted the confidence of colonial 
military officers in the cordiality of their relationships with their African 
subordinates, and Nyasaland was no exception to this. 133 The ethnic distinction 
between officers and other ranks seems to have allowed a `paternalistic' approach to 
develop in a much more literal sense than it could in the metropolitan army, as the 
Malawians' `otherness' allowed officers to characterise them as `mere children'. 134 
Whilst the well-defined class structure which characterised the British Army 
demanded separation between the ranks, officers were sufficiently differentiated 
from their African subordinates to allow a closer relationship to develop, provided 
that it operated within the parameters of the paternalistic paradigm. 
Reflecting this outlook, officers throughout the colonial period generally 
emphasised the humour and lightheartedness of Malawians. One officer, who served 
in the late 1930s, recalled that `Once the language barrier was broken all that was 
required was patience, enthusiasm and a sense of humour [... ] The Africans I knew 
loved a laugh! ', 135 whilst an officer who served in the early 1960s similarly noted 
[T]he Nyasa and latterly the Malawians, had a marvellous sense of humour [... ] 
[T]hey were a bit in awe of us, so if you could reduce tense situations to humour, 
you'd get it done quicker and better [... ] So there was a lot of laughter [... ] [1]t was 
133 Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, p. 220. 
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such a happy, happy regiment; there was very little animosity [... ] between the 
officers and the men. 136 
This interpretation of the relationship between officers and soldiers required 
Nyasaland soldiers to play a particular role. As de Guingand observed of 1 KAR's 
officers' mess cook of the mid-1920s: 
Jackie was a real K. A. R. pet, and one could almost imagine him being led with a 
collar round his neck in front of the Battalion when it marched past. I think he 
loved our officers and never minded the indignities to which he was sometimes 
subjected [... ] I have watched him being [... ] hunted around the mess building by a 
number of high spirited young officers armed with native spears [... ] But he always 
came up smiling for more, and generally finished the evening's `entertainment' a 
much richer man with the `prizes' that he received. 137 
At the same time, as a result of this perceived relationship, African soldiers were 
allowed greater latitude in some areas of their behaviour. Thus, soldiers' mockery of 
individual officers was regarded as a harmless signifier of good relations rather than 
as a threat to the military hierarchy. ' 38 One officer simply noted that `the Nyasa 
askari was a natural mimic and thought it great fun to imitate the Bwana'. '39 
As a corollary to their belief in the strength of the bond between officers and 
men, officers expected complete personal loyalty from their African subordinates: 
The old K. A. R. desturi (custom) was that an orderly was responsible for his 
B'wana's life. If he got killed on some expedition or out hunting, then he must 
never return himself [... ] one generally felt that if needs be one's orderly would 
almost be prepared to sacrifice himself for his master's safety. '4° 
Examples of such loyalty were proverbial for many KAR officers. Alston recalled 
how some of his soldiers refused to re-enlist under another officer, whilst others who 
136 Interview with Ian Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999. 
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had been discharged pleaded with him to take them back. 141 As late as 1941, Amini 
a Yao Personal Servant, told the story of searching Tanganyika and Kenya so that he 
could serve with his former master in I KAR. 142 More generally, most ex-soldiers 
recalled good relations with their officers. Ex-Staff Sergeant Joseph Kalilombe 
observed that `My bosses were good'; Jauma Matola recalled that he `liked them 
very much', and even Henderson Simuja, who stated that `There was nothing which I 
liked about life in the army' felt that `there was a cordial relationship between us. 
They could understand our problem. Maybe this was so since it was a war time'. 143 
However, the extent to which Nyasaland soldiers as a whole perceived the 
hierarchy in terms of the kind of loyalty described by many officers is questionable. 
On a basic level, from the perspective of Nyasaland's long service soldiers, European 
officers often must have seemed comparatively transitory members of the military 
community, serving on attachment for one or two tours of three years. This 
perception was probably increased by the continuing linguistic barrier between 
officers and soldiers. Before the First World War, officers still received no special 
training in African languages before their attachment with the KAR. 144 By 1905, 
they were required to pass a basic test in Chinyanja within a year of their arrival in 
Nyasaland, but in practice very few attended the examination. 145 Matters were worse 
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for the battalion serving in the East Africa Protectorate, since local regulations 
required officers to pass an examination in Swahili (the lingua franca of the other 
KAR battalions), effectively dissuading them from attempting to learn Chinyanja. 
This problem was increased during the First World War, when the many new officers 
had even less time to devote to learning Chinyanja than in peacetime. 146 A 
preparatory course for KAR service established in 1917, which was intended to 
mitigate such difficulties, taught only Swahili, thereby proving of very limited help 
to officers serving with Nyasaland troops. 147 As late as 1930, some officers failed to 
treat the Chinyanja examination seriously, and even the Commanding Officer of 2 
KAR `couldn't speak a word of Swahili, much less [Chinyanja]'. 148 As a result, 
interpreters remained an integral component of the military hierarchy. 149 
In isolated stations, this could have serious consequences for the relationship 
between officers and soldiers. The Nyasaland contingent of the Somaliland Camel 
Corps (SCC) in 1930 was under the command of officers with very little knowledge 
of Chinyanja, and only a civilian clerk with a poor knowledge of English in place of 
a military interpreter. '50 This effectively left power in the hands of the Nyasa 
Company Sergeant Major, who, other ANCOs claimed, actively prevented them 
from co-operating with the authorities, withheld soldiers' access to officers, and even 
extorted money from his subordinates. As a consequence, soldiers who felt that their 
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grievances had not been heard by the authorities attempted to shoot their 
commanding officer. '5' 
These events also signified a broader theme in African military service. In 
return for their acceptance of the military hierarchy, African soldiers naturally 
expected to be treated consistently, in accordance with the terms under which they 
enlisted. The soldiers serving in Somaliland expected that their grievances would be 
recognised, and resorted to violence when they were not. An earlier incident in 1913 
partially arose from a similar failure of the military authorities to meet African 
soldiers' expectations. A half-company of 1 KAR refused to obey an order to 
continue on a patrol after serving at a remote post for eighteen months, when they 
had been promised that the posting would last only six months. 
152 Again, Page notes 
that one First World War veteran recalled that his comrades `almost shot' their 
Commanding Officer because they felt his order that they should not kill prisoners 
was contrary to their whole purpose in the war. '53 
This concern with consistent treatment seems to have underlain African 
soldiers objections to the structure of the military hierarchy before the Second World 
War. Discussing African soldiers' grievances in 1915, Sergeant Nkwanda recalled 
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visiting England in 1902 as part of the KAR Coronation Detachment, and expressed 
surprise at finding an East African KAR soldier who seemed to have been 
commissioned as an officer. '54 More seriously, as the authorities had feared, 
Nyasaland NCOs serving in the First World War unsurprisingly resented the 
displacement of African Company and Platoon Sergeants by BNCOs. As the 
Administrator of Tanganyika noted of the Nyasaland battalions following the war, `it 
is certain that [the BNCOs] are disliked by the rank and file, by whom their presence 
is misunderstood and resented'. '55 This problem, however, seems to have been 
easily solved by the reversion to pre-war structures. 
The Second World War had a much more dramatic effect upon Nyasaland 
soldiers' feelings towards the military hierarchy. With the new influx of European 
ranks into the KAR, many Malawians were angered by the racist behaviour of some 
of the Europeans. Whilst `colonial' officers from Nyasaland approved of their fellow 
colonials from Kenya, 156 one British officer conversely recalled that colonial NCOs 
in particular were `already broken in in a very anti-African way'. 
157 Such 
distinctions were not unnoticed by Malawians: 
The troops much preferred their own Bwanas from Nyasaland. They accepted the 
Rhodesians and South Africans (many of them had worked in either or both 
countries at some time) but resented the Kenyans and others who treated them like 
Kenya natives. They were suspicious of us from the UK until they got used to 
US. ý 8 
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Nyasaland soldiers certainly seem to have believed that Kenyan Europeans gave 
preferential treatment to Kenyan Africans. NA Chikumbu recorded soldiers' 
complaints that 
If it were practicable that Nyasaland Europeans had to be appointed to instruct 
Nyasaland African Soldiers it would be better [... ] Kenya Europeans [... ] hate us 
Nyasaland African Soldiers because of our being praised for bravery and good 
actions159 
Similarly, soldiers in Kenya told NA Kawinga that they should have `European 
Officers [... ] from Nyasaland, Northern or Southern Rhodesia. We do not receive 
good treatment from Local Officers, they look after their own people of this 
country. ' 160 
Others Malawians both in East Africa and in South East Asia noted a more 
general racism on the part of some European officers and BNCOs in particular. 
Nyasaland soldiers in Kenya complained that `All European soldiers and some of the 
officers call us by this awful and annoying name "MONKEY" [... ] and they further 
say that we have joined the war to fight against the enemies for. no object'. 161 
Malawians' resentment was increased by the perception that Europeans treated them 
as comrades only when it was expedient. Soldiers of 31 KAR in Kenya complained 
to NA Kadawere that `When we were fighting we trusted our Officers as if they were 
our mothers. But now we are no longer fighting the friendship is finished. They 
regard us as if we were monkeys, just as Hitler said we were monkeys'. ' 62 NA 
Mwase simply added, `We are surprised if not astonished to see that our Bwanas are 
'S' MNA, S 41/1/2314/49A, `Native Authority Chikumbu's Journey to Nairobi to visit his soldiers', by 
NA Chikumbu, no date, 1944. 
'60 MNA, S 41/l/23/4/52A, `Native Authority Kawinga's Journey to Nairobi', by NA Kawinga, 11 
January 1945 
161 MNA, S 41/1/23/4/53A, `Complaints laid down by askari before chiefs against military authority', 
bNA M'mbelwa, 14 December 1944. 
172 S 41/1/23/4/49B, Report by NA Kadawere, 21 December 1944. 
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now treating us like dogs. When the war broke out in 1939 we all were treated as 
human beings'. 163 
Claims that such grievances were universally held by Nyasaland soldiers were 
dismissed by the military authorities; the commander of 11 (EA) Division asserted 
that such complaints were `NOT the opinions of the vast majority of Nyasaland 
askaris but might have been the opinions expressed by very few educated askaris 
who were becoming politically conscious'. 'M There may have been some truth in 
this. On the one hand, the decision taken before the war to promote African soldiers' 
learning of English, combined with the growing numbers of better educated recruits 
required to fill technical posts, meant that a minority of African soldiers were 
increasingly well placed to observe such attitudes. 165 On the other hand, Nyasaland 
NAs visiting East Africa and the Far East had been surprised to find the disdain with 
which they were greeted by many soldiers, and it was therefore in their interests to 
appear to be acting on soldiers' behalf by airing grievances. Nevertheless, some 
officers were also dismayed at their fellow Europeans' attitudes. One officer from 
Nyasaland noted, 
The Imperials in particular though the `joke' was shared by colonials who may 
have initiated the game enjoyed asking Africans to say `66 eggs in a box', which 
came out as `sixes sixety egges in a box-s' [... ] It was not a joke I liked though I 
am ashamed to say I also laughed. " 
163 MNA, S 41/1/23/4/53B, `Report on a visit to Nairobi and Somaliland by Chiefs', by NA Mwase 
[n. d., 1945]. See MNA, S41/l/23/5/63B, NA Chikumbu to PC Southern Province, 13 August 1945. 
'64 MNA, S41/I/23/5/63A, Acting Commander, I1 (EA) Division, to PC Southern Province, 14 
September 1945. 
165 MNA, KAR 5/1/1, `The re-organisation of the forces in our East African Colonies', Inspector- 
General, RWAFF and KAR, August 1937, pp. 21-2. 
166 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) 11, f. 96, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of the King's 
African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', by Donald 
Fergusson Tait Bowie, 1981. 
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However, Imperial officers equally blamed colonials for their rigid adherence to the 
social separation of African and European ranks, although both Imperials and 
colonials officers argued that BNCOs were often at the root of such problems. 
167 
As in the First World War, Nyasaland Platoon Sergeants also felt that they had 
been displaced with the appointment early in the war of European Platoon Sergeants. 
As Kettlewell noted, `They were too near in function and responsibility, and not 
infrequently the African N. C. O. was of more value than his British counterpart and 
would have functioned better without him'. 168 Nyasaland soldiers were also angered 
when they found that some Ugandan and Somali soldiers had been commissioned as 
officers. 169 Soldiers complained to NA Kadawere, `Why cannot we become Officers 
like Uganda asikari? Are we not fighting just as they are? ' . 
170 Other soldiers seem 
to have demanded not just commissions for Malawians, but even called for a 
Malawian to be made a Second Lieutenant, a Lieutenant, a Captain, and a Colonel, to 
prove that Malawians were valued as soldiers. 171 
In response to such grievances, the military authorities attempted to increase 
the status of African soldiers throughout the KAR. European Platoon Sergeants were 
removed, 1 72 and in an endeavour to meet African aspirations a new rank of Warrant 
167 Interview with Professor George Shepperson, 30 March 2000. 
1" RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (154), f. 16, `Memorandum from R. W. Kettlewell concerning the role of 
British forces in Africa', 20 July 1979. 
169 MNA, S 41/1123/4/53B, `Report on a visit to Nairobi and Somaliland by Chiefs', by NA Mwase 
[n. d., 1945], p. 4; MNA, S 41/1/23/4/53A, `Complaints laid down by askari before chiefs against 
military authority', by NA M'mbelwa, 14 December 1944, p. 2. 
170 MNA, S 41/112314149B, Report by NA Kadawere, 21 December 1944. 
"' MNA, S 41/1/23/4/49A, `Native Authority Chikumbu's Journey to Nairobi to visit his soldiers', by 
NA Chikumbu, no date, 1944. 
172 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (154), f. 17, `Memorandum from R. W. Kettlewell concerning the role of 
British forces in Africa', 20 July 1979. 
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Officer Platoon Commander (WOPC) was introduced in 1942.173 The WOPC was 
intended to replace a European officer in one platoon in each of a battalion's four 
companies. Platoons would therefore be entirely under African command, 
representing a major advance in the level of responsibility accorded to Africans. 
However, whilst a WOPC filled a commissioned officer's appointment, it was not a 
commissioned rank, and as such did not meet the soldiers' largely symbolic call for a 
Nyasaland officer. 
Following the Second World War, there was less evidence of the kind of overt 
racism expressed by some European ranks during the war. The KAR's regular 
officers largely reverted to their pre-war paternalistic outlook, with a strong belief in 
the personal loyalty of Nyasaland soldiers to their officers. 174 However, Malawian 
aspirations regarding the military hierarchy remained. Service in Malaya in the early 
1950s enhanced the role of WOPCs in the eyes of officers, most of whom regarded 
them as `first class men'; 175 indeed, the commander of 1 KAR considered them to be 
`as good as, if not better than, white [platoon commanders]'. 176 At the same time, 
smaller section patrols were successfully conducted under junior ANCOs' control as 
a matter of course. '77 Whilst some officers still regarded the existence of the rank of 
173 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, pp. 108-109. 
174 MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, 
M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 6; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (120), f. 11, Lieutenant-Colonel John T. H. 
Gunning [ 1980? ] 
175 MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, 
M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 2. 
176 F 248/2073, CAC/253/1/SEC/G(int), Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Hyde, OC I KAR, to Colonel R. F. 
B. Long, Southern Rhodesian Staff Corps, Defence HQ Salisbury, Zomba, 17 December 1953. 
"' RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (120), f. 11, Lieutenant-Colonel John T. H. Gunning [1980? ]; IWM Sound 
Archive, 6185/03, Transcript of interview with Colonel H. P. Williams OBE, 15 October 1979; MNA, 
8-9-5-R/14034,2nd K. A. R. Scrapbook Vol. 6,1953-1954; '1 KAR Newsletter No. 4 from Malaya. 
Aug/Sep 1952', 'Lipenga': Journal of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles, I, 3 
(1953), p. 9. 
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WOPC as an important step towards `Africanisation' of the Nyasaland battalions, 
senior ANCOs were clearly aspiring towards commissioned rank)) In 1953, the 
Officer Commanding 1 KAR, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Hyde, noted that the 
African Warrant Officers `asked some very pertinent questions when they saw West 
African officers going into an Officers' Mess', and they understandably wondered `If 
it is necessary for the European [platoon commanders] to be officers, why is it not 
necessary for the Africans to be officers? ' . 
179 As a result of the lack of further 
incentives, it was argued, the best African Warrant Officers were leaving the army 
for better paid jobs in the police and administration. However, whilst the rank of 
WOPC had granted African soldiers the responsibilities of officers without the 
concurrent status, Hyde now supported the creation of a `Governor's commission', 180 
`with all the prestige and privileges which go with the status', but which would still 
restrict Africans to commanding platoons, as Hyde did not feel `that East Africans as 
a whole are sufficiently advanced to be given Queen's Commissioned status'. t81 
The advent of Federation halted plans for a Governor's Commission in the 
Nyasaland battalions. The similar rank, termed `Effendi', was introduced to the East 
African KAR battalions in 1957, and 39 had been appointed by 1959.182 The Federal 
Prime Minister, Welensky, resisted its introduction in the Nyasaland Battalions on 
178 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (120), f. 11, Lieutenant-Colonel John T. 11. Gunning [1980? ] 
17' MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/253/I/SEC/G(int), Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Hyde, OC I KAR, to 
Colonel R. F. B. Long, Southern Rhodesian Staff Corps, Defence IIQ Salisbury, Zomba, 17 December 
1953. 
'g0 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/253/l/SEC/G(int), 'A paper on the Proposal for the Introduction of the 
Governor's Commissioned African Officer', GOC, EAC, to Chief Secretaries, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Nairobi, 3 July 1953. 
iss MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/253/1/SEC/G(int), Lieutenant-Colonel W. 11. Hyde, OC I KAR, to 
Colonel R. F. B. Long, Southern Rhodesian Staff Corps, Defence I IQ Salisbury, Zomba, 17 December 
1953. 
1$= Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, pp. 109-110. 
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the spurious grounds that `it would be looked upon as a sort of second best'. 
183 
Instead, by the early 1960s, intimations were made that `as a matter of policy [... ] 
Africans should be selected as potential officers and the best of these should go 
through Sandhurst'. In practice, however, it was argued that `very few Africans [... ] 
could qualify', and that commissioning Africans `would only lead to a lowering in 
standards which was NOT acceptable'. '84 The Federal authorities continued to 
emphasise the idea that the new Junior Leader Unit (used for training future NCOs) 
would also be used to prepare `eventual' candidates for Sandhurst, and argued that 
ANCOs' responsibilities had increased. 195 In fact, the political nature of the 
Nyasaland battalions' internal security duties meant that African WOPCs were no 
longer allowed to command platoons on operations. By 1962, given that even former 
British officers were distrusted by the Federation, and that the Nyasaland battalions 
were regarded as a future `gain for the armed forces of Pan-Africanism', there was 
no real prospect of Malawians being granted commissions. 
186 
In an atmosphere of overwhelming African opposition to the Federation, and 
under the threat of the influx of Federal officers into the army, Nyasaland soldiers 
were not deflected by promises of commissions in the future. A minority openly 
questioned the role of European officers in the army. One private was reported as 
asking his Commanding Officer `Do European Officers have the same qualifications 
as are required by Africans? If NOT why? When MCP gets into power will 
1B3 PRO, CO 968/666, f. 12, Mr. J. Moreton to Major A. E. Majendie, 4 November 1958. 
184 MNA, F 249/1131, G/ARC/A, `Minutes of the GOC's Fifth Conference held at Army 
Headquarters over the period 6-7 March 1961', Major-General R. E. B. Long, GOC, 20 March 1961. 
cgs MNA, F 2482073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `The Nyasaland Battalions - Changes since Federation', 
Lieutenant Colonel K. R. Coster, AQMG, June 1962. 
1" MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), Paper on the implications of the secession of Nyasaland, 
Federal Ministry of Defence, 21 June 1962. 
156 
[European officers] still be here? '. Another asked, `Why do officers do nothing and 
the PWO's [WOPCs] run the Platoons? Will the PWO's be commissioned? '. 197 In 
less formal environments, some soldiers were openly hostile. An ANCO returning 
from a football match was said to have shouted `Kwacha, Europeans Fuck Off', 188 
whilst a KAR driver wrote a letter to the Malawi News demanding to know when 
control of defence would be passed to a `Malawian' minister. `Until when is [the 
KAR] going to be under settlers and whites from Gatooma? ', he asked; `I will jump 
up and down with joy when change comes into effect'. '89 If such open hostility was 
relatively uncommon, it is clear that the desire for commissions was more 
widespread. The Commanding Officer of I KAR simply noted that `The question of 
African Officers is also raised from time to time and to this can only be given 
answers in half-tones much as one tries'. '90 
On the passing of control of I KAR to Banda's administration following the 
dissolution of the Federation, and the consequent prospect of the replacement of 
Federal by European officers, vociferous agitation for African commissions seems to 
have ceased. 191 The new administration showed surprisingly little urgency in 
A&icanisation, but possibly in response to the mutiny of the Tanganyika Rifles in 
167 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/l/NY/l/23B, `Political Subversion in Military Unit', Captain M. M. Roach, 
Military Intelligence Officer, Nyasaland Area, to HQ CAC, 27 September 1960. 
iah MNA, F 248/2075, MI/I/NY/l/23B, `Political Subversion in Military Unit', Captain M. M. Roach, 
Military Intelligence Officer, Nyasaland Area, to HQ CAC, 27 September 1960. 
169 Andison Bed Dinga, `When Shall We Control Defence? ', Malawi News, 18 January 1963; 
Interview with Ian Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999. 
10 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/l/NY/5, Lieutenant Colonel T. P. J. Lewis, OC Nyasaland, to Army HQ, 
Zomba, 20 October 1962. 
191 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/I/NY/4/15, Lieutenant Colonel T. P. J. Lewis, OC Nyasaland, to Lieutenant 
Colonel G. J. Hawkins, Zomba, 21 March 1963. 
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January 1964, which was partly a reaction to slow Africanisation, 192 the Regimental 
Sergeant-Major of I KAR, Graciano Matewere, 193 and five Company Sergeant 
Majors'94 were commissioned on the eve of independence, following a brief training 
course in Britain. 195 Following independence, the Malawi Army had nine indigenous 
officers and 40 Europeans, but by 1967 there were 36 Malawian officers, all but 
three of whom had been trained in the United Kingdom. By contrast, in 2 KAR, 
which passed to independent Zambia before being disbanded, no Africans were 
commissioned. 196 It was only in 1972 that Graciano Matewere became the first 
African commander of the Malawi Army. 197 
Uniforms: African soldiers and visual identity 
The importance of uniform as a recruiting tool was discussed in the preceding 
chapter. However, clothing played an equally important role in the experience of 
serving African soldiers. The Indian contingent of the Nyasaland forces was issued 
with one of the most overtly symbolic uniforms of any soldiers in the British Empire. 
The gaudy costume cut in the `Zouave' style consisted of a yellow-trimmed black 
jacket, worn over a white kurta, 198 with voluminous yellow trousers, white gaiters, 
"2 See Tanzania People's Defence Forces, Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny: January 1964 (Dar es Salaam: 
Dar es Salaam University Press, 1993) and Al J. Venter, Africa at War (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: 
Devin-Adair, 1974), pp. 149-59. 
193 Graciano Matewere had been promoted to RSM in August 1963. In 1972, he became the first 
Malawian to command the Malawi Army. `News Letters', Askari, July 1963, p. 14. 
194 Including Jonas Limbane, John Oweni and Jonas Mbweteka[? ]. 
195 Interview with Major Jonas Limbane, Zomba, 19 February 1999; Interview with ]an Robertson 
Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205) 'The Service with the King's 
African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979; Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, 
pp. 108-110; J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order, Studies in International Security, 13 (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 41,44. 
196 Lee, African Armies, pp. 44,126; Anon., `Farewell to Commander of the Malawi Army, Colonel 
D. E. Thornton, C. B. E., E. R. D. ', This is Malawi, 3,9 (1967), 12-13. 
197 James Njoloma, The Malawi Army: A Hundred Years Today, (Blantyre, Blantyre Printing and 
Publishing Company, 1991), p. 22. 
1" A shirt-like tunic opening only at the neck. 
ý¢ 
1. `A Sikh Sentry at Fort Johnston, British Central Africa'. 
Based upon a watercolour sketch by Sir Harry Johnston (who designed the black, yellow, white and red 
colour scheme), this is a reasonably accurate portrayal of the first uniform worn by members of the Indian 
contingent in British Central Africa. 
[Source: Supplement to The Graphic, ca. 1893] 
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and a broad red cummerbund around the waist. The Sikh identity of the wearer was 
signified by the addition of a black turban. 199 Johnston explained the use of this 
scheme as `our three colours, black, yellow , and white, with a touch of the English 
red. Into the sable mass of Africa I have driven [... ] Indian Yellow. Over all is the 
white [... ] representing in its best significations the all-embracing white man'. 200 
However, whilst the Zouave style originated in France's North African Army, the cut 
of the Nyasaland uniform drew on British African patterns, closely resembling the 
uniforms of the West India Regiment and the West African constabularies, which 
Johnston must have experienced at first hand in West Africa. 201 The Sikhs were also 
equipped with a Khaki uniform for field service, but their yellow and black full dress 
remained much in evidence throughout the 1890s. It is doubtful whether the 
uniform's symbolism was recognised by many outside the administration, but its 
ostentation clearly played an important role in the spectacle which was so important 
to the power relations of the colonial state. Moreover, its unusual colour scheme had 
a lasting impact upon the visual identity of the Nyasaland forces. 
In contrast to the Sikhs' elaborate uniform, the earliest African regulars 
probably had only simple khaki uniforms, whilst many of the local irregulars seem 
have received no uniform at all, instead wearing cloths tied around their waists 202 
As noted in the preceding chapter, early Yao irregulars seem to have been issued 
199 `A Sikh Sentry at Fort Johnston, British Central Africa, from a watercolour drawing by H. H. 
Johnston, C. B. ', Supplement to the Graphic [n. d. ]. 
200 Johnston, Sir Harry. H., British Central Africa: An Attempt to Give Some Account of a Portion of 
the Territories Under British Influence North of the Zambesi (London: Methuen, 1897), p. 129n. 201 Thomas S. Abler, Hinterland Warriors and Military Dress: European Empires and Exotic 
Uniforms (Oxford: Berg, 1999), pp. 100-03; Alan Harfield, The Indian Army of the Empress, 1861- 
1903 (Speldhurst: Spellmount, 1991). 
202 Glave, E. J., `G lave in Nyassaland: British Raids on the Slave Traders', The Century Illustrated 
Monthly Magazine, 52,4 (August 1896), 587-606 (pp. 595-596); Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African 
Riles, p. 689. 
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with `red turbans', which were probably adopted because, as mentioned above, the 
scarlet headband was a symbol of authority amongst the Yao. 203 However, with the 
regularisation of the local forces in 1896, a more conventional khaki uniform was 
adopted for all. 204 Johnston's colour scheme was also perpetuated in the non- 
commissioned officers' rank chevrons, which were made in yellow on a black 
ground. The uniform was less European in style than that used in British East Africa 
or Uganda, with the khaki `coat' cut more like the Indian Army's kurta than the 
British Army's tunic. 205 As in other East African forces, 206 following the pattern of 
the Egyptian Army, a fez was adopted, but unlike the red fez worn elsewhere, the 
Nyasaland fez was black, like the turbans of the Indian contingent. 207 Although this 
does not seem to have been intended, the use of the fez, with its Islamic associations, 
may have strengthened the identity of Yao soldiers within the armed forces, at a time 
when Yaos as a whole were increasingly associated with Islam. 208 With the addition 
of blue puttees and a blue jumper (also innovations from the Egyptian Army), this 
basic uniform was adopted by the whole KAR, and remained essentially unchanged 
before the Second World War. 209 
203 MNA, 13/WPO/1/1, f. 87, Wordsworth Poole to his mother. Zomba, 22 October 1895; Clyde 
Mitchell, The Yao Village, pp. 78,91-95. 
204 PRO FO 2/106, if. 246-47, 'Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed 
by Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 April 1896. 
205 PRO, CO 534/2, f. 433, Memorandum on Uniform and Equipment of the King's African Rifles 
tn. d., 1901]. 
06 The East Africa Rifles and the Uganda Rifles. 
207 PRO FO 2/106, if. 246-47, `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed 
by Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 April 1896. By 1900, the Uganda Rifles had abandoned the fez in favour 
of the British Army's blue Field Service Cap. 
208 `The Blue Book', Central African Times, 1 November 1902, p. 10. 
209 PRO, CO 534/2, if. 432-34, Memorandum on Uniform and Equipment of the King's African Rifles 
(n. d., 19011; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Ries, p. 689. 
Non-Nyasaland battalions continued to wear the red fez. 
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Soldiers were encouraged to treat this uniform with respect, and in the 1890s it 
was emphasised that it was `to be kept folded in their racks and never worn except on 
duty - especially the fez'. 
210 This was underlined by the fact that before 1900, except 
when on important parades or when on `expeditions', soldiers usually wore a fatigue 
dress which, consisting of a blue uniform and red `cloth cap', bore no resemblance to 
their khaki outfit. 21 Whilst British soldiers returning home on leave were allowed to 
wear their uniforms, Nyasaland soldiers were `on no account whatever [to] be 
allowed to take uniform - whether full dress or fatigue with them'. 
212 In 1905, the 
commanding officer even asked the civil police to arrest soldiers who had been seen 
wearing parts of their uniform on leave. 213 The wearing of a `mixture' of uniform 
and civilian clothing was still treated as a serious offence as late as 1963.214 
These measures were partly intended to prevent the abuse of the authority 
vested in the uniform, either by soldiers themselves, or by civilians who had illegally 
purchased items of military clothing. This reflected a real problem, as noted in 
chapter 2, Lewis Mataka Bandawe recalled how in the early twentieth century, men 
`in soldiers' uniforms' regularly robbed civilians in Palombe. 215 Perhaps more 
importantly, it was also feared that the wearing of uniform out of the sight of the 
military authorities might damage the prestige of the armed forces. Thus in 1898, an 
210 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 13, 'Clothing' [1897]. 
211 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 13, `Clothing' [1897]; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 206, 
`Khaki Uniform', 19 November 1898; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Annual Report on the 
British Central Africa Protectorate for the Year 1897-98, Africa No. 9,1898, Cmd. 9048, p. 16; NAM, 
6706-64-66, Force Order 352, `Red fezzes discontinued', 27 January 1900. 
212 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 279,13 May 1899. 
213 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 32, `Dress', 23 February 1905 
214 MNA, F 249/1129, A/133/Conf D/40, `Proceedings of a District Court Martial on the Trial of 
15146 Cpl. Andison Bed (I KAR)' 25/26 February 1963, Cobbe Barracks, Zomba. 
215 Lewis Mataka Bandawe, Memoirs of a Malawian, ed. by B. Pachai (Blantyre: Christian Literature 
Association in Malawi, 1969), pp. 63-64. 
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order was also issued that `Soldiers in Uniform are strictly forbidden to carry parcels 
and loads', 216 to which was later added a prohibition on uniformed soldiers drinking 
alcohol in public. 217 
For Nyasaland soldiers themselves, however, it was not the authority vested in 
the uniform, but rather the perceived lack of authority which seemed most 
problematic. Unlike the uniforms of the Uganda Rifles and East African Rifles, the 
dress of Nyasaland soldiers did not include boots. 
18 Even after the formation of the 
KAR in 1902, when the other battalions received a uniform similar to that of the 
CAR, boots were retained for certain orders of dress in Kenya and Uganda .2 
19 The 
lack of boots caused embarrassment to Nyasaland soldiers when they were sent 
overseas. Sergeant Nkwanda recalled that when the CAR had served in Ashanti, 
other African soldiers equipped with 'long trousers and boots [... ] were laughing at 
us because of our bare feet'. Later serving in East Africa, Nkwanda had also 
resented the issue of boots to Swahili soldiers, who were part of the same regiment, 
and whose uniform was otherwise similar to that worn in Nyasaland. 
22° 
The failure to issue footwear to Malawian soldiers also brought derision upon 
them from the civilian communities among which they were stationed. In 1899, the 
216 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 158, [June 1898]. 
217 Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Rifles, (Nairobi: 
Upanda Railway Press, [ 1908(? )]), p. 17. 
21 Anon, `In British East Africa With The East African Rifles', Navy and Army illustrated [n. d. ]; W. 
Lloyd-Jones, K. A. R.: Being an Unofficial Account of the Origin and Activities of the King's African 
Rifles (London: Arrowsmith, 1926), pp. 68f, 70f; C. Percival, `Five Years in British Central Africa', in 
The Rifle Brigade Chronicle for 1905 (London: John Bale and Sons, 1906), pp. 47-73 [p. 71 ]. 
2" Richard Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary 1902-1906 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), p. 10; PRO, 
CO 534/2, f. 436, `Direct Supply of Boots, Equipment to K. A. R. ' 16 August 1905. 
uo PRO, CO 525/66, f. 631, Evidence of Sergeant Nkwanda, Native Sergeant Askari, Chiradzulu 
Boma, Blantyre, 31 July 1915. 
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men of the CAR who attacked Mauritian villages near their barracks had been 
mocked for their bare feet by the local population. Private Jumbe recalled that `A 
creole shouted at us from the verandah of a house and jeered at us pointing to our 
bare feet', after which Jumbe and two other Malawians were set upon by a Mauritian 
crowd who stole their fezzes and assaulted them using `sticks stones and knives'. 
221 
Some of the Malawians had only their blue fatigue uniforms on disembarkation, 
indeed, the Governor of Mauritius subsequently described the battalion as 
A mob of savage undrilled recruits not only without uniform or arms but almost 
naked. Their clothing did not arrive for some weeks after the Battalion, and an 
unfortunate first impression was at once created by the rudely grotesque appearance 
they presented on disembarking. 222 
This aspect of their appearance in particular led to men being derided with shouts of 
'Zulu'. 223 More seriously, soldiers stationed in their own depot in Zomba were also 
laughed at by their fellow Malawians, to the extent that the authorities were forced to 
issue sandals to mitigate soldiers' embarrassment. 224 
Despite the wishes of soldiers like Nkwanda, who claimed that `If I put boots 
on I would walk fast, just the same with my bare feet', 225 the KAR refused to issue 
footwear as a standard part of soldiers' uniform. As Parsons notes, the first 
Regulations for the King's African Rifles made it an article of faith that `all tendency 
221 PRO, CO 167/724, `Evidence regarding the theft of Regimental Fezzes from No. 315 Private 
Jumbe and No. 275 Private Nyalapa 2B. C. A. Rifles at Vacoas on the 26th November 1899', Captain 
A. J. Gordon, Adjutant, 2nd BCA Rifles, 27 November 1899. 
222 PRO, CO 167/724, Sir Charles Bruce, Governor of Mauritius, to Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 14 December 1899. 
223 PRO, CO 167/728, Declaration by Boodhun to Sergeant A. Sarah, Mauritius Police, 3 December 
1899; PRO, CO 167/728, Lieutenant J. Johnson Stewart, 2 BCA Rifles, to Captain A. J. Gordon, 
Adjutant, 2 BCA Rifles, 10 December 1899; PRO, CO 167/724, Captain A. de Wilton, Inspector- 
General of Police, Mauritius, to Graham Bower, Colonial Secretary, Mauritius, II December 1899. 
224 PRO, CO 525/66, f. 631, Evidence of Sergeant Nkwanda, Native Sergeant Askari, Chiradzulu 
Boma, Blantyre, 31 July 1915. 
225 PRO, CO 525/66, f. 631, Evidence of Sergeant Nkwanda, Native Sergeant Askari, Chiradzulu 
Boma, Blantyre, 31 July 1915. 
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to introduce [footgear] into general use is to be discouraged', as it was felt this would 
hinder their `natural mobility'. 226 At the same time, however, provision was also 
made for sandals to be worn on active service, and it was subsequently ordered that 
`chupplis'227 should be worn `where the nature of the ground necessitates the use of 
footgear'. 228 This reflected practical experience, since soldiers often suffered 
wounds to their feet on active service. 229 Foot injuries, caused by `thorns and sharp 
stones', accounted for more `hospital cases' than any other cause among Malawians 
serving in Somaliland between 1908 and 19 10,230 and the lack of boots also caused 
serious problems with foot injuries during the First World War. 231 Such injuries 
were not uncommon during peacetime training: in 1920,30 per cent of hospital 
admissions in 1 KAR were for foot injuries, 232 and in 1924, about 35 men were 
hospitalised with cracked feet during the first week of the I KAR's battalion route 
233 march. 
In reaction to such problems, boots were issued to some Nyasaland units in the 
First World War after 1916, although supply was haphazard. 234 Many men 
226 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 118. See Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 96. 
227 A sturdy sandal used in the Indian Army. 
2"8 Great Britain, Regulations for the King's African Rifles, (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1908), p. 
21, amendment to paragraph 117. 
229 MNA, 13/WPO/2/I, Wordsworth Poole Journal, 23 September 1895; MNA, KAR 2/1/9, 
Memorandum by Captain H. P. Bennitt, Msinje, 25 August 1905. 
230 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Colonial Reports - Annual. No. 655. Nyasaland 
Protectorate. Report for 1909-10, Cmd. 4964-29, para. 42. 
231 NAM, 6505-16/3, f. 4, `2/2 KAR 1916-1918', Captain E. A. Priestland; PRO, CO 820/30/5/1, 
Major-General G. J. Giffard, Inspector General, RWAFF and KAR, to C. H. F. Plowman, Officer 
Administering the Government, British Somaliland, Sheikh, 16 November 1937. 
232 PRO, CO 534/46, f. 338, Report on Camp Sanitation and Requirements for the Patients in Hospital 
[December 1920]. 
233 PRO, CO 534/56, if. 193-201, `Ist Battalion, the King's African Rifles: Diary of the Battalion 
March, 1924'. 
234 NAM, 6505-16/3, f. 1, `2/2 KAR 1916-1918', Captain E. A. Priestland; PRO, WO 95/5321, War 
Diary 2/2 KAR, 21 May 1917; IWM, 83/31/1, Diary of A. W. Nichols, CQMS Kent Cyclists, attached 
3/2 King's African Rifles, 3I July, 1917. 
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unaccustomed to footwear suffered from ulcers, but Nyasaland soldiers were pleased 
to have access to the status which they associated with boots, whilst those who were 
not issued with footwear felt increased resentment »5 These boots seem to have 
been returned to stores at the end of the war, but sandals were made a general issue 
to soldiers of I KAR as an experiment for two years from 1925.6 However, it was 
only in 1937 that a decision was taken to provide `specially designed boots' for 
African ranks in the KAR. 237 This move was not a reaction to African soldiers' 
desire for footwear, but mainly reflected an operational concern that KAR soldiers' 
naked skin should not be exposed to mustard gas in case of war with Italy. 
238 
Fears that boots would hamper soldiers' mobility were realised to an extent, as 
many soldiers found their new footwear uncomfortable at first. 239 In 1 KAR, many 
soldiers' boots seem to have been badly fitted, and possibly as a consequence of such 
problems, orders were issued in 1941 that boots should only be worn on guard 
duties. 240 However, despite the genuine discomfort experienced by many, it is clear 
235 PRO, WO 95/5321, War Diary 2/2 KAR, 28 June 1917; Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 96. 
236 PRO, CO 534/56, f. 163, Bowring, Governor of Nyasaland, to Lieutenant-Colonel L. M. S. Amery, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 April 1925. 
237 MNA, S 2/6/35, King's African Rifles Reorganisation - Minutes of meeting held at Government 
House, Nyasaland, on the 24th of December, 1937. 
238 MNA, KAR 5/1/1, Memorandum by the Inspector-General, Royal West African Frontier Force and 
King's African Rifles on the reorganization of the forces in our East African Colonies, 1937 August, 
p. 20; PRO, CO 820/30/5/1, Major-General G. J. Giffard, Inspector General, RWAFF and KAR, to C. 
H. F. Plowman, Officer Administering the Government, British Somaliland, Sheikh, 16 November 
1937; Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 119. 
239 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (7), Colonel Desmond John Bannister [ 1980? ], f. 7; RHL, MSS Aft. s. 
1715 (105), f. 23, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24 
A), f. 91, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's African Rifles (Later Known as 
22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald Ferguson Tait Bowie, 1981. 
240 PRO, WO 169/758, Battalion Orders by Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Thornhill, Commanding, Ist 
Battalion, The King's African Rifles, 26 September 1940. 
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that boots were welcomed by Nyasaland soldiers as a `status symbol'; 241 indeed one 
officer recalled seeing men of 2 KAR in 1942 having `a good laugh when [they] 
encountered the barefooted Tamil up country in Ceylon. '242 The authorities 
officially recognised the social importance of soldiers' boots by extending their wear 
to the `walking out' uniform worn off duty. 243 Even an officer who served in the 
mid-1950s recalled that Nyasaland soldiers felt that their boots `gave them social 
superiority over their bare-footed brothers'. 244 
Prior to the Second World War, whilst the authorities had argued against boots 
on the grounds of operational efficiency, in practice the only time when footwear 
could never be worn by Malawians was on the parade ground. This suggests that the 
authorities valued the symbolism of bare feet as much as any perceived military 
advantages. Many early colonists and administrators in Nyasaland had certainly 
deprecated any tendency towards the Europeanisation of African dress. As Hector 
Duff noted at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
it seems to be a sine qua non that [the missionaries'] native assistants [... ] shall 
wear coats and trousers, frequently even hats [... ] To me, I confess, the sight of a 
negro thus arrayed is an abomination [... ] he loses at once all dignity of mien, all 
freedom of movement, all harmony with his surroundings245 
241 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24 A), f. 91, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's 
African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald Ferguson 
Tait Bowie, 1981. 
242 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 23, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
243 PRO, WO 169/2994, Battalion Orders by Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Macnab, Commanding, I/Ist 
Battalion, The King's African Rifles, 4 October 1941; PRO, WO 169/14104, Battalion Orders by 
Lieutenant-Colonel N. C. Robertson-Glasgow, Commanding, 1st Bn. The Ist King's African Rifles, 
27 February 1943. 
244 RI-IL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), p. 4, `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979. 
245 Duff, Nyasaland Under the Foreign ice, p. 214. 
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Similarly, for some KAR officers, African soldiers' bare feet were a sign of innate 
`toughness' which overtly European clothing such as boots threatened to destroy. 246 
Thus, whilst the role of uniform in emphasising regimental identity required that 
some unique features (such as blue puttees) were common to European and African 
ranks, the more explicitly `native' black fez which was to have been worn by 
European officers in 1902 seems to have been quickly abandoned. 247 
As well as seeking to perpetuate the differences between European and African 
ranks, uniform was also used to reinforce distinctions in status within the African 
ranks. Whilst combatant and non-combatant ranks were distinguished in the British 
Army by little more than a badge, in the Nyasaland battalions of the KAR, overt 
differences in dress were used to emphasise the distinction between those who could 
and could not consider themselves soldiers in the fullest sense. Thus, before the First 
World War, 2 KAR's Machine-Gun Porters, who went into action but were unarmed, 
wore a blue uniform and cap rather than the soldiers' khaki, and a brown jersey 
rather than the soldiers' blue. 249 By 1927, Machine-Gun Porters and Stretcher 
Bearers in 1 KAR had acquired the black fez and other items of soldiers uniform in 
Nyasaland, but were still distinguished as non-combatants by the brown jersey. 
More menial ranks, such as Messengers and Sweepers, were also identified by the 
246 De Guingand, African Assignment, pp. 24-25. 
247 PRO, CO 534/2, f. 300, `Conditions of service with the troops stationed in the African 
Protectorates administered under the Foreign Office', Foreign Office, I December 1903; PRO, CO 
534/2, if. 432-34, Memorandum on Uniform and Equipment of the King's African Rifles [n. d., 1901]. 
Photograph no. 68 in NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant C. W. Barton, shows the fez still worn in 
late 1903. 
248 Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Ries, (Nairobi: 
Uganda Railway Press, [ 1908(? )]), p. 34. 
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brown jersey, but along with Mess staff, they were further denied access to the black 
fez, wearing a red pattern instead. 249 
More significantly, from an early date, the authorities clearly recognised and 
sought to use the social desirability of European style dress which had underlain 
Malawians' attitudes towards footwear. By the 1920s, senior ANCOs were 
unofficially granted officers' accoutrements such as Sam Browne belts, European- 
style tunics, and boots. 250 To meet the aspirations of educated Malawians, 
interpreters were also granted European uniform elements such as tunics, boots, and 
long trousers. Both groups, however, retained the fez. 251 The adoption of boots and 
slouch hats for all ranks in the late 1930s reduced the obvious differences between 
Europeans and Africans in the field, but African uniforms continued to be of a lesser 
quality. 
Differences were retained in post-war parade uniforms, however, so that 
Europeans wore the slouch hat whilst African privates still wore the fez. Again, the 
Europeans' slouch hat, complete with officers' plumes or `hackles', was used to 
indicate the status of ANCOs. 252 From 1954, the Federal authorities made more 
deliberate use of Malawians' uniforms in an apparent effort to mitigate the 
comparatively slow rate of Africanisation. Whilst East African KAR soldiers 
249 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles, (Zomba: 
Government Printer, Nyasaland, 1927), pp. 88-89. See MNA, S 2/8/20/1, C. G. Phillips, OC 
Nýasaland Detachment 1 KAR, to OC Mangoche Detachment I KAR, Zomba, *5 February 1920. 
u De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 49. 
251 Society of Malawi Library (hereafter SOM), Military Album No. 1; Nyasaland, Standing Orders of 
the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles, (Zomba: Government Printer, Nyasaland, 
1927), p. 89. 
252 John Scuff, The Malayan Campaign 1948-60 (Oxford: Osprey, 1982), p. 19 ; Askari, January 1963, 
p. 13; 'Visitors and Events: Second Battalion Central African Rifles', Askari, June 1963, p. 13. 
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retained the `native pattern' collarless blouse, 253 Nyasaland soldiers' uniforms were 
`Europeanised' with the issue of `practically the same articles of dress as European 
soldiers'. 254 African Warrant Officers were given `gabardine uniforms and shoes, 
stockings and caps', `of exactly the same design as that worn by Officers', whilst 
Warrant Officers and Sergeants were also allowed to wear officers' style `Mess 
Dress'. 255 
It is doubtful whether such provisions compensated for the lack of 
commissions, but there are indications that accoutrements which suggested officers' 
status were valued by Nyasaland soldiers. Men from I KAR serving in Abyssinia in 
1941 took to carrying officers' style fly whisks and walking sticks, and had to be 
ordered to `cease forthwith and officers only will carry them'. 
256 An officer who 
served in the mid-1950s recalled that `The African Platoon sergeant major was very 
proud to wear the bush hat on which was mounted the Guinea Fowl feathers behind 
the cap badge - the mark of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion'. 
257 However, it is 
important to note that Malawians seem to have been less eager to abandon the more 
distinctive elements of their dress than the soldiers of other African forces. Whilst 
253 lain Grahame, Jambo Effendi: Seven Years With the King's African Rifles (London: J. A. Allen, 
1966), frontispiece; `Pictorial Supplement', Rhino Link: Newsletter of the King's African Rifles and 
East African Forces Dinner Club, I1 (1996), 8-9 (p. 9); `Pictorial Miscellany, Rhino Link: Newsletter 
ffthe King's African Rifles and East African Forces Dinner Club, 18 (1999), 15-17 (p. 15). 
MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `Improvements in African conditions of service since 
Federation', 25 June 1962; MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `The Nyasaland Battalions - 
Changes since Federation', Lieutenant Colonel K. R. Coster, AQMG, June 1962. 
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March 1961', Major-General R. E. B. Long, General Officer Commanding, 20 March 1961; `Visitors 
and Events: Second Battalion Central African Rifles', Askari, June 1963, p. 13. 
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Kenyan soldiers serving in Malaya in the 1950s were embarrassed by their khaki 
uniforms when other forces were clothed in jungle green, 258 Malawians in Ceylon in 
the Second World War complained that `we have had our khaki blouses, our jerseys 
and boots taken away from us'. 259 Similarly, whilst most independent African 
armies hurried to divest themselves of the most overtly colonial elements of their 
dress, the Malawi Rifles Band retained their fezzes, complete with yellow and black 
colour scheme, at least until the early 1970s, and the regiment was still equipped 
with the colonial parade uniform of slouch hat, khaki jacket and shorts in the 
1980s. 260 
Temporal structures and discipline. 
Military Training and Routine 
Of course, as in other western-style armies, rigid structure was not only 
inscribed upon soldiers through the military hierarchy and uniforms, but permeated 
daily life in the garrison. For Ranger, the military environment in colonial Africa, 
with `the drill square as source and symbol of discipline and punctuality', was 
deliberately constructed to control the behaviour of African soldiers. 26' This reflects 
the established Western disciplinary system, described by Foucault, in which 
institutional authorities sought to mould individuals into useful `docile bodies' 
through a series of well-defined expedients. Physically, individuals would be 
`enclosed' to isolate them from wider society, `partitioned' within that enclosure, `so 
ue Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 118. 
259 MNA, S 34/1/4/1/7, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 5 of 1942,22 August 1942. 
260 Anon, `The Malawi Rifles', Vision of Malawi, March 1970, pp. 11-15; James Njoloma, The 
Malawi Army: A Hundred Years Today, (Blantyre, Blantyre Printing and Publishing Company, 1991), 
25-27. gý 
Terence Ranger, `The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (eds. ), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 211-262, p. 228.. 
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that each individual has his own space', and then placed in `functional sites' devoted 
to particular defined activities. Temporally, the activity of individuals would be 
controlled at a general level through the timetable, and at the level of the body 
through the `temporal elaboration of the act', as in the minute movements described 
in the drill manual. This aimed to synthesise the individual's body with the 
movements which it is required to perform, as a `body-machine'. Individuals would 
then be combined, "`one by one, then two by two, then in greater numbers" [... ] as 
part of a multi-segmentary machine'. 262 
The earliest indigenous soldiers in Nyasaland seem to have experienced only 
minimal formal garrison life and military training before being sent on operations. 
Referring to the expedition against `Zarafi' (Jalasi) in mid-1895, Major Edwards 
noted, `As the majority of our Atonga Regulars were only enlisted in June or July I 
wanted an extra month to train them, more especially in fire discipline and 
shooting'. 263 However, with the decline in the intensiveness of military activity and 
the establishment of a formal military camp in Zomba, a more traditional routine of 
military training, ruled by the bugle call, was quickly initiated. Lieutenant Francis 
Poole noted the operation of this routine in the late 1890s: 
a black bugler steps from the quarter guard & [... ] blows a call, which is followed 
by a hundred & twenty odd soldiery dashing across the bridge, laughing, shouting 
words of command & left, right eager to come to parade. [... ] On entering they 
stop their noise & with a salute to their European officer, fall in on the parade 
ground, where the roll is called by a fine looking grey haired Sikh havildar with an 
enormous turban. [... ] The different squads now march off under their instructors & 
drill begins in earnest. A big fierce looking Sikh [... ] is explaining the mysteries of 
the [diagonal] march to half a dozen recruits, in a mixture of Hindustani, Swahili & 
Mananja, very curious to hear. An expression of desire to please & pay attention 
262 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan, 2nd 
edn., (London: Penguin, 1979), pp. 135-69. 
263 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Respecting Operations Against Slave- 
Traders in British Central Africa, Africa No. 4,1896, Cmd. 8013, p. 14. 
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can be seen on the negro faces, which greatly lessens the labour of training them. 
264 
This system grew to resemble Foucault's model on a number of levels. From 
the beginning of their training, recruits were separated from civilian society, not only 
symbolically through their uniforms, but also physically by moving into the military 
`Lines' with their families. 265 As Omissi has noted in relation to the Indian Army, 
this isolation later served to limit the influence of nationalist politics. 266 In line with 
this, in the Federal period the military authorities worried when soldiers lived in too 
close proximity to large urban centres, as in Stephenson Barracks in Lusaka, which 
an Intelligence Officer described as `the most exposed to subversive influence in the 
Federation'. 267 Before the Second World War, the internal organisation of the 
Nyasaland battalions into tribal companies also performed a useful function from the 
perspective of the authorities. The same ideas of tribal characteristics which 
informed recruiting policy also allowed the authorities to categorise what they 
believed to be the likely behaviour of the bodies of men under their command, and 
this dictated attitudes towards the most suitable methods of training. An early KAR 
officer noted, 
As regards an order, it is sufficient to say to a Yao, `You are not do so and so, ' but 
to an Atonga it is necessary to say, `You are not do so and so, and if you do you 
will be punished. ' [... J An Atonga, in his present state, must be ruled by `a stick and 
a smile, ' and the stick must come first; on the other hand, a Yao can be ruled by a 
smile with the rod in the background. I do not wish to suggest that the stick should 
be frequently used, [... ] but let it always be handy. 268 
264 MNA, 14/FGP/412, `Leaves From Darkest Africa', Francis Garden Poole [late 1897]. 
265 See chapter 4. 
266 David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London: Macmillan Press, 
1994), pp. 102-03. 
267 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/I/NR/I/2, Captain D. K. Bales, Military Intelligence Officer, Northern 
Rhodesia, to HQ CAC, 17 September 1959. See MNA, F 248/2075, Ml/1/NR/1, Colonel C. M. 
Grigg, OC, Northern Rhodesia, to HQ CAC, 2 September 1959. 
268 Percival, `Five Years in British Central Africa', p. 50. 
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Similarly, de Guingand wrote of an incident in the late 1920s, when two men left 
camp against orders to buy a goat, `Needless to say, the two men belonged to the 
Atonga tribe [.. ] The Atonga were certainly the "spivs" of our Battalion. '269 
From the start, the authorities sought to limit the amount of idle time available 
to soldiers. In 1895, Lieutenant Alston observed of the regime in Zomba camp, 
Each squad [of Tonga soldiers] is under a Sepoy who acts as instructor and looks 
after the men, and is responsible that they work. In the morning from 6.30 to 12 
they work at clearing the ground, stumping, fetching grass for thatching and 
bamboos for houses. At 2 p. m. they come on parade again for drill just like 
recruits and they are dismissed at 5.30.1 think it is much too long a day for them, 
however [Major] Edwards doesn't think so. 270 
The system developed so that both recruits and trained soldiers underwent a well- 
defined daily routine of training, broken into subjects such as arms drill, weapons 
training or `musketry', field training, and physical training. 271 By the 1950s and 
`60s, the established daily pattern, still marked by bugle calls, involved physical 
training at 6 a. m., a parade at 7 a. m., with military training during the morning, 
followed by sports after lunch. 272 For most of the colonial period, the weekly routine 
was also organised according to a predictable pattern, marked by the weekly 
Commanding Officer's inspection, and the Tamaam parade held each Sunday, at 
which all men had to appear in their best uniforms as `the "Last Post" was played 
and the Union Jack lowered at the flagstaff. 273 
269 De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 28. 
270 MNA, AL 1/1/l, Diary of Edward Alston, 2 July 1895. 
271 PRO, CO 534 and CO 820, Battalion Inspection Reports I KAR and 2 KAR, 1905-1939. 
272 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (120), f. 10, Lieutenant-Colonel John T. H. Gunning [1980? ]; RHL, MSS 
Aft. s. 1715 (205), 'The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, M. B. E. ', 
August 1979, p. 4; Interview with Ian Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999. 
273 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 32, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. See 
PRO, WO 169/24361, War Diary of 21 Nyasaland Battalion, King's African Rifles, 1946. 
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The nature of training also resembled the Foucaultian model of `the temporal 
elaboration of the act'. Recruits' training, based upon infantry training in the British 
Army, took up to eighteen months around the First World War, but was theoretically 
reduced to six months by the late 1930s. 274 The training schedule was dominated by 
drill, conducted by Sikh instructors in the 1890s, and later by ANCOs under the 
control of the European Adjutant and British Sergeant Major. 275 This drill was 
intended not only to inculcate automatic obedience to commands, but also to mould 
the very posture of the body, as graphically illustrated in a series of photographs 
taken by the medical officer Hugh Stannus Stannus in the early I900s. 276 Other 
types of training placed a similar emphasis upon learning by repetition: 
The commands were given in English but the explanations of the movements were 
given in Cinyanja [sic] which we all had to learn. Imitation, and learning by rote, 
was the basic model of teaching. Even the standard Army descriptions of trees 
were drummed in by repetition; so `booshy-top' tree was chanted endlessly until it 
was engrained [sic] in their memories. 277 
Finally, the long-term structure of training also reflected the model described by 
Foucault, with recruits moving from individual, through squad, platoon, company, 
and battalion drills. 278 A similar formula was generally repeated by trained soldiers 
throughout their careers, as they were put through an annual cycle of field training, 
moving through individual, squad, company, and battalion exercises, and 
culminating in the annual battalion march. 279 
274 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 24, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
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Of course, military routine in the KAR often failed to reach the level of 
systematisation suggested by this ideal. During the First World War, recruits to 3/1 
KAR had to be sent out on patrol within four months of their enlistment, and the 
standard programme of weapons training was curtailed as it was felt that `it was 
better to have a large number of men with some knowledge of how to fire a rifle than 
a few men who had completed a full musketry course'. 
280 In peacetime, the totality 
of the experience was broken up by involvement in military operations, by changes 
of station every three years, and annually by events such as drill competitions, and 
public spectacles such as the King's or Queen's Birthday Parade. 
28' 
Whilst drill and military routine were often regarded as onerous in the British 
Army, European officers were generally surprised at the extent to which Malawians 
enjoyed, or at least tolerated, military drill, and the trivial routine tasks or `bull' 
which was necessary to the maintenance of uniform. 
282 Writing in 1897, Lieutenant 
Gough noted that his Malawian troops referred to drill simply as `playing with the 
rifle'. 283 An officer who served in the 1930s recalled `The African of my time liked 
6 spit and polish'; their turnout and standard of drill was proverbial', 
294 while another 
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1917', Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Barton, Limbe, 7 July 1917. 
231 PRO, CO 534/56, if. 193-201,1 KAR Diary of the Battalion March, 1924; PRO, WO 169/24361, 
`Drill Competition', Lieutenant B. H. Dunkey, RIO, 2/1 KAR [March 19461; Interview with Ian 
Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999. 
262 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (120), f. 11, Lieutenant-Colonel John T. H. Gunning [1980? ]; RHL, MSS 
Afr. s. 1715 (154), f. 15, `Memorandum from R. W. Kettlewell concerning the role of British forces in 
Africa', 20 July 1979; James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: 
Macdonald, 1981), p. 234. 
283 Beckett, Ian F. W., Johnnie Gough, V . 
C: A Biography of Sir John Edmund Gough, V. C., K. C. B., 
C. M. G. (London: Tom Donovan, 1989), p. 29. 
Z" RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (7), f. 7, Colonel Desmond John Bannister [1980? ]. 
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noted that `the African took great pride in keeping his uniform clean and equipment 
blancoed'. 285 Post-war officers formed a similar impression: 
The majority of the African Askari liked being a soldier and liked the ceremonial 
and the dressing-up which is part of the military life. He liked to clean his 
equipment. He liked particularly to shine brass or steel or leather, and took great 
pride in presenting himself in the best popular manner. He particularly liked colour 
and flashy accoutrements. 
Such stereotypes must be treated with caution, but as noted in the preceding chapter, 
many recruits were attracted to the army by military spectacle, the prestige of which 
was enhanced in Nyasaland society by the Beni, Malipenga and Mganda dances. 
Soldiers even carried out drill in their spare time. In 1903 Lieutenant Barton 
observed that `At times fired with zeal my Yao [Orderly] gives an exhibition of 
bayonet exercise with a spear to an admiring crowd of Somalis & once I saw him 
drilling two small boys'. 287 Similar scenes were observed in the 1930s and even 
during the Second World War; officers noted that `They'd be so keen about drilling 
they'd even order themselves about , 
288 or 
The askari liked arms drill and `hitting his rifle' and two of them could often be 
seen in the lines shouting words of command at each other, each in turn completing 
the rifle movements. The orders given sounded very much like those given by 
their `Bwana'289 
Some ex-soldiers also remember drill fondly: Jauma Matola recalled that he `liked 
drill very much', whilst Seckson Philip Nkhoswe stated that he `liked drill and 
physical training as this gave me courage'. 290 
285 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 24, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
286 RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (205), `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 4. 
287 NAM, 7807-23, f. 24, Diary of Lieutenant C. W. Barton, 2 July 1903. 289 IWM, Sound Archive, 3960/05, Transcript of interview with Colonel R. E. S. Yeldham CBE, 3 
November 1978, p. 10. 
229 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 26, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
29° Interview with Jauma Matola, Zomba, October 2000; Interview with Seckson Philip Nkhoswe, 
Zomba, October 2000. 
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As in other African forces, training and operations were marked by the use of 
marching songs, for which Malawians were particularly renowned. 29' According to 
one observer, `The Nyasas are the singers of East Africa, or at least the East African 
forces. Their songs have power and music in them'. 92 Some marching songs, such 
as `Poyamba' (`First'), one of the regimental songs of 1 KAR, were officially 
inspired. However, the majority of such songs, drawing upon the form of porters' 
songs, were composed by Nyasaland soldiers in the field, often taking the form of 
morale boosting recollections of earlier victories against the Germans, or sentimental 
references to Nyasaland. 93 By the Second World War, many songs, such as `Sweet 
Bananas' or `Yao Lelsa Nkondo Gereman' (`Let's stop the Germans'), had became 
well-known to officers, and were even used for official performances. 294 However, 
even amongst the established repertoire, songs could often project soldiers' 
misgivings about the experience of war or the deprivations of military service, whilst 
in peacetime soldiers were often able to use song to express their opinions about the 
military hierarchy. 295 Song was able to be used in this way because of the language 
barrier between Malawians and their European officers: 
You'd get a lot of `chipongwe', which is `cheek', put in, they'd sing humorous 
things, [... ] with tears running down their cheeks, laughing at things, you know. 
And there are so many dialects that you might speak beautiful Chinyanja, but if he 
used a dialect they'd all understand it [... ] but the officers couldn't [... ] translate it. 
And you'd wonder, and it was no good asking them, `what are you laughing 
291 See Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 123. 
292 Gerald Hanley, Monsoon Victory (London: Collins, 1946), p. 163. 
293 Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 101-2; George Shepperson, `They Went Singing: Songs of the King's 
African Rifles', in KAR: A History of the King's African Rifles and East African Forces, by Malcolm 
Page (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1998), pp. 257-63. 
294 Interview with ]an Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999; Interview with Professor 
George Shepperson, Peterborough, 30 March 2000; IWM, 83/21/1, `Victory Search Light Tattoo: 
Souvenir Programme: 11th (East African) Division. 23rd, 24th, 26th & 27th November 1945, Nightly 
at 17.45 hrs. Ranchi'; Series of Columbia recordings of 2 KAR songs (GE 17813, GE 17814, GE 
17815), kindly made available by Major Richard Powell. 
295 Shepperson, `They Went Singing', pp. 257-63; Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 97. 
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about? ', they'd say, `Ee, bwana, he's very funny that man, ' but they'd be singing 
about YOU. 296 
Up to the 1930s, when soldiers were divided into tribally based companies, the scope 
for such behaviour must have been even greater, since in theory a majority of 
soldiers in a company would have spoken either Yao, Tonga or Ngoni languages, 
whilst officers only learned Chinyanja. Soldiers' songs could even be used as a 
vehicle for Malawians to introduce their own informal drill movements. An officer 
noted that in the 1930s 
One of their more popular songs was `Bwana General ali ku gona' which, 
translated, means `The General's gone to sleep', and the tricky part about this 
particular song was that at a certain point in the song the whole Company took two 
steps back! 297 
Although such an adaptation of military training could hardly be considered a form 
of `resistance', soldiers' song effectively operated both to indigenise military training 
and operations, and to provide a forum in which it was acceptable to criticise or 
mock military authority. 
Whilst European officers generally felt that Malawians enjoyed the display 
inherent in military training and routine, many believed that they were less 
susceptible to its intended physical and mental effects upon the individual. It was an 
axiom in Britain that a soldier could always be recognised by his bearing or posture. 
However, one officer noted that this was not the case in Nyasaland: 
It was noticeable that after a period of long leave, [... ] on their return some of the 
old askari took a few days to shake down and regain their military bearing and 
smartness. Even the C. S. M. was no exception, arriving back unshaven and bleary- 
eyed 298 
2" Interview with Ian Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999. See Interview with Professor 
George Shepperson, Peterborough, 30 March 2000. 
297 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 33, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
29e RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (105), f. 25, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
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Similarly, military officials believed that Africans were innately less amenable to the 
military structures of time and discipline: 
an African [soldier] [... ] lacked the determination to keep up a standard. If he got 
tired he would behave rather like an African would in his own village; he'd be out 
in the field having something to do, if he was tired he'd sit down under a tree and 
do nothing and then carry on. 99 
Of course, such assertions reflected widely held colonial prejudices regarding 
African `laziness', but officers' belief in the fundamental difference of Africans also 
meant that Malawians were sometimes able to circumvent disciplinary structures 
without being accused of indiscipline. Another officer remembered that early in the 
Second World War, 
I was taking a PT parade [... ] an unfortunate little African hare [... ] dashed across 
the parade ground whereupon the parade simply disintegrated and every single 
solitary man shouting at the top of his voice tried to chase this wretched animal 
until it escaped into the bush. And I don't quote that as a case of insubordination at 
all, it was the natural instinct of a people who are naturally hunters.. 00 
Some Malawian soldiers went beyond simple avoidance of military routine, 
regarding elements of their training and duties as demeaning. In 1937, Nyasaland 
soldiers serving in the Somaliland Camel Corps (SCC), who had been `mechanised' 
by the provision of 14 trucks in the early 1930s, were redesignated as an `infantry 
rifle company', requiring them to do much more of their training on foot. 301 The 
change was badly received by the Malawians, who promptly sent a deputation to the 
commanding officer, consisting of Bugler Sabiti and Privates Augustine and Simon 
Zachariah. Simon Zachariah's complaints were summarised: 
2' IWM Sound Archive, 3939/03, Transcript of interview with Major P. Logan, 1I September 1979, 
15. P. 
IWM Sound Archive, 3939/03, Transcript of interview with Major P. Logan, 11 September 1979, 
15. 
301 MNA, S1/652/31/74d, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Chater, OC SCC, to Secretary to the Government 
of Somaliland, I1 July 1938, Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 464. 
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1. Marching in Somaliland is very much harder than in Nyasaland. 
2. The askari returning from Somaliland told them that they always travelled by 
camel or truck. 
3. It appears like a punishment to walk when there are cars. 
4. The Somalis always travel by camel, pony or truck. 302 
All the men were agreed regarding the arduousness of marching in Somaliland. 
However, the main feature of the complaint was that being made to march would 
reduce the men's status in the eyes of both the earlier Nyasaland contingents, and the 
camel-mounted Somali soldiers, who were already noted for treating the Nyasaland 
troops as their inferiors 303 
Again, the official reaction was informed by officers' belief in the special 
character of African responses to military life. Whilst it is unlikely that opposition to 
a fundamental aspect of training would have been tolerated during peacetime in the 
regular British Army, the company commander wrote, `I feel that the situation is not 
without a certain gravity, and although their complaint is misguided, to them it seems 
a very important thing'. 304 The Governor was brought in to personally address the 
Nyasaland company, outlining the importance of being trained to march over long 
distances, and making an appeal to the men's pride, adding that `a foot soldier who 
says he cannot march may well feel ashamed'. Finally, the Governor made an open 
appeal to the men to remain within the bounds of military discipline: 
In the past Nyasa soldiers have held a high reputation for steadiness, loyalty and 
obedience. I hope that you will see that you do nothing to spoil that great 
reputation, for if you do I am sure that you will be sorry for it as long as you live. 305 
302 MNA, S1/652/31/74c, Captain H. French, OC B Company, SCC, to Adjutant, SCC, 5 July 1938. 
303 MNA, S1/652/31175, Major L. C. Thomas, OC 2 KAR, to Chief Secretary, Nyasaland, 19 August 
1938. 
304 MNA, S1/652/3l/74c, Captain H. French, OC B Company, SCC, to Adjutant, SCC, 5 July 1938. 
305 MNA, Sl/652/31/74e, `Reply made by the Governor to "B" Company, Somaliland Camel Corps, 
King's African Rifles, at Sheikh at 6 p. m. July 13th, 1938'. 
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In fact, despite the threat implicit in the end of the Governor's speech, the protest 
was successful, since `to facilitate for the men as dignified a withdrawal as possible 
from the position they have taken up', a greater use of mechanised transport was 
reintroduced into the company's training programme. 306 
Finally, as Parsons has noted, peacetime desertion rates in the KAR were 
generally low, and this was certainly the case for the Nyasaland battalions, which 
records suggest rarely lost more than three or four deserters annually in the 1920s 
and 1930s. 307 However, it should be noted that many soldiers during the Second 
World War, whose enlistment was less likely to be the result of personal choice, 
found military routine extremely onerous. John Phiri wrote to his home village from 
South Africa: 
I and the other eight Tonga fellows had joined up the army thinking that the army 
life was good but when we joined up we found that the conditions in the army were 
intolerable. Hence all decided to run away and leave everything behind308 
Similarly, signaller Alex Nyallapah wrote home from Kenya that `I am now tired of 
Signal work and I want to run away so if you hear nothing at all you will know that I 
have hit the trail for a far place from where I will not return. 309 Between August 
1943 and January 1944, an average of 214 men were deserting every month within 
Nyasaland alone. 310 Others tried more elaborate means of obtaining release from 
306 MNA, SI /652/31/74d, Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Chater, OC SCC, to Secretary to the Government 
of Somaliland, I1 July 1938. A similar refusal to march took place in 31 KAR during the Second 
World War: see IWM, 96/17/1, Major D. R. Dunseath, `A Curious Route to Nanyuki 1940-1950', 
1994. 
307 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 198; PRO, CO 820, Annual Inspection Reports I KAR and 
2 KAR, 1927-1938. 
308 MNA, S 45/3/2/4/17N, John Phili to Asma Anyamanda, Politsi, Transvaal, [n. d., 1944]. 
309 MNA, S 45/3/2/4/3Q, Signaller R. Alex Nyallapah, Sub Area Signals Nanyuki, to William. 
Nyallapah, 29 September 1943. 
31 MNA, KAR 6/2/1, Recruits and Deserters Rolls, August 1943-October 1943; MNA, KAR 6/2/2, 
Recruits and Deserters Rolls, October 1943-January 1944. 
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military service. Driver Milos James Mphili, among others, wrote home requesting 
`some of the medicine which causes one to be discharged. ' 311 Victor Chintenga, 
finding that the army was `very hard work', managed to get himself released by 
feigning an injured leg. 312 Another soldier worked out an elaborate scheme telling 
his mother to go to the District Commissioner and say that "`all my sons have died". 
"I only have one still alive and he is a soldier. We are left alone"', in order that he 
might be sent home. 313 
Punishment 
Although the authorities were often willing to accommodate African soldiers' 
challenges to military routine when they believed that issues such as prestige were at 
stake, punishment remained a visible and important feature in the maintenance of 
discipline in the KAR. The `BCA Rifles Ordinance, 1897' laid out a number of 
summary punishments which could be awarded by officers, including: extra duties 
for minor infringements; confinement to barracks (CB); fines of up to ten shillings; 
up to 84 days of imprisonment with hard labour (IHL); and the ultimate sanctions of 
corporal punishment and dismissal from the force. Later the `King's African Rifles 
Ordnance' added the death sentence, which could only be awarded out by Court 
Martial. 314 The offences for which these punishments were awarded included 
unsanctioned looting; theft from a fellow soldier, or from the government; sale or 
31 1 MNA, S 45/3/2/2/14/E, Driver No. 8565, Milos James Mphili, 2/6 KAR, to Mr. Kelear, 21 March 
1942; MNA, S 45/3/2/2/13/J, Driver No. 8567 John Garrason, 8 KAR to Garrason Unjika, no date, 
1942; MNA, S 45/3/2/4/7/K, Dresser Ritchie Kaugale, HQ Infantry Training Centre Jinja, Uganda, to 
T. K. Hampton, 8 December 1943. 
312 MNA, S 45/3/2/4/18/U, Victor Chintenga to Evans Arthur, D Company, 2 KAR, Fort Johnston, 4 
May 1944. 
313 MNA, S 45/3/22/12/I, Private Suwedi Ngomba, D Company, I/I KAR to Mr. Arthur Njewa, 14 
February 1942; MNA, S 45/3/2/2/12/1, Private Suwedi Ngomba, D Company, I/I KAR to Sano 
Chinyanja, 14 February 1942. 
314 `The King's African Rifles Ordnance, 1911', section 38. 
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loss of personal clothing; failure to assist in the arrest of a defaulter; sleeping at ones 
post; going absent without leave; drunkenness; disobeying an order; violence to a 
superior officer; and mutiny. 315 
In practice, corporal punishment, or flogging, seems to have been the most 
common punishment inflicted upon Nyasaland soldiers in the 1890s, reflecting the 
widely held belief that physical punishments were most suitable to `primitive' 
Africans. Flogging was carried out with a `chigoti' or lash, defined in 1903 as `A 
strip of hippopotamus hide three feet ten inches in length [... J not to be of extreme 
pliability, the butt and tip in this respect should only be made to meet by the use of 
considerable strength'. 316 Performing a didactic function, the punishment was 
carried out `before the rest of the men', 317 and the basic form is demonstrated in a 
sketch by Lieutenant Poole showing a naked soldier held prostrate on the ground by 
two of his fellow soldiers, whilst the flogging itself is administered by a Sikh 
NCO. 318 The punishment officially consisted of up to twenty-four lashes, 319 and was 
so brutal that in 1903 the Commanding Officer of 1 KAR issued an order that 
In future [soldiers] are not to be flogged `bare' except for very serious offences - 
The Officer Commanding the Troops in B. C. A. considers that flogging `bare' is 
liable 
(1) To send the man to Hospital & incapacitate him from work 
& (2) Is a brutal and disgusting spectacle. 
Flogging first on one side & then on the other is to cease, as the punishment when 
inflicted from one side only is sufficiently severe 320 
315 PRO, FO 2/126, if. 178-179, `The British Central Africa Rifles Ordinance, 1897', pp. 8-9. 
316 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 651, 'Regulation Chikoti', 23 June 1903. 
317 MNA, AL 1/1/2, Diary of Edward Alston, 20 February 1896. 
319 MNA, 14/FGP/3, `And punishment', sketch by Francis Garden Poole [ 1897? ). 
319 PRO, FO 2/126, f. 179, `The British Central Africa Rifles Ordinance, 1897', p. 9; `The King's 
African Rifles Ordnance, 1911', section 38. 
320 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 605, `Flogging', 17 January 1903. 
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It is now difficult to measure precisely the extent of flogging in Nyasaland at the turn 
of the century, but in 1906 the Inspector-General found it necessary to instruct the 
Commanding Officer of I KAR that 
The infliction of corporal punishment must as a general rule be limited to crimes of 
a disgraceful nature and to cases where it is evident that such punishment is 
needed. The infliction of corporal punishment for minor offences must cease. 02) 
Moreover, in 1908, following a year which had seen 55 awards of corporal 
punishment and a further 50 of IHL, the Inspector-General described discipline in I 
KAR as `good', and noted that `corporal punishment [... ] is being gradually reduced 
year by year, but the time has not yet come to abolish corporal punishment altogether 
even in peace time' . 
322 
By the inter-war years, the form of corporal punishment had changed 
significantly. The flogging itself was now carried out by the Provost Sergeant using 
a five-foot long rattan cane, considered to be less severe than the chigoti, and `a 
damp rag would be placed over the man's buttocks [... ] to prevent the skin being cut'. 
323 The punishment was sometimes carried out in the guardroom rather than in 
public, but always retained strong ritual elements; after the punishment, the soldier 
was ordered to `stand up erect, replace his tarbush [fez] hat and salute his officer'. 324 
Flogging was still carried out in front of the battalion formed in a `hollow square' if 
it was felt that it was necessary to `make an example' of the offenders. 325 By the 
mid-1920s, IHL had become the most common form of severe punishment in 2 
321 PRO CO 534/3, f. 450, Inspector General KAR to OC 1 KAR, Nairobi, 2 March 1906. 
322 PRO CO 534/8, f. 163, Report by the Inspector General on the Ist Battalion, King's African Rifles 
1908]. 
21 De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 27. 
324 RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (105), f. 34, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
323 De Guingand, African Assignment, pp. 28-29; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 34, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
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KAR, with 139 awards in 1926 to 1927, and 99 awards the following year. 
However, the number of `canings', at 50 and 46 respectively, had not declined 
significantly from 1908 326 In the late 1920s, the Malawians attached to the 
Somaliland Camel Corps seem to have been more likely to receive corporal 
punishment for lesser offences than Somalis (between 1925 and 1928, four out of the 
five lashings carried out on Malawians were for adultery, whilst the two lashes 
awarded to Somalis were both for threatening their superiors). 327 
From the late 1920s, the colonial office exerted growing pressure to reduce the 
extent of corporal punishment throughout the KAR and RWAFF, first requiring the 
Governor's sanction for floggings, 329 and in the early 1930s by issuing orders against 
the use of summary corporal punishment. However, officers in the Nyasaland 
battalions seem to have continued to use flogging when troops were `out in the bush 
where you couldn't punish them in any other way'. 329 With the outbreak of war in 
1939, KAR soldiers on active service again became liable to corporal punishment 
awarded by court martial, which was only finally abolished at the end of the war. 330 
Whilst it is clear that corporal punishment continued to be administered in the 
KAR through the war, it is unclear how far it was used in the Nyasaland battalions. 
326 PRO, CO 820/1/7, `Number of Severe Punishments for the Preceding 12 Months Showing 
Percentage of Punishments to Strength', OC 2 KAR, Tabora, 30 November 1926; PRO, CO 820/3/11, 
`Number of Severe Punishments for the Preceding 12 Months Showing Percentage of Punishments to 
Strength', Lieutenant Colonel Atkin, OC 2 KAR, Tabora, 20 November 1927. 
327 MNA, S 1/2161/23, SCC Returns of Severe Punishments, 1925-28. 
32B De Guingand, African Assignment, pp. 28-29. 
329 IWM, Sound Archive, 3960/05, Transcript of interview with Colonel R. E. S. Yeldham CBE, 3 
November 1978, p. 9. 
330 David Killingray, `The "Rod of Empire": The Debate Over Corporal Punishment in the British 
African Colonial Forces, 1888-1946', Journal of African History, 35 (1994), 201-16 (pp. 210-15), 
Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 187. 
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Battalion Orders of I KAR contain a number of references to IHL, but none to 
corporal punishment. Similarly, most ex-soldiers interviewed remembered IHL and 
confinement to barracks being used, but only three recalled recourse to corporal 
punishment. 33 1 At the same time, as noted by Killingray, the influx of new personnel 
during the war increased the incidence of unofficial physical punishment. 
332 
Arbitrary beatings seem to have been prevalent for Malawians stationed in Kenya, 
where the perception that Malawians were singled out for punishment was an 
important element in their antipathy towards Kenyan officers. Soldiers complained 
to NA Chikumbu that 
If a camp is staffed by KAMBAS or JALUWAS of higher ranks [... ] if a Nyasaland 
soldier makes a very slight mistake when being instructed, there, the Nyasalander 
has to undergo a very heavy kick, he is beaten just like a wild beast. And if a 
KAMBA or JALUWA does the same mistake he does not undergo anything. 
333 
Even in action, Malawians could find themselves subject to excessive, if 
understandable, arbitrary physical punishments: 
Disciplinary action had to be rough and ready. Ted Onslow bayoneted a man in the 
leg one night because he was coughing persistently and was in danger of giving 
away the position and destroying the element of surprise. It worked. The man did 
not cough again. 334 
As the incidence of formal corporal punishment decreased, other forms of 
punishment took over the public spectacle of flogging. In 1944, following the 
abandonment of an officer in the field by his company, the Commanding Officer of 
22 KAR set up an elaborate ritual near the front line to punish the offenders: 
331 Interview with Jauma Matola, Zomba, October 2000; Interview with Elia Noah, Zomba, October 
2000; Interview with Henderson Simuja, Zomba, October 2000. 
332 Killingray, `The "Rod of Empire"', p. 211. 
333 MNA, S 41/I/23/4/49A, `Native Authority Chikumbu's Journey to Nairobi to visit his soldiers', by 
NA Chikumbu, no date, 1944. 
334 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) III, `Account of 22nd Bn. King's African Rifles (Nyasaland) in 
Action Burma (Khabaw Valley) 1944 by David Bowie (Intelligence Officer)', [1945], p. 65 
186 
The whole Battalion was formed up in a hollow square on a small piece of open 
ground that evening. [... J 
The defaulting platoon were marched in front of the Battalion by the R. S. M. The 
charges were read out. The men answered "guilty" to them, each standing stiffly to 
attention. 
Ken Collen told them he could have them shot for cowardice, and would do so on 
another occasion. He then reduced the NCOs to the ranks ripping the stripes from 
their shirt sleeves. He then told them that the platoon would be disbanded and 
reformed. [... ] 
The whole ceremony lasted about half-an-hour and was completed just before 
dusk. It was a theatrical but an extremely effective parade which the troops never 
forgot. 335 
In wartime, the application of the Army Act to the KAR meant that Malawian 
soldiers were again liable to execution by court martial. During the First World War, 
executions were also carried out as a public spectacle. One soldier recalled the 
execution of two deserters: 
We were asked to wake up and stood in lines. Meanwhile, two people were 
digging pits. [... ] The officers said to us , `You see your 
friends here! They ran 
away from fighting. Soldiers are not supposed to run away from fighting. Now we 
want to punish them. ' When the officer was saying this the two were securely tied 
to a tree. So he took a gun and shouted, `Present fire! 336 
Executions do not seem to have been carried out as a public spectacle during the 
Second World War, possibly in response to official fears that they could engender 
resistance. Reflecting this, Shepperson remembered a rumour following one 
execution that, `instead of lining [the firing party] up, they put them behind 
individual trees so they wouldn't know who was who'. 337 
Most officers serving with the KAR before the First World War believed not 
only that that corporal punishment was the most suitable punishment for African 
soldiers, but also that soldiers preferred corporal punishment, especially to fines. 
"s MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) 111, `Account of 22nd Bn. King's African Rifles (Nyasaland) in Action 
Burma (Khabaw Valley) 1944 by David Bowie (Intelligence Officer)', [ 1945], pp. 54-55. 
336 Interview with Belo Kaponya, quoted in Page The Chiwaya War, p. 100. 337 Interview with Professor George Shepperson, Peterborough, 30 March 2000. 
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Such claims may have some validity, since they were generally based upon the 
expressed wishes of Nyasaland soldiers. Yeldham, who served in 1 KAR in the late 
1920s, noted that ex-German soldiers in particular `always used to say to us "Bwana 
for God's sake don't give us fines or CB give us six for backside"'. 338 Glass, who 
served in the late 1930s, cited a soldier accused of adultery: 
as a punishment he was given the option of 14 days Detention or six strokes in 
front of the entire Company paraded for this purpose [... ] 
The Askari considered 14 days in Detention away from his wife a far more serious 
punishment than six strokes administered on the spot; he also forfeited no pay. 339 
Similarly, de Guingand noted `I never knew a case where resentment was shown 
after the punishment, and the askari's usual attitude was: "Thank heaven that's over 
and there's no fine to worry about"'. 340 Yeldham ascribed this preference to the 
effect of fines upon the soldier's dependants: `it meant of course that the wife and the 
family didn't get all the posho and food that they were hoping to get [... ] so the askari 
preferred to be given a punishment' 341 Of course, the fact that soldiers preferred 
corporal punishment over fines, and accepted it as part of military life, did not imply 
that they liked flogging. Glass also noted that Malawians found corporal punishment 
humiliating: `What he did not like was other askari ridiculing him for his crime and 
this he had to endure for quite a period afterwards'. 
342 
During the Second World War, possibly reflecting the influx of better educated 
personnel, many Nyasaland soldiers became increasingly dissatisfied with the nature 
of military justice. Complaints collected during the Chiefs' visits to Kenya and the 
338 IWM, Sound Archive, 3960/05, Transcript of interview with Colonel R. E. S. Yeldham CBE, 3 
November 1978, p. 9. 
39 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 34, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
340 De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 27. 
301 IWM, Sound Archive, 3960/05, Transcript of interview with Colonel R. E. S. Yeldham CBE, 3 
November 1978, p. 9. 
342 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 34, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
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Far East in 1944 and 1945 show that many were unhappy with the heaviness of 
punishments awarded for what they regarded as minor infringements, and 
particularly resented receiving two kinds of punishments for the same crime. 
Soldiers' complaints included: 
If we do wrong we are put in prison for 14 days and fined as much as £5. Why 
should we be punished twice for the same offence 343 
If any Nyasalander looses [sic] even one button, he is accused, and fined 40/- 
including imprisonment for 40 days 344 
When we make any mistakes they put us in prison and fine us at the same time, 
besides which, we are beaten. If we were treated like the D. C's prisoners at home 
we would be alright 345 
Given the long-standing practice of giving soldiers a choice between fines and 
imprisonment or corporal punishment, such grievances were understandable. 
Others felt that cases were not fairly heard, and that defendants did not get an 
opportunity to answer accusations. NA Chikumbu summarised the complaints of 
Nyasaland soldiers in the Far East: 
We are not refusing to be punished if we have done a bad thing, but sometimes an 
African is persuaded to say he has done a bad thing when he has not 346 
If a soldier is charged on any case either petty or a serious one he is not allowance 
to make a statement or evidence to defend himself; [... ] sometimes the accused 
soldier may be asked whether he has any questions to put forward, if the answer to 
this is `yes' and starts to question, the officer trying the case immediately says 
`You have a second case' and the accused soldier stops in a great fear and then 
after that the Officer passes a sentence on two counts against him accordingly - is 
that justice? "' 
343 MNA, S 41/1/23/4/49B, Report by NA Kadawere, 21 December 1944. 
344 MNA, S 41/1/23/4/52A, `Native Authority Kawinga's Journey to Nairobi', by NA Kawinga, II 
January 1945. See MNA, S 41/1/23/4/55A, 'Journey of Chiefs to the North', by NA Gomani, January 
1945. 
aas MNA, S41/1/23/5/63B, NA Chikumbu to PC Southern Province, 13 August 1945 
346 MNA, S41/1/23/5/63B, NA Chikumbu to PC Southern Province, 13 August 1945. 
347 MNA, S 41/1/23/4/53B, `Report on a visit to Nairobi and Somaliland by Chiefs', by NA Mwase, 
no date, 1945; See MNA, S 41/1/23/4/55A, `Journey of Chiefs to the North', by NA Gomani, January 
1945. 
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The latter complaint seems to relate to Contempt of Court, but the fact that 
Nyasaland soldiers were not made aware of this possibility suggests the extent to 
which many must have felt alienated by court martial procedures. 
Such treatment certainly increased the desire of some soldiers to desert or 
attempt to be discharged from the army. 348 However, particularly in the Far East, 
where desertion was a less attractive option, individual soldiers occasionally took 
extreme courses of action against perceived injustices. In just one Nyasaland 
battalion, 13 KAR, there were at least two fatal incidents as the result of punishments 
which were perceived as unjust. Following a charge made by a British NCO, Private 
Devesiasi Ndembo, of D Company, 13 KAR, threw a grenade into the company 
officers' mess tent, killing an officer and an African Lance-Corporal, and wounding 
three officers, the British Company Sergeant Major, and an African mess servant. 349 
In another incident, again apparently following a charge made by a BNCO, a 
Regimental Policeman fired a shot through the window of the officers mess, again 
killing an officer. 350 Such incidents were not, of course, unique to the Nyasaland 
battalions, but do clearly show the depth of Nyasaland soldiers' grievances in 
difficult circumstances. 35 
348 See S 45/3/2/4/7/K, Dresser Ritchie Kaugale, H. Q. I. T. C. Jinja, Uganda, to T. K. Hampton, 8 
December 1943. 
34' PRO, WO 172/6535, War Diary, 13 KAR, October 1944; John Nunneley, Tales from the King's 
African Rifles, (Petersham, Askari Books, 1998), p. 172; Interview with Professor George Shepperson, 
30 March 2000. 
350 Interview with Professor George Shepperson, 30 March 2000. 
351 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, pp. 200-201. 
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It is unsurprising that Nyasaland soldiers resisted punishment. However, 
except in extreme cases, such resistance was usually limited; Malawians accepted the 
idea of military punishment, but rejected those which appeared to be arbitrary or 
excessive. Similarly, whilst Malawians' challenged other elements of military life, 
these challenges were not founded upon a rejection of the idea of military service. 
African reactions to the military hierarchy were informed by a desire for increased 
prestige within that hierarchy, rather than a desire to displace it. Malawians' 
objected to BNCOs when they felt that their existing positions had been diminished, 
but up to the end of the Second World War, calls for commissions for Malawians 
were driven by comparisons with Africans who had been commissioned in other 
forces, rather than with European officers. As such, demands were largely symbolic 
rather than calling for wholesale change. Where objections to European officers did 
exist, they were often aimed at specific groups, such as officers from Kenya. Even in 
the 1960s, when Malawians naturally resented the slow Africanisation of their 
battalions, criticism of Europeans was often aimed specifically at the Rhodesian 
officers identified with the Federation, and as a result, such criticism largely 
disappeared after 1963. 
However, whilst Malawians accepted the idea of military service, they 
frequently sought to negotiate the terms under which that service took place. Both 
European and African ranks recognised the importance of the symbolism of uniform, 
both as an external indicator of authority, and as an internal indicator of status. 
However, Malawians resisted elements of the visual identity which was imposed 
upon them, and although their efforts were initially unsuccessful, the military 
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authorities were compelled to recognise Malawians' desires regarding dress to the 
extent that they were eventually used as a substitute for Africanisation. Finally, 
whilst the KAR undoubtedly had many of the features of a `total institution', 
Malawians were able to effectively appropriate some of its most oppressive features, 
such as drill, and redefine them as prestigious or even desirable activities. 
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Chapter 4 
`What the Askari had been used to in his tribal life'?: ' 
Domestic life in the military lines? 
The military camp is a unique environment. Like the prison, or in the southern 
African context the mine compound, it is both workplace and living place. However, 
unlike these functional spaces, the military authorities aimed not only to discipline, 
but to foster a sense of community. This was particularly significant in the case of 
Nyasaland, where soldiers often spent over twenty years in the KAR. Another 
unique feature of the military environment which stood in contrast to the mine 
compound was the presence of soldiers' wives. Whilst the military camp was clearly 
structured upon the status of men, women were perhaps more visibly significant in 
African colonial armies than in any other armed forces of the twentieth century. This 
poses particular questions in the case of Nyasaland, since the majority of Malawian 
colonial soldiers were recruited from matrilineal societies (including the Yao, 
Nyanja, and Nguru/Lomwe) in which land ownership was nominally vested in 
women. 
RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (7), f. 8, Memorandum by Colonel Desmond John Bannister [1980? ]. 
Z The term lines was commonly used in preference to barracks to refer to soldiers' accommodation in 
the colonial army. It implied rows of temporary buildings rather than the large blocks common in the 
metropolitan army. 
3 '2nd Battalion The King's African Rifles, Length of Service Return', Lieutenant Colonel W. 1. 
Gunn, Officer Commanding 2 KAR, 4 March 1920, PRO CO 534/40, f. 16; ` 1st Battalion King's 
African Rifles Tanganyika Territory, Length of Service', Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Griffiths, Officer 
Commanding 1 KAR, I May 1920, PRO CO 534/40, f. 66; `Ist King's African Rifles, Length of 
Service', Adjutant, I KAR, November 1923, PRO CO 534/54, f. 165; '2nd Battalion, The King's 
African Rifles, Length of Service Return', Lieutenant Colonel Murray, Officer Commanding, 2 KAR, 
1 November 1923, PRO CO 534/54, f. 391; `No. 3 Depot Company, Length of Service', Officer 
Commanding, Depot 1 and 2 KAR, 4 March 1925, PRO CO 534/56, f. 189; Twaya Namonde, `The 
Story of Twaya Namonde', Nyasaland Journal, 16,1 (1963), pp. 49-61; Aibu Chikwenga, `Aibu 
Chikwenga: an Autobiography', translated by C. A. Baker, Society of Malawi Journal, 25,2 (1972), 
pp. 11-21. 
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Interest in African soldiers' family lives and the role of African women in the 
military environment has recently grown, with works by both David Killingray and 
Timothy Parsons. 4 These valuable studies have shed much new light upon the role of 
African women in the colonial army. However, their predominant focus upon the 
experience of women has obscured a broader picture of domestic life in the army. 
They also make little reference to the specific impact of military service upon 
matrilineal societies. In the context of Malawi, the impact upon gender relations of 
urbanisation and of labour migration to the Rhodesias and South Africa has received 
much attention. This has focused upon the changing role of women in the face of 
male absence, and upon the displacement of women relocated to urban environments, 
particularly the influence of such displacement upon women from traditionally 
matrilineal and matrilocal societies. Complementing this, van Onselen has provided 
a detailed analysis of life for African men living within mine compounds. 5 Just as 
colonial Nyasaland acted as a labour pool for Southern Africa, it equally served as a 
military labour pool for East Africa, where Malawian soldiers played a 
disproportionately conspicuous role from the early years of the century. However, 
the domestic social structure of the colonial army, where women were generally 
Timothy H. Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in 
the King's African Ries, 1902-1964 (Oxford: James Currey, 1999), chap. 5, pp. 145-18 1; Timothy 
Parsons, 'All Askaris Are Family Men: Sex, Domesticity and Discipline in the King's African Rifles, 
1902-1964', in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964, ed. by 
David Killingray, and David Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 157-178; 
David Killingray, `Gender Issues and Colonial Armies', in Guardians of Empire, ed. by Killingray 
and Omissi, pp. 221-248. 
5 Charles van Onselen, `The role of collaborators in the Rhodesian mining industry 1900-1935', 
African Affairs, 72,289 (1973), 401-18; Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in 
Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933 (London: Pluto Press, 1976). 
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present rather than absent, differed markedly from conventional forms of labour 
migration. 6 
This chapter aims to examine the domestic experience of Malawians in the 
colonial army as a whole, examining the conditions in which they lived, and the roles 
performed by different members of the military community. By highlighting the 
conflict between military desire to maintain order within the camp on the one hand, 
and the aspirations of soldiers on the other, it is intended to investigate the extent to 
which Malawians in the military camp were able to indigenise their surroundings, 
and indeed, how far they wished to do so. Finally, the chapter will focus on the 
development of official attitudes towards women in the army, and the degree to 
which their role was developed or subverted by military women themselves. 
Following from this, the paper examines the reciprocal impact of the military service 
upon gender relations within the army, and the implications of this for military 
society. 
Who was present in the Lines? 
The domestic community within the military camp comprised a number of 
groups in addition to the combatant soldiers of the KAR. These included not only 
enlisted non-combatants, such as Malawian Interpreters, Clerks, Hospital Dressers, 
6 PRO, FO 2/108, if. 30-1, Acting Commissioner Sharpe to Foreign Secretary, Zomba, 29 September 
1896; MNA, AL 1/1/2, Diary of Edward Alston, 6 September 1896; 'The B. C. A. Rifles in Mauritius' 
(Reproduced from the Morning Leader), Central African Times, 19 May 1900, p. 8; `King's African 
Rifles for British East Africa', Central African Times, 24 June 1905, p. 9; MNA S2/32/22/27, 
Governor of Nyasaland to Colonial Office [October 1922? 1; MNA S2/32/22142, Somaliland 
Administration to Governor of Nyasaland, 29 September 1925; MNA, S 1/652/31/62, Commissioner 
of Somaliland to Governor of Nyasaland, 4 April 1935; MNA S 1/652/31/64, Governor of Somaliland 
to Governor of Nyasaland, 27 May 1935; MNA M2/24/39/37a, Captain Stayter, Officer Commanding 
2 KAR to Director of Medical Services, Zomba, 30 May 1936; MNA M2/24/39/39a, Move Table, 
Acting Adjutant 2 KAR to Director of Medical Services, Zomba, 24 June 1936. 
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Stretcher Bearers, Artisans, and Machine Gun (MG) Porters, but also civilian `line 
boys' such as Messengers and Sweepers. As well as these `public followers', 
European officers and BNCOs usually maintained private `Personal Servants', who 
were paid and provided with uniform by their masters.? Finally, up to the Second 
World War, the KAR was also reliant upon `carriers' or `tenga lenga' for its 
transportation needs. Since carriers were normally obtained on an ad hoc basis and 
were not usually accommodated within the military camp, they cannot generally be 
regarded as part of the permanent military community. However, carriers were 
occasionally enrolled for longer periods. 8 
Non-combatants often provided a significant proportion of the strength of the 
Nyasaland battalions. Early lists of the establishment included only Malawian 
interpreters, 9 and many artisans' positions were provided by the Indian contingent. 1° 
However, it is clear that Malawian MG porters and officers' personal servants were 
attached to the Nyasaland battalions from an early date. " By 1926, the strength of I 
KAR included four Malawian Clerks, three Interpreters, nineteen medical staff, 
seven Artisans, sixty-five MG Porters, six Messengers, nine Sweepers, and twenty 
`Sanitation Boys' for the Regimental Hospital, in addition to the 374 combatant 
7 PRO, WO 169/758, WO 169/2994, WO 169/7020, WO 169/14104,1 KAR Battalion Orders. 
s MNA, S 2/8/20/1, C. G. Phillips, OC Nyasaland Detachment I KAR, to OC Mangoche Detachment 
1 KAR, Zomba, 5 February 1920. 
9 PRO FO 2/106, if. 246-47, `Reorganization of Armed Forces in British Central Africa, proposed by 
Major C. A. Edwards, ' 3 April 1896. 
10 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 58, `Distribution Staff-Pay Year 97-98', [n. d. ]. 
" PRO, FO 2/67, `Estimates for the Year's Expenditure in British Central Africa Protectorate: April 
1,1894, to March 31,1895', H. H. Johnston, Commissioner of BCA, to Earl of Kimberley, Colonial 
Secretary, 29 August 1894; MNA, KAR 2/1/3, Mobilization Scheme for M'Quamba Expedition, 
August 1899; NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 516, `Pay Maxim Gun Carriers', 31 December 1901. 
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soldiers. The battalion probably also supported at least thirty personal servants. 12 
The number of non-combatants had changed little by 1945, when I KAR included 
twenty-two artisans, thirteen `Sanitary Orderlies' (sweepers), forty-four cooks, 
fifteen Mess Servants, and forty-seven Private Servants, who had recently been re- 
titled `Orderlies' and were now paid from public funds. 
Although not categorised as askari, non-combatants were often closely 
associated with the military structure of the KAR. Non-combatants such as 
Interpreters obviously played an important role as intermediaries in the military 
hierarchy. However, MG Porters also became increasingly assimilated into the 
combatant structure. In 1920, most Malawian MG Porters were enlisted from men 
who had failed medical examinations to serve as soldiers. 13 By the mid-1920s, MG 
Porters were uniformed similarly to soldiers, and were drilled alongside recruits, 
although they were not included in arms drill. 14 In the early 1930s, MG porters were 
trained to fire machine guns themselves, and provided a source of recruits. ls Finally 
in 1939, enlisted porters were redesignated as `askaris'. 16 
Unlike enlisted non-combatants, line boys such as sweepers were not provided 
with their own accommodation, but slept in the kitchens attached to the lines. 
12 PRO, CO 820/1/10,1 KAR Strength Return, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins, OC I KAR, Zomba, 1 
November 1926. 
13 PRO, CO 534/47, f. 30,2/1 KAR Inspection report 1920-1921, Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, 
Inspector General KAR, Kilossa, 31 January 1921. 
14 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the 1st (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles, (Zomba: 
Government Printer, Nyasaland, 1927), p. 88; CO 820/6/1,1 KAR Inspection Report, Colonel Walker, 
Inspector General KAR, Dar-es-Salaam, 1927. 
's PRO, CO 820/10/9,2 KAR Inspection Report, by Brigadier H. Walker, Inspector General KAR, 
Dar-es-Salaam, 7 January 1931. 
'6 PRO, WO 169/758, Battalion Orders by Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. Dillon, Commanding 1st 
Battalion, King's African Rifles, 18 November 1939. 
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Similarly, Personal Servants lived in quarters attached to the houses of the officers 
who employed them. 17 Nevertheless, such men were in no way transient figures in 
the camp. KAR messengers were often selected from ex-soldiers, and indeed, in 
1925 the entire complement seems to have been met by veterans, since nine of the 
twenty veterans resident at the KAR Memorial Home were working as messengers 
for the KAR. 18 Personal Servants worked and lived alongside the officer's Orderly, a 
combatant soldier `of long service and good conduct' 19 who received extra pay and 
was excused from his normal duties in return for acting as personal assistant to an 
officer. 2° Orderlies' close proximity to officers made them important intermediaries 
between European and African ranks, and de Guingand described his Orderly, 
Subehana, as `The most important member of one's personal staff' hom he 
regarded as `a trusted friend'. 21 Servants such as Jackie, 1 KAR's Officers' Mess 
cook in the mid-1920s, were equally prominent in officers' lives, and could be long- 
standing members of the military community. 22 During the World Wars, when 
Nyasaland Europeans served with the KAR, Malawians such as Ardwell Mlenga or 
`Amini' simply followed their civilian employers into the army as personal 
servants. However, in peacetime, Personal Servants were commonly passed from 
one officer to another. Following this pattern, Twaya Namonde worked as a cook 
17 RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (7), f. 5, Memorandum by Colonel Desmond John Bannister [ 1980? ]. 
18 PRO, CO 534/56, f. 205, 'Report on K. A. R. Memorial Pensioner Home', by A. G. Bishop, 
Honorary Secretary, KAR Memorial Fund, 30 March 1925. 
19 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Ries, (Zomba: 
Government Printer, Nyasaland, 1927), p. 17. 
20 Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Riffes, (Nairobi: 
Uganda Railway Press, [1908(? )]), p. 14; Sir Francis De Guingand, African Assignment (London: 
Hodder & Stroughton, 1953), p. 26. 
21 De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 26. 
22 De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 21. 
23 Mlenga, Ardwell, 'An Autobiography', The Nyasaland Journal, 17,2 (1964), 25-28 (p. 27); Amini, 
'In Search of a Bwana', in Abyssinian Patchwork: An Anthology (London, Frederick Muller, 1949), 
ed. by Kenneth Gandar Dower, pp. 40-42. 
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and Personal Servant for at least nine different KAR officers between 1904 and 
1942. Like other servants, Twaya Namonde accompanied the KAR on active service 
in both wars, and was even awarded a special `follower's' medal. 24 
The most significant group of followers in the military camp, both numerically 
and in the eyes of the military authorities were the soldiers' wives and families. It is 
clear that women were living with soldiers in garrisons in Nyasaland as early as 
1896.25 When the newly raised 2nd BCA Rifles sailed for Mauritius in 1899, the 878 
Malawian soldiers were accompanied by 220 women and 77 children. 26 As one 
observer noted, `Many of the recruits brought their wives and children with them, so 
that [... ] it was a small army which landed'. 27 The proportion of women living with 
the Nyasaland battalions grew slowly before the First World War, so that in 1905, 
600 men of 1 KAR travelling to East Africa were accompanied by 239 women. By 
the eve of the Second World War, it was estimated that more than ninety-five percent 
of Malawian soldiers were living in the lines with a woman. 
Accommodation 
For the first twenty years of the colonial army in Nyasaland, Malawian soldiers 
were generally responsible for building their own accommodation. 28 A map of Fort 
Lister drawn by Lieutenant Poole shows the officer's house, the Sikh soldiers' 
24 Twaya Namonde, `The Story of Twaya Namonde', The Nyasaland Journal, 16,1 (1963), 49-6 1; 
Society of Malawi Library, World War One Album 4, f. 33, `Brief historical details of Twaya 
Namone, in support of his application for admission to K. A. R. Memorial Home Zomba' [n. d. ]. 
25 Acting Commissioner Sharpe to Foreign Secretary, Zomba, 29 September 1896, PRO FO 2/108, f 
30-1 
26 Moyse Bartlett, p. 29. 
27 `The B. C. A. Rifles in Mauritius' (Reproduced from the Morning Leader), Central African Times, 
19 May 1900, p. 8. 
29 MNA, AL l/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston, 2 July 1895. 
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`Lines', and even cow, goat, and fowl houses inside the Fort, whilst the Malawian 
soldiers' accommodation is simply referred to as a `Village' occupied by his soldiers, 
not only some distance outside the Fort, but even on the opposite bank of the 
stream. 29 This spatial segregation was reproduced at other forts. In 1903, the 
`Round and square Askari huts' of `mud and daub' at Fort Mangoche were also 
outside the walls of the fort, although the Malawian Interpreter's houses were on the 
opposite side of the fort with that of the Indian Hospital Assistant. 30 The situation 
was even more marked at Fort Manning, where the soldiers' houses were sited about 
400 yards away from the Fort itself. 31 This pattern was also followed when soldiers 
served outside Nyasaland. Photographs of I CAR in Mauritius show `the regimental 
lines' consisting of rows of square thatched houses, 32 and in 1906 it was noted that 
Malawians serving in Kenya were `hutting themselves in the bee-hive shaped wattle 
and daub hut with a grass thatched roof. 33 The role of the military authorities in 
such construction seems to have been limited to issuing instructions for the position 
of the buildings. Supervising the erection of huts for 1 KAR in 1903, Lieutenant 
Barton recorded that `As may be expected there is not much the white man can teach 
the Central African in this work, [t]hough of course the ground has to be laid out and 
marked before they begin building'. 34 
29 MNA 14/FGP/4/1, `Plan of Fort Lister', by Lieutenant Francis Garden Poole, 1897; see `British 
Central African Protectorate', Navy and Array Illustrated, 3 September 1898, pp. 561-562. 
30 MNA, KAR 1/2/5, `Report on Fort Mangoche', Captain C. Percival, I KAR, 1 June 1903. 
31 MNA, KAR 1/2/5, Map of Fort Manning by Captain Brook, 3 March 1906. 
32 `The Central African Regiment', Navy and Army Illustrated, 12 May 1900, pp. 191-92 (p. 92). 
33 PRO, CO 534/3, f. 453, Inspection Report on 1 KAR, 1 February 1906, Brigadier General W. H. 
Manning, Inspector-General KAR, 3 March 1906. See NAM, 6705-60, `Personal Narration of Service 
with the 1st. Battalion K. A. R. by Lieut. Col. C. R. R. Bacon' [n. d. ]. 
34 NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant Charles W. Barton whilst serving in the Somaliland Campaign, 
9 July 1903. 
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By 1912, soldiers stationed in Zomba were living in geometrically arranged, 
single-storey blocks of rooms, still made by the Malawian soldiers themselves from 
unfired `green' brick, which the Inspector General considered `in every respect 
preferable to the old mud and thatched huts which required constant attention and 
were very difficult to keep tidy'. 35 During the First World War, the increase in the 
size of the KAR, coupled with frequent changes of station, meant that Malawian 
soldiers were often compelled to build their own huts. 36 Following the war, the brick 
buildings erected in 1912 were once more taken into use, but the Commandant now 
argued that iron roofs should be added, since `grass roofs harbour rats which damage 
the men's kit, are dangerous on account of fire and are in constant need of renewal 
and repairs'. 37 At the same time, in 1920, Malawian soldiers from 2 KAR stationed 
in newly occupied Tanganyika found themselves in a variety of inadequate housing. 
At Tabora, the Malawian soldiers found themselves sharing rooms in former German 
barrack blocks, although an overspill of 40 men lived in a corrugated iron house. 
Accommodation was crowded, since no extra provision was made for the men's 
wives. Soldiers at Arusha and Dodoma were living in wattle and daub huts, but the 
62 Malawians stationed at Bukoba were compelled to live in `worn out' tents, since it 
was believed that grass huts were unsuitable due to the spirullum tick. 38 Financial 
constraints prevented the improvement of these facilities, and by the following year, 
the situation had deteriorated to the point where soldiers at Tabora were also 
35 PRO, CO 534/15, f. 49, Inspection Report on I KAR, 1912-1913, Colonel G. Thesiger, Inspector- 
General KAR, 12 November 1912. See MNA, M2/24/39/75, 'The Housing and General Sanitary 
Condition of the 2nd K. A. R. Lines', Director of Medical Services Nyasaland, 19 November 1938. 
36 NAM, 6505-16, Diary of Captain E. A. Priestland, 2/2 KAR, 4 December 1916,17 January 1917. 
37 PRO, CO 534/34, f. 412, Inspection Report on KAR in Nyasaland, Brigadier E. H. Llewellyn, 
Commandant KAR, 12 August 1919. 
38 PRO CO 534/40, f. 10, Inspection Report on 2 KAR, 1919-1920, Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, 
Inspector-General KAR, 21 March 1920; PRO, CO 534/40, if. 22-26, `Medical Report on 2nd King's 
African Rifles from January 1919 to January 31st 1920', Lieutenant Colonel W. 1. Gunn, OC 2 KAR, 
Tabora, 14 March 1920. 
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accommodated in `porous' tents, whilst the soldiers at Bukoba in `very bad quality' 
tents were `continually getting wet and are consequently very dissatisfied' . 
39 
By 1923, money had been found to build new barracks in Tabora, which the 
Inspector General described as `exceptionally good 9,40 although soldiers in 
outstations and Machine Gun Porters continued to live in round huts. 41 However, 
whilst problems in Tanganyika seemed to be solved, the brick lines in Zomba were 
already beginning to fall into a poor state of repair. 42 No major building projects 
appear to have been undertaken for the rest of the interwar period, and by the late 
1930s, the soldiers' housing in Zomba was regarded as inadequate. Despite the 
recommendations made in 1919, most houses still had thatched roofs 43 Soldiers 
lived in rooms, with no door to keep out insects, measuring only about ten feet by ten 
feet, or ten feet by fifteen feet for ANCOs. Of the 253 soldiers in the camp, 85 had 
to share this space with a wife, 72 with a wife and child, 16 with a wife and two 
children, two with a wife and three children, and one with a wife and four children. 
39 PRO CO 534/47, ff. 65-70, `Medical Report for 2nd Battalion the King's African Rifles from 
January Ist to 31st December 1920', Lieutenant Colonel W. I. Gunn, OC 2 KAR, Tabora, 31 January 
1921; PRO, CO 534/47, f. 46, `Inspection Report 1920-1921: 2nd Battalion The Kings African 
Rifles', Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, Tabora, 7 February 1921. 
40 PRO, CO 534/54, f. 386,2 KAR `Medical Report for 1923', Colonel J. 1-larington, Inspector- 
General KAR, Dar-es-Salaam, 7 January 1924. 
41 PRO, CO 534/49, if. 689-96, 'Medical Report for 2nd Battalion the King's African Rifles from 
January Ist to December, 31st 1922', Lieutenant Colonel W. I. Gunn, OC 2 KAR [n. d. ]; PRO, CO 
534/51, f. 389,2 KAR `Medical Report for 1922', Lieutenant Colonel L. G. Murray, OC 2 KAR 
[April 1923? ]; PRO, CO 820/1/7,2 KAR Inspection Report, Colonel John Harington, Inspector 
General KAR, Dar-es-Salaam, 17 December 1926; PRO, CO 820/3/11,2 KAR Inspection Report, 
Colonel Walker, Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, Dar-es-Salaam, 4 December 1927. 
42 PRO, CO 534/56, f. 171, Inspection Report on I KAR, Colonel J. Harington, Inspector-General 
KAR, Zomba, 8 April 1925. 
43 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles (Zomba: 
Nyasaland Government Printer, 1927), p. 54. 
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Rooms containing more than two adults and one child were considered 
overcrowded. 44 
By late 1938, the authorities were beginning to make improvements to this 
accommodation, building blocks of slightly larger rooms, using burnt bricks and 
corrugated iron roofs, whilst some of the old green brick blocks were renovated with 
the addition of iron roofs and mud plaster ceilings. 5 However, reflecting the 
increased requirements for accommodation during the war, the older buildings 
remained in use. By 1940, with women removed from the camp, the rooms which 
had previously accommodated one soldier and his family were now used to house 
three men and their equipment. The Medical Officer described the old green brick 
buildings as `in a very bad state of repair and [... ] unfit for habitation', whilst the new 
ceilings in the renovated buildings had blocked old ventilation spaces so that the air 
was `foul'. The lines as a whole were condemned as `largely insanitary and unfit for 
use'. 46 This situation, however, had not improved two years later, when the old 
thatched buildings at Zomba were pronounced `tick infested'. 7 The Director of 
Medical Services noted that the buildings, some of which had now been in use for 
thirty years, were `not built in permanent materials: the floors are earth and the walls 
of lime plaster are badly cracked, enabling ticks to establish themselves once they are 
introduced'. However, he advised against improving the buildings since this `would 
44 MNA, M2/24/39/75, 'The Housing and General Sanitary Condition of the 2nd K. A. R. Lines', 
Director of Medical Services Nyasaland, 19 November 1938; PRO, CO 820/30/4, `Appendix "A", 
Work required on the King's African Rifles lines at Zomba', Inspector General's Inspection Report, 
Southern Brigade, KAR, Major-General G. J. Giffard, Inspector General RWAFF and KAR, Tabora, 
14 January 1938. 
45 MNA, M2/24/39/75, `The Housing and General Sanitary Condition of the 2nd K. A. R. Lines', 
Director of Medical Services Nyasaland, 19 November 1938. 
46 MNA, M 2/24/39/110, Medical Officer to Director of Medical Services, Zomba, 11 April 1940 
47 MNA, M 2/24/39/118A, H. R. Price, Director of Public Works, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 
Zomba, 14 December 1943. 
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tend to convert them into permanent buildings without correcting all their defects'. 48 
Elsewhere, Malawian soldiers during the Second World War were housed in a 
variety of accommodation reflecting the diversity of their postings. Many wartime 
camps in East Africa were equipped with wooden huts, whilst most Malawian 
soldiers seem to have spent the majority of their wartime service living in tents. 49 
Following the end of the war, Malawian soldiers and their families were again 
living in the pre-war brick buildings in Zomba. By the early 1950s, in contrast to 
pre-war practice, married soldiers received separate housing to single soldiers. 5° In 
practice, this meant that unmarried men lived in the old brick blocks whilst soldiers 
with families lived in detached `single mud huts'. 51 However, whilst Malawian 
soldiers had earlier been issued only bed boards, a married soldier now received beds 
for a wife and up to two children, two chairs, and a washing basin. Senior NCOs 
received more comfortable string beds, extra chairs, and a mirror. 52 Following 
Federation, by 1956 the authorities had begun a full-scale programme of 
reconstruction, with new brick buildings equipped with an electricity supply for all 
ranks. Privates and Corporals were to be accommodated in blocks of married 
quarters, Sergeants in semi-detached quarters, and Warrant Officers each in detached 
`superior houses containing their own toilet facilities'. 53 This building project was 
48 MNA, M 2/24/39/118, Memorandum by Director of Medical Services, Nyasaland, 20 December 
1943. 
49 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) 11, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The King's African 
Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald Ferguson Tait 
Bowie, 1981, f. 55; Interviews, October 2000. 
so MNA, I DCKU 1/8/1, `Notes on the King's African Rifles' [ 1952]. 
51 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (120), f. 11, Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel John T. H. Gunning, 
11980? ]. 
Z MNA, I DCKU 1/8/1, `Notes on the King's African Rifles'[ 1952]. 
53 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `Improvements in African conditions of service since 
Federation' [25 June 1962? 1; IWM, 83/21/1/143, Lieutenant Colonel John Dauncey, OC I KAR, 
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intended to be finished by 1958, but in practice financial constraints meant that, 
whilst the senior ranks' accommodation was completed early, only half of the 
Privates' and Corporals' buildings had been built by mid-1961.54 Malawian soldiers 
stationed in Bulawayo in 1957, where rebuilding was completed earlier, found 
themselves living in accommodation which the Journal of The King's African Rifles 
described as `luxurious'. 55 Regardless of where they were stationed, Malawian 
soldiers seem to have benefited from improved scales of furniture for their homes, 
which now included beds with mattresses and tables. 
There is little evidence of Malawian soldiers' opinions about their 
accommodation. However, the very absence of criticism by soldiers regarding 
accommodation, when complaints were evident in so many other areas of military 
life, suggests that Malawian soldiers were generally at least satisfied with their 
housing. There is little reason to doubt this satisfaction, since although the military 
authorities were often concerned about the standard of soldiers' housing, it was 
generally of a higher quality than that found in the communities from which men 
were recruited. Thatched mud huts with minimal furnishings, of the kind which had 
been gradually eliminated in the KAR since the First World War, remained the main 
form of rural dwelling in southern Nyasaland throughout the colonial period. S6 In 
Zomba, to Brigadier T. H. Birkbeck, 8 February 1956; MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `The 
Nyasaland Battalions - Changes since Federation', Lieutenant Colonel K. R. Coster, AQMG, June 
1962. 
54 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `The Nyasaland Battalions - Changes since Federation', 
Lieutenant Colonel K. R. Coster, AQMG, June 1962. 
55 journal of The King's African Rifles, 1,2 (1957), p. 8. See RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The 
Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 2. 
56 H. L. Duff, Nyasaland Under the Foreign Office (London: George Bell and Sons, 1903), pp. 290- 
91; J. C. Mitchell, `The Yao of Southern Nyasaland', in Seven Tribes of British Central Africa, ed. by 
Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman (Manchster: Manchester University Press, 1951), pp. 292-353 
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these circumstances, features that became common to KAR houses, such as brick 
construction and metal roofs, became prestigious. 57 Even when soldiers had been 
housed in mud huts, because the huts were built by the soldiers themselves, they 
were able to reproduce the conditions which they would have experienced at home. 
Even the distinction between traditional round huts and the square huts which 
became more common in southern Malawi seems to have been evident within the 
military lines. 58 Emphasising this, Malawian soldiers did object to more 
impermanent forms of housing which they experienced during wartime. As Private 
Seckson Nkhoswe recalled, `We never liked the houses since they were all tents', 59 
and Private Henderson Simuja noted that `accommodation was not up to standard. 
We were living in houses made from planks. '60 
Malawian soldiers clearly had less control over the form of their housing once 
the authorities assumed control for its construction. Nevertheless, they continued to 
influence their environment through the construction of small pieces of cultivated 
ground or `gardens'. Soldiers' seem to have maintained gardens some distance 
outside the lines as early as the mid-1890s. At this time, they were tended by 
soldiers' wives (several were kidnapped in the act of gardening by slave raiders), and 
it seems likely that this continued to be the pattern whenever women were present. 1 
There is little direct evidence of soldiers' gardens in the first decades of the twentieth 
(p. 303); Landeg White, Magomero: Portrait of an African Village (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), pp. 102,214. 
37 White, Magomero, pp. 124,229-30. 
58 White, Magomero, p. 191. 
39 Interview with Private Seckson Philip Nkhoswe, Zomba, October 2000. See also, Interviews with 
Staff Sergeant Joseph Kalilombe, Private Jauma Matola, Private Alfred Mmambo, Private Elia Noah, 
and Private Ordnance Zulani, Zomba, October 2000. 
60 Interview with Private Henderson Simuja, Zomba, October 2000. 
61 MNA, AL 1/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston, 3 October 1895 and 30 October 1895. 
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century, but by the inter-war period, they were being actively encouraged by the 
military authorities, both as a source of vegetables to supplement soldiers' diets, and 
as a pastime. In 1929, the Inspector General noted of the Nyasaland company of the 
SCC that he was `glad to see that my recommendation about a garden for the 
Nyasaland natives has been carried into effect and I saw an excellent little garden 
which has proved very productive'. 62 
Elsewhere, however, Malawian soldiers' gardens were so prolific that they had 
a profound impact upon the appearance of the lines. In 1938, Nyasaland's Director 
of Medical Services found that in 2 KAR's lines at Zomba, `The ground around these 
lines, and in some cases that in between blocks of living quarters is under 
cultivation', and argued that 
The cultivation of land in the immediate vicinity of the native lines should be 
forbidden; Standing crops provide suitable cover for children to defaecate [sic] in, 
whilst decaing vegetation in neglected gardens gives the camp an unsightly 
appearance. 3 
The Director of Medical Services suggested that `Land for cultivation could easily be 
provided in another part of the Camp, for individual needs are small', and this 
recommendation seems to have been carried into effect, since by the following year, 
the commanding officer noted with approval that a single `vegetable garden' was 
being established. M When African soldiers served in the Far East during the Second 
World War, the importance of gardens was enhanced, as they were seen as a means 
to `Africanise askari life'. In a report on the welfare of African soldiers in Ceylon, 
62 MNA, S 1/2161/23/14, Inspection Report on SCC, 1928-1929, Brigadier H. A. Walker, Inspector 
General KAR, 11 March 1929, p. 6. 
63 MNA, M2/24/39/75, `The Housing and General Sanitary Condition of the 2nd K. A. R. Lines', 
Director of Medical Services Nyasaland, 19 November 1938, pp 1,4. 
64 MNA, M 2/24/39/97, OC 2 KAR to HQ Southern Brigade KAR, Dar es Salaam, 2 May 1939. 
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Chaplain Quick noted, `the African's flair for gardening [should not] be overlooked. 
A tiny patch, where he could grow his own relishes, would attach him to the spot. 
One unit has already taken to gardening as a hobby'. 65 It is tempting to speculate 
that this unit was 2 KAR. When new quarters were built in the 1950s, the 
commanding officer of I KAR noted soldiers were `encouraged to make gardens' 
adjacent to the buildings. 66 Whilst soldiers' gardens were tolerated by the military 
authorities from an early date, their acceptance within the lines did represent an 
`Africanisation' of the military environment, and stood in contrast with the `spit-and- 
polish' culture of the British Army. However, whilst gardens meant that the lines 
were to an extent physically indigenised, the lines remained fundamentally different 
from the southern Malawian villages where the majority of the soldiers were 
recruited, insofar as the `ownership' of the land, albeit temporary, was clearly vested 
in the status of men. 
Food 
Malawian soldiers' rations were limited at the beginning of the colonial period, 
but unlike other East African soldiers, who had to buy their own food before the First 
World War, Malawians always received some free food from the authorities. 67 In the 
late 1890s, soldiers received only a daily ration of half an ounce of salt and either one 
pound of rice or two pounds of maize, which was ground to flour and used to make a 
65 PRO, CO 820/55/3, `Report on Welfare in 21st (EA) Infantry Brigade rendered to the [? JGG East 
Africa Command at request of Brigadier Portman Officer IC welfare, India', Chaplain Griffith Quick 
July 1943]. 
IWM, 83/21/1/143, Lieutenant Colonel John Dauncey, OC I KAR, Zomba, to Brigadier T. H. 
Birkbeck, 8 February 1956. 
67 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 120. 
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porridge called nsima in Chinyanja. 68 The issue of rice was increased to one-and-a- 
half pounds by 1908, but otherwise this remained the standard ration until the First 
World War. 69 Under normal circumstances, soldiers were expected to supplement 
their diet by `local purchases' of beans and groundnuts, and presumably by growing 
their own vegetables. 70 However, if this was not possible, as when Malawian 
soldiers were on campaign in Somaliland, extra rations of dates and vegetables or 
occasionally meat were issued. 7' In the 1890s, soldiers were also able to supplement 
their diets by looting `fowls, ducks, pigeons and native food', which soldiers were 
allowed to keep themselves rather than handing to the commanding officer as official 
loot. 72 The food provided by such activities could be substantial; a minor expedition 
in 1897 was said to have obtained between 5,000 and 8,000 chickens. 73 Soldiers in 
Somaliland in 1903, and later during the First World War, were also occasionally 
allowed to shoot game for meat. 74 
In 1908, the Inspector-General argued that the free rations issued to Malawian 
soldiers meant that `it is possible to improve the health and physique of the men 
68 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Commissioner Sir Harry Johnston, K. C B. on the 
Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate April 1,1895, to March 31, 
1896, Africa No. 5,1896, C. 8254, p. 12; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Annual Report on the 
British Central Africa Protectorate for the Year 1897-98, Africa No. 9,1898, C. 9048, p. 16; NAM, 
6706-64-66, Force Order 236, `Conditions of Enlistment', 23 December 1898. 
69 PRO, CO 534/8, f. 168,1 KAR Inspection Report, 1907-1908. 
70 PRO, CO 534/3, f. 446,1 KAR Inspection Report, Commissioner's Office, Nairobi, to Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 6 March 1906. See PRO, CO 534/41, f. 155,1 KAR Inspection Report, 1919- 
1920. 
" PRO, CO 167/728, Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Jessep, OC Troops, Mauritius, to Under Secretary 
of State for War, 6 January 1900; NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant Charles W. Barton whilst 
serving in the Somaliland Campaign, Garrerho, 12 July 1903. 
72 MNA, 13/WPO/5/1, `Orders by Major C. A. Edwards Commanding the Armed Forces in the British 
Central Africa Protectorate', Zarafi Expedition, 1895; MNA, 13/WPO/2/1, Journal of Dr. Wordsworth 
Poole, 23 September 1895. 
73 Ian F. W. Beckett, Johnnie Gough, Y. C.: A Biography of Sir John Edmund Gough, V. C, K. C. B., 
C. M. G. (London: Tom Donovan, 1989), p. 30. 
74 NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant Charles W. Barton whilst serving in the Somaliland Campaign, 
8 September 1903; Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 98. 
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[and] the Officers are able to see that their men are properly fed'. 75 However, even 
in Somaliland, where rations had included vegetables, the authorities had been 
compelled to issue lime juice to combat cases of scurvy. 76 During the First World 
War, rations were again increased to include ghee (clarified butter) and a 
combination of meat and dates. 77 Unlike earlier campaigns, an increased ration scale 
was retained after the war, as it had been found that the pre-war allowance was 
`barely a living ration' when men were not able to buy supplementary food. 
Malawian soldiers now received twelve ounces of rice, a pound of maize ('meal'), 
half an ounce of salt, two ounces of ghee (later ground nut oil) and four ounces of 
beans per day. 78 The only change to this ration during the inter-war period was the 
reduction of the beans to two ounces. Three pounds of meat were also issued once 
per month. This left Malawian soldiers at a considerable disadvantage in comparison 
to other KAR soldiers. Those in Tanganyika received twice as many beans, whilst 
Kenyan and Ugandan soldiers also received six ounces of peas or potatoes per day, 
and two pounds of meat per week. All other KAR soldiers received one pound of 
maize meal, which was the equivalent of twice the whole maize issued to the 
Malawians. In 1939, the medical officer responsible for 2 KAR noted the `poor 
physique' of the soldiers, and blamed the poor rations issued in Nyasaland: 
[There is] a shortage of proteins and fats - practically twice the quantity is required 
of each - whilst the carbohydrates are in excess. [... ] the meat issue should be 
spread out evenly over the month. There is also a complete absence of fresh 
vegetables and fruit. 
's PRO, CO 534/8, f. 168,1 KAR Inspection Report, 1907-1908. 
76 NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant Charles W. Barton whilst serving in the Somaliland Campaign, 
Garrerho, 12 July 1903. 
77 IWM, 83/31/1, Diary of A. W. Nichols, CQMS 3/2 KAR, October 1917. 
79 PRO, CO 534/41, if. 154-55,1 KAR Inspection Report, 1919-1920, Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, 
Inspector General KAR, Zomba, 8 May 1920. 
210 
The authorities moved to bring Nyasaland rations into line with those in the rest of 
the KAR in 1939, but this was overtaken by the outbreak of war. 79 The war saw an 
improvement in all KAR rations, with regular issues of meat and vegetables, whilst 
soldiers serving alongside European soldiers in the Far-East received standardised 
rations. 80 Improved scales continued after the war, so that in 1952 Malawian soldiers 
received a daily ration including ground maize, potatoes, groundnuts, milk, dates or 
beans, rice, sugar, ghee, salt, fresh and tinned vegetables, tea, fresh and dried fruit, 
sweets, and four ounces of fresh meat. 
Other groups within the military community fared less well than soldiers. In 
the 1920s, non-enlisted followers, such as sweepers and porters, only received 
reduced ration scales. 81 Whilst the military authorities tolerated and later encouraged 
the presence of soldiers' families in the lines, financial constraints meant that they 
were reluctant to provide them with free food. Instead, soldiers had to share their 
rations with their families, and to supplement this, from the early 1900s both soldiers 
and their wives were allowed to purchase rice from KAR stores at preferential 
Government prices. 82 This system naturally made women living in the lines highly 
dependent upon their husbands' presence, and in recognition of this, the authorities 
occasionally made free issues of rice to women whilst their husbands were away on 
active service, as in 1901, when rice was given to the wives in Zomba of men who 
" MNA, M2/24/39/84, Director of Medical Services, Zomba, to Medical Officer, Native Hospital, 
Zomba, 9 March 1939. 
B0 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, pp. 120-121. 
81 MNA, S 2/8/20/1, C. G. Phillips, OC Nyasaland Detachment 1 KAR, to OC Mangoche Detachment 
1 KAR, Zomba, 5 February 1920; Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The 
King's African Rifles, (Zomba: Government Printer, Nyasaland, 1927), p. 69. 
82 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 603, `Sale of Rice', 10 January 1903; MNA, S 2/3222/1, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 23 July 1922. 
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were serving in West Africa. 83 In the early 1930s, the authorities took steps to issue 
a `half ration' to Malawian women living with the SCC in Somaliland, since women 
were not receiving adequate food when the soldiers were absent on patrol. However, 
this really represented a formalisation of the existing system, since the rations were 
to be paid for from the soldiers' wages. 
A suggestion to issue free food to soldiers' wives was again rejected in 1940, 
on the strange grounds that the officer commanding the KAR Depot in Nyasaland 
believed that soldiers did not `share their rations to any appreciable extent', and that 
women would not therefore suffer unduly from the absence of their husbands. 
84 The 
improved post-war ration scales seem to have meant that soldiers were more easily 
able to share their own rations with their families. 
85 Finally, after 1959 the authorities 
decided that `free rations be issued to the wives of Askari [living in the lines] 
whenever their husbands were away from their home stations on duty'. 
86 However, 
even this gesture was driven by a concern with the soldiers' rather than the women's 
welfare: `it means that the African soldier "goes to war" knowing that his family is 
being looked after'. 87 
Before the Second World War, Malawian soldiers seem generally to have been 
satisfied with their simple rations. Before joining the army, most soldiers would 
83 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 431, `Rice issued to Askaris and Capitaos' wives', 28 January 
1901. 
" MNA, S41/1/8/1/170, Lieutenant Colonel N. R. G. Tucker, OC KAR Depot, Zomba, to Chief 
Secretary Nyasaland, 8 August 1940. 
BS MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), 'Improvements in African conditions of service since 
Federation' [25 June 1962? ]. 
86 MNA, F 248/2073, CAC/158/9/G(ops), `The Nyasaland Battalions - Changes since Federation', 
Lieutenant Colonel K. R. Coster, AQMG, June 1962. 
87 F 248/2073, CAC/171/1/G(ops), `A brief survey of the Army lessons learned from the Internal 
Security Operations in Nyasaland covering the period February-April, 1959' [October 1959? ]. 
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have subsisted on a diet largely consisting of nsima made from millet, cassava, 
maize, or occasionally rice flour, and served vegetable `relish'. 88 The army ration, 
supplemented by the soldiers' own purchases or cultivation, was therefore no worse 
than what soldiers had previously experienced, and had the important advantage of 
being supplied on a regular and reliable basis. The shortage of meat in the soldiers' 
diet was a point of contention, but it seems likely that this too was at least as plentiful 
as in civilian life. 89 More serious dissatisfaction arose when the authorities failed to 
provide the rations which soldiers were accustomed to, and therefore felt justified in 
expecting. During the First World War, there were often severe shortages of 
supplies, causing hunger which veterans could still vividly recall in the 1970s. 0 
However, soldiers also resented attempts to change the quality of their rations in 
peacetime. In the late 1920s, Malawians serving in the Somaliland Camel Corps 
were issued with `red' (unmilled) rice on the advice of the Medical Officer, and 
successfully complained so that the authorities returned to the previous issue of white 
rice. 9' Similarly, in 1939, Malawians resisted attempts to replace their issue of 
whole maize with machine ground maize, which the Malawians complained was 
`ground together with the husks and they get stomach trouble from eating it'. 92 This 
objection probably reflected the fact that in civilian life, grain husks were only eaten 
88 White, Magomero, pp. 103-0S. 
89 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (7), f. 8, Memorandum by Colonel Desmond John Bannister [1980? ]. 
90 See Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 96-97. 
91 MNA, S1216123/14, Inspection Report on SCC, 1928-1929, Brigadier H. A. Walker, Inspector 
General KAR, 11 March 1929, p. 6; MNA, S1216123/15a, Inspection Report on SCC, 1929-1930, 
Inspector General KAR [n. d. ]; MNA, S1/216123/16, Inspection Report on SCC 1930-193 1, Inspector 
General KAR, 11 April 1931. 
92 MNA, M 2/24/39/97, OC 2 KAR to HQ Southern Brigade KAR, Dar es Salaam, 2 May 1939. See 
MNA, M 2/24/39/94, Major Tucker, OC 2 KAR, to Director of Medical Services, Zomba, 26 April 
1939 and MNA, M 2/24/39/95, H. De Boer, Director of Medical Services, Zomba, to OC 2 KAR, 28 
April 1939. 
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during periods of food shortage. 93 There were few complaints about food following 
the improvements during the Second World War. The majority of soldiers thought 
that army rations were good, and some such as Alfred Mmambo identified good food 
as the highlight of their military service. 94 
Whilst women received few of the benefits of rations, they played a central role 
in their preparation. By the time the colonial army in Nyasaland was formed, 
soldiers in the British Army ate in centralised cooking facilities staffed by trained 
cooks from the School of Cooking. 95 However, no formal system of food 
preparation was instigated in Nyasaland, and instead this role was instead undertaken 
by the women who accompanied the KAR. This followed the pattern of labour in 
civilian society, and had profound implications for the lives of women living with the 
KAR, since the pounding of grain in particular was a laborious and time consuming 
activity. An inspection report in 1906 noted that men who had women with them 
were `better off than those without, implying that any man without access to a 
woman would have to cook for himself. 96 The role of women as the `catering corps' 
of the Nyasaland forces continued throughout the inter-war period, and was 
increasingly formalised. 97 In the late 1920s, in imitation of a practice in other KAR 
battalions, a system was adopted whereby unmarried recruits were attached to their 
section commander or another older married man specifically so that his wife could 
93 David Clement Scott, Dictionary of the Nyanja Language: Being the Encylopcedic Dictionary of the 
Mang'anja Language, ed. by Alexander Hetherwick (London: United Society for Christian Literature, 
1929), pp. 405-06. 
94 Interview with Alfred Mmambo, Zomba, October 2000. 
95 Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992), pp. 140-41. 
'* Inspection Report on 1st Battalion King's African Rifles, 6 March 1906, PRO CO 534/3, f. 446; 
Inspection Report on 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles, 31 March 1906, PRO CO 534/3, f. 99. 
97 Sir Francis De Guingand, African Assignment (London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1953), p. 28; 
Transcript of interview with Major P. Q. Logan, IWM, Department of Sound Records, 3864/3, p. 16. 
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cook for them in return for a small fee. 98 Malawian soldiers were always fed by male 
cooks when on patrol or on active service, and during the Second World War men 
were fed centrally in the same fashion as European troops. Central preparation of 
food continued in the post-war period for unmarried men, but the majority of married 
men returned to having their food prepared by their wives, and this system seems to 
have remained in place until the end of the colonial period. 100 
Religion 
As noted in chapter two, in contrast to the generally recognised bias of colonial 
recruitment in favour of Muslims, the Tonga men who were enlisted in the British 
Central Africa forces in the 1890s were closely identified with Christianity through 
their association with the Livingstonia Mission. There are certainly suggestions that 
a number of early Malawian soldiers were practising Christians. The former 
Livingstonia `Mission boy', Sergeant-Major Bandawe, was remembered by officers 
for leading traditional `war dances', but Johnston also recalled that 
He learned to play the harmonium quite well: and after one or other of our victories 
on Nyasa used to make for the nearest mission station with some of his men, and 
[... ] would sit down and play and sing hymns of triumph. "" 
Unlike regular British regiments, which usually had their own chaplain, no official 
arrangements were made for soldiers' worship, and it is therefore possible that senior 
Christians such as Bandawe ministered to their men themselves. 
'g RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), ff. 31,33; Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel 
Glass [1980? ]; PRO CO 820/6/1,1 KAR Inspection Report, 1928-1929, by Inspector-General KAR 
[n. d. ] 
99 D. H. Barber, Africans in Khaki (London, Edinburgh House, 1948), p. 40. 100 `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, M. B. E. ', by Major T. D. 
O'Connel, 1979, p. 5, RHL MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205); Interview with Ian Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 
17 March 1999. 
10' Johnston, The Story of* Life, p. 302n. 
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The identification of the administration's `Arab' and Yao enemies with Islam 
probably made the Tonga soldiers' Christianity a valuable tool for the military 
authorities in the 1890s. However, the majority of the Swahili or `Arab' soldiers 
recruited from Zanzibar and the East Coast in the early 1890s are likely to have been 
Muslims. Whilst little reference is made to their religious practices, it unlikely that 
they were discouraged, given Johnston's belief that his use of Zanzibari troops might 
help him to win allies amongst his Muslim foes. The growing predominance of the 
Yao as the martial group in Malawi from the late 1890s, at a time when the Yao were 
increasingly becoming associated with Islam, introduced a significant Muslim 
element into the armed forces. Parsons has noted that the Sudanese and Swahili 
soldiers who formed the core of the early military units in Kenya and Uganda were 
responsible for the conversion of many new recruits to Islam. 102 Whilst most Swahili 
soldiers had left British Central Africa before Yaos were recruited into the army, 
notable exceptions, such as the Zanzibari Sergeant-Major Ali Kiongwe and the 
piously named `Persian' Sergeant-Major Hajji Askar, remained well placed to offer 
religious instruction to Yao soldiers. 
The first major signs of official interference in soldiers' religious practice came 
in 1904, when a decision by the officer commanding the Mangoche detachment to 
allow a UMCA mission school to be built in the camp was overturned by the 
commanding officer, Captain Markham. Markham not only closed the school, but 
added that no soldiers would be allowed to attend such a school whether it was in 
the camp or not, arguing that `Whilst a man is an askari I consider that he owes the 
102 Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 124. 
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whole of his time and his entire allegiance to his profession [... ] Surely there is plenty 
of time to convert him when he has done with soldiering? '. 103 Markham's emphasis 
upon conversion suggests that his chief concern lay with active proselytisation, 
which might interfere with soldiers' existing religious practices. However, the 
Bishop of Likoma regarded the act as representing a prohibition upon Christianity in 
the army, and it is possible that some soldiers reacted similarly. During the previous 
year, Lieutenant Barton had noted his men's strong interest in education: 
Their chief recreation off parade is trying to read & write & the game of "House" 
of "Tommy" is replaced by the chanting of A. B. C. D. etc. & spelling out words in 
their own language, which being a very rough form of dialect without any native 
written form they now write in English character with phonetic spelling104 
This suggests that the presence of the mission school in Mangoche was a response to 
the soldiers' own wishes, and certainly raises the possibility that the authorities had 
indeed acted contrary to some of the soldiers' religious leanings. However, the army 
as a whole continued to be strongly identified with Islam, and was even held to be a 
mechanism for the spread of Islam in wider Malawian society: in 1911 the Blantyre 
Mission's Life and Work claimed that Islam's `grip of the people' in the Zomba area 
was `largely accounted for by the presence and influence of the troops'. 105 
Whilst missionaries felt with some justification that the army was seeking to 
restrict the active practice of Christianity within the armed forces, an Islamic rising 
was still regarded as the major threat to internal stability in Nyasaland on the eve of 
103 PRO, CO 525, reel 3, vol. 2, Captain Markham to Sharpe, 4 June 1904, in Commissioner Alfred 
Sharpe to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 July 1904, quoted in Robert Greenstein, `The 
Nyasaland Government's Policy Towards African Muslims, 1900-25', in From Nyasaland to Malawi: 
Studies in Colonial History, ed. by Roderick J. Macdonald (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 
1975), pp. 144-68 (p. 152). 
104 NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant Charles W. Barton whilst serving in the Somaliland 
Campaign, 19 July 1903. 
105 Life and Work in Nyasaland, October-December 1911, p. 5. 
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the First World War. As noted in chapter two, the authorities therefore sought to 
reduce the proportion of Muslim soldiers in 1 KAR by adding Tonga and Ngoni 
companies to the battalion in 1914.106 However, the Chilembwe Rising in January 
1915, which was based upon John Chilembwe's Providence Industrial Mission, did 
little to improve the military authorities' disposition towards Christianity. The rising 
hardened official attitudes not only towards African-run missions, but also towards 
the missionary enterprise in general. 107 From the military perspective, the rising also 
probably highlighted the wider question of Christian attitudes towards military 
service, since Chilembwe, who had criticised the use of Malawian soldiers in 
Britain's colonial wars as early as 1900, had written a letter to the Nyasaland Times 
complaining about the use of Malawians during the First World War just two months 
before the rising. ' 08 
The change in official attitudes towards Christians seems to have had a 
profound impact upon religious practice within the Nyasaland battalions. In August 
1915, in an incident which echoed that in 1904, forty-nine Christian soldiers serving 
in Zomba sought permission to build themselves a church or church school. This 
was apparently a reaction to the fact that `The Mahommedan soldiers in the camp 
[... ] were allowed to have a mosque built in the camp for themselves', 109 but the men 
bypassed the military hierarchy by seeking the help of a Church of Scotland 
106 MNA, KAR 1/1/1, Intelligence Officer I KAR, to Adjutant I KAR, 2 December 1912; PRO, CO 
534/18, f. 163, Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Zomba, 7 February 
1914; Moyse Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 157,159. 
107 Shepperson, George, and Thomas Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, 
Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1958), pp. 363-380. 
108 Shepperson and Price, Independent African, pp. 133,234-36. 
109 MNA, Church of Scotland Papers, Hetherwick Papers, Revd. Alexander Hetherwick to Elmslie, 21 
August 1915. 
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Missionary, the Revd. A. M. Anderson. The Revd. Alexander Hetherwick of the 
Blantyre Mission noted the authorities' response to the request: 
They were refused this and the whole of them were flogged for asking Mr 
Anderson - to whom they were entrusted by their missionary up country - to speak 
for them. Anderson is forbidden to have anything to do with the Christians among 
the troops `lest it should lead to insubordination'. "0 
Given the presence of a `mosque' in the camp, the Church of Scotland missionaries 
regarded the refusal as a blatently anti-Christian act. In fact, the `mosque' seems to 
have been simply a hut which Muslim soldiers had been allowed to use during 
Ramadan precisely because there was no mosque in Zomba, and the military 
authorities' opposition to a church school in particular probably represented a 
reiteration of the policy of limiting external interference which had already been 
acted upon in 1904. Moreover, it is clear that the soldiers were flogged for a breach 
of military protocol, not because of their desire for religious facilities. Nevertheless, 
in the wake of the rising, when rumours were even circulating in Southern Nyasaland 
that the Administration was enforcing Islam, it was unsurprising that the Christian 
soldiers felt that they were being punished because of their religion. ' 
The interwar period saw a continuation of the military policy of limited 
interference in soldiers' religion, a situation which is indicated by the almost total 
absence of religious matters from inter-war records. The army continued to 
accommodate Islam, particularly when it impacted upon the practical running of the 
KAR. In 1927,1 KAR's Standing Orders issued instructions that `It is important 
that the Mohamedan Company should not fire during the month of Ramazan [sic], if 
110 MNA, Church of Scotland Papers, Hetherwick Papers, Revd. Alexander Hetherwick to Elmslie, 21 
August 1915. 
111 Greenstein, `The Nyasaland Government's Policy Towards African Muslims', pp. 162-63. 
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this can be avoided, as their fasting undoubtedly affects their shooting'. Instead, 
Muslim soldiers were to be `employed in collecting grass for thatching purposes'. 112 
The authorities also instituted a system for supervising religious practice through the 
African RSM. This makes it clear that both Muslim and Christian soldiers were now 
permitted to construct their own places of worship, since the RSM was to be 
responsible for `the Mosque and any other native churches in the lines'. Catholic 
soldiers of one of 2 KAR's companies stationed in Tanganyika in the late 1930s 
certainly took advantage of this, and were even permitted to call upon the services of 
a local missionary. One of the company officers recalled, 
Roman Catholic Service was held at Masoko once a month. A White Father from a 
German Mission fifteen miles away used to travel over on his donkey and say Mass 
for the R. C. s, about a third of the Company were Catholics. A chapel had been 
constructed by the askari. No other denominations held services. 113 
The growing acceptance of Christian practice probable reflected the increasing 
proportion of Christian recruits, and the declining number of Muslims, as recruitment 
from Southern Nyasaland shifted away from the Yao and towards the Nguru/Lomwe. 
By 1938, the Southern Brigade, which was largely composed of Malawian soldiers, 
included twice as many Christians as Muslims. 114 
The Second World War saw a major change in official policy towards 
Christianity throughout the East African forces, as the East African Army Chaplains 
Department (EAAChD) was formed to provide an official ministry for Church of 
England soldiers, whilst Catholic Chaplains were also supplied to the forces. The 
"2 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Ries (Zomba: 
Nyasaland Government Printer, 1927), p. 54. 
" RHL MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 28; Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel 
Glass [1980? ]. 
114 PRO, CO 820/34/12, Southern Brigade, King's African Rifles: `Racial distribution of African 
combatant ranks on 31st Oct. 1938', by Colonel C. C. Fowkes, OC Southern Brigade KAR, 7 
December 1938. 
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EAAChD included both Commissioned European Chaplains and African Chaplains 
who were classed as Warrant Officers. Later, Sergeant `Catechists' were introduced 
to officiate where Chaplains were not available. ' 15 Although Parsons has shown that 
the East African forces suffered from a shortage of qualified personnel to fill 
Chaplains' posts, the new system had a profound impact upon the conduct of 
religious life within at least some of the Nyasaland battalions. Whilst the army had 
previously insisted that worship was essentially a personal matter, Protestant soldiers 
in I KAR now found themselves compelled to attend Church of England services, 
which were to be `treated as a parade'. 116 Whilst Parsons argues that proselytisation 
was not accepted until after the war, some active provisions were made to permit 
soldiers to consolidate their beliefs. In 1944 1 KAR's African Chaplain, David 
Sibande, was holding daily confirmation classes in his tent, and Catholic soldiers in 
13 KAR were confirmed in 1945.1 17 
In the post-war period, the Nyasaland battalions remained predominantly 
Christian, to the extent that Gunning recalled his belief that `Christians and Roman 
Catholics' were the only major religious groups represented in 1 KAR in the early 
1950s. 118 In Malaya, 1 KAR had one Catholic chaplain, but both Catholic and 
Church of Scotland services were held with the aid of a Presbyterian chaplain from 
the British army. In Malaya, the Malawian soldiers' Christianity seems to have been 
promoted as a propaganda tool with local Chinese Christians, who were impressed 
by the `askaris enthusiasm for their religion', and were invited to worship with them. 
115 Parsons, African Rank-and-File, pp. 125-26. 
16 PRO, WO 169/18332, I KAR Battalion Orders, 8 June 1944. See PRO, WO 169/14104,1 KAR 
Battalion Orders, 10 June 1943. 
117 PRO, WO 172/9483, War Diary of 13 KAR, 6 May 1945. 
118 MSS Aft. s. 1715 (120), f. 11, Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel John T. H. Gunning [ 1980? ]. 
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By contrast, Muslim soldiers seem to have received little formal recognition, 
although the authorities noted that `some Mohammedans worship with the 
Malays'. 119 
The end of the Second World War seems to have seen some reduction in the 
provision of formal religious facilities, so that I KAR no longer had its own chaplain 
in the early 1950s. 2 KAR also had its own chaplain in Malaya, and after its return 
to Africa it had access to Anglican and Catholic garrison churches, whilst services 
were also arranged for other Christian denominations. 120 By contrast, the minority of 
Muslim soldiers `arranged their own religious services', although an ex-officer 
recalled that `Their religious customs were strictly observed [... ] Each person's 
beliefs were respected and he was allowed to get on with what he believed in'. 121 
Recreation 
African dancing or ngoma was an important feature of soldiers' recreation. 
Recording his experiences with the BCA Rifles in the mid- I890s, Lieutenant Alston 
noted many ngomas being performed by the soldiers under his command, both before 
and after expeditions, and to celebrate victories or important occasions. 122 Whilst 
these ngomas were permitted by the authorities, they seem to have been arranged by 
'19 'Lipenga': Journal oIthe Ist Nyasaland Battalion The KinS'. 11 s African Ries, 12 (1952), pp. 19 , 56. 
120 MNA, 8-9-5-RI14034, `List of British Officer, British other ranks and African Warrant Officers on 
Strength of 2nd (Ny) Bn. K. A. R. at 1200 hrs 4th July 1953', 2 KAR Scrapbook, Vol. 6,1953-1954; 
RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, 
M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 5. 
121 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 6. 
'22 MNA, AL 1/111, Diary of Edward Alston, 9 April 1895,10 April 1895,3 May 1895,24 May 1895, 
24 March 1896,29 May 1896,21 August 1896. See MNA, 13/WPO/2/1, Journal of Dr. Wordsworth 
Poole, 23 September 1895 and NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant Charles W. Barton whilst serving 
in the Somaliland Campaign, Wadamgoa, 3, September 1903. 
222 
Malawian soldiers themselves, leaving European officers as interested onlookers. 
Alston simply observed that `the Atonga are dancing and yelling away [... ] They 
seem to be able to work all day and dance all night', 123 or 
I have just been out to see the natives, Atonga, Makua, Yaos etc etc. dancing and 
going through all kinds of extraordinary attitudes. [... ] War dances are going on 
all got up with feathers, spears and shields. Whenever I go out the man who is 
dancing rushes at me with his spear and then kneels down and clasps my legs. '24 
Large amounts of African beer (moa, mowa or pombe), made by the soldiers 
themselves, were a central component of the larger celebratory ngomas. As Alston 
observed on the same occasion, `[400 soldiers] are now feasting on the 120 large pots 
of native beer (pombe), about 5-6 gallons in each [... ] They are royally drunk'. 125 
Beer was thus established as an important and officially sanctioned element of 
Malawian soldiers' recreation from an early date. 
Ngomas remained an important recreational activity for Malawian soldiers 
until the 1950s. However, the military authorities increasingly appropriated tribal 
dancing for public purposes. Ngomas were formalised, creating the terminology of 
the `Battalion Ngoma', timetabling dances as regimental events, and requiring 
official sanction for them. 126 This formalisation was probably mitigated to some 
extent when new dances such as Beni, Malipenga and Mganda were performed by 
soldiers following the First World War. 127 The authorities may also have been 
reluctant to interfere with dances which had strong religious significance, such as 
Gule Wamkulu, the Chewa Nyau dance. In 1945, soldiers from 22 KAR were able to 
123 MNA, AL 1/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston, 24 March 1896. 
124 MNA, AL 1/l/I, Diary of Edward Alston, 29 May 1896. 
'u MNA, AL 1/1/1, Diary of Edward Alston, 29 May 1896. 
126 IWM, 83/21/1, 'Detachment Orders by Lieut. T. H. Birkbeck, 2nd K. A. R. Commanding S. C. C. 
Draft, May 1937, on Board the S. S. "Matiana". ' 
127 See chapter 2. 
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spend two days performing the Nyau dance, in a situation where officers were still 
present as outsiders who felt privileged since `Not many Europeans have been 
allowed to watch it'. '28 At the same time, ngomas were also increasingly used as 
entertainment. During the war, ngomas were performed to encourage relations 
between Nyasaland battalions, as Malawian soldiers attended each other's ngomas as 
guests. 129 Ngomas were also utilised to entertain European troops serving alongside 
the Malawians, as in 1942 when `a selected number of askaris' serving with 1 KAR 
in Madagascar `staged' an ngoma for soldiers of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. 130 The 
ngoma was coming to be viewed as a cultural artefact of the KAR. By the 1950s, 
dances were regularly `attended by all British personnel' in the battalion, 131 and the 
authorities took deliberate steps to promote them: 
Normal tribal customs were encouraged - certainly tribal dancing was a feature of 
the African life and at certain festival times special beer and meat rations would be 
made to encourage dancing which would continue very late into the night. 132 
However, under the Federal programme of modernisation, ngomas had been 
abandoned by the early 1960s, disappearing to the extent that an ex-officer recalled 
`we didn't get involved in sort of tribal dancing in the army [... ] because they were 
soldiers, they weren't tribal dancers [... ] they still don't. Tribal dancing is for the 
villagers'. 133 
128 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) II, if. 85-86, `A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The 
King's African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald 
Ferguson Tait Bowie (1981). 
129 PRO, WO 172/9483, War Diary of 13 KAR, August and November 1945. 130 PRO, WO 169/7020, War Diary of 1/1 KAR, 27 June 1942. 
13' RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (120), f. 11, Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel John T. H. Gunning, 
1980? ]. 
132 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), 'The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 6; 
133 Interview with Ian Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999. 
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Whilst the drinking of beer was accepted as integral to ngomas, as in the 
metropolitan army, the consumption of alcohol was also perceived as a possible 
threat to discipline. In consequence, the military authorities sought to regulate 
Malawian soldiers' access to alcohol. The BCA Rifles Ordnance made drunkenness 
an offence `whether on duty or not on duty'. 134 In addition, Standing Orders issued 
by 2 KAR before the First World War ordered that soldiers `wishing to make beer in 
the lines' should first seek the permission of their company commander, who would 
specify the quantity which could be brewed. Soldiers were also prohibited from 
drinking any alcohol other than beer `of the same nature as that drunk in 
Nyasaland'. 135 Although Malawian soldiers continued to brew their own beer, 
136 by 
the 1930s, the authorities sought to control the quantity and quality of beer by 
supplying it to the soldiers themselves through a `native beer canteen' which was 
closely supervised by the Malawian Provost Sergeant and Company Sergeant 
Major. 137 African soldiers were still restricted from drinking European beer or spirits 
in the 1950s, and continued to be supplied with African beer by the authorities at the 
end of the colonial period. 139 It was only in 1961 that senior Malawian ranks were 
permitted to buy spirits in the Warrant Officers' and Sergeants' Mess. 
139 
134 PRO, FO 2/126, f. 178, `The British Central Africa Rifles Ordinance, 1897', p. 7. 
'35 Kenya, Standing Orders of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion, The King's African Ries, (Nairobi: 
Uganda Railway Press, [1908(? )]), p. 16. 
13 RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (24A) II, if. 85-86, 'A Colonial's Experiences in the 2/2nd Bn. of The 
King's African Rifles (Later Known as 22nd Bn K. A. R. ) During World War 2 1940-1947', Donald 
Ferguson Tait Bowie (1981). 
137 RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (105), f. 29, Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel 
Glass [1980? ]. 
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General R. E. B. Long, GOC, 20 March 1961. 
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Malawian soldiers resisted attempts to limit their access to alcohol. Statistics 
for the Nyasaland battalions during the 1930s suggest that severe punishments for 
drunkenness rarely exceeded twenty per battalion in any year. 140 Nevertheless, some 
soldiers were certainly prepared to defy the authorities' instructions. Just a small 
selection of defaulter sheets from the inter-war period includes three senior NCOs 
who were found guilty of knowingly permitting men under their command to be 
drunk. 141 In Tanganyika in 1932, Private Wadi Nyalugwe was also found guilty of 
illicitly `Permitting his wife to brew Kangala Beer' and of `Drinking kangala beer in 
the bush outside the Lines'. 142 This was similar to the illegal distillation of the strong 
drink kachasu by unmarried women on the slopes of Zomba mountain at the same 
period. 143 Given the prevalence of this activity amongst African women in 
Nyasaland towns during the colonial period, it seems likely that similarly displaced 
military women were also involved in beer brewing on a wider scale than records 
suggest. 144 
Alcohol occasionally caused serious disciplinary incidents. Soldiers charged 
with drunkenness were often also found guilty of insubordination, and fighting in the 
lines was naturally often associated with alcohol. As early as 1895, Alston found 
that one of the NCOs under his command, Mtoga, 
had been drinking ever since he arrived the day before, and was fearfully drunk. 
[... ] gradually became abusive, and when I ordered him out of the stockade to his 
140 PRO, CO 820, Southern Brigade Returns of Severe Punishments, 1932-1938. 
141 MNA, S 1/105134/85, Defaulter Sheet of No. 5688 Sergeant Ngambani, SCC; MNA, S 
1/105/34/139, Defaulter Sheet of No. 10795 CSM Bigula Saidi, 1/l KAR; MNA, S 1/105/34, 
Defaulter Sheet of No. 7153 Sergeant Wadi Nyalugwe, I/1 KAR. 
142 Defaulter Sheet of No. 7153 Sergeant Wadi Nyalugwe, 1/1 KAR. 
143 Defaulter Sheet of No. 7153 Sergeant Wadi Nyalugwe, 1/1 KAR, 1 June 1941, MNA 
S1/105/34/133 
144 See Joey Power, "`Eating the Property": Gender Roles and Economic Change in Urban Malawi, 
Blantyre-Limbe, 1907-1953', Canadian Journal of African Studies, 29,1 (1995), 79-106 (pp. 85-86). 
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hut he wanted to go for me. So the only thing to do was to put the irons on him and 
he was locked up till tomorrow. '45 
By the 1960s, drinking had gained a significant political dimension as it became a 
regular vehicle for nationalist sentiment amongst soldiers. An intelligence report in 
1960 noted, 
An officer was told by an NCO that troops were being influenced in town by the 
MCP (the bar near the ENCOs Mess is known to be a hotbed) and troops shout 
KWACA when returning to the lines at night. They also sing MCP songs in the 
lines after beer drinks. 146 
However, soldiers' access to alcohol remained a contentious issue which seems even 
to have transcended nationalist politics. In 1962 cheap Chiperoni beer was 
condemned in the MCP's Malawi News as `obnoxious' and `devastating', and the 
paper warned that 
Untold harm has been done to our people by the consumption of this beer [... ] 
People have been fighting each other more than ever before . Chiperoni drunken 
men have been mishandling harmless women in the streets. Indeed, the 
consumption of this beer has brought about a decayed state of affairs which has 
never been seen in this country. 147 
Yet soldiers reacted `most unfavourably' when the MCP government closed down 
the brewery making Chiperoni Beer in 1963, so that one of the last outbreaks of 
discontent by Malawian colonial soldiers was actually aimed against Banda's 
policies. 148 
145 MNA, AL 1/l/1, The Diary of Edward Alston, 10 April 1895; MNA, AL 1/1/1, The Diary of 
Edward Alston, 17 August 1895. 
iah MNA, F 248/2075, MI/1/NY/l/23B, 'Political Subversion in Military Unit', Captain M. M. Roach, 
Military Intelligence Officer, Nyasaland Area, to HQ CAC, 27 September 1960. 
147 `Chiperoni Beer: Condition for Nail Factory', Malawi News, 15 June 1962. See John Lwanda, 
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Army Women and Sexual Relations 
Official Attitudes to Soldiers' Women 
Officers generally acknowledged the vital domestic roles played by Malawian 
women in the army, which have been outlined above. 149 However, official military 
policy towards women was overwhelmingly informed by two sets of concerns. On 
the one hand, the military authorities believed that the presence of women was 
essential for the contentment of the African soldiery, and the consequent 
maintenance of discipline within the ranks. 15° Conversely, they felt that women 
posed a threat to the efficiency of the army, both as a drain on resources and more 
specifically as possible carriers of venereal disease (VD). Official policy towards 
women in the Nyasaland forces was therefore a result of the interaction between the 
conflicting aims of ensuring access to women whilst limiting their overall numbers 
and the character of their presence. 
Although it seems that women were present with Malawian soldiers from the 
earliest days of the colonial army, they were given little formal recognition before 
1898.151 In the absence of instructions to the contrary, it seems likely that recruits 
simply brought women with them when they arrived. 152 There are also suggestions 
that the military authorities may have allowed the use of women captured in the 
campaigns of conquest as a form of `booty' for African soldiers, a practice which 
was carried out by other East African colonial forces. In what the Central African 
149 Sir Francis de Guingand, African Assignment (London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1953), p. 28; 
Transcript of interview with Major P. Q. Logan, IWM, Department of Sound Records, 3864/3, p. 16. 'S0 Inspector General to Officer Commanding Ist Battalion KAR, 2 March 1906, PRO CO 534/3, f. 
446. 
15' Acting Commissioner Sharpe to Foreign Secretary, Zomba, 29 September 1896, PRO FO 2/108, fl: 
30-1 
152 `Plan of Fort Lister', by Lieutenant Francis Garden Poole, 1897, MNA 14/FGP/4/I. 
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Planter described as a `doubtful policy', Malawian soldiers were allowed to take 
women prisoner until 1895, and in at least one case it is noted that 3 captured women 
`preferred to return with the troops to Loangweni', rather than be released with 37 
others. 153 More explicitly, in 1896 Lieutenant Gough noted that one of the Tonga 
soldiers under his command had kidnapped a local woman. 154 However, this kind of 
practice again may have reflected soldiers' expectations of the pattern of warfare, 
based upon pre-colonial experience. Numbers of the predominantly Tonga and Yao 
soldiers who comprised the bulk of the army from 1894 had undoubtedly been 
involved in pre-colonial warfare, and certain Yao soldiers in particular were known 
to have fought against the British. '55 
Women's presence in the military environment can thus be seen in the first 
instance largely as a result of African initiative. Women only appear to have become 
an important issue for the military authorities as the armed forces began to serve 
outside the territory, by which time women's presence was an established feature of 
the military environment. The growing mobility of the armed forces compelled the 
authorities to decide whether to separate soldiers from their wives or to enable their 
inclusion. The army clearly decided that it was important to facilitate the presence of 
women, since in 1898 formal provision was made for soldiers' wives to be allocated 
places on lake gunboats when troops were moved around the territory. ' 56 When the 
new 2nd Battalion was raised in December 1898 for service in Mauritius, the 
153 `Current Chat', The Central African Planter, 1,4 (December 1895), p. 51; MNA, KAR 2/1/2, 
Captain H. E. J. Brake, Commanding Forces in British Central Africa, to Commissioner and Consul 
General British Central Africa, Loangweni, 21 January 1898, p. 10; Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, 
Traders, and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870-1939 (London: James Currey, 
1992), pp. 37-38,40. 
154 Beckett, Johnnie Gough, Y. C., p. 21. 
us Life and Work in British Central Africa, 154, January-March 1901, p. 3. '-"6 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 201, `Passages', October 1898. 
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conditions of enlistment formally stated that `A proportion of men going abroad will 
be permitted to take each one wife', and it was also emphasised that `recruits need 
not be refused because they are married'. 157 Clearly, the authorities believed that 
Malawians joining the army expected to be able to take their women with them when 
they enlisted, and after this date Malawian soldiers proceeding overseas in peacetime 
were routinely given a passage for their wives. However, it should be noted that the 
official emphasis upon soldiers being allowed to take one wife with them was a 
deliberate acknowledgement of the practice of polygamy, and signified a recognition 
of the need to limit the overall numbers of women who were present, at the same 
time as providing soldiers with access to women. This prohibition on soldiers having 
more than one wife in the lines remained in place throughout the colonial period. 
In accordance with the instruction that `a proportion' of men should take 
wives to Mauritius, only 220 women and 77 children had accompanied the 878 
soldiers of 2 BCA Rifles in 1899.158 As noted in the preceding chapter, when the 
Malawian soldiers attacked the local villages of Vacoas and La Caverne, several 
rapes were reported. As part of the discourse of `savagery' in which the press 
reaction to the attack was conducted, colonial newspapers alleged that the soldiers 
were in part sexually motivated as a result of the relatively small number of 
Malawian women who were present with the regiment. 159 Listing the causes of the 
attack, The Times noted, `Only a few native women had been permitted to 
accompany the regiment'. IN A letter to the same paper more explicitly argued that 
'57 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 236, 'Conditions of Enlistment' 23 December 1898. 
152 Moyse Bartlett, King's African Rifles p. 29. 
t59 `The African Regiment in Mauritius: Grave Misconduct', Central African Times, 7 April 1900, p. 3 
X60 `The BCA Rifles in Mauritius', Central African Times, 14 April 1900, p. 7. 
4. `Ladies of the Regiment' 
5. `In the Regimental Lines' 
Two photographs showing the families of Malawian soldiers in Mauritius, probably taken in 1899 by a 
regimental officer. Soldiers' wives rarely appeared in the pages of The Navy and Army Illustrated, and their 
inclusion here suggests the unusual prominence of women in the CAR. These photographs belie assertions 
that the attack by Malawian soldiers upon Mauritian civilians in December 1899 arose from the absence of 
Malawian women. The presence of a number of small children is noteworthy. In the second photograph, the 
rows of square thatched huts built by the soldiers for their accommodation can be seen in the background. 
[Source: `The Central Africa Rifles at Mauritius', The Navy and Army Illustrated, 12 May 1900, p. 192] 
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With Three of Their Lords and Masters in the Background. 
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`the military authorities must make up their mind to give back to these men the 
company of their wives and children, as the only means of protecting them from 
association with the scum of the population', and described the Malawians as `brutes 
exasperated by the unnatural solitude of barrack life'. 16' Similarly, in the wake of 
the attack, the Governor of Mauritius described the low proportion of women as `a 
grave danger'. '62 However, although* there was little doubt that rapes had been 
committed, only Private Molongoti was actually prosecuted, receiving a sentence of 
five years' imprisonment. 163 The officers of the battalion were generally sympathetic 
to the soldiers' actions and rejected the idea that the raid was principally motivated 
by sexual impulses. 16' Nevertheless, the senior officer in Mauritius clearly believed 
that the absence of Malawian women was a significant factor in the raid on Vacoas: 
It is much to be regretted that more African women (only 220 landed with the 
battalion) did not come to Mauritius one cause of some of the disturbances is 
doubtless due to the endeavours of the African soldiers to have intercourse with 
creole and Indian women in the villages. 165 
Thus events in Mauritius signalled a significant shift in official thinking from 
facilitation towards active encouragement of women's presence. 
By 1906, the concerns which had been raised in Mauritius had been embodied 
within official thinking in the Nyasaland battalions, and the presence of wives was 
clearly being seen as essential to the maintenance of discipline. The Inspector- 
161 `Colonial' to the Editor, `The Mauritius Outbreak', The Times, 21 March 1900, p. 14. 
162 PRO, CO 167/724, Sir Charles Bruce, Governor of Mauritius to Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 14 December 1899. 
163 PRO, CO 167/728, F. T. Piggott, Procureur General, Mauritius, to Sir Graham Bower, Colonial 
Secretary, Mauritius, 4 January 1900; PRO, CO 167/728, F. T. Piggott, Procureur General, Mauritius, 
to Sir Graham Bower, Colonial Secretary, Mauritius, 8 January 1900. 
164 PRO, CO 167/728, Major A. T. P. Hudson, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Mauritius, to 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Jessep, OC Troops Mauritius, Vacoas, 17 December 1899. 
165 PRO, CO 167/728, Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Jessep, OC Troops, Mauritius, to Under Secretary 
of State for War, 26 December 1899. 
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General of the KAR voiced concerns over the failure of some men of the Ist 
Battalion to take their wives with them to East Africa: 
A certain number of men brought their wives with them from British Central 
Africa and are therefore better off than those who did not, though any man could 
have brought a wife had he wished. Arrangements for bringing some of the men's 
wives who remained behind are now being made. 166 
The Inspector-General was worried that the Malawians might cause disciplinary 
problems by `interfering' with the women of the Kenya battalion. As a remedy, it 
was suggested that soldiers should be compelled to bring women with them from 
Nyasaland, although as an alternative, the Commanding Officer was even instructed 
to `assist his men in marrying the women of the country [Kenya]'. The insistence that 
men should be married even if Malawian women were not available also reflected a 
concern regarding the dangers of VD, since the Inspector General ordered that the 
soldiers were to be warned `continually of the danger they incur of disease by having 
relations with loose women in the neighbourhood'_167 
The risk of VD continued to inform official encouragement of wives in 
peacetime. In 1908, an increase in VD amongst Malawians stationed in Zanzibar 
was blamed upon men being `brought into closer touch with the local natives than is 
considered desirable'. 168 Similarly, at the end of the First World War, a high level of 
VD amongst Malawians in 2 KAR stationed in Tanganyika was blamed on soldiers 
`breaking out of barracks and [... ] having unregistered women in the lines'. The 
commanding officer also blamed the spread of VD on the fact that many soldiers 
166 PRO, CO 534/3, f. 443,1 KAR Inspection Report, Commissioner's Office, Nairobi, to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 March 1906. 
167 PRO, C0534/3, f. 451, Brigadier-General W. H. Manning, Inspector General KAR, to OC I KAR, 
Nairobi, 2 March 1906. 
169 PRO, CO 534/8, f. 164,1 KAR Inspection Report, 1907-1908. 
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were living with officially sanctioned local women, and called for soldiers to be 
`encouraged to bring their own wives from Nyasaland'. 169 One reason why the issue 
of official recognition or `registration' was crucial to the authorities was because it 
enabled them to inspect women for VD: as 2 KAR's medical report for 1919 noted, 
`All local women, before being allowed to live in the lines, are medically examined 
and men are only permitted to keep those certificated as free from Venereal'. 170 
Similarly, when I KAR suffered an increase in VD in the early 1930s, a system was 
enforced whereby all the registered women were inspected for VD once every two 
weeks. 171 
Despite the increased awareness of VD, the encouragement of wives was still 
principally regarded as a disciplinary concern. By the early 1930s, matters had 
reached the stage where the authorities considered it unusual for any soldiers to be 
unmarried. As an officer of I KAR recalled, `Virtually every soldier had a wife and 
a family in the lines. In fact, if he hadn't got a wife one wanted to know the reason 
why, because they usually got into mischief without one. ' 172 In fact, whilst the 
authorities continued to prefer soldiers to be accompanied by Malawian wives, in an 
elaboration of the practice of NCOs' wives cooking for recruits, informal systems 
169 PRO, CO 534/47, f. 65, 'Medical Report for 2nd Battalion the King's African Rifles, from January 
l st to 31st December 1920', Lieutenant Colonel W. 1. Gunn, OC 2 KAR, Tabora, 31 January 1921. 
10 PRO, CO 534/40, f. 22, `Medical Report on 2nd King's African Rifles, from January 1919 to 
January 31st 1920', Lieutenant Colonel W. 1. Gunn, OC 2 KAR, Tabora, 14 March 1920. See PRO, 
CO 534/41, f. 152, `Inspection Report 1919-1920: 1st King's African Rifles and Combined Depot 1st 
& 2nd K. A. R. Zomba', by Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, Inspector-General KAR, Zomba, 8 May 1920. 
171 PRO, CO 820/17/6, Southern Brigade, KAR 'Health Statistics of African ranks for year from 1st 
October, 1932 to 30th September, 1933', Major P. R. Mundy, Acting OC Southern Brigade KAR, 
Dar-es-Salaam, 30 October 1933. 
172 IWM Sound Archive, 6185/03, Transcript of interview with Colonel H. P. Williams OBE, 15 
October 1979, p. 3 
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were put into place to ensure access to women for unmarried men. As one officer 
observed, 
If a young askari was not sufficiently wealthy to afford a wife, (so many head of 
cattle! ) the African C. S. M. saw that he took a concubine unto himself - the policy 
being that for disciplinary reasons that all askari in the lines should have a wife 
[... ]so there was hardly an askari without female company in the lines. This policy 
worked well and prevented crime. 173 
As Parsons has noted, the identities of such women are unclear. It is likely that they 
were usually local women whether soldiers were stationed in Nyasaland or overseas, 
although this is unlikely in the case of the SCC, where colonial racial stereotypes 
discouraged sexual relations between Malawian soldiers and Somali women. 174 The 
use of such a system makes it is clear that the army's definition of the term `wife' 
was flexible, and was mainly governed by a desire to control women's movements 
rather than to definitively verify their identities. In any case, by the late 1930s 
official attempts to encourage the presence of women seem to have proven 
overwhelmingly successful. In 1938, it was stated that the average number of 
inhabitants of the KAR lines in Zomba was 310 soldiers, 300 women, and 100 
children. ' 75 
The end of the Second World War saw a continuation of the pre-war emphasis 
upon the presence of wives. Parsons notes that as early as 1946, the authorities in 2 
173 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f 31,33, Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick 
Lepel Glass [1980? ]. See IWM Sound Archive, 3939/03, Transcript of interview with Major P. 
Logan, 11 September 1979, p. 11. 
174 MNA, S2/1 1/30/17A, `Somaliland Incident. Narrative compiled from statements made by 
No. 10545 Corporal Ali Chitenje and No. 10720 Private Makwera to Captain F. W. de Guingand, 
Native Regtl. Sgt. -Major Magareta and Coy. Sgt: Major Saidi', Captain F. W. de Guingand, 19 
November 1930; MNA, S2/11/30/23, Inspector-General KAR to Governor of Nyasaland, 2 April 
1931; MNA, 52/11/30/28, Major J. W. Kaye, SCC, to OC SCC, Burao, 28 July 1931; Parsons, The 
African Rank-and-File, p. 151. 
'1$ MNA, M 2/24/39/55A, Major L. C. Thomas, Acting OC Southern Brigade KAR, to Director of 
Public Works, Zomba, 19 May 1938. Numbers continued to fluctuate: the actual population of Zomba 
camp in 1938 was 253 soldiers, 176 women and 114 children. 
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KAR expressed a desire that `100%' of soldiers would be living in married 
accommodation with families by the end of the year. ' 76 However, whilst the 
inclusion of wives continued to be encouraged, the emphasis shifted from a primarily 
disciplinary concern founded upon assumptions about African sexuality, to a broader 
desire to cater for soldiers' families. Accordingly, a range of facilities were 
established or improved. The officer commanding 1 KAR noted that 2 KAR had 
started a `small hospital for wives and children' by 1946, and suggested doing the 
same in his own battalion. '77 By the early 1950s, in addition to free medical care in 
`their own special hospital', families received free travel between the camp and their 
homes, and soldiers were given a family subsistence allowance according to the 
number of children present. 178 
The new emphasis upon the presence of children was particularly striking. 
Some pre-war officers had recognised the importance of children, and Glass recalled 
that the Malawian soldier `was above all a great family man and very proud of his 
children and spent a great deal of time with them'. 179 However, soldiers had been 
discouraged from keeping their children in camp once they were old enough to 
function within the domestic economy of their home villages. In 1931, rules for 
Malawians serving with the SCC had noted that `The number of children should be 
restricted as far as is compatible with the avoidance of hardship on individuals [... ] 
Only small children who cannot be provided for otherwise should accompany the 
176 PRO WO 269/98, Quarterly Historical Report, 2 KAR, 30 September 1946, quoted in Parsons, The 
Arican Rank-and-File, p. 148. 
17 MNA, M 2/24/39/119, OC I KAR, Zomba, to Director of Medical Services, Zomba, 27 August 
1946. 
178 MNA, 1 DCKU 1/8/1, `Notes on the King's African Rifles' [1952). 
19 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 32, Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel 
Glass [1980? ]. 
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contingent'. 18° By the 1950s, free compulsory education was provided in a school in 
the camp, and in 1960,181 children in 1 and 2 KAR were being taught up to 
Standard III by six military and civilian teachers. '8' A troop of Boy Scouts was also 
set up in 2 KAR in 1951, receiving not only uniforms, but also an officially 
appointed African sergeant to act as Scoutmaster. ' 82 This was followed by the 
establishment of a Brownie pack for soldiers' daughters. 183 Finally, the unofficial 
`Boys Platoon' established in 2 KAR in the early 1960s also provided as facility for 
soldiers' children in addition to its primary function as a source of recruits. '84 
However, as a corollary of the army's increasing orientation towards families, its 
tacit recognition of some informal relationships such as the provision of concubines 
came to an end, and a recruit was now required to `bring with him a certificate signed 
by [the Native Authority] stating that he is married'. 185 
Malawian reactions to militaryfamily policy 
It is clear from the high proportion of women accompanying the Nyasaland 
battalions that the authorities' policy of encouraging the presence of wives was 
180 MNA, Sl/652/31/27b, Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Holt, OC SCC, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 
Burao, 3 December 1931. 
18' I DCKU 1/8/1, `Notes on the King's African Rifles' [1952]; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), 'The 
Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 5; Great 
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1960, Cmnd. 1149, p. 130. 
192 MNA, 1/DCMJ/1/10/1, KAR recruiting poster, [1952? ]; MNA I/DCKU/1/8/1/66, OC Depot 
(Nyasaland) KAR to DC Kasungu, 16 September 1955; RHL MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), `The Service 
with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. O'Connel, M. B. E. ', by Major T. D. O'Connel, 1979, 
p. 6; MNA, 17/BSA/l/42, Captain M. E. W. Morton, 2 KAR, Zomba, to Richard C. Belcher, 
Organising Commissioner, Boy Scouts of Nyasaland, 6 September 1951; MNA, 171BSA/1/42, 
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183 MNA, 8-9-5-R/ 14034,2 KAR Scrapbook Vol. 6,5 September 1953. 
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largely successful. However, the extent to which the army was able to control the 
identities of these women through the system of registration is much less certain. 
Some soldiers flouted rules forbidding them from bringing unregistered women into 
the lines, and in 1924 Clerk John Kumbanga was convicted of `keeping 3 
unregistered women in the lines' at the same time. 186 However, many more soldiers 
were able to bring local women into the camp simply by claiming that they were 
their wives, since officers assumed that many soldiers were polygamous, and 
consequently expected soldiers to occasionally exchange their wives. One officer 
noted of the situation in the 1920s: 
The askari were allowed one wife at a time in camp and would change these 
around if one was soon to have a baby, or if they got tired of a particular wife and 
wanted a little change ... 
If the [askari's] wife nagged too much, he could always 
send her back to his village and replace her with another! "" 
The number of women coming in and out of the camp meant officers had little means 
to verify whether wives were legitimate or not, thus a Malawian soldier could 
effectively bring any woman into the camp and claim she was his wife. 
Many of the women brought into the camp as wives in this way were probably 
drawn from the same categories of local women who provided the officially 
acknowledged `concubines' made available for unmarried men. 188 This was 
effectively a form of `semi-prostitution' similar to the practice of malaya in Kenya, 
in which women were paid to act as wives. 189 In these circumstances, soldiers often 
had little faith that the women left behind in the camp would remain faithful to them 
186 MNA, S 1/105/34/72, Defaulter Sheet of No. 7022 Clerk John Kumbanga, HQ Wing 2 KAR; 
MNA, S 1/105/34, Defaulter Sheet ofNo. 7153 Sergeant Wadi Nyalugwe, I/l KAR. 
197 De Guingand, African Assignment, pp. 20,26. 
1n Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, p. 151. 
189 Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, African Women: A Modern History, trans. by Beth Gillian Raps 
(Oxford, Westview Press, 1997) pp. 120-21. 
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when they were on duty. Malawian soldiers of I KAR, who mutinied in 1913 after 
being stationed in the interior of Kenya for eighteen months without their wives, 
complained that `they were paying subsistence allowance to their women who were 
leading immoral lives in Nairobi' in their absence. 190 In 1931, fifteen Malawian 
women with the Nyasaland company of the SCC were identified as `not proper 
wives' who had `never been married to the men who brought them to Somaliland'. 
The women had been presented to the authorities as the `real' wives of the soldiers, 
but at least one, supposedly the wife of Corporal Ali Chitenje, was already registered 
as the wife of another NCO in I KAR. The officer commanding the Nyasaland 
company cited the women's `readiness to live with other men during the absence on 
duty of their "husbands"' as a cause of much trouble, but argued that the women, 
who received no official rations, were unable to support themselves unless they had a 
husband in the camp. '9' As a result of this situation, out of 68 serious crimes 
committed by members of the Nyasaland contingent between 1924 and 1931, a total 
of 17, or 25 percent were connected with cases of adultery with comrades' wives, 
whilst by contrast, out of 101 offences committed by Somalis serving in the same 
unit, not one was related to adultery. '92 Although the authorities viewed the 
immorality of the women as the main cause of such incidents, there are strong 
suggestions that some soldiers actively colluded in the women's activities, since one 
soldier was convicted of `Beating his wife for refusing to commit adultery with a 
190 Lieutenant Colonel B. R. Graham, Commanding Troops British East Africa Protectorate, to Chief 
Secretary British East Africa, Nairobi, 30 April 1913. 
19' MNA, S2/11/30/28, Major J. W. Kaye, SCC, to OC SCC, Burao, 28 July 1931, pp. 12-13. "Z MNA, AL 1/1/2, Diary of Edward Alston, 2 June 1896; MNA, S1/2161/23, SCC Returns of Severe 
Punishments, 1924-1931; MNA, 51/105/34/152, Conduct Sheet of No. 10757 Sergeant Adamson 
Kuranganji, Nairobi 16 October 1940; RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 34, Memorandum by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel Glass [1980? ]. 
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comrade', and another of `Abetting the wife of a comrade to commit adultery. '93 It is 
notable that similar practices were still being carried out in the 1950s, when soldiers 
were supposed to provide marriage certificates to prove their wives' identities: 
Whilst it was necessary to restrict the amount of family allowed on the station it 
did encourage prostitution in that the Askari sometimes preferred to take a local 
woman, declare her his wife and set her up in married quarters. It was of course 
quite impossible to check up on the legality of the woman since African tribal 
marriages are not registered. ' 4 
Family relations were also a cause of disputes when women were not present 
with soldiers. The most obvious cause of absent wives and families was the 
departure of the KAR on active service, particularly during the Second World War. 
However, a corollary of the practice of taking local wives and of the army's 
prohibition upon polygamy was that many soldiers' dependants also lived in their 
home villages in peacetime. The failure of wives at home in Nyasaland to write 
letters also became an important grievance for soldiers, both during the Second 
World War, and later in the 1950s when Nyasaland soldiers served in Malaya. '95 
However, there are some indications that the failure of families to respond to 
soldiers' letters, at least in the Second World War, were due in part to the fact that 
cheap Air Mail facilities (two letters a month for 20 cents) were available only to 
soldiers writing home, and not to families writing to soldiers, who found the rate of 
193 MNA, S1/2161/23/7h, SCC Return of Severe Punishments 1924-26', OC SCC, I March 1926; 
MNA, S1/2161/23/11 g, SCC Return of Severe Punishments 1927-28, OC SCC, IS February 1928. 
194 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), 'The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. 5. 
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one shilling three pence too high to pay. It was also potentially difficult for women to 
write to their husbands, due to the need for them to obtain the services of 
professional letter writers. 1% 
The issue of financial support for absent families was a cause of concern for 
many soldiers. Up to the Second World War, women living with the KAR had no 
automatic right to soldiers' pay, but in 1920 it was suggested that soldiers should be 
forced to pay an allotment of £2 to their first wife and £1 for any other wives (the 
suggestion was not entirely benevolent, since it was intended to prevent soldiers from 
applying for hut tax exemptions for women who were not legitimate wives). '97 
Soldiers stationed outside Nyasaland were also expected to send remittances to their 
absent families, and when family subsistence allowances of up to 26 shillings for a 
wife and children were introduced in the 1950s, these also had to be remitted home 
when families were absent. 198 
Many soldiers objected to aspects of the remittance system. As early as 1924, 
Malawian soldiers serving in Somaliland complained that their remittances were not 
reaching their families, and the problem of non-delivery of remittances became more 
widespread during the Second World War, as the authorities in Nyasaland were 
16 MNA, S41/l/l/13/l, Sir William Platt, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, EAC, to Sir 
Edmund C. Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, 16 February 1944; MNA, S41/1/I/132, Sir Edmund C. 
Richards, Governor of Nyasaland, to Sir William Platt, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, EAC, 
1 March 1944,. 
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unable to deal with the volume of claims. 199 The records of the Zomba DC during 
the 1950s suggest the extent to which soldiers worried that money was not reaching 
their wives. 200 However, it is clear that some soldiers were concerned about 
remittances because they regarded them as a means of saving rather than as a form of 
support for their dependants. During the Second World War, Malawians complained 
that they were unable to save money which they sent home, since it was spent by 
their families in their absence. 201 Similarly, in the 1950s, Private Chikopa James of 2 
KAR wrote to his DC to ensure that his wife was receiving remittances, but added `if 
she is getting the money, tell her to keep for me'. 202 Many soldiers simply omitted to 
send any remittance to their wives. 
In the post-war period Malawian soldiers' unwillingness to send remittances 
was often underlain by concerns of adultery on the part of absent wives. 203 This had 
also been a major cause of concern during the Second World War. Malawians 
stationed in Nairobi in 1944 used radio broadcasts home, which were intended for 
morale boosting messages to their families, as a means of chastising chiefs for their 
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20 MNA, I DCZA 1/20/4/5, EA. 4099 Chikopa James, D Company, 2 KAR, to DC Zomba, Lusaka, 
23 January 1955. 
. 203 MNA 1 DCZA 1/20/4/27, N. 55355 Corporal Paulo Chikagwile, C Company 2 KAR, Lusaka, to 
DC Zomba, 17 August 1955; MNA, I DCZA 1/20/4/29, DN. 30623 Patrick Kumwenda, HQ Company 
2 KAR, Lusaka, to DC Zomba, 18 September 1955; MNA I DCZA 1/20/4/32, EA. 3433 Harold 
Ndege, B Company 2 KAR, Lusaka, to DC Zomba, 6 October 1955; MNA, I DCZA 1/20/4/66,15190 
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failure to prevent adultery by their wives. 204 Moreover, Nyasaland chiefs visiting 
soldiers in the Far East in 1945 found that the soldiers resented their presence, 
complaining that `their work is to look after our wives and families at home [... ] If 
they come here, let them take rifles and march with packs on their backs'. 205 The 
authorities took measures to allay soldiers' fears through newsletters and radio 
broadcasts by Malawian chiefs. These emphasised the severe punishments dealt by 
Native Authority Courts to civilians who committed adultery with the wives of 
absent soldiers, supported by the names of offenders and details of fines and 
compensation. 206 
Women's experience of the military environment 
This thesis focuses upon the experience of Malawian soldiers within the 
colonial army. The subjective experience of soldiers' women both within the KAR 
and as absent wives has been dealt with more fully elsewhere. 207 However, the 
nature of military women's experience within the camp is an important factor in an 
analysis of the character of the domestic sphere in the army. 
Women were clearly regarded as performing a number of important functions 
within the army, not only because of the implications of their presence for soldiers' 
discipline and morale, but also, as outlined above, because of their practical role as 
Z`' MNA, S34/1/411/17, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. I of 1944,29 April 1944. 
205 MNA, S41/1/23/5/72B, `Extract from Report by Rev J. M. Rose of (C/S) 22 (EA) Inf Bde. Visit of 
African Chiefs' [October 1945? ]. 
206 MNA, NNK 1/10/1, ff. 36; 37, Specimen Newsletter, October 1943; `A message from N. A. 
K1ungu K. M. to his people in Ceylon', NA Kyungu to DC Karonga, Bwiba, 26 November 1943. 
20 See Parsons, The African Rank-and-File, pp. I45-181. For a specific study of Malawian military 
women, see Timothy J. Lovering, `African Women and the Colonial Army in Nyasaland, 1891-1964', 
in Twentieth Century Malawi: Perspectives on History and Culture, ed. by John McCracken et al 
(Stirling: Centre of Commonwealth Studies, University of Stirling, 2001), pp. 5-20. 
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providers of domestic labour, which reflected the part played by women within 
indigenous society. 208 In recognition of this role, and to allow the authorities to 
control activities within the lines, registered women were integrated into formal 
military structures. In 1927, the Standing Orders of the Ist Battalion gave the 
African Regimental Sergeant Major formal responsibility for the women, noting that 
`Through his wife he will supervise the behaviour of the askari wives and other 
women living in the lines'. This situation indicated not only the inclusion of women 
in the military hierarchy, but also the imposition of an internal hierarchy upon 
soldiers' women, with the Regimental Sergeant Major's wife performing a function 
in relation to the women which was analogous to her husband's position in relation 
to the African soldiery. 209 This position was more than nominal, and army women in 
the 1920s even found themselves, like the soldiers, subject to physical discipline. As 
one officer noted, 
On occasions even the wives were beaten! If a case of adultery had been proved, it 
was usual to order the guilty woman to be beaten as well as the man. The `dirty 
work' was carried out by the Sergeant-Major's wife ... a 
large and formidable old 
dame, but much respected by the other wives! ... 
The punishment was carried out 
quietly in the precincts of the R. S. M. 's hut! 210 
Women were equally subject to broader structures of military organisation, 
being placed under the formal supervision of the Regimental Police, and apparently 
being required to parade along with their husbands at inspections of soldiers' kit and 
209 See Jean Davison, `Tenacious Women: Clinging to Banja Household Production in the Face of 
Changing Gender Relations in Malawi', Journal of Southern African Studies, 19,3 (1993), 403-421; 
Elias Mandala, `Peasant Cotton Agriculture, Gender and Inter-Generational Relationships: The Lower 
Tchiri (Shire) Valley of Malawi, 1906-1940', African Studies Review, 15,2-3 (1982), 27-44; Joey 
Power, "`Eating the Property": Gender Roles and Economic Change in Urban Malawi, Blantyre- 
Limbe, 1907-1953', Canadian Journal of African Studies, 29,1 (1995), 79-107; Landeg White, 
Magomero: Portrait of an African Village (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
209 Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles (Zomba: 
Nyasaland Government Printer, 1927), p. 20. 
210 De Guingand, African Assignment, p. 28. 
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accommodation. 21' Emphasising the parallels between the structures applied to 
soldiers and the structures applied to women in the army, women were also included 
in organised recreation, such as regimental sports days, as early as 1896, although in 
contrast to the masculine games (such as the tug-of-war) arranged for soldiers, 
women's games overtly referred to their recognised roles, including races where 
women carried water pots on their heads. 212 The finale of a company sports day in 
the late 1930s was a women's race which involved running to a tree to retrieve the 
prize (an umbrella) from its upper branches, a spectacle apparently resulting from a 
conscious effort to exploit the women's `frantic efforts' to obtain such material 
goods as a source of general entertainment. 213 
Soldiers' wives stood to gain from some of the same material benefits which 
attracted soldiers into the army, including housing, medical facilities, and pay, 
although it should be noted that the medical facilities provided for families before the 
Second World War were of a lower standard than those provided for soldiers. 214 
However, it is important to recognise that for most of the colonial period, the 
majority of soldiers in the Nyasaland battalions were drawn from traditionally 
matrilineal groups in southern Nyasaland, such as the Yao, Nyanja, and later the 
Z1' Nyasaland, Standing Orders of the Ist (Nyasaland) Battalion The King's African Rifles (Zomba: 
Nyasaland Government Printer, 1927), p. 25; RHL MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), `Saturday's full Kit and 
Line Inspection, "B" Company Masoko 1937', Scrap Book by Harold P. L. Glass, second-in- 
command, B Company, 2 KAR, 1937-1938. 
212 MNA AL 1/12, Diary of Edward Alston, 30 May 1896. 
213 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (105), f. 12, Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Patrick Lepel 
Glass [1980? ]. 
214 Great Britain, Nyasaland Protectorate: Report for 1907-8, Cd. 3729-38, para. 35; MNA, 
S1/1618/29/1a, Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Hawkins, OC I KAR, to Director of Medical and Sanitary 
Services, Zomba, 23 November 1929; MNA, S1/161829/4a. 'Report on the possibility as to whether 
or not any savings could be effected by the abolition of the present King's African Rifles Hospital', 
Captain E. L. P. Slayter, OC 2 KAR [1934? ]; PRO, CO 820/3/11,2 KAR Inspection Report, Colonel 
H. A. Walker, Inspector-General KAR, Dar-es-Salaam, 4 December 1927. 
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Nguru/Lomwe, Whilst ultimate authority within such communities still resided with 
the women's male relatives, ownership of the village was vested in the female line. 
Moreover, the institution of matrilocal residence provided women with the security 
of living in their own villages with their close relatives. Matrilocal residence, and 
associated practices such as systems of bride service by the husband could not 
operate in the KAR lines, which were clearly established as a virilocal environment 
(insofar as the right to live in the lines was vested in the husband's status as a 
soldier). Analogy with the impact of urbanisation in Nyasaland suggests that such 
women moving into the military environment would have experienced a significant 
reduction in their autonomy. 215 
The common practice of changing wives, as outlined above, clearly had serious 
implications for the security of women within the military environment. Some 
temporary wives were able to take up residence with new soldiers when their former 
partners returned to Nyasaland, but this was not always the case. An officer noted 
that in the 1950s `When the Battalion moved then problems were created by 
abandoned "wives" who had to be paid off by the Askari which created financial 
problems for him'216 Legitimate wives were also often left in significant financial 
hardship when they were separated from the army. During the Second World War, 
the wives of Malawians who had joined the Rhodesian African Rifles travelled to 
Salisbury against official advice to live with their husbands, but finding that there 
were no married quarters and little space in the designated African `Location', they 
Zis See Joey Power, "'Eating the Property": Gender Roles and Economic Change in Urban Malawi, 
Blantyre-Limbe, 1907-1953, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 29,1 (1995), 79-107 (pp. 82-84). 
216 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (205), 'The Service with the King's African Rifles of Major T. D. 
O'Connel, M. B. E. ', August 1979, p. S. See MNA, S2/11(4)/29, f. 9, Governor of Tanganyika 
Territory to Governor of Nyasaland, 14 May 1932. 
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were reduced to `living in grass shacks on the Commonage and in the squalid hovels 
in the brickfields'. 217 The possibilities for the abandonment of wives in Nyasaland 
were increased by the length of separation during the Second World War, and 
individuals were named in newsletters in an attempt to control the practice. 
18 The 
real impact of abandonment upon soldiers' wives is clearly demonstrated in the 
Zomba DC's files from the 1950s, which contain much correspondence complaining 
of the deprivation caused by the failure of soldiers to support their wives: 
219 
Agness ... came and complained 
to this office that ever since she returned from 
Bulawayo in June this year her husband does not support her. In addition she states 
that she has no home to live in. 
Pte. Alfred remits 25/- monthly to his elder brother SULILA MATOPE. 
Agness tells me that one day she approached SULILA and asked him to give her 
some money but he did not do so. 220 
The army took steps to enforce the payment of remittances, but even when these 
were paid, some wives also suffered when their husbands' families refused to share 
the money with them against the soldiers' wishes. 22' 
Women also faced financial hardship when their husbands were killed on 
active service. For most of the period, Malawian soldiers were paid a lump sum 
gratuity rather than a pension on discharge, and the same provision applied to 
payments to widows, who could not therefore depend upon an income. Before the 
217 MNA, LB 8/7/1/21, Nyasaland Labour Officer Salisbury to Acting Labour Commissioner 
N'asaland, 27 February 1943. 
21 MNA, NNK 1/10/1, f. 203, `Newsletter for the Troops - Karonga', Native Authority Kyungu, 23 
Aril 1945,. 
2 See MNA, IIDCZA/l/20/4/37, DC Zomba to OC D Company, 2 KAR, Lusaka, 14 February 1956; 
MNA, I /DCZA/I /20/4/70, DC Zomba to OC HQ Company I RAR, GPO Labis, Johore, Malaya, 14 
December 1956; MNA, I/DCZA/1/20/4/113, DC Zomba to OC B Company, I NRR, Ndola, Northern 
Rhodesia, 19 December 1957; MNA, I/DCZA/1/20/4/126, OC HQ Company, I KAR, Lusaka, to DC 
Zomba, 26 June 1958. 
220 MNA, 1/DCZA/l/20/4/71, DC Zomba to OC HQ Company 2 KAR, Bulawayo, 15 December 
1956. 
221 MNA, 1/DCZA/1/20/4/22, EA. 18125175 Private Daniel Nkhalambo, HQ Company I NRR Signal 
Section, GPO Kuala Lipis, Pahang, Malaya, to DC Zomba, 10 April 1955; NINA I/DCZA/l/20/4/60, 
4120 Private Cabbage Bwanali, 1 RAR Signals Centre, Johore, Malaya, to DC Zomba. 
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First World War, the payment of gratuities to widows was only made at the 
discretion of the authorities, depending upon the circumstances of the husband's 
death, so women might receive no money at all. 222 From 1915 the widows of 
soldiers killed on active service became entitled to a gratuity equivalent to two years' 
pay (between £12 and £30). Even then, however, the Governor of Nyasaland 
recommended that the Nyasaland rate should be reduced to £5 and `distributed to the 
next of kin according to native custom' at the discretion of the District 
Commissioner, which presented the possibility of women from matrilineal groups 
being unprovided for. 223 Gratuities rather than pensions were also awarded to 
soldiers for long service, and this could also be disadvantageous to their wives, due 
to the ease with which a lump sum might be spent. 224 It was only in the 1950s that 
pensions were introduced for the KAR in Nyasaland . 
225 
Even when women had secured their place in the army, their isolation from 
their communities made them vulnerable. In particular, women stationed overseas 
were effectively trapped within the army. Several examples exist of soldiers 
convicted or accused of `wife beating', 226 and for Nyasaland women stationed 
overseas with their husbands, escaping from this kind of situation could be 
particularly difficult, involving the making of special travel arrangements, and 
222 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 428 11,25 January 1901. 
22 PRO, CO 534/19, f. 131, Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Zomba, II 
October 1915; PRO CO 534/20, ff. 300,303, Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Zomba, 21 February 1916. 
224 MNA, S1/1709/23/54, OC Southern Brigade KAR to Chief Secretary Tanganyika, 7 January 1932. 
225 W. O. 11 Alfred W. Kampeny, `About I st K. A. R. Battalion', Journal of the Kings African Rifles, 1, 
1 (1956), pp. 68-69. 
226 MNA, S1/2161/23/9b(8), SCC Return of Severe Punishments 1926-27, Adjutant SCC, 28 February 
1927; MNA, S1/2161/23/11 g, SCC Return of Severe Punishments 1927-28, OC SCC, 15 February 
1928; MNA, S1/2161l23/16g, SCC Return of Severe Punishments 1930-31, OC SCC, 20 March 1931; 
MNA, SI/105/34/152, Conduct Sheet No. 10757 Sergeant Adamson Kuranganji, 16 October 1940. 
247 
consultations between military officials and District officers in Nyasaland. 227 Such 
cases often came to light only because relatives of the abused women revealed 
matters to local officials, rather than as a result of direct complaints through military 
structures, suggesting that the extent of such abuse may have been greater than 
documentary evidence indicates. Possibly, such cases were dealt with by African 
non-commissioned officers, as in occurrences of adultery. This is supported by the 
extreme nature of cases of abuse which did come to the attention of the military 
authorities, such as the alleged rape by soldiers of the African Regimental Sergeant- 
Major's daughter in the 1960s. 229 
Colonial officers argued that `The pattern of life outside training hours was 
similar to what the Askari had been used to in his tribal life' 229 There is little doubt 
that this was true of the physical environment before the First World War, but 
became less so with the introduction of regimented brick terraces and later, barrack 
blocks. The domestic roles performed by women within the army did reflect the 
pattern of indigenous society. Indeed, their overwhelming presence was a striking 
feature of military service in Nyasaland, contrasting sharply even with other colonial 
armies. The military authorities both in the metropolitan army and in India clearly 
held similar fears regarding the influence of access to women upon morale and 
discipline, but the Indian Army only introduced married accommodation widely in 
227 MNA, 1/DCZA/1/20/20/13, Major for Lieutenant Colonel Commanding Advanced Ordnance 
Depot, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, EAC, Kenya, to DC Zomba, 11 March 1950; MNA, 
I /DCZA/ 1 /20/4/58, DC Zomba to OC D Company 2 KAR, Bulawayo, 3 October 1956; MNA, 
1/DCZA/l/20/4/122, DC Zomba to OC I KAR, Lusaka, 22 May 1958; MNA, 1/DCZA/1/20/4/58, OC 
A Company, I KAR, Lusaka, to DC Zomba, 4 June 1958. 
223 Interview with Ian Robertson Glasgow, Lilongwe, 17 March 1999. 
229 RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (7), f. 8, Memorandum by Colonel Desmond John Bannister [1980? ]. 
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1891. Even by 1921, married accommodation was provided for only nine percent of 
Indian Army soldiers. 230 The presence of women also provides a striking contrast 
between the experience of colonial soldiers in Nyasaland, and the conditions of 
Malawian labour migrants in the Rhodesias and South Africa, who generally were 
not encouraged by their employers to take their wives with them. Part of the 
explanation for this disparity probably lies in the longevity of military service in 
Nyasaland. Labour migration was generally intended to be based upon relatively 
short contracts of six months, whilst soldiers often served for 21 years or more, 
periods which might even be extended if men continued to work as non-combatants 
after they were retired. These circumstances made the prospect of separating men 
from their wives less viable to the military authorities than it was to mine owners. 23 1 
However, it also made the KAR much more closely resemble a complete community. 
Reflecting the colonial military belief that unsophisticated rustic Africans made 
the best soldiers, for most of the colonial period, the authorities sought to maintain 
the lines as an indigenous environment by encouraging a limited range of 
`traditional' activities. Like the presence of women, the practice of ngomas within 
the army had originally been the result of African initiative, but increasingly came to 
be used not for the internal purposes of the military community, but for an external 
230 David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London: Macmillan, 1994), 
x. 64-66. 
PRO, CO 534/40, f. 16,2 KAR Length of Service Return, Lieutenant Colonel W. 1. Gunn, OC 2 
KAR, 4 March 1920; PRO, CO 534/40, f. 66,1 KAR Tanganyika Territory Length of Service Return, 
Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Griffiths, OC I. KAR, 1 May 1920; PRO, CO 534/54, f. 165,1 KAR Length 
of Service Return, Adjutant, 1 KAR, November 1923; PRO, CO 534/54,2 KAR Length of Service 
Return, Lieutenant Colonel Murray, OC 2 KAR, 1 November 1923, f. 391; PRO, CO 534/56, f. 189, 
No. 3 Depot Company, Length of Service Return, OC Depot I and 2 KAR, 4 March 1925; Twaya 
Namonde, `The Story of Twaya Namonde', Nyasaland Journal, 16,1 (1963), pp. 49-61; Aibu 
Chikwenga, `Aibu Chikwenga: an Autobiography', translated by C. A. Baker, Society of Malawi 
Journal, 25,2 (1972), pp. 11-2 1. 
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display of corporate identity, which had little to do with the interests of Malawian 
soldiers. The authorities sanctioned the use of `traditional' beer within limited 
contexts, but simultaneously punished drunkenness. Similarly, in seeking to isolate 
soldiers from religious proselytisation, the early KAR appeared to be limiting the 
religious freedom of soldiers with established religious convictions. In their policy 
of ensuring the presence of women, the authorities created a social system which was 
significantly different from the matrilineal societies from which most of their soldiers 
originated. Ironically, this very lack of traditional matrilineal structure may have 
been an appealing aspect of military service for Malawian soldiers. 
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Chapter 5 
Perceptions of Soldiers and Soldiering in Colonial Nyasaland 
The discussion in the preceding chapters of the place of Malawian soldiers 
within the social structure of the colonial army inevitably highlights sites of conflict 
between the military authorities and Malawian other ranks. This reflects the 
importance of such disputes as indicators of underlying tensions, and on this level it 
is easy to see soldiers as one more group of colonial subjects negotiating their 
position within colonial society. Nevertheless, it must also be recognised that, 
however revealing dissent may be of the tensions underlying Malawian military 
service, there is little to suggest that this was the permanent state of the Malawian 
soldiery; annual reports regularly note that discipline was `satisfactory' or 
`excellent', and evidence of this sort, however superficial its nature, cannot be 
ignored. 
Malawian soldiers were not simply the subjects of colonial oppression, but 
took an active role both as fighting men in wartime and in internal security 
operations in Nyasaland and elsewhere. In the first part of this chapter, it is intended 
to address the central question of how Malawian soldiers perceived their own role as 
members of the colonial army. Some of the ways in which Malawians perceived the 
idea of military service outside Nyasaland, and especially during the World Wars 
were suggested in the discussion of the motivations behind enlistment outlined in 
chapter two. But even if we accept that many soldiers joined the army 
overwhelmingly for financial reasons, they nevertheless had to perform the duties 
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required of them by the colonial state. This was relatively straightforward in the case 
of service outside Nyasaland, but is less easily explained in relation to the period of 
conquest or later aid to the civil power (over which soldiers appear to have had few 
misgivings, even when the majority were not in favour of Federation). Finally, if we 
are to acknowledge the part played by the army as a coercive force, we must also 
recognise the role played by Malawian soldiers within the colonial society from 
which they were drawn. 
Malawians as soldiers: The Malawian soldier's experience of warfare 
In his discussion of the Indian Army, David Omissi has emphasised the role of 
a well-established concept of honour ('izzal') in the formation of Indian soldiers' 
attitudes towards their role within the army. ' Thus, whilst he argues that soldiers 
often joined the army for economic reasons, their behaviour once they had enlisted, 
and particularly during military operations, was shaped by a genuine desire for 
honour, as well as a concomitant fear of shame. Crucially, these concepts applied 
not only to individual behaviour, but also to the corporate identity of the regiment. 
Finally, whilst Omissi argues that whilst Indian soldiers' loyalty to individual 
European officers was limited, their view of military service was underlain by a 
powerful loyalty to the monarch which was successfully nurtured by the military 
authorities. 
Chapters three and four have examined the experience of Malawian soldiers 
within the military community, whilst chapter two investigated the motivation of 
David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London: Macmillan Press, 
1994), pp. 76-112. 
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soldiers in joining the army. This emphasised the significance of prestige and 
masculinity as motivating factors in Malawian enlistment, but also acknowledged the 
overriding importance of material factors. However, soldiers' reasons for joining the 
army can provide only a limited account of perceptions of military service in a 
country where men often served in the army for more than a decade. As suggested in 
the Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
Askari of 1 K. A. R., for instance, are drawn from all the Nyasaland tribes [... ] What 
welds these diverse people into a unit? [... ] Regular food and steady pay soon 
became strong inducements to join the Colours. Once in the Army the Askari 
tends to become of it, and over the years a steady tradition of loyalty has been built 
up. 
As noted in chapter two, many of the European officers who served with 
Malawian soldiers regarded the ethnic groups from which they were recruited as 
`warrior tribes' with a special aptitude for soldiering. Officers in the early KAR 
tended to comment upon the bravery of particular ethnic groups rather than 
Malawian soldiers as a whole. This reflected the needs of the ethnic recruitment 
policy, which required the military value of different tribes to be judged, but also 
reflected the perceived reality that all the soldiers of a particular company were likely 
to be from a particular tribe. Whilst references to the bravery of Yaos, Tongas and 
Ngonis certainly excluded many Malawian ethnic groups, they did not exclude 
groups within the army, since by the act of enlisting, a Malawian became a member 
of a Yao, Tonga or Ngoni company. Opinions about the martial characteristics of 
particular Malawian tribes therefore came to represent Malawian soldiers as a group. 
Thus, when fears of Tonga cowardice were raised at the beginning of the Second 
2 W. V. Brelsford, Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Salisbury, Rhodesia: 
Cassel, 1960), p. 671. 
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World War, they were manifestations not only of the practical desire of officers to 
ensure that they had the best recruits, but also of a broader belief that such behaviour 
was aberrant for Malawian soldiers, so that the apparent cowardice of the smaller 
group affirmed the warlike characteristics of the remainder. 
The official rejection of tribal recruitment criteria during the war, as well as the 
consequent expansion of recruitment, necessitated a shift to the more inclusive 
concept of the `Nyasa' soldier; a terminology which was already in official use 
before the war, but which quickly superseded the idea of the Yao soldier. 3 This trend 
was undoubtedly increased by the unique linguistic position within the Nyasaland 
battalions, speaking a different language from the remainder of the KAR, which 
necessitated the maintenance of separate Nyasaland units and provided a focus for a 
distinct Nyasa identity. As a result, whilst European officers who served with 
Malawians remained aware of the distinct ethnic identities of their men, and 
continued to hold opinions about their relative military value, it also became 
increasingly easy to broadly apply such characteristics to `Nyasa' soldiers as a 
whole. 
Page notes that during the First World War, Malawian soldiers were believed 
by military officials to have a special aptitude for close-quarters fighting. 4 This idea 
carried over to the Second World War when, in common with other East African 
troops, accounts of Malawians or `Nyasas' in battle emphasised the use of the panga 
3 PRO, CO 820/17/6, Colonel T. S. Muirhead, OC Southern Brigade KAR, to Governors of Nyasaland 
and Tanganyika, 3 April 1934. 
4 Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 101. 
254 
or machete, in an image reminiscent of the Gurkha's kukri. 5 AI KAR officer's 
account of fighting against the French in Madagascar noted, `we were by that time 
using bayonets and pangas [... ] The very first Frenchman captured in this action had 
a panga wound in his head'. This aspect of the fighting was given added significance 
in the official publication The King's African Rifles in Madagascar, where it 
appeared in a chapter entitled Tanga Fighting at Andriba', which emphasized the 
visceral and instinctive nature of the fighting: 
Andriba was not fought with machine guns at a distance. It came in the end to 
hand to hand fighting with pangas. [... ] 
The fighting was fast and furious now. The blood of the Nyasalanders was. up. 
They had seen their officer killed and, as the colonel of the battalion put it, `that 
sort of thing makes them angry. 6 
Malawians also participated in the creation of a `warlike' image with the use of a 
`war cry' in battle. The commanding officer of 22 KAR, Ken Collen, recorded a 
particularly hard-fought attack on a Japanese position in Burma: 
For two whole days my dear Bn hammered at a blasted Jap position, of very great 
strength. By incredible guts and determination [they] fought their way to the top, 
only to be literally blasted off by the M. M. Gs, L. M. Gs and grenades. I was so 
terribly proud of them, but it was just too agonising. [... ] I could hear them 
whooping and yelling "Sokalai, sokalai, yao-oo-oo" the Nyasa war cry. Then the 
most appalling noise - all hell let loose; then worse still, the Coy Commanders on 
the phone asking for more and more stretcher-bearers. 7 
Whilst the use of edged weapons in combat was used to project a martial image 
of Malawians, when combined with the use of the `war cry', some officers believed 
this also performed an important function on the battlefield, particularly when 
fighting non-African opponents. As Collen noted of one action, `the Japs were 
s Gerald Hanley, Monsoon Victory (London, Collins, 1946), pp. 46-62. 6 Kenneth Gandar Dower, The King's African Rifles in Madagascar (Nairobi, East Africa Command, 
ýn. d. ]). 
IWM, 79/21/1, "`A Story of the Gallant 22nd Battalion King's African Rifles", typescript extracts 
from K. H. Collen's letters from Burma, dated 16 July 1944 to 21 December 1944', 28 October 1944. 
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absolutely scared stiff and took every opportunity of beating it. I suppose a mob of 
yelling askari with bayonets and pangas is a pretty formidable sight'. 8 These aspects 
of Malawian soldiers' experience were deliberately harnessed for `jitter parties', 
designed to unnerve Japanese soldiers in Burma: 
When the Nyasas staged their big party, it was with the object of demoralizing the 
Japs [... ] Two companies began surrounding the hill and in the darkness they 
began howling and screaming. They sharpened their matchets together, and threw 
dozens of grenades. [... ] The Japs became increasingly nervous and began 
showing terror. Many cried out and whimpered. The darkness around them was 
filled with screaming black men who were waiting with sharp matchets and 
bayonets. [... ] The Africans took a real and savage pleasure in their jitter-party, 
and when the time for the attack came, they were singing war-songs of their tribal 
territory. [... ] 
When the signal for attack was given, it went in with a rush, and the Nyasas 
swarmed on to the hills with matchets and grenades. [... ] The Japs who were alive 
had managed to scurry away through the thick jungle, leaving their fox-holes to the 
Africans, who shouted, "Sokolei! Sokolei! " which is the war-cry of the Nyasas 9 
This account, which emphasizes a primitive, tribal image of Malawians in 
warfare, clearly has much to do with the uses to which the military authorities 
believed the presence of African soldiers could be put. However, the general 
perception of Malawians as warriors was certainly supported by the genuine courage 
displayed by countless individual soldiers. Following the Ashanti expedition of 
1900, Sergeant Adada of 2 CAR and Corporal Chitenga of I CAR, who `went into 
the bush by himself and routed out two of the Ashanti who were in such a position 
that they could do considerable execution to the troops', 1° were both awarded the 
Medal for Distinguished Conduct in the Field (DCM) for gallantry. At least fifteen 
more Malawians received rewards of one or two pounds, another thirty-five were 
8 IWM, 79/21/1, "'A Story of the Gallant 22nd Battalion King's African Rifles", typescript extracts 
from K. H. Collen's letters from Burma, dated 16 July 1944 to 21 December 1944', 30 September 
1944. 
9 Hanley, Monsoon Victory, pp. 184-85. 
10 `Welcoming The Troops - Address to Capt. Cobbe. - Interesting Ceremony', Central African Times, 
26 January 1901, p. 7. 
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promoted for `gallantry in action and good service', whilst the whole of 2 CAR were 
commended `for their gallant conduct at the action of Ojesu on August 31. ' , On 17 
April 1903 at Gumburu in Somaliland, 124 Malawians from 2 KAR who were 
attacked by a force of over 10,000 Somalis `fell to a man at their post beside their 
officers'. Only 37 Malawians escaped, almost all of whom had been wounded, and 
Private Mandelumba was awarded the DCM.. A few days later at the battle of 
Daratolch, under attack from several hundred Somalis, Sergeant Nderemani and 
Corporal Surmoni remained behind to defend a wounded officer, and were also 
awarded the DCM. 12 
The World Wars saw Malawians rewarded for bravery on numerous occasions. 
Malawians seem to have received a disproportionate number of awards in 
comparison to other KAR soldiers. During the First World War, out of about 193 
KAR DCMs' 3 awarded, at least 113 went to soldiers in the Nyasaland battalions, 
whilst four soldiers received a second award. In the Second World War, only twelve 
DCMs were awarded to soldiers of the KAR, but eight of these went to Malawians. 
14 
At least a further thirty-five Malawians were awarded the East Africa Force Badge 
11 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 428, `Ashanti expedition. Awards and promotions', 25 January 
1901; Peter Charlton, `Bravery Awards to I&2 KAR', The Society of Malawi Journal, 49,3 (1996), 
15-23 (p. 16); `The 2nd Battalion Central Africa Regiment', The Times, Thursday, 18 October 1900, 
p. 4. 
12 'Somaliland', Life and Work in British Central Africa, No. 173, August 1903, p. 4; `Reverse in 
Somaliland', The Times, 24 April 1903, p. 5; British Central Africa Protectorate. Report for 1904-5, 
Cd. 2684-18; Moyse Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, pp. 178-79; Charlton, `Bravery Awards to I 
&2KAR', p. 16. 
1' Between 1903 and 1942, soldiers in the KAR received a special `KAR DCM' rather than the DCM 
awarded to European troops. 
14 Charlton, 'Bravery Awards to l&2 KAR', pp. 17-18. 
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for bravery in Abyssinia in 1941, whilst dozens of Malawians were awarded the 
Military Medal or `Mentioned in Despatches'. '5 
Many of the DCMs awarded during the First World War were for accumulated 
gallantry rather than particular acts of bravery. However, where records do provide 
accounts of specific acts, they give a vivid impression of the genuine courage of 
individual Malawians. In August 1917, `though wounded', Private Kalima of 2/2 
KAR `continued to fire his Machine Gun and helped to get it out of action until he 
dropped'. In September 1917, Corporal Namati of 2/2 KAR single-handedly 
dismantled and repaired two damaged Lewis Guns `under heavy Maxim and shell 
fire'. A young soldier named Lance-Corporal Matress Dinala `set an excellent 
example to his comrades [... ] by running up and down the firing line giving 
encouragements regardless of danger'. 16 On a similar occasion, Sergeant Siabu of 2 
KAR `Although twice wounded in action [... ] refused to leave the firing line but 
walked about encouraging and maintaining a firm hand on his men', whilst Moyse 
Bartlett records that Lance Corporal Sowera, already the holder of a DCM, `took 
command of a section that had become shaky after losing its N. C. O. and danced an 
ngoma up and down the firing line to hearten his men'. 17 Similar accounts from the 
Second World War include that of Corporal Rabson who single-handedly defended a 
road in Madagascar despite coming under fire from small arms and field guns for 
15 MNA, S 33/2/1/1, f. 112, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland, to Lord Moyne, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 28 May 1941; MNA, S 332/1/!, f. 148, D. M. Kennedy, Governor of 
Nyasaland, to Lord Moyne, Secretary of State for the Colonies, [December 1941? ]. 
t6 PRO, CO 534/27, if. 256-260, C-in-C, EAF to Secretary of State for the Colonies, GHQ EAF, 16 
August 1918. 
17 PRO, CO 534/27, f. 330, C-in-C EAF to Secretary of State for the Colonies, GHQ EAF, 1 October 
1918; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 392. 
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four and a half hours, and Corporal Enock Ngwani who risked his life in Burma in an 
attempt to retrieve the body of a dead officer. 18 
What inspired so many Malawians to carry out acts of heroism in the service of 
the British state? How far Malawian soldiers assimilated the view of themselves as 
members of warrior tribes or martial races, as projected by the military authorities, is 
questionable. There is little suggestion that Malawian soldiers viewed their use of 
the machete or panga with the same significance as did the military authorities. 
During the inter-war period, the panga was viewed primarily as a tool for clearing 
vegetation, and no training was given in its use as a weapon. An officer who served 
with 1 KAR in the 1930s believed that the Malawian soldiers' name for the panga, 
`pwetika', was `nothing but the Africanised pronunciation [sic] of the English word 
fatigue'. 19 Whilst it also seems plausible that this name was derived from Chinyanja 
`ku pweteka' (to hurt or be painful), 20 this belief at least casts doubt upon the place of 
the panga as the archetypal Malawian soldiers' weapon. At the same time, however, 
some Malawians seem to have identified a link between their role in modern and pre- 
colonial warfare. During his visit to Malawian soldiers in the Far East, NA Kawinga 
described the use of the `Sokole' war-cry in these terms: 
this word of SOKOLE commenced long long time ago by our parents when 
fighting the war [... ] whenever he happen to meet the enemies and before starting 
to fire, the first thing to do was to shout with the word of SOKOLE, and then, 
afterwards firing their guns, and that is, to make them puzzle so that they could not 
stand bravely against their enemies [... ] for this reason all the young men are 
taking an example of their parents what they were doing on the oldest days, and 
1 MNA, S 41/1/23/1/9, `Heroes from Nyasaland', by K. Gandar-Dower, Ministry of Information, 
EAC, 9 October 1942; PRO, WO 172/9477, War Diary of 1 KAR, 27 April 1945. 
19 IWM Sound Archive, 3939/03, Transcript of interview with Major H. F. Bingham OBE, 5 May 
1978, p. 13. 
20 David Clement Scott, Dictionary of the Nyanja Language: Being the Encylopcedic Dictionary of the 
Mang'anja Language, ed. by Alexander Hetherwick (London: United Society for Christian Literature, 
1929). 
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this is why the young men are no coward in fighting because fighting war started 
with their parents? ' 
There is evidence to suggest that some Malawian soldiers did come to see 
themselves as a military elite. Page records how a First World War marching song 
proclaimed that `The Nyasas are the Lions of the Europeans'. 22 Examples from the 
Second World War suggest that Malawians sometimes expressed a sense of 
superiority through disdain for the military value of other colonial soldiers in 
particular. A 2/2 KAR officer recalled a Malawian sentry refusing to salute 
Abyssinian Army officers on the grounds that they were `only' Ethiopians. 3 
Similarly, describing `the extraordinary sight [... ] of wounded Nyasalanders and 
Senegalese lying side by side in adjoining beds', Gandar Dower noted that the 
Malawians befriended the Senegalese out of `mutual respect' but would `refuse to lie 
in the next bed to a Malgache'. 24 
Such feelings were doubtless increased by the growing sense of being 
`Nyasas', which represented not just a change in attitude on the part of the military 
authorities, but also a genuine trend amongst Malawian soldiers. Service overseas 
naturally intensified a sense of attachment to home. Serving with 1 KAR in 
Somaliland in 1903, Lieutenant Barton recorded `Asking the Yaos the directions of 
various places, they in their turn asked the direction of Zomba. There is no doubt 
Z' MNA, S 4111/2315184A, `Native Authority Kawinga's Journey to Ceylon', NA Kawinga, 13 
December 1945. 
n Interview with Sydney Chituta Nkanda, quoted in Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 102. 23 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (36), f. 65, Memorandum by Major G. N. Burden [1980? ]. 
2' Kenneth Gandar Dower, Into Madagascar (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1943), p. 43. 
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they are all very home-sick'. 25 Later, in the First World War, soldiers' songs 
included such powerful sentiments as `When I die, bury me at Zomba', or in a 
variation of one of the most popular Malawian soldiers' laments, `On this journey, I 
did not know / That I would die in Kenya'. 26 A Second World War song included 
the simple lines `the country of Nyasaland [... ] wouldn't it be fine to be there'. 
27 
Joanna Bourke has emphasised the importance of attitudes towards the enemy 
as a motivation for soldiers in combat. 28 As noted in chapter two, some Malawian 
soldiers who joined the army in wartime undoubtedly did so in the belief that they 
were defending their homes against a real threat. Again, a First World War song 
celebrated victory over the Germans, `He has failed, the German has failed'. 
29 In 
1940 Malawians serving in Kenya made exaggerated claims of their achievements in 
their letters home, such as `I am in England fighting the Germans who are being 
greatly harassed by the British Empire', or `We have captured the King of the 
Genmans'. 30 Later in Burma, another Malawian soldier's song made the exaggerated 
claim that `The Japanese are running away because of the African'. 
31 In common 
with other allied troops, Malawians were encouraged to view the Japanese as absurd, 
and Ulemu, the newsletter for Chinyanja speaking troops in South East Asia 
u NAM, 7807-23, Diary of Lieutenant Charles W. Barton, 13 September 1903. 
26 Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 97-98. 
27 George Shepperson, They Went Singing: Songs of the King's African Rifles', in KAR: A History of 
the King's African Ries and East African Forces, by Malcolm Page (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1998), 
pp. 257-63 (p. 261). 
21 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare 
(London: Granta, 1999). 
29 Interview with Anusa Makumba, quoted in Page, The Chiwaya War, p. 101. 
20 S 33/2/1/I, f. 29, K. L. Hall, Acting Governor of Nyasaland, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
30 March 1940. 
31 Shepperson, 'They Went Singing', p. 261. 
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published the typical grotesque caricatures of bespectacled Japanese soldiers. 32 Such 
images seem to have had an effect upon some Malawians, and a Karonga District 
newsletter records how a soldier on leave, Sergeant Joseph Mhango `told us how the 
Japanese are being chased [and] made the people laugh a great deal by pulling back 
the corners of his eyebrows to make his eyes appear small'. 33 Some veterans still 
recall the Germans as particularly `bad' people, 34 but the extent to which Malawians 
genuinely believed in the value of the war against Japan seems more doubtful. One 
officer who served with Malawians in Burma recalled, `the Nyasas often told me that 
they should have been fighting their Portuguese neighbours - not the unknown 
Japanese'. 35 
How far Malawian soldiers in combat were inspired by loyalty to the British 
cause or to the monarch, as described by Omissi, is more questionable. Soldiers' 
songs with lines such as the First World War's `Nyasaland, sit down and play cards 
on account of the British' suggest that the military successes which Malawians 
celebrated were seen as `British' rather than just `Nyasa' victories. 36 Loyalty to the 
King in particular was emphasised not only in annual ceremonies such as the King's 
Birthday parade, but also in the oath of allegiance which soldiers took upon 
enlistment. 37 KAR officers certainly believed that references to the King would be 
sufficient to settle any dispute with the soldiers under their command; as Shepperson 
recalled, officers `always referred to Bwana King George [... ] he was very useful 
32 Ulemu: Mwezi Uli Wonse, 1, December 1944, p. 7. 
33 MNA, NNK 1/10/1, f. 192, `Karonga District. Newsletter for the week ending Saturday April 7th. ', 
Signed DC Karonga 10 April 1945. 
34 Interview with James Chigawa, 6 July 2000, Zomba. 
33 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (8), f. 25, Memorandum by Patrick William George Barnes [1980? ]. 
;6 Anthony Clayton, Communication for New Loyalties: African Soldiers' Songs (Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1978), p. 51 
37 King's African Rifles Ordinance 1911, in Ordinances of the Nyasaland Protectorate in Force on 
the 31st March, 1913 by Charles J. Griffin (London: Stevens and Sons, 1913), p. 144. 
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was Bwana King George'. 38 Whether this reflected a naive trust in the King's 
judgement, or a resigned acceptance that the King's will was absolute, cannot easily 
be distinguished, but it is notable that Malawian soldiers who met the King at the 
victory celebrations seem to have shown a genuine enthusiasm for the monarch: 
As soon as the King was sighted, an almost imperceptible sigh ran through the 
ranks, and one of the Nyasas was heard to murmur "There he is, he looks just like 
his pictures. " [... ] 
An hour later Their Majesties left the camp and as they passed the troops yelled 
and cheered, without encouragement. "Sokole, sokole" could be heard long after 
the cars had gone. The Askari had seen and talked with King George, and they 
were satisfied. 9 
It is important to recognise that whilst Malawians were singularly prominent as 
fighting men in the KAR, individual Malawians were as vulnerable to the traumatic 
effects of combat as were any other group exposed to the horrors of modern warfare. 
Page cites the experience of Fololiyane Longwe who recalled `War itself is bad [... ] 
Listen to the sound from exploding bombs and machine guns, smoke all over and the 
vegetation burnt and of course deforested. Look at your relatives getting killed, 
crying and finally dead, . 
40 Page also cites a song, `A beard has grown', mourning 
the negative impact of the conflict upon soldiers' characters, 41 whilst another First 
World War song `Balala' or `Scattered' mourns the incredible loss of life with the 
line `Germany has completely finished off our young men'. 42 A general rejection of 
the whole concept of war is also evident amongst veterans of the Second World 
39 Interview with Professor George Shepperson, Peterborough, March 2000. 
39 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) III, `Account of 22nd Bn. King's African Rifles (Nyasaland) in 
Action Burma (Khabaw Valley) 1944 by Donald Bowie (Intelligence Officer)' [ 1945], pp. 77-78. 
'° Interview with Fololiyane Longwe, 23 August 1973, quoted in Page, The Chiwaya War, pp. 100-01. 
41 Interview with Che Kalokwete Likwapi, 8 April 1973, quoted in Melvin E. Page, 'The Great War in 
Malawian Memory', The Centennial Review, 21 (1977), 321-32 (p. 329). 
42 Clayton, Communication for New Loyalties, p. 50. Clayton translates 'Balala' as `Helter Skelter'. 
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War. 43 In common with other soldiers, Malawians used humour to cope with some 
of the more hideous aspects of fighting; the commander of 22 KAR noted that `The 
askari are tickled to death by all the gruesome relics of the battlefield which surround 
us! [... ] There are still a good many dead lying about on the hills', 44 whilst another 
officer recalled that the Malawian Regimental Police had nicknamed a particular 
corpse the RSM's mbale or brother. 45 Such humour could not, of course, protect 
Malawians from the technology of warfare, which could have particularly 
devastating effects upon soldiers' morale. An officer who served with Malawians in 
22 KAR in Burma noted 
trigger happiness was an added danger and created additional tensions. It made the 
discipline of the men difficult to maintain. When we were later bombed by Jap 
planes, men were killed because they could [not] accept that they were safer in 
their slit trenches. In a wild panic, which was infectious, some Askari left out of 
their trenches and ran blindly into the falling bombs they thought they were 
escaping. 
On another occasion we had an African suddenly go berserk, rip off his clothes, 
and run naked straight into the attacking Japs only to be mown down and chopped 
to pieces 46 
Perhaps bearing in mind such incidents, some officers rejected the idea of Nyasas as 
a kind of expanded warrior tribe, as one recalled, `The Nyasas were jolly fellows and 
handy to live with in the jungle, but they were not battle mad at all'. 47 However, 
ultimately this admission could only serve to make the disproportionate service and 
heroism of Malawian soldiers all the more remarkable. 
43 Interviews with Seckson Philip Nkhoswe, Ella Noah, Henderson Simuja, Ordnance Zulani, Zomba, 
October 2000. 
44 IWM, 79/21/1, "`A Story of the Gallant 22nd Battalion King's African Rifles", typescript extracts 
from K. H. Collen's letters from Burma, dated 16 July 1944 to 21 December 1944', 13 August 1944. 
°S RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) 111, `Account of 22nd Bn. King's African Rifles (Nyasaland) in 
Action Burma (Khabaw Valley) 1944 by Donald Bowie (Intelligence Officer)' [1945], p. 8. 
46 RHL, MSS Afr. s. 1715 (24A) 111, `Account of 22nd Bn. King's African Rifles (Nyasaland) in 
Action Burma (Khabaw Valley) 1944 by Donald Bowie (Intelligence Officer)' [ 1945], p. 65. 
47 RHL, MSS Aft. s. 1715 (8), Memorandum by Patrick William George Barnes [1980? ], f. 18. 
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Malawian soldiers and Malawian civilians: The problem of internal security 
There is evidence to suggest that Malawian soldiers serving during the period 
of conquest often behaved with considerable and indiscriminate brutality towards the 
Malawian societies against which they were pitted by the colonial authorities. C. A. 
Cardew recalled that a group of Tonga irregulars which he sent against a raiding 
party `brought in severed legs and arms as evidence of their victory'. 49 Wordsworth 
Poole noted another incident involving an injured villager in 1895: 
The man got away into the bush but the blood-thirsty Atonga tracked him down & 
had got out their knives preparatory to cutting his throat and were very surprised 
when Coape Smith stopped them and made them carry the wounded man to a 
stream. The Atonga's great delight is polishing off a wounded man. 49 
Again, following another operation in 1895, Poole noted 
The Atonga, though clothed in khaki & carrying sniders [rifles] are still savages & 
brutal ones too, they cut the throat of a wounded man, they shoot women with their 
babies, they tossed a child on their bayonets. One little girl was bayoneted in 5 
places [... ] All these acts were visited with severe punishment. Yet if people knew 
of it at home there would be a great outcry5° 
As Wordsworth Poole's description suggests, Europeans serving with 
Malawian soldiers seem to have regarded such acts as an inevitable result of the 
employment of men only recently introduced to the norms of Western conflict. 
There were certainly many soldiers in the ranks of the BCA Rifles who had direct 
experience of pre-colonial warfare; indeed, as noted in Life and Work in 1901, `All 
of these men were two years ago raw untrained natives - not few of them at one time 
fought against the forces of the Administration'. 51 However, whilst the incidents 
described by Poole were not sanctioned by the authorities, the actions which 
48 C. A. Cardew, `Nyasaland in the Nineties', The Nyasaland Journal, 8,1(1955), 57-63 (p. 59). 
49 MNA, 13/WPO/l/l, ff. 63-64, Wordsworth Poole to his mother. Zomba, II September 1895 
so MNA, 13/WPO/I/1, if. 77-78, Wordsworth Poole to his mother. Zomba, 9 October 1895 
51 Life and Work in British Central Africa, 154, January-March 1901, p. 3. 
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Malawian soldiers were required to perform were often equally brutal in character. 
Poole outlined the methods employed by the administration to impose its will on 
chiefs who refused to pay their taxes: 
The usual proceeding, they say, we'll give you till such & such a day to bring in 
your taxes (3/- a hut paid in fowls, grain, mats, baskets, salt etc), & if they are not 
all in by then we'll burn your village. If a chief's village is burnt, & it makes a 
52 good bonfire, and his grain collared he is helpless and knuckles under at once. 
Some idea of the frequency of such action, and the routine with which it was 
regarded, is provided by Poole's brother Francis, an officer in the BCA Rifles who 
claimed to have `burnt many, many villages', 53 and noted in 1897 that `Every now & 
again I have to burn a village to hurry [the soldiers] up & show them I'm alive'. 54 As 
noted in chapter two, an important part of this process of destruction was the 
sanctioned looting of `fowls, ducks, pigeons and native food' by the soldiers. 55 
Malawian soldiers, many of whom had intimate experience of the impact of slave 
raiding, must have understood only too well the impact of the total destruction of a 
village's resources. As such, it would be unsurprising if many failed to accept the 
distinction between this and the physical ill treatment of non-combatants. An 
inherent element of violence towards civilians can thus be seen to have been 
embedded in Malawian military service from its inception, and derived not so much 
from an echo of pre-colonial practice as from the extreme dehumanising violence 
which was intrinsic to the process of conquest. 
52 MNA, 13/WPO/l/l, f 62-63, Wordsworth Poole to his mother, Zomba, 11 September 1895. 
33 MNA, 14/FGP/1/1, f. 13, Francis Garden Poole to his mother. Fort Lister, 27 September 1897. 
54 MNA, 14/FGP/1/l, f. 5, Francis Garden Poole to his Aunt Mary, Fort Mina, Lake Shirwa, 20 
August 1897. See Life and Work: Blantyre Mission Supplement, January 1892, p. 3; PRO, FO2/108, 
if. 196f, Captain Stewart to Acting Commissioner Sharpe, Zomba, 5 November 1896; MNA, KAR 
2/1/2, Captain H. E. J. Brake, OC Armed Forces BCA, to Commissioner BCA, Loangweni, 21 
January 1898. 
55 MNA, 13/WPO/5/1, Orders by Major C. A. Edwards Commanding the Armed Forces in the British 
Central Africa Protectorate, 1895. 
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Hut burning continued to be used as an expedient against hut tax defaulters, but 
with the end of the period of conquest such duties increasingly devolved upon the 
civil police. However, de Guingand describes how even in the mid-1920s the threat 
of hut burning by soldiers from 1 KAR was still used to cow NAs into compliance. 
After the soldiers had built a mock village, 
We told Chindi [the defaulting NA] that we would show him how the huts could be 
burnt up from where we stood. [... ] Chindi now saw a hail of bullets racing 
towards the huts, for the tracers showed up magnificently in the gloaming. Soon 
one or two of the huts began to smoke, and then the dry grass burst into flame. [... ] 
I looked round to see how all this was affecting Chindi's followers, who had turned 
up in their hundreds to see the fun. Their expressions were quite wonderful-from 
complete astonishment to very real fear. [... ] 
To close the display, the machine guns were stopped and a line of askari with rifle 
grenades lined up about 200 yards from the now burning targets, and then 
altogether let loose their missiles. [... ] 
Chindi returned to his hut that night a subdued and chastened man. The question of 
his dilatory behaviour regarding Hut Tax payments was never mentioned 
throughout our stay, but no doubt he fully appreciated the significance of our 
Visit 
56 
As Risto Marjomaa has suggested, such visible proof of the KAR's potency, not just 
over Malawian civilians, but even over the most senior Africans in Nyasaland, must 
have had a profound impact upon many Malawian soldiers. 57 
As outlined in chapter one, the KAR continued to be used as a sign of the 
power of the colonial state over Malawian civilians. The role of `flag marches' as a 
recruiting tool has been discussed in chapter two, but the concept of `showing the 
flag' was also intended to represent the potential military resources which could be 
called upon if necessary. 58 Finally, although this function had principally remained a 
56 De Guingand, African Assignment, pp. 62-64. 
57 Marjomaa, Risto, `The Martial Spirit: Nyasaland (Malawi) Soldiers in British Service during Peace, 
1895-1939', (unpublished paper presented at the Accra Workshop, Institute of African Studies, 
University of Ghana, 2000). 
58 MNA, NN 1/18/1, f. 17, Captain MacC. Wilkins, 2 KAR, to A. G. 0. Hodgson, PC Northern 
Province, Zomba, 25 May 1937 
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threat throughout the inter-war period, the State of Emergency of 1959-1960 again 
brought Malawian soldiers into direct contact with civilians (it should be recognised, 
however, that it was the presence of large numbers of white Rhodesian troops which 
caused most resentment amongst the Malawian population). Whilst flag marches 
increased in importance during the emergency, Malawian soldiers were inevitably 
involved in violent incidents. 59 On at least six occasions, Malawian KAR snipers 
shot dead those who had been identified as the ringleaders of violent crowds, and 
several Malawian civilians were wounded by KAR rifle fire in the same incidents. 60 
On 8 March a KAR soldier who was struck by a spear shot the perpetrator in the leg. 
On 10 March, in an action which resulted in the soldier's conviction for 
manslaughter, a Malawian soldier illegally shot dead a cyclist who was riding away 
from him after ignoring an order to stop. 61 The Commission of Inquiry recorded a 
similarly questionable event at Misuku a week later: 
A man ran out of a hut and ran towards a group of three askaris obviously without 
seeing them [... ] he was told to stop and he then at once turned round and ran 
away. The leading askari, according to the orders he had been given, called again 
three times and then fired and hit the man in the leg. The man got up and went on 
running, and with a wounded leg could then surely have been caught. But the 
62 askari fired again, hit him in the chest and he was killed 
Soldiers from 1 KAR were also involved in a number of incidents in Northern 
Rhodesia in 1961, where they opened fire upon crowds, killing several civilians. 63 
s' Colin Baker, State of Emergency: Crisis in Central Africa, Nyasaland 1959-1960, International 
Library of African Studies, 7 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), pp. 64-65. 
60 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, 1959, Cmnd. 
814, pp. 64,65,69,104,107,124; Baker, State of Emergency, p. 111. 
61 Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, p. 134. 
62 Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, p. 136. 
63 MNA, F 248/2075, Al, `Comds Diary - Op Doubloon I11', 1961. 
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Of course, there are few modem states which have not used their armed forces 
in internal security operations against their own people, and accounts of the violence 
give some idea of the pressure under which Malawian soldiers were placed: 
Hostile gathering shouted KWACHA and stones thrown. Crowd told to disperse. 
Crowd armed with spears, hatchets, matchets. Again ordered by DC to disperse. 
Four askari under Sgt protecting [right] flank and [transport] attacked by 50 who 
attempted to seize weapons. This party opened fire. Killed 1, wounded 5. Crowd 
still remained hostile [... ] 
Army [patrol] arrested 20 villagers who were caught burning [bridge] LUWINGU- 
KASAMA [road]. One askari badly slashed by pangs 6' 
It would be inappropriate to ask why Malawian soldiers in such circumstances were 
willing to take part in violence against their fellow Central Africans. However, it is 
important to acknowledge the general absence of evidence for any unwillingness to 
take part in such actions, despite the shared opposition of many soldiers to the 
Federal Government. Indeed, taking the colonial period as a whole, it could be 
argued that Malawian soldiers not only accepted but also often embraced violence 
against civilians as a privilege of military service. 
This can most clearly be seen in a series of officially unsanctioned violent 
encounters between soldiers and civilians throughout the colonial period. In the 
1890s, the behaviour of Malawian soldiers towards the civilian population can be 
seen as an extension of the looting and village burning which characterised official 
military operations during the period. Late in 1896, Lieutenant Gough complained 
that a party of his Tonga soldiers sent on a raid had started looting friendly Ngoni 
villages. Shortly afterwards, he noted that his men were `looting the people 
60 MNA, F248/2075, A I, 'Comdr Diary -Op Doubloon 111', 12,15 August 1961. 
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whenever I send them on messages'. 65 Early the following year, he found that some 
soldiers from Fort Johnston had taken part in a raid by a local chief on another chief 
who was actually under Gough's own protection at Dedza. The acquisition of 
women also seems to have been a feature of these incidents. 66 
If such violence in the 1890s can be seen as an imaginative extension of 
`legitimate' military activity, there are also suggestions that the experience of such 
military operations continued to inform soldiers' behaviour towards civilians after 
the period of conquest. The attack by hundreds of Malawian soldiers on the 
Mauritian villages of La Caverne and Vacoas in 1899, which has been addressed 
elsewhere in this work, could be interpreted in this light. Unlike earlier incidents in 
the 1890s, the raid was effectively a reprisal for racially motivated attacks against the 
Malawians, who were systematically mocked, insulted and laughed at by crowds of 
Mauritian civilians. As noted in chapter three, part of the abuse related to the men's 
appearance, but this appears to have been part of a broader and more sustained 
campaign. The Malawian soldiers seem to have been systematically `hooted at', 
jeered and greeted with cries of `Zulu' from their arrival in Mauritius 67 Within a 
few months, this had turned to physical violence. On 2 October, an Indian man was 
arrested for stoning two Malawian boy buglers. On 26 November, when Privates 
65 Ian F. W. Beckett, Johnnie Gough, V. C.: A Biography of Sir John Edmund Gough, V. C., K. C. B., 
C. M. G. (London: Tom Donovan, 1989), p. 22. 
66 Beckett, Johnnie Gough, p. 24. 
6' PRO, CO 167/724, Major H. E. J. Brake, OC 2 BCA Rifles to Major A. T. P. Hudson, DAAG 
Mauritius, 28 November 1899; PRO, CO 167/728, Captain P. A. Charier, 2 BCA Rifles, to Captain A. 
J. Gordon, Adjutant, 2 BCA Rifles, Phoenix Camp, Vacoas, 18 August 1899; PRO CO 167/728, 
Lieutenant J. Johnson Stewart, 2 BCA Rifles, to Captain A. J. Gordon, Adjutant, 2 BCA Rifles, 10 
December 1899; PRO, CO 167/728, Captain A. J. Gordon, Adjutant, 2 BCA Rifles, to Major H. E. 
Brake, OC 2 BCA Rifles, Phoenix Camp, 18 December 1899; PRO, CO 167/728, Garrison Orders: 
Head Quarters, Phoenix Camp: `Court of Enquiry', 13 December 1899; PRO, CO 167/728, 
Declaration by Boodhun to Sergeant A. Sarah, Mauritius Police, 3 December 1899. 
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Jumbe and Nyalapa were mocked for their bare feet and had their fezzes stolen, 
Jumbe recalled that the crowd of up to 60 Mauritians `set upon us and beat us. They 
used sticks stones and knives'. During this incident, Nyalapa was stabbed in the 
head, and Jumbe in the leg. 68 On 3 December, Malawian Sergeant Amani claimed 
that 
We met a very large crowd of creoles and as we went along these men attacked us 
with sticks there were so many of them that we did not try to defend ourselves but 
ran away and the creoles threw stones at us. I was hit by sticks and stones also. 
On the same day, Private Mangwana became involved in a disagreement with a local 
pimp who threatened him with a gun, and he also claimed he was forced to run away 
when he was attacked by `a great number of Creoles who were throwing stones'. 
Privates Bwanadogo, Galosi and Amasi were also attacked and, according to 
Bwanadogo, `all got our heads cut open'. 69 
In light of the catalogue of abuse which Malawian soldiers in Mauritius 
suffered, it is not difficult to appreciate their attack upon two local villages as a 
simple act of revenge. However, it should also be recognised that the raid itself had 
characteristics which echoed the Malawian experience of military service in the 
1890s. Besides the physical violence which was offered to the villagers, houses 
seem to have been ransacked just as huts were burned in Nyasaland. Sympathetic 
officers denied that any looting had taken place, but the Mauritius Police noted that 
`Several pieces of clothing and jewellery have been picked up in the road and cane 
" PRO, CO 167/724, `Evidence regarding the theft of Regimental Fezzes from No. 315 Private Jumbe 
and No. 275 Private Nyalapa 2B. C. A. Rifles at Vacoas on the 26th November 1899', Captain A. J. 
Gordon, Adjutant 2 BCA Rifles, 27 November 1899; PRO, CO 167/724, Major H. E Brake, OC 2 
BCA Rifles, to DAAG Mauritius, 28 November 1899. 
69 PRO, CO 167/728, Statement of Evidence, 4 December 1899. 
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field which must have been dropped by the soldiers of the African Rifles', 70 and 
villagers also stated that their goats and chickens had been slaughtered. 7' As noted in 
chapter four several women also claimed to have been raped by the soldiers, 
although only one soldier was found guilty, having been seen by an officer, leaving 
one woman's home `with his trowsers [sic] down'. 72 Given the similarity of the 
content of the attack to both official and unofficial violence in Nyasaland, the raid 
could be seen as an attempt to reclaim the prerogative of violence against civilians 
which operated so successfully in Nyasaland. 
Insofar as it derived from the abuse of Malawian soldiers by Mauritian 
civilians, the attack in Mauritius was unique. However, the willingness to commit 
acts of violence against civilians, which it represented, also continued to be evident 
in Nyasaland itself. The clearest example of this took place in October 1902 when 
large numbers of African civilians around Blantyre were impressed as carriers to 
assist in the urgent mobilisation of Malawian soldiers for service in Somaliland. 73 In 
what the Central African Times christened a `Reign of terror', 74 Malawian soldiers 
and Blantyre civil police were accused of committing a series of `[e]xcesses': 
Local police and soldiers (all called "Askari") were used to seize everyone at hand. 
The result was that on Sunday night pandemonium reigned at Blantyre, and the 
state of excitement into which the native population was thrown is only comparable 
to the old days when slave raiding and intertribal wars were the order of the day. 
This was not confined to Blantyre but all along the Zomba road and the Katunga 
70 PRO, CO 167/728, Report by Inspector A. Johnson, Mauritius Police, 16 December 1899. 
71 PRO, CO 167/724, Captain A. De Wilton, Inspector-General of Police, Mauritius, to Graham 
Bower, Colonial Secretary, Mauritius, I1 December 1899. 
72 PRO, CO 167/728, F. T. Piggott, Procureur General, Mauritius, to Sir Graham Bower, Colonial 
Secretary, Mauritius, 8 January 1900 `The African Regiment in Mauritius: Grave Misconduct', 
Central African Times, 7 April 1900, p. 3. 
73 See Sean Morrow, "`War Came from the Boma": Military and Police Disturbances in Blantyre, 
1902', The Society of Malawi Journal, 41,2 (1988), 16-29. 
74 `Reign of Terror - Under the British Government', Central African Times, I November 1902, p. 4. 
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road carriers were molested, and it is alleged women were assaulted, and that 
several have been carried off. 75 
As Sean Morrow has suggested, the interest of the white settler dominated Central 
African Times in the disturbances was largely a response to the indiscriminate 
character of the soldiers' press-ganging, which included many employees of the 
settler community. Nevertheless, the subsequent investigation by Judge Nunan 
seemed to reveal the extent of soldiers' violence against Malawian civilians. 
Nunan made efforts to distinguish between the actions of soldiers and civil 
police by asking Malawian witnesses to identify whether men had worn red fezzes 
(signifying the police) or black fezzes (signifying the KAR). Many witnesses giving 
evidence of the worst incidents identified civil policemen as the culprits, 76 including 
Magasi who was tied up by policemen, Mlekano who claimed to have been beaten 
and robbed of three shillings, Madambo who was also beaten and robbed of his hoe, 
and two `Anguru' women, Nsima and Salima who were raped. Both Madambo and 
Mlekano noted that soldiers from the KAR had simply passed along the road whilst 
they were attacked by policemen, but soldiers were identified as `carrying away' 
several children, and beating a man called Mtwane whilst he was carrying loads for 
them. Other civilians could not identify whether they had been attacked by soldiers 
or policemen; Tuwenaon recalled, 
she met many soldiers on the Katungas road [... ] four of the askari had, she stated, 
assaulted her [... ] witness was carrying nsima (porridge) and chimanga, and these 
things the askari took from her [... ] she was held by the soldiers, and violated. 
75 `The Week', Central African Times, I November 1902, p. 3. 
76 Morrow, "`War Came from the Boma"', p. 19. 
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Unidentified askari also robbed Ngamjo of twelve shillings and nine chickens, then 
raped her. 77 
Nunan's enquiry found the police rather than the army largely responsible for 
the worst excesses, although soldiers were found to have been responsible for two 
sexual assaults and some looting. 78 However, one European witness stated that he 
`thought that the natives believed that there was no difference between the Askari 
and the Police, he did not think they knew the difference, '79 and the evidence given 
by Malawian witnesses does suggest that few made any distinction between the army 
and the police. Chipole, seeing three soldiers `with black caps' coming to his village 
stated that he had believed `the war came from the Boma [government]'. 80 He was 
clearly not comforted by the fact that the men were soldiers rather than policemen. 
This lack of distinction had some validity, since the civil police were increasingly 
being drawn from the ranks of ex-soldiers and as such their behaviour, like that of 
the Malawian soldiers in Mauritius, must have drawn upon the paradigm provided by 
their experience of military service in the 1890s. 
The Central African Times regarded the 1902 disturbances as symptomatic of a 
much broader pattern of behaviour amongst Malawian soldiers. In the initial 
response, it was observed that 
[W]hat [the disturbances] mean anyone who is acquainted with Native Askari need 
not be told. They mean theft, they mean personal violence, they mean rape, and in 
77 `The Recent Disturbances - Official Enquiry Before Judge Nunan, Central African Times, 22 
November 1922, pp. 7-10. 
79 Supplement to Central African Times, 22 November 1922, p. 2; `British Central Africa', The Times, 
21 November 1902, p. 3. 
79 `Askari Troubles - Official Enquiry', Central African Times, 15 November 1902, p. 7. 80 'The Recent Disturbances - Official Enquiry Before Judge Nunan, Central African Times, 22 
November 1922, pp. 7-10. 
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extreme cases, murder [... ] When we train savages to murder, and war is simply 
organised murder, what else can we expect! 91 
This account is clearly reflective of the wider scepticism of the white settler 
community regarding the wisdom of arming Africans at all, and as such must be 
treated with caution. However, the genuine panic amongst Malawian civilians which 
seems to have accompanied the disturbances in 1902 does seem to reflect a more 
generalised fear of soldiers' continuing potential for violence. Writing in the 1970s, 
Kamuzu Banda recalled the extent of soldiers' and policemen's use of violence to 
extract goods and services from the civilian population: 
In my childhood, it was not uncommon for the helpless villagers of Kasungu, to see 
men in shorts, jerseys, and tassled fezzes on their heads, sporting guns on their left 
shoulders, [... ] strutting about the villages, terrorizing the people, demanding fowl, 
eggs, ufa (maize flour), beer and [... ] women. Because they were in the habit of 
demanding fowl, [... ] policemen were called Asilikari wa nkhuku, [chicken 
soldiers] as opposed to soldiers, who were called Asilikari wa nkhondo [war 
soldiers]. 2 
Whilst this also suggests that the civil police were mainly implicated in such activity, 
it is clear that soldiers were perceived to be equally culpable. Lewis Mataka 
Bandawe recalled that in the 1900s it was common for travellers in Palombe to be 
robbed by men `in soldiers' uniforms'. Bandawe described one incident in which a 
soldier stopped a party of men carrying dried fish: 
The soldier stopped them and threatened to shoot them if they dared disobey him. 
[... ] The man said quite proudly that he was a soldier from Fort Lister who was 
detailed to arrest all the people coming from the Lake carrying fish'. 8' 
As late as 1908, it was still felt necessary when soldiers were on the march in 
Nyasaland to issue an order that `Any man interfering with the Villagers, or their 
g' `Reign of Terror - Under the British Government', Central African Times, 1 November 1902, p. 4. 82 `A Message from Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu Banda His Excellency the Life President of Malawi', in C. 
Marlow, History of the Malawi Police (Zomba: Government Printer, 1971). 
83 Lewis Mataka Bandawe, Memoirs of a Malawian, ed. by B. Pachai (Blantyre: Christian Literature 
Association in Malawi, 1969), pp. 63-64. 
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property will be severely punished'. 84 Thereafter there is little documentary 
evidence of abuse of civilians by serving soldiers until the Second World War, 
although in 1924 Masale, a deserter from 2 KAR, dressed in his uniform and armed 
with a rifle stole money from numbers of Indian shopkeepers by saying he had been 
sent by the Government to collect their takings. 85 Reports in the Second World War 
strongly echoed patterns from earlier in the century. In 1942, a Political Intelligence 
Bulletin noted that `Truculence by soldiers in training when dealing with their 
civilian compatriots has been reported'. 86 Later, in 1943 another bulletin recorded 
Instances have been reported of Askari in leave being aggressive and complaints of 
assaults and extortion have been made. In one such instance an Askari was killed 
by the villagers. Six men were arrested and are awaitinj. trial by the High Court. 
In another, an Askari was sentenced to 12 months I. H. L. ' 
In addition to actual incidences of violence by soldiers, as in 1902 the presence of 
soldiers could still engender panic amongst the civilian population. In 1943, Military 
Police searching for deserters in Lilongwe sparked rumours that they had been sent 
to kill Africans in order to extract quinine from their brains, whilst women attending 
a display by the KAR manned Mobile Propaganda Unit were similarly overheard 
saying that `people were being urged to attend the show so that they could be 
killed'. 88 This represented a variation of the concept of chifia'amba, 89 or kidnapping 
to extract substances from the body, but it is noteworthy that soldiers themselves 
may have fostered such fears, since following these rumours a soldier named James 
8° KAR 3/1/4, `Company Orders by Capt. W. B. Brook, "C" Company 2/K. A. Rifles', 4 June 1908. 
gs C. Marlow, A History of the Malawi Police Force (Zomba: Government Printer, 1971), p. 14. 
66 MNA, S 34/1/4/1/7, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 5 of 1942,22 August 1942. 
7 Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 6 of 1943 [n. d. ]. 
B8 MNA, S 34/1/4/1/14, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 4 of 1943,12 August 1943. 
89 Rumours of chifwamba could have serious consequences: in August and September 1953 several 
weeks of rioting followed rumours that men stealing oranges in Cholo had been killed and eaten by 
white planters. See Robin Palmer, 'Working Conditions and Worker Responses on Nyasaland Tea 
Estates, 1930-1953', Journal of African History, 27 (1986), 105-126 (pp. 123-24). 
276 
was convicted of `spreading the rumour that "Askari" had been sent by the "Boma" 
to kill Africans to obtain their blood and flesh'. 90 
There were also suggestions that soldiers were using violence to subvert the 
racial hierarchy of colonial society. Mussa Ahmed, an Indian trader, complained to a 
relative: 
The attitude of Nyasaland natives towards members of the Indian Community here 
is getting worse by the day. Many incidents have taken place, such as - abusing 
our Indian brothers, storming in our Indians' stores and robbing goods from our 
Indian stores. But, worse than that, a few days ago a native `Askari' beat one of 
our Indians heavily somewhere near Palombe. A complaint was made and the said 
Askari was sentenced to one year's imprisonment 91 
This probably reflected long-standing resentment of Indian traders, 
92 but may have 
been reinforced by a perception amongst Malawian soldiers that the Indian 
community in Nyasaland had been able to avoid involvement in the war as `none of 
them have joined up'. In response to such concerns, the authorities rather 
unconvincingly explained that `the Indians in Nyasaland do not come from the 
military tribes, but that in India itself many thousands of them have joined the forces 
and have shown themselves to be excellent soldiers'. 
93 Later, antagonisms were 
intensified when Malawians serving in the Far-East were abused by Indian civilians, 
leading to episodes which closely resembled earlier events in Nyasaland. As 
Shepperson recalled, 
Africans would go into the towns, say Ranchi, and Indian barbers would refuse to 
cut their hair, just `Get out jungly wallahs, you're jungly wallahs'. [... ] We had a 
headquarter company clerk, a very nice chap [... ] his name was John Leyo [... ] 
John was one of nature's splendid men, pretty well educated, bright type, all the 
90 MNA, S 34/1/4/1/15, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 5 of 1943,12 October 1943. 
91 MNA, S 45/3/2/4/3/0, Mussa Ahmed, P. O. Box 19, Limbe, Nyasaland, to Hussen Ahmed, Kotda- 
Sangani, India, 18 November 1943. 
92 NAM, 6706-64-66, Force Order 511,9 December 1901; MNA, S 1/652/31/27b, Lieutenant Colonel 
H. B. Holt, OC SCC, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, Burao, 3 December 1931. 
93 MNA, S 34/1/4/1/12, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 2 of 1943,10 February 1943. 
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rest of it, got on extremely well with the European NCOs and the orderlies. He 
went to town and was told they wouldn't serve him. He went for some sweets. He 
just tore the store apart. He was reduced to the ranks 94 
Antagonism towards the Indian community may also have been fostered by 
resentment at the better conditions experienced by Indian soldiers in the Far-East, 95 
and of service in India, where Malawian soldiers' perceptions of the colonial order 
must have been challenged by the menial positions of Indians such as low-caste 
Untouchables. 96 However, what is most striking is that some Malawian soldiers 
clearly believed that their monopoly of violence even overrode elements of the 
established social order of the colony. 
At least one serious case of unsanctioned violence by Malawian soldiers took 
place in the post-war period. In 1953, following a beer drink between soldiers of 2 
KAR and Malawian employees of the Forestry Department, `a minor quarrel' broke 
out as a result of `over-familiarity on the part of one of the soldiers with a married 
women and an allegation that the beer was bad'. As a result, the soldiers later 
returned to the Forestry Quarters with a large number of their comrades `armed with 
bayonets and service matchets [sic]', and `proceeded to assault every civilian they 
could find'. The scene reported by a KAR officer bears comparison with 
Wordsworth Poole's descriptions of the period of conquest: 
He arrived in the middle of a sizeable riot and saw askari deliberately setting fire to 
huts. He managed to get three injured civilians into his truck and managed to 
rescue a small girl from being attacked by a soldier with a machet [sic] before he 
and his orderlies were themselves attacked by soldiers. [... ] he returned to the 
94 Interview with Professor George Shepperson, Peterborough, March 2000; see George Shepperson, 
`America through Africa and Asia', Journal ofAmerican Studies, 14,1 (1980), 45-65 (p. 51). 
95 IWM, 79/21/1, Scrapbook by Brigadier K. H. Collen, `Kabaw Valley July 1944-Jan. 1945' [n. d. ]. 
96 MNA, S 34/1/4/1/13, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 3 of 1943,17 June 1943. 
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scene of the riot to find that the soldiers had dispersed and that twenty-four houses 
comprising the Forestry Quarters were alight. 97 
Whilst this incident appears to be isolated, the attack upon employees of a 
Government department in their `Lines', combined with the subsequent assault upon 
a military officer, again suggests the extent to which unsanctioned violence seemed 
to subvert not only the law but also the colonial order. 
Whilst it is clear that early violence against civilians was closely related to the 
actual pattern of military activity in the period of conquest, this cannot fully explain 
the recurrence of such violence throughout most of the colonial period, even when 
Malawian soldiers were not actively engaged in duties which brought them into 
active contact with the wider population. Frantz Fanon has argued that 
In the colonial countries [... ] the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate 
presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and 
advise him by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge. [... ] the agents of 
government speak the language of pure force. [... ] [The soldier] is the bringer of 
violence into the home and into the mind of the native. 98 
Whilst it might be argued that this is not an accurate description of the overt role of 
Malawian soldiers throughout the colonial period, it is probable that soldiers' 
perception of their position was always informed by the knowledge that they were 
the ultimate sanction of state power. 
97 PRO, CO 968/315, `Disturbance in Zomba involving soldiers of the 2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion of 
the King's African Rifles', Governor of Nyasaland to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 August 
1953. 
9B Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington (London: Penguin, 1967), 
p. 29. 
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Malawian soldiers in colonial society 
Malawian soldiers did not simply act upon colonial society as an external 
force; as individuals, they also functioned within the societies from which they were 
recruited. As emphasised in chapter two, the prestige associated with service in the 
KAR provided an important inducement to enlistment. The keenness of soldiers and 
ex-soldiers to advertise their military credentials is suggestive of the value which was 
placed upon service in the army. Between 1950 and 1954, the District Commissioner 
in Liwonde alone received numerous requests from ex-soldiers for medals to which 
they believed they were entitled. 99 Some, such as Corporal Rashidi serving in the 
Tanganyika Police, may have sought medals because of their continuing service in 
uniformed organisations. 1°° Others seemingly wanted them for less tangible reasons, 
like James Tengenesha who complained that `When all my friends were called to the 
Boma to get the King's honour Mendle [sic] of war I also went there but the D. C. of 
my Boma did not know me'. 101 Many soldiers also seem to have joined the ex- 
servicemen's organisation, the British Empire Service League (BESL), with the aim 
of gaining visible evidence of their military service. In 1947, the DC of Mulanje 
wrote to the secretary of the BESL complaining; 
I am having an increasing number of queries from ex-Servicemen who state that 
they have paid their 51- subscription but as yet have received no badge or card. [... ] 
The fact that certain men have already received their badges is causing anxiety 
amongst those who have not received badges. 102 
Three years later, the DC of Mzimba recorded similar complaints by `numerous' ex- 
soldiers: 
99 MNA, NSL 1/8/1, District Commissioner, Liwonde District: Military: Medals: 1950 February-1954 
February. 
10° MNA, NSL 1/8/1, No. 8563 Corporal Rashidi, Police Training Depot, Dar-es-Salaam, to Senior 
Superintendent of Police, ilc Police Training Depot, Dar-es-Salaam, 22 February 1950. 
10' MNA, NSL 1/8/1, James Tengenesha of Mpemba's Village, Fort Roseberry, to DC Zomba, 28 
March 1950. 
102 MNA, NSM 1/4/2, DC Mlanje to Secretary, BESL, Limbe, 28 January 1947. 
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They were promised, so they say, that they would be issued "A medal" (button) for 
the 5/-, and ex-soldiers are repeatedly coming to see me to ask when they will 
receive these lapel-buttons. It is now more than four years since they paid their 
subscriptions and there is a general feeling among them that they have been 
defrauded, because they have not received these lapel-buttons. '°3 
The prestige ascribed to military service, which provided the impetus for this 
keenly felt desire to visually demonstrate their wartime experience, operated on a 
number of levels. From the earliest days of the colonial state, both the administration 
and elements of the European settler community had given soldiers and ex-soldiers 
privileged positions within colonial society. As seen in Chapter Three, at the turn of 
the century, as a response to the perceived difficulty of getting Malawian soldiers to 
`realize that an order given by any non-commissioned officer must be obeyed', 104 
officers had adopted a policy of appointing chiefs' sons as NCOs. 105 Whilst intended 
to perform a practical function within the military hierarchy, this must have 
engendered or strengthened a connection between soldiers and indigenous authority. 
From the late 1890s, when W. J. Livingstone was establishing new Nguru villages to 
provide labour on the Magomero Estate in the Shire Highlands, he followed a 
deliberate policy of employing Yao ex-soldiers as chiefs. 106 It is uncertain how far 
such a policy was followed on other estates, but it is clear that many Nguru 
immigrants settled under Yao chiefs. This, combined with the administration's 
preference for Yao soldiers, may in itself have further encouraged an identification 
between indigenous authority and military service in Southern Nyasaland. 
103 MNA, I DCMZ 3/4/1/8, DC Mzimba to PC Northern Province, 13 May 1950. 
104 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Report by Consul and Acting Commissioner Sharpe on the 
Trade and General Condition of the British Central Africa Protectorate from April 1,1896, to March 
31,1897, Cmd. 8438, p. 12. 
105 'The British Central Africa Protectorate', The Times, 15 August 1899, p. 13. 
106 Landeg White, Magomero: Portrait of an African Village (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), p. 90. 
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Individual soldiers were often important assets to the economies of their home 
villages, as providers of income for their extended families, as well as for the women 
who usually lived with them in the lines. As discussed in Chapter Two, soldiers' pay 
was generally superior to pay in Nyasaland although, except for higher ranks, it was 
generally inferior to that available in the mines of the Rhodesias and South Africa. 
Like mine workers, soldiers serving outside Nyasaland generally sent remittances to 
their wives or other relatives in their home villages. Whilst in Chapter Four, the 
importance of remittances to the soldiers themselves was emphasised, there is an 
equal volume of correspondence to suggest the extent to which many civilians were 
dependent upon the money sent home. 107 Soldiers serving outside Nyasaland also 
often deferred pay until their return, so that they returned home on leave or on 
discharge with lump sums. Unlike mineworkers, soldiers, who at different periods 
might be stationed in Somaliland or on a Tanganyikan outstation, had less 
opportunity to spend their pay than other migrant labourers, and therefore might 
bring back private savings in addition to their deferred pay. 108 Moreover, unless they 
deserted, which was unusual except amongst recruits, soldiers were also more likely 
to return to Nyasaland than other labour migrants, either when they were sent home 
on leave, or when the battalion returned home to Zomba. The value of soldiers' pay 
to their home communities was also enhanced by the half remission on hut tax to 
107 MNA, 1 DCZA 1/20/4, various correspondence. 
108 Phyllis Deane, Colonial Social Accounting, Economic and Social Studies 11 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1953), p. 313. 
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which serving soldiers were entitled after 1911, which was replaced by full 
exemption from the tax from 1933.109 
During periods such as the Second World War when large numbers of 
Malawians were serving in the armed forces, army pay clearly represented a large 
proportion of national income. Phyllis Deane estimated that in 1945, soldiers serving 
in Nyasaland earned about £206,400, whilst a further £431,100 in cash and goods 
was remitted back by soldiers serving overseas. This represented eleven percent of 
all income earned by Africans in Nyasaland during the year. ' "D However, even in 
peacetime, when the number of Malawians in military service might be less than two 
thousand, the importance of soldiers to local society was still enhanced by the 
concentration of recruitment in particular areas. Recruitment remained focused in 
the north and east of the Southern Province, even after the official abandonment of 
tribal recruitment criteria during the Second World War: in 1945 demobilization 
plans were complicated by the fact that approximately 8,000 soldiers (about one third 
of Malawians under arms) would be returning to the Zomba and Liwonde (Upper 
Shire) districts alone. " This concentration meant that military setbacks could have 
a devastating effect upon local communities. When a company of 2 KAR was wiped 
out at the battle of Gumburu in 1903, the missionary journal Life and Work in British 
Central Africa observed that `The killed are chiefly from the Blantyre, Zomba and 
Mianje districts. No less than 33 are from Chiradzulu alone. From one village 
109 The King's African Rifles Ordnance, Section 27 (8-9); MNA, S 1/240/34, f. 41, 'The Native Hut 
and Poll Tax Ordinance', Acting Chief Secretary Nyasaland, Zomba, 29 January 1937. 
110 Deane, Colonial Social Accounting, pp. 310,314,320. 
111 MNA, LB 8/2/1/138, DC Zomba to PC Southern Province, 18 September 1945. 
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fourteen have been killed - two of them brothers'. 112 Later, in September the 
following year, it noted `A touching incident' at Zomba in which 
An old woman had walked eighty miles to welcome back her six sons who were at 
the war. Standing amid the cheering crowds she saw the troops march past, and 
enquired after her boys. She then learned for the first time that they had all of them 
been killed. [... ] 
In many villages there has been heard the maliro or funeral lament accompanied by 
the beating of native drums. ' 13 
The economic despair in which the dependents of these soldiers were left provided a 
major motivation behind John Chilembwe's objections to Malawian military service 
in the early twentieth century. 
Ex-soldiers continued to play a distinctive economic role in their communities 
following their discharge from the army. As highlighted in Chapter Two, after 1933 
soldiers who served over nine years received a `bonus' of 150 shillings, rising to 200 
shillings after twelve years, when it was also supplemented by a long-service gratuity 
which could reach 900 shillings for a senior NCO. 114 At the end of the Second 
World War, soldiers received a War Gratuity which could amount in theory to 
between 248 and 426 shiiiings for a soldier who served for the duration, the Overseas 
Service Benefit of one day's pay for each month outside East Africa, a bonus of 56 
days' pay in lieu of leave, 56 days ration allowance, and 40 shillings clothing 
allowance. 115 Whilst most soldiers would not receive the maximum benefits, it is 
clear that in a country where wages for agricultural labour could still be as low as 15 
112 `Somaliland', Life and Work in British Central Africa, No. 173, August 1903, p. 4 113 Life and Work in British Central Africa, No. 186. September 1904, pp. 1,12. 
14 MNA, S 1/1709/23/64a, King's African Rifles (Amendment) Ordinance, 1932; MNA, LB 
8/2/1/144, `Long Service Gratuities', [n. d., 1945]. 
113 MNA, LB 8/2/1/111, `East Africa Command Release Instruction No. 16. Instructions for the 
Release of Africans', 12 June 1945, pp. 16-17. 
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shillings a month in the late 1940s, many ex-soldiers returned to their home 
communities as comparatively wealthy men. 116 
The colonial authorities worried that ex-soldiers squandered the lump sums 
which they received upon discharge. In 1932, the officer commanding the Southern 
Brigade complained that 
in the majority of cases, the men squander their gratuities immediately they receive 
them, they go to the bazaar and spend all their money on cheap German goods. A 
man was recently paid a gratuity of £9, the day after the payment was made, he was 
killed in a [sic] accident while riding his new bicycle, in endeavouring to make 
some provision for his widow it was brought to light that he had only six 
shillings. "' 
In fact, as McCracken has suggested, as a cheap means of transportation, the bicycle 
could play an important role in local societies; for example, in 1944 the North Nyasa 
District newsletter for the troops reported that Company Sergeant Major Jacob 
Mwakanema had bought `a new bicycle for his sons to use it when going to school at 
Mwenelondo', the newsletter recording with some pride that the model was a 
`Hercules'. 118 
Deane's economic survey of Nyasaland in the post-war period suggested that 
soldiers did spend their gratuities quickly, but that much was invested in traditionally 
economically or socially significant areas, particularly livestock, and luxury 
foodstuffs such as meat, fish, and African beer. 19 Similarly, Simon Chimwona, 
from Chitipa in the Northern Province recalled that many returned soldiers had 
116 John McCracken, `The Age of Development' (unpublished chapter, 2002), p. 28. 
17 MNA, S 1/1709/23/54, OC Southern Brigade KAR to Chief Secretary Tanganyika, 7 January 1932. 
118 McCracken, `The Age of Development', p. 28; MNA, NNK 1/10/1, f. 103, North Nyasa District 
Newsletter, April 1944. 
119 Deane, Colonial Social Accounting, p. 87. 
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bought cattle following the end of the First World War. 120 Perhaps influenced by the 
conditions which they had experienced in the army, returned soldiers built brick 
houses and locally-made furniture. Towards the end of the war, many serving 
soldiers had begun to construct houses ready for their return. Again in 1944, the 
North Nyasa District newsletter announced that WOPC Wilson Munthali had 
`arranged with his relatives that a big house should be built on his absence [sic]', 121 
whilst some soldiers even wrote to their District Commissioners asking them `to buy 
such things as an estate with a brick house on it, a store stocked with trade goods, 
and even a wife'. 122 Soldiers serving in the 1950s continued to ask DCs to help them 
to use their money to build new houses in their home villages. 123 Importantly, ex- 
soldiers invested money not only in their immediate families but also in the wider 
community. As early as 1904, soldiers returning from Somaliland invested some of 
their deferred pay in the Blantyre Mission's Church Fund, including one who 
donated the impressive sum of three pounds, eight shillings and six pence, 
considerably more than most labourers could earn in a year in Nyasaland . 
124 After 
the Second World War, Deane noted, returned soldiers `gave many gifts to relatives', 
but also threw parties for the wider community. 125 Serving soldiers also enjoyed 
demonstrating largesse, and a 1942 account recorded that Malawian soldiers 
travelling to Mombassa `had just received a welfare gift of tobacco and cigarettes 
120 F. S. Kalikene Chiwona, `The Impact of the First World War on Northern Chitipa' (Final Year 
History Seminar Paper, University of Malawi, 1972-1973), p. 7. 
121 MNA, NNK 1/10/1, f. 103, North Nyasa District Newsletter, April 1944. 
122 MNA, LB 8/2/1, Report by M. A. Whitechurch, DC Mlanje, I December 1945. 
'23 MNA, 1 DCZA 1/20/4/24, N. 52017 Private Stanley N. Matawele, Matawele Village, Ntondwe, to 
DC Zomba, 18 May 1955; MNA, I DCZA 1/20/4/79, EA. 3686 Lance Corporal Johasi Kimau, IIQ 
Company 2 KAR, Bulawayo, to DC Zomba, I February 1957. 
124 Life and Work in British Central Africa, No. 186. September 1904, p. 12. 
125 Deane, Colonial Social Accounting, p. 87. 
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from Nyasaland and every native they passed standing on the track or at stations was 
showered with cigarettes'. 126 
The material benefits which ex-soldiers brought back into their communities 
were not limited to the comparative financial and material wealth which a soldier 
might be able to accrue during his service. Malawians with a good record of military 
service often received preferential access to government positions. The most 
prominent of these was the police force, which had been separated from the army in 
1896, but which retained a visibly military character and continued to draw `a large 
proportion' of its numbers from ex-soldiers on the eve of the First World War. 127 
This association was formalised in 1920, when it was instructed that all police 
recruits should be ex-soldiers. McCracken notes that by the mid-1920s, ex-soldiers 
formed 91 per cent of the police force, although this had fallen to around 50 per cent 
by the eve of the Second World War as a result of changing policing requirements. 
However, the recruitment of ex-soldiers by the police was renewed in 1954 with the 
formation of the paramilitary Police Mobile Force, which was limited to men with at 
least five years' military service. 128 Numbers of ex-soldiers also found jobs in the 
police forces of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, as well as Tanganyika. 129 The 
prospect of service in the police force offered a range of benefits similar to those 
enjoyed by serving soldiers. However, as members of the police generally operated 
126 PRO, WO 169/7020, `The journey of 1/1 Bn. K. A. R. from Yatta to Mombasa by train and thence 
by ship to Madagascar and the reaction of the troops to their new experience' [June? 1942]. 
127 C. Marlow, A History of the Malawi Police Force (Zomba: Government Printer, 1971), p. 3; MNA, 
KAR 1/2/1, `Nyasaland Defence Scheme 1913'; University of Dundee Archives, MS 49/2/7 (268), 
photograph of police at Zomba, by Hugh Stannus Stannus, medical officer, ca. 1905. 
128 John McCracken, `Coercion and Control in Nyasaland: Aspects of the History of a Colonial Police 
Force' Journal of African History, 27 (1986), 127-47 (pp. 142-43); McCracken, 'Authority and 
Legitimacy', p. 175. 
129 `Newsletters', Journal of the King's African Rifles, 2,1 (1959), p. 7; Interview with Major Jonas 
Limbane, 19 February 1999. 
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independently, they also offered enhanced opportunities to abuse their authority, as 
suggested by Banda's recollections quoted above. 
Soldiers were also often preferred for other forms of uniformed employment, 
such as government messengers, or watchmen. 130 The association of military service 
with such employment was probably increased following the Second World War, 
when in response to the challenge of the demobilisation of thousands of soldiers, the 
government took active steps to encourage employers to take on ex-soldiers as 
watchmen. 131 As a further measure to assist the re-integration of ex-soldiers into 
society, in Zomba District a number of former non-commissioned officers were 
appointed as paid Councillors to Native Authorities. ' 32 
The increasing mechanisation of the army during the war also meant that many 
ex-soldiers entered civilian life with technical skills, and in the immediate post-war 
period government vacancies for artisans, medical staff, clerks, signallers and drivers 
were all offered to ex-soldiers in preference to those without military service. 
133 The 
number of men who actually benefited from such preferences was in fact limited, but 
the restriction of government vacancies to ex-soldiers can only have increased the 
association of military service with prestigious employment opportunities. 
'30 PRO, CO 534/56, f. 205, 'Report on K. A. R. Memorial Pensioner Home', by A. G. Bishop, 
Honorary Secretary, KAR Memorial Fund, 30 March 1925. 
"' MNA, LB 8/2/1/4, DC Dowa/Kasungu to PC Northern Province, Lilongwe, 31 October 1942; 
MNA, LB 8/2/1/64, Secretary, Native Tobacco Board, Limbe, to Labour Commissioner, Zomba, I 
July 1944. 
132 Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories: Part ll: Central Africa: 
Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia (London: HMSO, 1950), p. 52. 
133 MNA, LB 8/2/4/92, 'Post-War Training and Employment for African Ex-servicemen in 
Nyasaland'. 
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The skills which soldiers took with them into their own communities were not 
only practical, but also cultural. As suggested in chapter two, when the various 
military style dances (Beni, Malipenga and Mganda) were developing, soldiers may 
have been valued as experts on military drill movements. Ex-soldiers from 
Nyasaland were certainly prominent in Beni societies in the Southern Rhodesian 
mines in the period after the First World War, giving instruction in drill, and 
providing authentic military music. ' 34 Later, the army provided access to Western 
musical forms, so that soldiers such as Jack Banda of 13 KAR used their army pay to 
buy guitars which were even taken with them to Burma. 135 Malawian soldiers took 
their guitars back to Malawi, and soldiers such as Sergeants Theodore H: Mungwira 
and Kelvin Gwebe Nyrenda played the instrument at celebrations such as weddings 
and religious festivals. 136 This experience laid some of the foundations of modem 
Malawian music, broadening experience of musical forms, and inspiring the careers 
of some musicians such as Black Paseli. 
The rise of nationalist politics posed particular challenges to the position of 
Malawian soldiers in colonial society. On one hand, it is sometimes argued that the 
experience of African soldiers in the Second World War played a formative role in 
the development of nationalism and nationalist parties. ' 37 However, as in other 
colonial territories, serving soldiers were also involved in internal security operations 
against African nationalists, as has been shown above. 
134 Van Onselen, Chibaro, p. 200. 
135 Interview with Professor George Shepperson, Peterborough, March 2000. 
136 MNA, NNK 1/10/1, f. 19, North Nyasa District newsletter to the troops, August 1943; MNA, NNK 
1/10/1, f. 180, North Nyasa District newsletter for the troops, December 1944. 
"' John Lonsdale, `The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya', in 
Africa and the Second World War, ed. by David Killingray and Richard Rathbone (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1986) pp. 97-142 (pp. 128,130). 
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Wartime service certainly equipped many soldiers with both the motivation and 
the experience to challenge the colonial administration. In 1943, a `polititical 
intelligence bulletin' noted that many educated Malawians in particular were 
`speculating as to the extent of social advancement to which the African will attain 
after the war', and anticipating `that their social standard will be raised to a 
considerably higher level, that salaries will be higher, and that better prices will be 
paid for their produce'. The bulletin emphasized that `This feeling is fostered by 
African Troops returning from such places as Ceylon, where they had experienced 
social equality with Indian Troops'. 138 This was borne out when soldiers returned to 
Nyasaland at the end of the war. In November 1945 soldiers being lectured on the 
various possibilities for post-war employment complained angrily about the low 
wages paid in Nyasaland. One Malawian Sergeant who had served in South-East 
Asia made specific reference to his experience during the war, complaining that 
everywhere the troops had served, wages were higher than in Nyasaland. He 
continued, 
You say that we have done well in the war. We always hear this from Europeans, 
but when we return to our country you forget us and nothing is done for us. We 
come back to poverty. We soldiers have got used to a higher standard of living and 
we cannot be expected to be content with the wages Europeans pay us in 
Nyasaland. 139 
Former soldiers continued to use their wartime experience to good effect in their 
home communities. McCracken notes that when in 1953 an Agricultural Officer 
attempted to encourage people to construct bunds or ridges by claiming that the 
Garden of Eden had been turned to desert because of the lack of bunds, `An old 
138 NINA, S 34/1/4/1/13, Political Intelligence Bulletin No. 3 of 1943,17 June 1943. 
139 NINA, LB 8/2/1/163, `Lecture to the Troops at Ntondwe on Labour matters - 20th November 
1945', Labour Commissioner, Zomba, to Chief Secretary Nyasaland, 21 November 1945. 
290 
soldier got up & said [he] was talking balls; he'd been to Aden & they still had lots 
of people living there, with gardens too'. 140 
The extent to which African soldiers serving in the Indian Subcontinent were 
influenced by Indian Nationalism in particular is debateable. Malawian soldiers who 
encountered the hostility experienced by John Leyo may have felt little inclination to 
learn from Indian experience. 14 1 Nevertheless, wartime service certainly heightened 
many Malawian soldiers' awareness of issues which were central to African 
nationalism. Whilst many experienced racial prejudice at the hands of European 
soldiers, Malawians were also struck by the absence of formal racial segregation in 
the countries in which they served. In 1945, a Malawian soldier writing under the 
name of `St Boniface' wrote to the Askari journal, comparing conditions in 
Nyasaland unfavourably with those encountered elsewhere in the Empire: 
In Nyasaland there are stores run by Indians, Europeans and also Africans. Often 
we natives are allowed to purchase from the Indian and native stores; the European 
stores are not open to natives. This shows that the Europeans have no sympathy 
and are very rude as in these stores they chase a native out as though he were a 
dog. Is there a particular brand of money known as `African Currency'? Or as 
Nyasalanders Money? If this is not the case why is it that natives are not allowed 
in these stores? 
Many askari have saved a great deal of money to purchase what they desire. They 
have seen the customs of other countries and they wish to copy these after the war. 
If the Nyasaland Government makes such laws how can you expect the askari who 
have been told to save their money to trust you. As I see it there is no reason why 
the natives should be prevented from entering therein. Why is it that in other 
countries of the British Empire they do not have this kind of thing? 112 
140 RI-IL MSS Afr. V 123, Griff Jones, `Ulendo Diary', 2 August 1952, quoted in John McCracken, 
`Conservation and Resistance in Colonial Malawi: the "Dead North" Revisited', (unpublished paper 
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141 George Shepperson, `America through Africa and Asia', Journal ofAmerican Studies, 14, 
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102 MNA, S 4l/1/23/5/60A, Translation of letter from `St. Boniface' to the Editor of `Askari', [n. d., 
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The aspirations brought back to Nyasaland by soldiers were reinforced by a 
strong sense that, by serving the British state in the war, Malawian soldiers had 
earned a right to concessions; as `St Boniface' concluded, `You told us to join up and 
fight for "Freedom of Speech and from Want". We have fought. ' 143 The idea that 
the loyalty and sacrifices of Malawian soldiers had earned reciprocal consideration 
by the colonial authorities was not limited to soldiers themselves, but became a 
significant political tool. This use of the idea of military service had already been 
prefigured by John Chilembwe, whose final letter to the Nyasaland Times in 1915 
stated 
We have unreservedly stepped to the firing line in every conflict and played a 
patriot's part with the Spirit of true gallantry. But in time of peace the Government 
failed to help the underdog. In time of peace everything for Europeans only. And 
instead of honour we suffer humiliation and names contemptible. But in time of 
war it has been found that we are needed to share hardships and shed our blood in 
equality. It is true that we have no voice in this Government. 144 
Whilst Chilembwe fundamentally objected to the use of Malawian soldiers in 
imperial wars, post-war nationalists seem to have embraced Malawian military 
service as a useful paradigm of African responsibility. In 1951, a Nyasaland African 
Congress (NAC) memorandum arguing against federation with the Rhodesias made 
clear reference to the role played by Malawian soldiers: 
In regard to defence, is it not deplorable that the United Kingdom Government 
should so quickly forget the sacrifices the sons of Nyasaland made in the first wars 
and the TWO MAJOR WORLD WARS, in combating the King's enemy? Is it not 
embarrassing that the United Kingdom Government should give its moral support 
to the Federation issue on the ground of defence? Nyasaland Africans without 
143 MNA, S 41/1/23/5/60A, Translation of letter from `St. Boniface' to the Editor of `Askari', [n. d., 
1945]. 
144 John Chilembwe, `The Voice of African Natives in the Present War' [n. d., 1914], quoted in George 
Shepperson, and Thomas Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and 
Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1958), 
pp. 234-35. 
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Federation, have defended and are defending and will help in the defence of His 
Majesty's Empire. '45 
Such rhetoric was not confined to the NAC, but was also employed by more 
conservative opponents. In a meeting between Southern Province NAs and James 
Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary, NA Chikumbu argued against federation that 
We have already federated with King George. If anything should trouble the King 
and befall him let him know that every African in Nyasaland is his K. A. R., and 
because of this we say that we are in King George's hands and we are very proud 
indeed. 
NA Nsomba emphasised that `there have been many wars such as the Ashanti War, 
the Somaliland War, the 1914-18 War and the 1939-1945 War. We only fought in 
those wars because we wanted to be well looked after by Britain'. 146 The KAR had 
become, rather than the instrument of colonial oppression, a symbol of a functional 
display of loyalty for which the price was self-determination. 
With reference to West Africa, David Killingray has argued that most soldiers 
and ex-servicemen in the post-war period showed little interest in nationalist politics, 
and that where such interest existed it focused upon specifically economic rather than 
political grievances. 147 Closer to Malawi, Nicholas Westcolt has made a similar 
point in relation to Tanganyika, where, he argues, only the best educated soldiers 
who were already politically aware assimilated new ideas. 
149 In Nyasaland, whilst 
the army still needed well educated personnel for technical services, and continued to 
145 PRO, CO 1015/54/4, `Nyasaland African Congress: Memorandum on closer association in Central 
Africa to be presented on 28th August, 1951, at Lilongwe, Nyasaland on the behalf of the African 
people and chiefs of the Nyasaland Protectorate' [13 August 1951? ]. 
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members of the Southern Province African Provincial Council held in the Chiefs' Council Chamber 
on Thursday 30th August, 19S 1'. 
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value English language skills to a greater extent than before the war, many of the 
best educated soldiers left the army at the end of their wartime service, either to take 
up more lucrative civilian posts or because of the reduction in the size of the East 
African forces. '49 Nevertheless, whilst there is little evidence for the participation of 
serving soldiers in politics in the immediate post-war period, some ex-soldiers 
certainly became prominent in NAC conferences, although they seem to have used 
the occasion mainly as an opportunity to raise the economic grievances outlined 
above. 1 so 
Although Malawian soldiers showed little reluctance to align themselves with 
the colonial authorities in the 1959 emergency, at least some were already members 
of the NAC, Colour-Sergeant Samuel Kalima having joined in 1958 along with 
Sergeant James Nyau and Privates Jimu Musba and John Chande. 151 At the same 
time, troops stationed in Northern Rhodesia were being investigated for involvement 
with the African National Congress. Intelligence reports recorded telephone calls 
between William Chimwenya, an ex-soldier involved in the ANC, and Colour- 
Sergeant Harnecki Namakawa, Regimental Sergeant-Major Alfred, and a Corporal 
Munuwani, all stationed in Stephenson Barracks, Lusaka with 1 KAR. ' 52 Around the 
same time, the Northern Rhodesian `United National Independence Party' announced 
its desire to establish a branch in 1 KAR with the aim of obtaining weapons. The 
"' MNA, F 2482073, CAC/253/l/SEC/G(int), Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Hyde, OC I KAR, to 
Colonel R. F. B. Long, Southern Rhodesian Staff Corps, Defence HQ Salisbury, Zomba, 17 December 
1953. 
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151 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/I /NY/1/23B, Acting Sub-Superintendent, Special Branch, Nyasaland 
Police, to Captain M. M. Roach, Military Intelligence Officer, Nyasaland Area, Zomba, 26 February 
1960. 
152 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/I/NR/l, Report on telephone calls between William Chimwenya and 
Members of I KAR, by Captain D. K. Bales, Military Intelligence Officer, Northern Rhodesia, 24 
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fact that nationalists were also suspected of creating `several instances in the African 
township of deliberate provocation of askaris at the beerhall, with a view to causing 
an incident', suggests that Malawian soldiers were not largely involved in instigating 
contact, but the authorities, regarding Stephenson Barracks as `the most exposed to 
subversive influence in the Federation', were concerned enough to place a Special 
Branch Agent in 1 KAR. '53 
From the end of the emergency, the expression of nationalist sentiment by 
soldiers became increasingly overt. In late December, a KAR football team under 
Colour-Sergeant Samuel Kalima shouted the MCP slogan `Kwacha' as they entered 
Zomba barracks. '54 A similar incident happened after a football match in August 
1960 when Lance Corporal Allen shouted `Kwacha, Europeans Fuck off. In the 
same month it was reported that 
troops were being influenced in town by the MCP (the bar near the ENCOs Mess is 
known to be a hotbed) and troops shout KWACA when returning to the lines at 
night. They also sing MCP songs in the lines after beer drinks. '55 
`KWACA' was also found painted on KAR vehicles. Other soldiers expressed 
approval for the MCP in broad terms. Privates Austin and Chandemale sent letters 
home praising the MCP, and in September 1960 the KAR Guard at Government 
House presented arms to Dr Banda. 156 Despite the prohibition on membership of 
153 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/1/NR/l, Colonel C. M. Grigg, OC, Northern Rhodesia, to HQ CAC, 2 
September 1959; MNA, F 248/2075, MI/1/NR/1/2, Captain D. K. Bales, Military Intelligence Officer, 
Northern Rhodesia, to HQ CAC, 17 September 1959; 
'-"4 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/1/NY/1/23B, Acting Sub-Superintendent, Special Branch, Nyasaland 
Police, to Captain M. M. Roach, Military Intelligence Officer, Nyasaland Area, Zomba, 26 February 
1960. 
155 MNA, F 248/2075, MI/l/NY/l/23B, `Political Subversion in Military Unit', Captain M. M. Roach, 
Military Intelligence Officer, Nyasaland Area, to HQ CAC, 27 September 1960. 
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political parties, soldiers continued to join the MCP, and in August Sergeant-Major 
Kidney reported that `2 or 3 MCP cars visit the lines at night'. 157 
One of the most striking indications of the identification between the KAR and 
the MCP is provided in a complaint by Kidney, who claimed that the other members 
of the Sergeants' Mess accused him of being a `Capricorn' (a member the Capricorn 
Africa Society, a moderate organisation whose principles included inter-racial 
harmony, but which was regarded by Nationalists as a refuge of "`stooges" and "sell- 
outs"' by 1960), 158 and had beaten him up and threatened to break into his house and 
steal his kit. 159 The idea that the senior African members of the principal coercive 
arm of the colonial state could identify one of their own number as a collaborator 
illustrates clearly the extent to which the KAR was now perceived as a Malawian 
institution which was, as Andison Bed complained in 1963, being illegitimately 
controlled by `settlers and whites from Gatooma'. 160 
At the same time, there were signs that not all Malawian civilians regarded 
soldiers as being at the forefront of the Nationalist cause. In May 1960, a KAR 
veteran ex-Company Sergeant-Major Leonard Mtenje had his arm broken and rifle 
stolen by a gang claiming to be members of the Youth League of Malawi. 
161 In 
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1963, Simama Sumali, a seventy-five year old veteran of the Ashanti wars, was 
accused of striking a member of the Malawi Women's League who, he claimed, had 
called him `bad names, a Capricorn, and a stooge'. A local court had sentenced 
Simama Sumali to one year's Imprisonment with Hard Labour, for being `one who 
despised young girls of the Youth League, and he hit one'. 16' Nevertheless, the MCP 
made continued efforts to present a favourable image to soldiers and veterans, and 
when the Malawi News reported that the British Empire Service League was seeking 
encourage soldiers to support the United Federal Party in the 1961 elections, it 
emphasised that 
`We have all the assurance of ex-servicemen that they are solidly behind the 
leadership of Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda. ' Some ex-servicemen have decided 
to resign from the League because they say they did not expect the League to 
indulge into Politics at all. 
A meeting at Mitsidi in the Blantyre area organised by the League was a flop when 
after hearing the League officials ask them to vote for UFP ex-servicemen walked 
out. '63 
Finally, crucially Banda's regime continued to use the image of the army which had 
first been used by the NAC in the early 1950s, so that whilst the more explicitly 
colonial references were abandoned, Malawi's colonial soldiers continued to be 
projected as having performed an essentially patriotic service fighting for freedom 
during the two World Wars. By the 1970s, Malawi's Daily Times could record that 
Malawian soldiers who died in the First and Second World Wars had `lost their lives 
in a patriotic attempt to ensure peace, freedom and dignity'. 164 
162 `African War Veteran Wins Court Appeal', Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Newsletter, 22 
November 1963, p. 5. 
163 `Empire League is Supporting UFP', Malawi News, 22 June 1961, p. 1. 164 `Homage to Soldiers', Daily Times (Blantyre), II November 1974, p. 5. 
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Malawian colonial soldiers earned a justified reputation as soldiers, which 
became a source of pride, for the soldiers themselves, for their European officers, 
and for much of the wider colonial community. At the same time, their monopoly of 
violence within the colonial state meant that the arrival of soldiers continued to be a 
cause of fear for Malawian civilians throughout much of the colonial period. Some 
Malawian soldiers embraced the opportunity which this presented to abuse their 
authority, valuing the possibilities for looting or extortion, and all soldiers had to 
accept the possibility that they would be used in internal security operations against 
civilians. However, within their own communities, soldiers were in a position as 
providers, which was analogous to that of the labour migrant, but simultaneously 
enjoyed the advantages of often being stationed close to their homes, and of the 
occasional favour of the state. Ultimately, the tensions inherent in the dual roles of 
symbol of Malawian heroism and tool of colonial oppression were dissipated by the 
nationalist regime's cooption of the KAR's heritage. 
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Conclusion 
Given their prominence as a military reserve for Africa, and subsequently for 
the Empire, Malawian soldiers could be regarded as the premier martial group in 
colonial East Africa. This prominence arose through a combination of the pressure 
placed upon the British and Indian armies by Imperial commitments in the late 
nineteenth century, and the early completion of the process of conquest in 
Nyasaland, which saw 2 CAR established as a notable exception to the exclusion of 
African soldiers from an overtly Imperial role. Whilst this experiment failed, the 
existence of a battalion of Malawian soldiers who were not required for the 
maintenance of the colonial state within Nyasaland was a crucial factor in their 
establishment as a military reserve for East Africa. As such, Malawian soldiers had a 
unique role amongst the colonial armed forces, but as a prominent body of colonial 
soldiers they also provide a useful paradigm of colonial military service in Africa. 
Malawian soldiers often engaged in the army for unusually long periods of 
service - in the mid-1930s the average period of engagement was ten years - and 
frequently continued to work within the military environment as servants, 
messengers or other auxiliaries following their discharge or even between periods of 
enlistment. This long service was probably derived from the high proportion of 
soldiers recruited from the area around the Zomba depot, which allowed many 
soldiers to remain in contact with their home communities without disrupting their 
employment, since in peacetime they could expect to spend up to half of their service 
stationed in Zomba. This stood in contrast to Malawian labour migration to the 
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south, which often saw Malawians divorced from Nyasaland as `Machona'. This 
concentration of enlistment in the south was also enhanced by colonial recruitment 
policies, which up to the 1930s continued to focus northern recruitment upon the 
Tonga, despite the increasing engagement of Tongas in the economy of labour 
migration, and the relatively small size of the Tonga population. The concentration 
of enlistment amongst southern Malawians demonstrates a radically different pattern 
from other long-service groups within the KAR, whose long service derived from 
their complete alienation from their place of origin. 
The unusually long periods of engagement undertaken by Malawian soldiers 
meant that military service was not a transitory experience, but for many peacetime 
soldiers represented the greater part of their adult lives. Soldiers engaged in the army 
principally for the material reasons which motivated enlistment throughout East 
Africa, but these motivations were underpinned by the prestige enjoyed by soldiers in 
colonial society. However, once in the army, it could be argued that because of their 
long careers, many Malawian soldiers were more likely to become completely 
assimilated into military culture. However, what this process meant for Malawians is 
by no means straightforward. Whilst the draconian nature of disciplinary methods in 
the colonial army, including flogging, should not be underestimated, the reaction of 
Malawians to much of the array of disciplinary techniques employed was surprising. 
Close order drill, regarded as one of the most onerous features of military life in the 
metropolitan forces, was sometimes valued by Malawians, particularly because of its 
association with the popular and increasingly culturally important Malipenga, Beni 
and Mganda dances which grew up after the First World War. Whilst soldiers who 
300 
enlisted during the First World War felt cheated by the use of colourful uniforms, 
military music and ceremonial in recruiting campaigns, Malawians who joined the 
army in peacetime could expect to experience such attractions in the army. Thus, 
whilst the army sought to co-opt indigenous culture through their emphasis on tribal 
identities and upon `traditional' activities such as ngoma, Malawian soldiers 
simultaneously ascribed new meanings to aspects of military culture. 
The `Malawianisation' of internal military culture fed into a broader process of 
the acceptance of the idea of the modern soldier in colonial society. The 
indigenisation of the army was problematic in the colonial state, since the military 
had played the central role in the violent imposition of colonial rule, and remained its 
ultimate guarantor. Moreover, it is important to recognise that, whilst Malawian 
soldiers showed little enthusiasm for warfare in itself, their monopoly of violence 
was sometimes valued by soldiers for the power and prestige which it implied in 
wider colonial society. As such, Malawian civilians often justifiably feared the 
presence of soldiers. However, Malawian soldiers also remained an integral part of 
their own home communities, and the concentration of recruitment in the area around 
the KAR's Zomba depot meant that Malawian soldiers were not overwhelmingly 
isolated from those communities. In this respect Malawian soldiers were in a 
different position from many African colonial soldiers who were separated from their 
agrarian origins. 
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Timothy Parsons' sensitive study of colonial soldiers in East Africa is underlain 
by a fundamental reluctance to engage with the idea that colonial soldiers harboured 
any real enthusiasm for their role. His observation that `Many East African veterans 
admit to volunteering for the colonial military" realistically reflects the concerns of 
the 1990s, but betrays an ahistorical need to justify an action which may have 
seemed politically unproblematic in the 1930s. As a corollary of this approach, 
Parsons works steadily towards an account of military service which is dependent 
upon privileging dissent and resistance as defining features. In seeking to highlight 
the ways in which Malawians soldiers were successfully co-opted by the army, and 
the ways in which they were able to adapt military culture themselves, this work is 
not intended to diminish the importance of protest and resistance as signifiers of 
tensions within military society. Rather, dissent amongst Malawian soldiers was 
most often a reflection of a belief that a `contract' between the Government and the 
soldier had not been fulfilled, or a reflection of a desire for fuller inclusion in the 
military system, rather than a rejection of the military authorities. Later, political 
agitation in the 1960s was largely focused upon the Federation, or by extension upon 
Rhodesian officers, rather than upon the white authorities as a whole, and it is 
notable that the mutinies which occurred in Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda after 
independence were not repeated in Malawi. 2 In this regard this work seeks to strike a 
balance which is closer to the perspective of Omissi, who acknowledges the 
importance of dissent in the Indian Army, but also emphasises the stability of the 
Indian Army between 1857 and independence. 
' Parsons, The African Rank and File, p. 81. 
Z See Tanzania People's Defence Forces, Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny: January 1964 (Dar es Salaam: 
Dar es Salaam University Press, 1993). 
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The colonial army was ultimately an alien institution, initiated by the Imperial 
authorities to maintain Imperial interests. As such, Malawian soldiers could be 
viewed as collaborators. However, there is little to suggest that Malawian soldiers 
viewed themselves in this light for most of the colonial period; indeed, in some ways 
military service provided a unique forum in which Malawian identity could be 
constituted. The shift from tribal identities towards a broader `Nyasa' identity, 
which was particularly apparent during the Second World War, emphasised the 
territorial bond between Malawian soldiers. This trend was enhanced by the use of 
Chinyanja as an official language by Malawian soldiers, which may also have made 
this effect stronger for them than for other East African soldiers, who were more 
likely to serve in mixed units. Whilst Malawian labour migrants in the south also 
experienced this phenomenon, it must have been enhanced by the grouping together 
of soldiers in separate units bearing the `Nyasaland' title. 
Finally, to an extent, the increasing emphasis upon `Nyasa' identity also 
implied the transference of the specific martial reputations of identities such as the 
Yao, Tonga and Ngoni onto Malawian soldiers as a whole. This reputation, 
combined with the very real role performed by Malawian soldiers allowed military 
service to become a paradigm of broader Malawian capabilities and responsibility. 
This paradigm in turn was co-opted by the nationalist movement from the 1950s as a 
signifier of what Malawians had done for the Empire, and by implication of what the 
metropolitan authorities owed to Malawians in return. This process helped to 
indigenise the image of the army at a time when the crisis over the Federation might 
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have alienated it from Malawian society, so that by 1964 the army was largely 
regarded as a Malawian institution simply awaiting Malawian control. 
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Appendix 
Interviews 
The majority of interviews used in this study were conducted on the author's 
behalf by Lieutenant Andrew Peter Kaziputa. Lieutenant Kaziputa carried out the 
interviews with Malawian ex-soldiers living in the Zomba memorial home in 
October 2002, using questionnaires. The questions asked were as follows: 
Personal and Service details 
1. Soldier's Name 
2. Soldier's number 
3. Birthplace 
4. Tribe 
S. Dates of service in the army 
6. Regiment or Corps 
7. Places where the soldier served 
8. Were any other members of his family in the army? 
Enlistment and training 
9. Why did he join the army? 
10. Where did he do his training? What Happened during training? 
Military Life 
11. What did he like about life in the army? 
12. What did he not like about life in the army? 
13. What did he think about the European Officers and NCO's? 
Discipline 
14. What kinds of punishments does he remember being used in the army? 
15. What did he think about the discipline and punishment in the army? 
Home life 
16. What did he think about the food and housing in the army? 
17. What did he think about army pay and conditions? 
18. Was he married when he was a soldier? If he was married, did his wife live with 
him in barracks? 
After service 
19. What did he do after he left the Army? Did being a soldier help him to get other 
work? 
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